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Abstract 
The research conducted is in the field of innovation and focuses on the UK energy sector. 
The key theme of the study is the transition towards a hydrogen economy with fuel cell 
technologies at the epicentre and takes into account the relevant scientific, technological, 
economic and policy issues. In order to provide an understanding of the factors that affect 
techno-economic transitions to alternative energy systems, the thesis investigates the 
historical transition processes such as the transition to electrification in the early 1900s 
and recent transitions to CCGT and renewable energy systems (wind, biofuels and solar) 
that have taken place since the late 1980s.  
 
As the developmental status of hydrogen technologies lay at the heart of these transitions, 
a thorough analysis of the hydrogen and fuel cell technologies, the R&D requirements, 
and innovations required in different scientific fields (including materials science) to 
develop these technologies is conducted. At the same time, as other factors such as 
sustainability, climate change and security of supply concerns can greatly affect the 
direction of the transition processes, that includes R&D activities and investment in 
alternative energy technologies, an overview of these factors is also provided. 
 
The analysis employs a new theoretical framework that combines two well established 
theories in the literature, Techno-economic Transitions and Large Technological 
Systems. By using this new framework, the technological transition towards a hydrogen 
energy system can be analysed at three levels, (global, national and local). The analysis is 
narrowed down to the local level in order to determine the timing of a transition in 
London and how it can form the foundation for a wider a transition at the national level 
based on alternative technologies.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The energy sector has gone through a number of transformations in the past century. 
Starting with the establishment and rapid diffusion of electrification, internal combustion 
engine and the fast learning achieved in the exploitation and development of fossil fuels, 
the industry has grown and become the backbone of all economic activity. While the first 
three quarters of the 20th century focused on the establishment and growth of this sector 
to meet increasing demand, problems of different nature emerged in the final quarter.  
 
The two major oil crises experienced in the 1970s and the emergence of an awareness of 
environmental problems acted as the catalysts for the major changes in this sector. 
Firstly, the most important effect of the oil crises was that it created a realisation that an 
economy based on finite fossil fuels was not tenable over the long term and consumption 
patterns would create even bigger problems for future generations. These developments 
had a dramatic impact on both the environment and energy fronts.  
 
The concerns regarding the potential side effects of techno-economic development on the 
environment which emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s opened the way for discussions 
to consider ways to integrate the environment into the techno-economic development 
agenda. The discussion on economic development and the environment continued for 
almost two decades and ended with the establishment of the concept of sustainable 
development. It was suggested that economic, environmental, social and technological 
development were interlinked and that countries would have to take these pillars into 
consideration shaping their future techno-economic development. The other consequence 
of the emergence of the environment as an issue was its impact on the climate change 
policy agenda. As the awareness on the side effects of economic development were 
realised, the search was broadened to understand more about the linkages between human 
activities and different components of the environment. The World Climate Programme 
 24 
Conference at Villach, Austria (1985) was a watershed for the issue of climate change, 
where a scientific consensus on the link between increasing CO2 concentrations and 
global warming emerged
1
. Research eventually confirmed the link between economic 
activity, greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, and the issue of climate change 
gained political prominence with the help of international institutions. Following more 
than a decade of research and negotiations the Kyoto Protocol finally came into force. 
This was where countries agreed to cut their emissions under a legally binding 
agreement.  
 
While these developments were taking place in the environmental arena, the oil crises 
exposed the vulnerability of countries to the ‘exploits’ of the exporting countries. It 
rapidly dawned on the importing countries that they would need to reduce their reliance 
on oil in their energy mix and develop indigenous resources to ensure security of supply. 
On the one hand, governments quickly increased their search for new oil resources, 
whilst on the other, they shifted to sources such as coal and nuclear to at least reduce the 
dependence in the power and heat sectors. The outcome was positive in terms of the 
world energy supply increased and oil prices declined.   
 
In this new environment of excess supply and low oil prices, state control was no longer 
necessary. In fact, most of the developed nations started to introduce privatisation and 
competition which was expected to not only reduce costs but also improve productivity. 
With the involvement of the private sector the new priority shifted to the maximisation of 
profits. However, following the oil crises, demand for oil had fallen and because of 
positive outcomes from exploration activities outside the OPEC region, demand for oil 
from OPEC decreased. Under these circumstances, OPEC increased the supply in order 
to eliminate surplus capacity and increase the demand for oil. The combination of excess 
supply, the decline in demand and an increase in supply from outside the OPEC region 
forced OPEC to reduce the price of oil. In the mid-1980s oil prices collapsed and the 
private sector strategy shifted away from investment to asset sweating to increase 
profitability.  
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The situation was similar in the power industry where previous investment in capital 
stock and surplus capacity implied that large subsidies to ensure supply was no longer a 
prerequisite and therefore the new priority was the lowering of prices. In the early 1990s, 
governments started to implement legislation to liberalise the markets. However, because 
of excess supply and low energy prices, the private sector focused on minimising  costs 
and this  had two major effects. It deterred investment in coal and nuclear based power 
and created the need to find new ways to generate electricity more cost-effectively. 
Natural gas became the preferred option with the development of new reserves and the 
emergence of combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) stations. The flexible design and high 
efficiency provided opportunities to reduce construction and fuel costs. This led to a shift 
away from nuclear and coal to natural gas for power generation. Natural gas was also 
preferable for  reasons to do with climate change that started to become much more 
intense towards the end of the 20
th
 century.  
 
While excess capacity, declining fuel prices and market liberalisation allowed 
governments to withdraw from the fossil fuel sector, the increasing climate change 
pressures forced countries to reallocate resources to R&D activities and the deployment 
of less-carbon intensive fuels and technologies. These changes saw the emergence of 
renewable energy technologies, especially wind.   
 
However, the lack of investment in new generation capacity (except for CCGT and 
renewables) when combined with increasing demand created security of supply concerns. 
This coincided with declines in the supply of non-OPEC oil and gas (North Sea). The 
situation was exacerbated by some unforeseen incidents such as hurricanes in America 
(2004-2006), leakages the pipelines (BP 2005, Shell 2006) and by the new political 
disputes between Russia and its neighbours which led to cuts in the supply of gas in 
2006-2008. As expected, the growth in demand, the lack of spare capacity accompanied 
with these interruptions to supply lead to much greater volatility in the price of oil. The 
security of supply issue re-emerged on the policy agenda once again. 
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As mentioned earlier, in the late 1990s and early 2000s climate change started to take on 
a much greater political prominence and by the turn of the century the pressures 
stemming from it became much more intense. As a result, both the security of supply 
concerns and climate change issues created the necessity to switch away from oil to 
indigenous (and green) sources and technologies.  
 
The emergence of all these issues over the last few decades have created windows of 
opportunities for the development of alternative technologies including; energy efficient 
technologies such as the new versions of combined heat power and generation (CHP), 
renewables, carbon capture and sequestration technologies and the hydrogen economy. 
The popularity of hydrogen and fuel cells was due to the fact that these technologies 
could be applied to all subsectors of the energy industry including transport, heat and 
power sectors. They have lower emissions as hydrogen releases no CO2 emissions when 
combusted. At the same time, because hydrogen can be generated from all types of 
natural resources; fossil fuels, renewable energy sources as well as water, it created an 
opportunity to diversify the energy mix that had become an imperative because of the 
concerns about the security of supply. Finally, it also promised solutions to the problems 
experienced with the renewables; integrating renewables with hydrogen and fuel cells 
could act as a means to store electricity and enable non-intermittent supply to the grid. 
Although the high costs of hydrogen and fuel cells created barriers to their deployment, 
the expectation was that R&D efforts would reduce costs, and the high efficiency of fuel 
cells and the potential to reduce GHG emissions these costs would be offset compensate 
with high energy prices. In other words, hydrogen and fuel cells promised increasing 
returns to adoption. 
 
These favourable price conditions have changed following the economic recession and 
the collapse in the price of oil in 2008. In this new environment, costs have become the 
key priority. In addition, the security of supply concerns have become more urgent as a 
result of the previous under-investment in new generating capacity and the likelihood is 
this will create a major supply vacuum in the late 2010s. However as hydrogen and fuel 
cell are still at the demonstration stage they cannot provide timely solutions to these gaps 
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in supply. Therefore these unforeseen circumstances have created the necessity for more 
immediate solutions that has created a shift in focus towards other alternatives that are 
more cost effective and closer to commercialisation. The changes to these external factors 
have stimulated competition between the hydrogen and fuel cells and other alternative 
technologies. This competition is very important where the transition to the hydrogen 
economy is concerned. Depending on future developments, it can result in favour of the 
alternative technologies and create an early lock-in that can constrain the transition to the 
hydrogen economy. On the other hand, because of synergies between hydrogen and other 
alternatives such as renewables and/or CCS technologies, they can compliment the 
development of hydrogen and fuel cells and lead to their adoption. 
 
Thus an understanding of transition to hydrogen economy requires an analysis on the 
external factors that affect the choices of decision-makers in the energy sector, the 
interactions between different subsystems of the energy industry and hydrogen economy 
as well as the relation between the hydrogen and fuel cell technologies and the alternative 
energy options.  
 
1.1. Objectives of the Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse factors that might create a shift away from carbon 
based economy to hydrogen economy. However, the transition in the current context is 
complex. The first reason behind this complexity is the vast size of the energy sector. It is 
a wide industry that encompasses number of subsectors including power, heat and 
transport and involves a large number of actors, ranging from politicians, to scientists and 
to economists with different agendas and expectations. At the same time this industry is 
made up of natural resources and immeasurable number of technologies that are 
interlinked. The second reason is that all these components are affected by changes in 
each one of them, the decisions of the actors involved and wider socio-economic issues 
such as international relations, international and national policies, changes in the 
economic environment, developments in the environment and climate change agendas as 
well as the energy market. Thirdly, similar to the energy sector, the hydrogen economy 
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has its own subsystems, components, technologies and actors that interact and are 
affected by the wider socio-economic developments. Finally, this transition becomes 
more complicated due to the number of ways the hydrogen economy and the energy 
sector are interlinked.  
 
Therefore, the first objective of this thesis is to create a new tool that will disaggregate all 
these interactions/problems into different levels and help analyse the issues at each level. 
For this purpose the niche-based multi-level perspective (MLP) is used. The MLP 
distinguishes three levels: (i) a micro-level of technological niches, which are ‘protected’ 
spaces where actors are involved in learning processes about radically new technologies 
such as hydrogen and fuel cells; (ii) a meso-level of socio-technical regimes, accounting 
for stability of established socio-technical systems; (iii) a macro-level of socio-technical 
landscapes which consists of a range of contextual factors influencing technological 
development (e.g. climate change, security of supply concerns and economic downturn)
2
. 
Although this framework is very useful to help structure the issues, it does not allow a 
detailed analysis on either the different components of the energy sector and hydrogen 
economy or the interactions that take place between these components. Therefore, it is 
integrated with the Large Technical Systems theory which enables the examination of the 
developments in different components of a system and provides insights into 
understanding the evolution of small closed systems into large technical systems that 
interact with their environment. This integration is done by treating the meso-level of 
socio-technical regimes as a large technological system. By doing so the energy sector is 
regarded as an open Large Technical System (LTS) which is situated at the meso-level, 
comprises its own components and subsystems and interacts with the developments at the 
landscape and niche levels. Hydrogen technologies, on the other hand, are accepted as 
new small technological systems that need to evolve to be integrated into the current 
energy LTS.  
 
However as discussed earlier, fast changing landscape developments can alter the choices 
of the actors involved in the energy LTS and emerge new alternatives which can lead to 
competition. As this competition can have multiple outcomes complimenting or 
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hindering the transition to hydrogen economy, it also needs to be analysed. Therefore in 
order to achieve this kind of analysis, the final step in creating this tool involves 
combining the aforementioned theories with the competing technologies theory 
postulated by Paul David
3
 and Brian Arthur
4
.  
 
With the use of this tool, the second objective of this thesis is to analyse the evolution of 
events at the macro and meso levels that might affect the adoption of hydrogen 
technologies. This analysis is then narrowed down to the developments at the UK energy 
LTS which aims to provide an understanding of how landscape developments have 
affected changes at the national level in the case of the UK and created opportunities for 
the development of hydrogen economy. In addition, as technological competition plays 
an important role in determining the transitions, the third objective is to provide a brief 
comparison between the hydrogen economy and the alternative systems. This is done by, 
firstly, providing a technical overview of what hydrogen economy entails and how it is 
related to the incumbent and alternative technologies, and secondly, by demonstrating the 
advantages and disadvantages of the hydrogen technologies in comparison to the 
alternatives in two subsystems. The final objective is to examine how all these factors 
identified throughout this thesis can be joined together to set in motion the techno-
economic transition to hydrogen economy. For this purpose, the case of London is used 
to demonstrate how a technological niche can be formed by bringing in different 
technologies, actors and policies, how the co-existence of alternative options can be 
managed to compliment the adoption of hydrogen technologies and how external factors 
such as the economic recession or elections may change the direction of transitions.  
1.2. Methodology  
In order to achieve these objectives three types of analysis are conducted. As discussed 
earlier and will be elaborated later on in Chapter 4, the developments that took place in 
the realms of energy policy, market and environmental policy remain relevant to the 
current energy LTS. The problems the energy sector is facing today are the legacy of the 
past. Therefore an evolutionary analysis provided the most appropriate approach in terms 
of examining the impact of the past on the current energy system. This evolutionary 
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approach is followed in analysing the landscape developments, the changes in the UK 
energy LTS and developments in London.  
 
Secondly, to enable a robust analysis, the case study research method is deemed to be the 
most appropriate as the aforementioned tool incorporates a number of factors that have 
complex mutually interdependent linkages. The history of electrification provides a good 
example to understand the factors that play a role in forming a closed technological 
system around a single technology and how this closed system grows and evolves into a 
new large technological system. It also demonstrates the importance of external factors 
and the impact competing technologies can have on the outcome of transitions. 
Therefore, the aforementioned combined tool is applied to this case study. Both of these 
approaches are used in the case of London. The analysis is conducted in three interlinked 
steps (i) the evolution of climate change policy and their influences on emerging 
alternative technologies; (ii) how the alternatives can be interlinked and therefore 
competition can result in favour of hybrid systems hydrogen technologies at the heart of 
it; and (iii) how the changing circumstances can create uncertainty and might lead to 
variety of outcomes where the transition to a hydrogen economy in London is concerned. 
 
Finally, the comparative analysis is conducted to give an overview of the potential of 
hydrogen and fuel cells and other alternative technologies in providing solutions to the 
problems at the landscape and regime levels. This analysis also enabled an understanding 
of the synergies between different technological options and how they might compliment 
one another and lead to transitions via the establishment of hybrid systems.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the technical 
change literature that describes the three theories utilised to form the analytical tool 
applied in this thesis and the reasoning behind the integration of these theories. Chapter 3 
illustrates how the aforementioned analytical tool is applied to a historical case study of 
electrification. The subsequent chapters are organised based on the three levels identified 
in the analytical tool applied. Meanwhile, Chapter 4 discusses the evolution of landscape 
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developments over the past four decades, Chapter 5 narrows down the analysis to the UK 
energy LTS level.  It shows the impact of factors identified in Chapter 4 on UK energy 
policy and how these changes in the energy and environmental policy arenas and energy 
market have created windows of opportunities for the emergence alternative technologies 
including the hydrogen economy. Chapter 6 focuses on the technological components of 
the hydrogen system and shows the possible technological roadmaps that might lead to 
the hydrogen economy of the future. In order to provide an understanding of the 
differences and synergies between the hydrogen and other technological options, Chapter 
7 compares the technologies that are competing against hydrogen and fuel cells. Chapter 
8 describes how all the factors identified throughout this thesis can be linked together to 
set in motion a techno-economic transition to a hydrogen economy in London. Finally, 
Chapter 9 draws together the conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Realising the scale of the problem of climate change, rising oil demands and prices and 
their effects, from policy makers to engineers and economists alike, have attempted to 
formulate various strategies to move towards sustainable energy systems. Economists 
have argued it is best left to market forces to play the biggest role through a combination 
of economic incentives and disincentives to make some paths more „attractive‟ and others 
less so
1
. On the other hand, scientists and engineers have attempted to improve the 
environmental performance of specific technologies through innovation
2
. However, as 
energy systems have distinct links with wider environmental, economic and social 
aspects, the approach taken in this paper is an adoption of two models, the niche-based 
multi-level perspective, and the large technical systems theory. 
 
The former framework (Rotmans et al, 2001, Geels, 2002) distinguishes three levels: (i) a 
micro-level of technological niches, which are „protected‟ spaces where actors are 
involved in learning processes about radically new technologies; (ii) a meso-level of 
socio-technical regimes, accounting for stability of established socio-technical systems; 
(iii) a macro-level of socio-technical landscapes which consists of a range of contextual 
factors influencing technological development (e.g. climate change)
3
. The latter 
framework analyses the formation of small closed systems and the factors that lead to 
their evolution into large technical systems. This framework is chosen as it enables the 
analysis on the developments on different components of a system that affect the 
adoption of the entire technological system. This is an important aspect as the eventual 
hydrogen economy comprises a number of components and subsystems improvements 
and changes in which have impacts on the whole system and in turn transitions. 
Additionally, as transition to one technological system is directly linked to the incumbent 
technologies and is affected by the developments in other alternative technologies, an 
analysis on the competition between these different options is necessary. Therefore, the 
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aforementioned tool is complimented with findings of the competing technologies theory 
postulated by Paul David
4
 and Brian Arthur
5
. 
 
However, as the departing point for analysing technological transitions should be 
describing the determinants of technical change, this chapter starts with a brief overview 
of how technological change has been viewed by different scholars. This then leads on to 
the elaboration of the reasoning behind the choice of utilising systems theory and the 
creation of this tool to examine technological transitions.  
2.2. Innovation and Technical Change 
Broadly technical change is viewed as a complex, interactive progress at the centre of 
which lies innovations of different nature. In order to provide a thorough understanding 
of the concept, the characteristics of technical change needs to be analysed. Dosi et. al 
(1988), have identified some of the general features of technical change and the 
innovation process as: 
 
1. Sector-specific degrees of appropriability and levels of opportunity of 
technological advance; 
2. Partial tacitness of technological knowledge; 
3. Variety in knowledge-base of and search procedures for innovation; 
4. Uncertainty; 
5. Irreversibility of technological advances (i.e. unequivocal dominance of new 
processes and products over old ones, irrespective of relative prices); 
6. Endogeneity of market structures associated with the dynamics of innovation; 
7. Permanent existence of asymmetrics and variety between firms (and 
countries) in their innovative capabilities, input efficiencies, product 
technologies and behavioural and strategic rules.
6
 
 
Dosi et. al (1988) suggests that under these circumstances learning processes should be 
considered as the starting point for technical change.
7
 Learning processes and their 
mechanisms have been studied by many scholars. Arrow (1962)
8
 who defined learning as 
‘the knowledge acquisition as a product of experience’ has coined the term „learning-by-
doing‟. In his model, he has illustrated how the experience accumulated during the 
manufacturing and investment processes increases the rate of production, reduces labour 
costs and results in increasing returns
9
. However, as Arrow points out in his paper, the 
model has some gaps. It does not take into account the learning which takes place during 
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the utilisation of products or the learning enabled by institutions, education and 
research
10
. These points are later examined by Rosenberg (1982) and Lundvall (1988). 
Rosenberg (1982)
11
 has pointed out that the performance characteristics of the capital 
goods, which are described as „complex systems of interacting components’, are not 
certain at the manufacturing stage as conditions are controlled and no operating 
experience in different environments is present. Therefore, he suggests that modifications 
(modifications in related components, hardware, maintenance, servicing) are needed to 
increase performance, efficiency and reliability. The reduction in uncertainty is only 
possible as a result of extensive utilisation by different users in a variety of different 
environments. He has named this type of knowledge process ‘learning-by-using’ and has 
demonstrated how experience gained through utilisation has led to an increase in 
productivity; new practices greater efficiency, reliability and a reduction in capital costs.  
 
All these learning processes have described how the problems in a specific domain can be 
tackled by building on the available knowledge and that novelties can emerge from the 
current setting. This means that learning processes help the agents in a paradigm or a 
regime to accumulate knowledge and the expertise needed to solve the bottlenecks to 
enhance the performance and efficiency of products and achieve economies of scale. It 
also implies, however, that the new knowledge to be created is influenced by the existing 
knowledge. 
 
This direction of the agents‟ behaviours and beliefs in solving a problem by the „sense of 
potential, of constraints, and of not yet exploited opportunities‟ was first defined by 
Nelson & Winter (1977) as „natural trajectories‟12. They have argued that these 
trajectories occur not only as a result of technological capabilities and R&D activities of 
scientists, engineers and organisations but are also adjusted according to the user 
demands. According to their theory, the totality of all these elements; scientists, 
engineers, organisations, technologies, technical knowledge and capabilities, and demand 
and cost conditions have been named a „technological regime‟ which can be seen as a 
platform for the emergence of natural trajectories as result of both technology push and 
demand pull
13. Nelson and Winter‟s regimes and trajectories were the first attempts to 
 36 
describe technical change and the generation of innovation from an „evolutionary‟ point 
of view.  
 
Following Nelson and Winter‟s approach, Dosi focused on the micro-technological 
concept and named it a „technological paradigm‟ that has been defined in his paper as: 
 
… a pattern for solution of selected techno-economic problems based on highly 
selected principles derived from the natural sciences. In other words, a 
technological paradigm is both a set of exemplars – basic artefacts which are to be 
developed and improved and a set of heuristics – “Where do we go from here?”, 
“Where would we search?”, “On what sort of knowledge should we draw?” 
…Putting it another way technology paradigms define the technological 
opportunities for further innovations and some basic procedures on how to exploit 
them
14
. 
 
Defining paradigms from a technological point of view, he stated that ‘technological 
paradigms channelled the efforts in certain directions rather than others thus a 
technological trajectory was the activity of technological progress along the economic 
and technological trade-offs defined by a paradigm’15. Irrespective of the differences in 
naming technological regimes or technological paradigms, the scholars have agreed that 
they prepare the ground for technological trajectories which are based on certain 
knowledge of agents in a specific activity and that such trajectories will be followed by 
the coming agents leaving the other trajectories unexplored.    
 
Therefore, it can be stated that once a technological trajectory is identified and considered 
feasible and profitable, many other actors in that field will change their direction towards 
this path; constantly improving the existing technological capacity via innovation based 
on the current stock of knowledge. In this case, if future innovations are generated from 
improvements based on the current ones, taking a step back, one can see that the current 
stock of knowledge an accumulation of past knowledge. This aspect of technical change 
is known as „path-dependency‟ in the literature and has been best described by Rosenberg 
(1994) who argues that:  
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There is always a huge overhang of technological inheritance which exercises a 
powerful influence upon present and future technological possibilities. Much 
technological progress at any given time, therefore, has to be understood as the 
attempt to extend and further exploit certain trajectories of improvement that are 
made possible by the existing stock of technological knowledge.”16 
 
His argument for the direction of technical change is in line with the evolutionary 
approach followed by Nelson & Winter, and Dosi. However, by bringing in another 
parameter; the influence of past actions, he proves that the acceptance of technical change 
in a regime or in other words, the adoption and further expansion of an innovation or a 
technology is not only determined by the „prevailing conditions‟ but also by the 
developmental path agents and technologies have followed. Then, combining the 
evolutionary and path-dependency approaches, a technological trajectory can be 
described as a path of knowledge accumulation that agents in a regime pursue to solve 
problems and to improve technologies within the existing technological and economic 
conditions by building on the knowledge, skills and methods learned in the previous 
paradigms.   
 
To sum up, the approaches reviewed so far have illustrated some of the determinants of 
technical change. As a starting point, it has been accepted that both technology push and 
demand pull mechanisms are equally important to analyse change. Secondly, the contents 
of the paradigms or regimes; the economic and technological conditions, technological 
inheritance and the existing stock of technological knowledge guide engineers and 
scientists to innovate based on current circumstances. As the knowledge inherited from 
the past has an impact on the present as well as the future, technical change is accepted to 
be path-dependent. This path or trajectory, once considered tackling problems in the 
current regime, is further exploited through the help of learning mechanisms. These 
learning processes enable technologies to be improved via innovations in complementary 
technologies such as components and hardware, which result in an increase in 
technological performance, cost reductions and economies of scale. Such an approach 
must be treated as of being of great importance to analyse the adoption and diffusion of 
technologies and  the „incremental‟ nature of technical change and innovation process.  
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In the current context, it provides insights into understanding the evolution of the energy 
sector. Following this logic, one can easily see that today‟s street lighting, electricity 
appliances, underground transportation systems, large power stations are all 
improvements on and complementary innovations of a major invention-electrification. 
Another example is the invention of internal combustion engine which has given rise to a 
number of innovations in auto manufacturing, manufacturing processes, oil exploration, 
refining and distribution as well as developments in road infrastructure and so on. 
Undoubtedly, all these have occurred as a result of continuous research and development 
activities which have been responses to changing demand and cost conditions. As the 
knowledge about these technologies has been accumulated, complementing technologies 
have been developed, which resulted in expansion, greater utilisation and economies of 
scale. All these advancements have combined to form the current very large and well 
established energy sector. 
  
However, although these models are satisfactory to investigate some important factors 
leading to the evolution of a technological regime or an industry, their focus is limited to 
incremental changes emerging within the technological realm. Their fundamental 
weaknesses are that they cannot be used to how radical new technologies emerge, or for 
that matter, the impact of interactions between different realms on the existing paradigm. 
As the aim of this thesis is to analyse the transitional pathways to alternative energy 
systems, in other words, transitions that include radical technologies, a thorough analysis 
of radical innovations and the creation of new systems around these technologies is 
required. For this reason, this part of the literature review focuses on different types of 
innovation that result in radical changes and more broadly regime transformations 
leading to technological transitions.  
2.3. Incremental versus Radical Innovation 
The models presented in the previous section, such as learning mechanisms, 
technological trajectories and paradigms and path-dependency approach,  have discussed 
how improvements in the existing technologies or products and processes can be and/or 
have been achieved. As described in detail in the studies of Freeman & Perez (1988)
17
, 
Freeman (1992)
18
 and Perez (1998)
19
; all these successive improvements upon existing 
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products and processes involving technical innovations, organisational innovations and 
skill improvements based on experience, which occur depending upon a combination of 
demand pressures, socio-cultural factors, technological opportunities and trajectories, 
are known as ‘incremental innovations’. Then these incremental changes can be regarded 
as necessary mechanisms to make the new technology compatible with the user and 
producer preferences, market demand, standards of the industry and the regulations on 
one hand and technical progress to achieve growth in productivity and expansion of an 
industry on the other. However, having stated that these are alterations made to the „new 
technology‟, one should question what this new technology is, how it comes about or 
whether it follows the same patterns incremental innovations go through.  
 
In the innovation literature, new technologies, products or processes that are not 
compatible with the existing ones, are named „radical innovations‟. To our knowledge the 
very first attempt to describe the emergence of new technologies or radical innovations 
came from Schumpeter. In his studies, accepting innovation as the main driver for 
economic change, he defined „innovation‟ as the first commercial application of 
„invention‟, of which „diffusion‟ leads to new products, processes and markets 
(Schumpeter 1934
20
, 1939
21
).  He also argued that the source of these radical innovations 
was the activities of entrepreneurs rather than changes in demand conditions.  
 
Although his emphasis on the role of the entrepreneur for creating radical innovations is 
widely accepted, it was later criticised that it is a „heroic approach‟ and that it excludes 
the other factors which can lead to the emergence of radical technologies (Rosenberg 
1976
22
, Freeman 1992
23
). These points are studied by different scholars. For instance 
Hughes (1987), Freeman and Perez (1988), Freeman (1992), have illustrated that radical 
innovations can come about as a solution to the problems arising during the development 
of technologies. Hughes (1987) has named these as „reverse salients‟ which are technical 
problems that surface as the technologies are applied to different environments and 
tackling these problems may result in the emergence of radically new technologies
24
. In 
relation, Freeman (1992) has discussed how constant improvements, in other words 
incremental innovations made to new technologies to expand their utilities can not 
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continue forever, rather they have their limitations; nothing can be scaled up forever, and 
as these limits are approached, costs for additional improvements increase
25
. Both the 
economic and technical limits to further incremental innovations may cause a shift to 
seeking alternative solutions resulting in „radical discontinuities‟ which usually occur as 
an outcome of deliberate R&D activities
26
. This does not mean to say that radical 
innovations occur only in the same industry which is in need of change. As Abernathy 
and Utterback (1982)
27
 and Rosenberg (1996)
28
 describe they might be introduced from 
outside the industry and can be applied to the others via inter-sectoral flows.   
 
Either way, when the radical technologies come about, they disrupt the organisations or 
the industries and are not adopted instantly. Rosenberg (1996) relates this to the primitive 
condition of radical innovations where their characteristics, utilities and further 
applications are unknown in the early days of their introduction
29
. Hughes (1987) takes 
this point further suggesting that they create anxiety amongst large organisations and 
therefore do not become components of the existing systems
30
. This phenomenon is 
described as an important difference between the radical and incremental innovations by 
Freeman (1992) who states that „in the case of incremental innovations the changes that 
take place can be expressed as change in the coefficients of the input-output matrix of the 
existing array of products and services whereas in the case of radical innovation, new 
rows and columns would be needed as they change the array of products and services 
and not just the efficiency in use of existing commodities‟31.  Therefore, in order for the 
radical technologies to be fully adopted, not only they require other radical innovations in 
the related aspects but also they need to be complimented with incremental innovations. 
These complimentary innovations ( product, process and organisational innovations) can 
be regarded as incremental improvements made in the radical technologies to increase 
their productivity gains and clusters of them, which may lead to new branches in the 
industry, have been named as „new technological systems‟, in the „Taxonomy of 
Innovations‟ introduced by Freeman and Perez (1988)32. In their study, by categorising 
innovations, the authors aim to illustrate how major changes in the economy can occur as 
the linkages between clusters of radical and incremental innovations and also between 
new technological systems are created. This final level in their taxonomy is described as 
 41 
„changes of techno-economic paradigms‟ which portray a shift affecting all sectors of the 
economy
33
.   
 
This type of analysis, examining different types of innovations and the linkages between 
them provide a perfect method to investigate the emergence and diffusion of radical 
technologies such as hydrogen fuel cells. Combining them with the other related radically 
new technologies such as hydrogen production, storage and distribution technologies, can 
lead to emergence of hybrid technological systems entailing hydrogen and current energy 
technologies or new technological systems based solely on hydrogen technologies. 
However, creating a working technical system should neither be understood as a full 
adoption of that system (hydrogen economy) nor an immediate shift in the current 
techno-economic paradigm having an effect on the other sectors linked to the energy 
sector. These technical systems, even when they emerge, are radical and therefore need to 
be complimented with a variety of incremental innovations to ensure full adoption by 
different types of agents in a regime that might lead to changes in techno-economic 
paradigms. Following the argument of Freeman and Perez, the transition to a hydrogen 
economy can be viewed as the final level in his taxonomy of innovations; changes of 
techno-economic paradigms, which can occur as a result of the creation of new 
technological systems and inter-linkages between them. Thus, in order to analyse 
transitions in a stepwise manner, a thorough understanding of the systems perspective 
and technological systems; their contents, interactions and developmental patterns is 
required.   
 
Having demonstrated the type of analysis that will be used in this study, it is important to 
introduce a well-known theory developed by Christensen (2003), who analyses how the 
emergence of radical technologies can disrupt the market, cause large successful firms to 
fail and new markets to emerge. In his book, Christensen argues that large successful 
firms can have a tendency to focus on the higher end of the market where the most 
important customers reside and who are ultimately willing to buy their products
34
. By 
monitoring the requirements of these customers and predicting what they want, they 
improve the performance of the incumbent products via incremental and/or radical 
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technologies. These are called „sustaining technologies‟ which aim to maintain the 
growth and improve profitability of firms
35
. Sustaining technologies are preferred over 
the disruptive technologies as they target existing markets and focus on well-known 
customer requirements and characteristics
36
. However, as Christensen argues, the focus 
on existing customers‟ needs and sustaining technologies has two main consequences. 
Firstly, constant improvements made to the products based on the current needs of the 
existing customers can exceed the future demands of these consumers
37
. Christensen 
relates this problem to the changing product choices of consumers that shift from 
functionality to reliability, convenience and finally to price
38
. These changing parameters 
can create openings for disruptive technologies that may meet the future requirements of 
customers. When these technologies are developed they can compete successfully with 
the existing products and disrupt the market for the incumbent technologies. 
While this theory can provide insights into understanding how radical technologies such 
as hydrogen and fuel cells can come about and eventually disrupt the market as the basis 
of product choice shifts towards the sustainability and environmental criteria, the current 
features of hydrogen and fuel cells do not fit the definition of disruptive technologies 
provided by Christensen. It is argued that the disruptive technologies have; a lower 
performance; are cheaper and more convenient to use; involve a high level of uncertainty; 
and finally have a limited appeal in niche markets
39
. When applying this framework to 
hydrogen and fuel cell applications in the transport sector, it can be seen that fuel cell 
vehicles (FCVs) do not have all these attributes. Although there is a high level of 
uncertainty involved because of the number of scientific breakthroughs required to 
commercialise these technologies, the FCVs are neither more cost effective nor do they 
have a lower performance. As discussed in Chapter 7, the FCVs are more fuel efficient 
than the internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV) and emit zero emissions when run 
on hydrogen. Additionally, as will be shown, the current FCV costs are significantly 
higher than the incumbent ICEVs which is why this framework cannot be applied to 
FCVs. However, as the theory suggests, if the current improvements that are considered 
by the major auto manufacturers are applied to improve the performance (in terms of fuel 
efficiency and emissions) of the ICEVs and lead to performance levels that exceed what 
customers demand and/or are willing to pay, a paradigm shift can occur. In the mean 
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time, if the costs of FCVs are reduced then these technologies can disrupt the (then) 
existing market. Therefore, these technologies can be considered „potential disruptive 
technologies‟ that can become competitive in the future. Although useful, this framework 
cannot explain the current issues related to hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. 
2.4. Technical Change from a Systems Perspective 
Interest in the „systems‟ approach in analysing technical change originates from the 
understanding that technology and science, and so other realms such as politics, 
economics and social interact and overlap with each other rather than having a context-
content relationship
40
. Thomas Hughes (1986), in his well known Note: The Seamless 
Web
41
, describes that even though the contextual approach can help in understanding the 
emergence of a new coordination from a previous one, it fails to describe what constitutes 
context and what the relationship between the context and the content is. Thus he 
suggests that as the actions of actors cannot be limited to a single realm, all the 
„interactions‟ and „interpenetrations‟ between different disciplines because of these 
actions can be seen as part of a „seamless web‟ and that this can best be studied by a  
„systems‟ or „networks‟ approach eliminating the need for categorising42.   
 
Having accepted that a systems approach will provide a good method to analyse technical 
change in the energy sector, a definition of the term „system‟ is required. Fleck (1992)43 
describes a system as „complexes of elements or components, which mutually condition 
and constrain one another, so that the whole complex works together, with some 
reasonably clearly defined overall function‟. In order to elaborate on the definition of a 
system, Edquist (2004)
44
 provides insights from the „general systems theory‟ and 
proposes three characteristics of systems:  
 
i. A system consists of two kinds of constituents: there are, first, some kinds of 
components (organisations and institutions) and second, relations among them. 
The components and relations should form a coherent whole (which has 
properties different from the properties of the constituents) 
ii. The system has a function, i.e. it is performing or achieving something. 
iii. It must be possible to discriminate between the system and the rest of the world; 
i.e. it must be possible to identify the boundaries of the system. If we, for example, 
want to make empirical studies of specific systems, we must of course know their 
extent.   
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Taking these characteristics into account Edquist (2004) suggests that technical progress 
can also be understood as a „system of innovations‟ which in the broadest sense implies 
determinants of innovation process; all important economic, social, political, 
organisational, institutional and other factors that influence the development, diffusion 
and use of innovations
45
.  
 
In the last two decades, a number of scholars have applied this type of systemic analysis 
of technical change to different fields. The concept was first introduced by Freeman 
(1987)
46
  in the form of the national system of innovation (NSI). He defined the concept 
as „the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies‟. Two major books 
published by Lundvall (1992)
47
 and Nelson et.al (1993)
48
 have been influential in 
emphasising the importance of this concept in the analysis of innovation processes at a 
national level. While Lundvall (1992) has repeatedly highlighted the role of institutional 
set-ups, interactions between the users and producers, in relation to the learning processes 
(learning by interacting) and the cumulativeness of technical knowledge, Nelson et. al 
(1993), having examined the concept covering 15 countries, has stressed the importance 
of priorities, economic and political conditions of countries, and their varying perceptions 
in viewing the factors influencing the technical progress. Despite accepting the usefulness 
of this concept because of its flexibility, it also suffers from some weaknesses. Peters 
(2006)
49
 has argued that the NSI implies the „confinement’ of a country’s innovation 
activities and processes to national borders and that it ignores the effects of globalisation 
on NSIs in the development of specific technologies,  while Edquist (2004)
50
 has 
discussed the difficulties that arise with this concept as neither the contents nor the 
boundaries are given any precise indication. 
 
Irrespective of these weaknesses, the NSI concept has been influential and led the SI 
approach to be developed for other fields, namely regional, sectoral and technological 
systems of innovation. Similar to NSI, regional systems of innovation has geographical 
limitations and focuses on the institutions of a region, their political, economic and 
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cultural inter-linkages and the impact of these components and their interactions on 
technical progress
51
. Slightly different and more specific, sectoral and technological 
systems of innovations have been introduced to analyse more focused areas. Sectoral 
systems of innovation and production is defined by Malerba (2002) as  
 
a set of new and established products for specific uses and the set of agents 
carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, production and 
sale of those products. Sectoral systems have a knowledge base, technologies, 
inputs and a (potential or existing) demand
52
.   
 
Correspondingly, the concept of technological systems of innovation termed by Carlsson 
& Stankiewicz (1995)
53
 is argued to be sectoral.  Edquist (1997) has discussed that 
technological and sectoral systems of innovation are similar in the sense that „they 
include only a part of a national or a regional system‟ and that they are „determined by 
generic technologies (technology fields)‟54. However, while technological systems of 
innovation can be considered to be similar to the NSI or sectoral systems of innovation 
where their constituents are concerned, in our opinion, they must be treated differently 
given that the focus of the former concept; technologies and their emergence, 
development, diffusion, in relation to supply and demand cannot be limited either to 
geographical areas or to sectors. Therefore, as Carlsson & Stankiewicz (1995) states, „it 
may sometimes make more sense to talk about local, regional, international and even 
global technological systems‟55.  
 
This point is particularly important in the choice of the appropriate framework for 
analysing the subject matter of this thesis; socio-technical transitions to in hydrogen 
economy in London, UK. With its focus on London, one can easily argue that the 
approach should be the NSI focusing on the UK or regional systems of innovation as 
London is a specific region of the UK. Alternatively, one could opt to analyse it with a 
sectoral systems approach as the industry being analysed is the energy sector. However, 
according to our understanding, the transition to a hydrogen economy, is best analysed 
using a „systems of innovation‟ approach concentrated on technologies. This is mainly 
because these technologies are invented, developed and are being and/or will be adopted 
in different parts of the world. In addition, innovations can come from individuals, firms, 
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different sectors, regions or countries. Thus, in the early stages of this study a 
„supranational‟56 systems approach with the emphasis on technologies is preferred. 
Following on from this, the findings are narrowed down and applied to the national (UK), 
regional (London) and sectoral (energy industry) levels. To our knowledge, the most 
appropriate framework in the literature to serve this purpose is the „Large Technical 
Systems‟ approach conducted by Thomas P. Hughes (1983)57. In this approach – 
although not named as a „system of innovation‟ – technical change is described from a 
systems perspective not only by illustrating the components of a system and their 
relations within and across different systems but also by exploring the impacts of 
different systems, regions, nations and historical actions on the evolution and future of 
this system.  
2.5. Large Technological Systems 
Carlsson & Stankiewicz (1995) defines a technological system as a network of agents 
interacting in a specific economic/industrial area under a particular institutional 
infrastructure or set of infrastructures and involved in the generation, diffusion and 
utilisation of technology
58
. Although he describes these systems in terms of 
„knowledge/competence flows‟ (as they consist of knowledge ad competence networks) 
„rather than flows of ordinary goods and services‟, he implies the existence of other 
components of a system by stating that „in the presence of an entrepreneur and critical 
mass, such networks can be transformed into development blocs, i.e. synergistic clusters 
of firms and technologies within an industry or a group of industries’59. In this case 
technologies and entrepreneurs become components of a system. The concept of 
technological systems and their components were first identified by Thomas Hughes in 
his study of Networks of Power
60
. 
 
Having analysed the history of electrification from a systems perspective, Hughes (1983) 
defines technical systems as networks of interacting complex, problem-solving 
components which are constantly controlled and geared towards achieving a common 
system goal
61
. Emphasising the importance of linkages between different elements of a 
system, he classifies two major components constituting a technological system; human 
operators and artefacts which are more precisely analysed under five main headings: 
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i. Physical artefacts (i.e. turbo-generators, transformers, transmission lines) 
ii. Physical artefacts: natural resources as they are socially constructed and 
adapted in order to function in systems (i.e. coal mines) 
iii. Physical artefacts: organisations (i.e. manufacturing firms, utility companies 
and investment banks) 
iv. Non-physical artefacts: legislative artefacts (i.e. regulatory laws) 
v. Inventors, industrial scientists, engineers, managers, financiers and workers 
(components of but not artefacts in the system)
62
. 
 
All these artefacts in a system interact with each other and also with the human operators 
(non-artefacts) as they are invented and developed by the „system builders‟. Due to these 
interactions, any change or alteration in the system affects the rest of the components. 
Hughes describes this phenomenon by relating to characteristics of the components 
which are driven from the system they are a part of
63
.  
 
However, it must be noted that the elements and internal dynamics are not the only 
mechanisms that change and/or evolve systems; they are also influenced by „external 
factors‟ that are not under the control of the system managers64. Hughes calls this an 
„environment‟ which is defined in his own words as the totality of „the parts of the world 
that are not subject to a system’s control but influence the system‟65. Even though, an 
environment is not a component in a system, it must be treated as an enabling parameter 
to interpret the boundaries of a system. This acceptance falls in line with the system 
characterisation of Edquist (2004)
66
 who points out the need to differentiate between the 
system and the rest of the world. However, while, Hughes discusses the importance of 
environment in a systems analysis, he does not examine different levels of influences in 
an environment. An indication of what is meant by the term „environment‟ can be gained 
by reference to Freeman (1992). He introduces the concept of the „selection environment‟ 
that aims to illustrate how external factors can affect systems.  At this stage a selection 
environment is best described as „the interactions between human needs, the economy, 
entrepreneurship and the internal dynamics of the science-technology system, generating 
an increasingly wide range of technological and organisational possibilities‟ on one 
hand and „preventing and frustrating deployment of new technologies‟ on the other67. He 
distinguishes between three types of environment namely the natural environment, the 
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built environment and finally the institutional environment, which is also distinguished 
into different types and levels of selection
68. Freeman‟s classification of „selection 
environment‟ encompasses the „environment‟ defined by Hughes. While Hughes 
emphasises the factors that come from outside the technological system, Freeman argues 
that there are not only uncontrollable and/or unforeseen factors (natural disasters, wars) 
but also others that stem from the system due to selection of actors affecting its direction. 
Therefore, while analysing the boundaries of a system, one needs to consider both the 
internal and external mechanisms.     
 
These two concepts; „systems‟ and „environment‟ are incorporated in „open systems‟ as 
they are influenced by the external factors, whereas the „closed systems‟ which are 
identified as the ones without an environment
69
 are not affected by the outside pressures. 
Hughes (1987) explains this relation between the two as a „one-way influence‟;   
 
Two kinds of environment relate to open technological systems: ones on which 
they are dependent and ones dependent on them. In neither case is there 
interaction between the system and the environment; there is simply a one-way 
influence
70
.  
 
However, it must be noted that, if one is considering an external factor as a problem to be 
tackled; then, even though there is one way influence in the early days of system 
development, during the later stages, an interaction occurs if the system develops 
successfully and solves this problem. Although in his analysis, Hughes acknowledges the 
fact that over time, technological systems fits the environment in them
71
, he does not 
clarify the interactions between the environment and the systems.  This point is examined 
later in this chapter and a broader understanding of systems „shaping‟ and „being shaped‟ 
by the environment, is accepted.  
 
Having analysed the external factors affecting a system, the definition of large 
technological systems is extended and concluded that they are networks of interacting 
complex, problem-solving components including artefacts, organisations, legislative 
artefacts, natural resources and actors all of which are „embedded‟ in an environment that 
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cannot be controlled by their builders. This broad understanding of a large technological 
system with its components and factors influencing them is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Interactions between the environment and the components of a large technological system. 
Source: Author 
 
2.5.1. The Energy Sector as an Open Large Technological System 
In an attempt to apply such a systems perspective to the subject of this thesis, the energy 
sector can be regarded as a large technological system (LTS); including interacting 
physical and non-physical artefacts which are built, developed, controlled and managed 
by the human operators involved. As Hughes points out, for different purposes of 
analysis, these components can be regarded as smaller systems or sub-systems (since one 
artefact can be considered as a system with components) which are linked by internal 
inputs and outputs within a technological system
72
.   
 
Following this argument, the energy sector or system then can be analysed by dividing it 
into so many subsystems. However, in order to avoid a partial analysis, in this study, the 
energy system is demonstrated as having two very large subsystems broadly defined as 
“direct fuel use” and “electricity generation, transmission and distribution” which have 
their own components and are linked to each other via supply and demand.  
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To begin with, in direct fuel use, energy is produced by different types of primary sources 
(coal, oil, natural gas) which cannot be used efficiently before some refining processes 
take place. These refinement processes vary according to the type of the resource, that is, 
crude oil is refined by fractional distillation or chemical processing and converted into oil 
products such as gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, industrial fuel oil and lubricating oils. 
When these products are produced, they are stored on-site and then distributed to the 
consumers by ships, railways or pipelines. This type of fuel utilisation is called direct fuel 
use (see Figure 2). In our daily lives, the energy we consume such as petrol for our cars, 
heating in our houses, or fuel for jets, is generated through this path. The electricity 
industry is one of the significant consumers of these products; more than 70% of the 
electricity is produced by these sources
73
. Very simply, electricity – a secondary energy – 
is generated from the conversion of primary energy sources like coal, gas, and oil, and 
other sources like renewables and nuclear power. This is done by electric generators 
which are driven by a turbine, engine, water wheel, or other similar machine to convert 
mechanical or chemical energy into electricity
74
. The electricity produced is changed 
from low voltage to high voltage to allow it to move long distances. Transmission lines 
are used to carry the electricity to transformers where it is changed into low voltage that 
is appropriate for households; offices and industry (see Figure 3).  
 
It is clear within these subsystems there are physical artefacts such as natural resources, 
technologies for producing and distributing these sources, organisations managing these 
processes as well as non-physical artefacts such as regulations and laws to control them. 
There are also human operators building, managing, changing and using these systems 
and their products. Therefore, all these components cooperate creating a network within 
the individual subsystems. However, one should not consider these smaller systems as 
isolated entities. On the contrary they are linked and interacting with each other – the 
output of one subsystem is the input to the other
75
. For instance, in the current electricity 
system, the choice of the power plants depends on the character of the fuel suppliers. 
Today most of the electricity is generated by fossil-fuels. This is mainly due to the 
accumulated knowledge and expertise on the exploration, production and distribution of 
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these sources, which in turn increase their availability and decrease the price. Because the 
price of this sort of electricity is cheaper it is in high demand from consumers, which puts 
pressure on the the electricity suppliers to purchase from these companies. Due to these 
interactions, any change or alteration in one of the elements affects the entire system. 
Thus, the energy system can be regarded as a platform involving subsystems such as 
“direct fuel use” and “electricity generation, transmission and distribution” which have 
their own interrelated elements but are also components of a broader network constituting 
a large technological system-the energy sector.   
 
 
Figure 2: Vertically integrated direct oil use. 
Source: Jennings E, (1996), Redistribution of Power, IEE Review  
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Figure 3: Energy flow in the electricity sector 
Source: Everett B. (2004)  
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As mentioned earlier, technological systems are also a part of a wider environment and 
factors in this environment have an impact on the whole system. Having accepted the 
energy sector is a large technological system, it is important to view the parameters 
affecting this whole system. The selection environment of the current energy sector – 
although not named as such –is studied in greater detail later on. Briefly, climate change 
and the uneven distribution of fossil-fuel reserves can be referred to as the natural 
environment, while the embedded structure of electricity generation and direct fuel use 
could be defined as the built environment. Further to the problems of changing climate 
and the rigid technological structures; political instability, sustainability, rising oil prices, 
the high costs of alternative energy technologies and existing accumulated knowledge 
and capabilities of technicians, engineers and scientists can be defined as the institutional 
or more broadly social environment for the current fossil-fuel based energy system.  
 
Combining the environment and the large technological system, the energy sector can be 
regarded as an open technological system; including interacting physical and non-
physical components which are affected by different factors in environment they are 
embedded in. Figure 4 illustrates the affairs within the energy system and its wider 
environment.  
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Figure 4: Energy sector as an open system with its inter-linkages and the environment it is embedded 
Source: Author 
 
2.5.2. Evolution of Large Technological Systems 
The figure above shows the existing affairs, structures and problems in the current energy 
sector. However, it should be pointed out that this picture looked different at different 
time intervals. For instance, if one were to analyse the energy sector of the 1920s, 
components such as nuclear power generation or transmission grid and problems like 
climate change, sustainability and increasing oil prices, would not appear in the analysis. 
All these new elements have occurred because of constant changes in both the 
environment and the technological system. For example, in the late 1970s, following the 
two oils shocks and increase in demand for oil demand and prices, policy-makers decided 
to change the market structure and promote privatisation and competition. Moreover, 
these external changes at this time pressurised the actors involved to explore alternative 
sources of energy and encouraged the exploitation of natural gas and nuclear power.  
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These changes in the environment and the LTS have occurred before and they have 
created „window of opportunities‟ for the emergence of alternative technologies and/or 
systems. However, despite the openings inside the established technological systems, 
these alternatives do not become components of the existing systems immediately. 
Instead, they face resistance from the actors involved. In order to reduce this resistance 
and generate acceptance, agents dealing with these technologies tend to support them 
with variety of inventions such as complimentary technologies, new organisations 
providing necessary sources and/or new institutions to protect and diffuse them. All these 
research, development and deployment activities lead to emergence and establishment of 
new technological systems. Hughes (1983, 1987) suggests that such establishment occurs 
as technological systems evolve following a pattern along which different actors get 
involved
76
.  
 
The first stage of the evolutionary pattern identified by Hughes (1983, 1987) involves the 
development of radical invention into an innovation where inventions (companies, 
power plants, light bulbs) are tested in an experimental environment to learn more about 
the techno-economic and political characteristics they require to survive in the use 
world
77
. During these stages, inventor-entrepreneurs constantly invent, improve and alter 
the inventions and related components to adjust them to the existing social circumstances. 
Therefore, the outcome of such development processes; innovations imply a complex 
system consisting of physical and non-physical components
78
. However, it should be 
remembered that these are site-specific systems of inter-related components only used in 
particular times and places. 
 
Despite being site-specific, once they have been proven work, either the manager-
entrepreneurs of this new system or other managers want to apply these innovations to 
different regions to increase their utilisation and in turn to achieve economies of scale. 
This phase of the evolutionary pattern is described as the technology transfer. However, 
as innovations described by Hughes imply a complex system that is both applied science 
and economics and shaped by political and social factors, or as Carlsson refers to them 
they are networks of commodity-like and non-physical resources (know-how)
79
, the 
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transfer of these systems is difficult and thus require a variety of adaptations
80
. These 
modifications have created the concept of „technological style‟ which is defined by 
Joerges (1988) as the widely varying shape that ‘one and the same’ technology takes 
under different geographical, political, legal and historical conditions
81
. Therefore, 
transfer which encompass adaptations to different conditions and consequently 
technological style result in different modes of the same technology. According to 
Hughes, this leads the systems to move to the final phase of the evolutionary pattern; 
growth, competition and consolidation.  
 
During the growth of systems, many other actors such as financier-entrepreneurs, 
consulting engineers, politicians get involved and new larger firms are set-up or the 
existing small ones merge. Involvement of all these actors with different interests usually 
generates conflict and thus problems of different nature (technical, organisational, 
financial, legal) surface. Hughes (1983) names these unforeseen problems as „reverse 
salients‟ that occur due to irregular expansion of the systems. As Joerges (1988) states 
progress on one front may produce backwardness elsewhere
82
. Depending on the 
characteristics of the problems, solutions can take the form of radical or incremental 
inventions and innovations. If the solution requires a radical invention, it generally comes 
from outside the system implying the involvement of actors different than the ones in the 
system which results in emergence of a new system with new components
83
. 
Undoubtedly, this creates „competition‟ between the old and the new systems. The 
outcome differs; either the new system evolves in a way that it becomes compatible with 
the previously established system (hybridisation) or its development leads to a whole new 
system because it proves to have superior performance or promises to tackle the existing 
or the expected problems.  
 
Hughes supports this argument by examining one of the best known competitions the 
battle of the currents. This led to the establishment of the universal system that coupled 
the DC and AC systems. In the early 1880s Edison successfully developed and 
demonstrated a lighting system based on direct current (DC) with inter-connected 
components by taking into account the technological, economic, social and legislative 
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factors. The system which was developed in Menlo Park (USA) was transferred to 
different regions in Europe.  During the transfer process there were so many reverse 
salients and complementary innovations, it led to the expansion and recognition of the 
DC system.  
 
The number of applications it could be used for increased. This was a big departure from 
its original application-lighting. The DC system could also be used to supply variable 
speed electric motors such as those used in electric cars, trams, elevators and home 
appliances
84
. However, one reverse salient, the high cost of distribution over long-
distances, which was techno-economic in nature, could not be tackled by the actors 
involved in this system
85
. The solution came from other inventor-entrepreneurs who 
developed a new system, single-phase AC, and used it in the regions identified as low 
load factor areas where the DC system was not dominant and failed to meet the 
demand
86
. This latter system evolved through a similar pattern, it was transferred, 
complimented with variety of inventions and further improved by tuning them to 
technical, economic, legal and social conditions. As both of the systems were socially 
constructed and techno-economic in nature, the battle between them occurred in related 
realms of technology, economics, politics as well as the society. This complex 
competition and all the developments in both systems reassured the fact that neither the 
dominant system that was established around DC nor the higher efficiency promises of 
AC could be ignored. The battle came to an end as the rotary converter, which enabled 
hybridisation of two systems, was invented
87
.  
 
This era was followed by; the formation of new companies, mergers between the 
supporters of the old and the new system; the establishment of technical standards; the 
creation of new research, professional and educational institutions and new branches of 
science such as electrical engineering; and finally the intervention of regulatory bodies. 
As Hughes points out, this was to resolve the conflicts which continued at the 
institutional and organisational level even after the problems were tackled at the technical 
level with the establishment of universal system of electric light and power
88
. He also 
adds that involvement of all these agents or in Carlsson‟s words „critical mass of people, 
 58 
ideas, and as well as physical resources and infrastructure
89’ are important prerequisites 
for a system to gain momentum and to become autonomous in turn
90
. The concept of 
momentum is similar to the earlier mentioned „trajectories‟ or the „development blocs‟ 
defined in Carlsson‟s study as „a sequence of complementarities which by way of a series 
of structural tensions, i.e. disequilibria, may result in a balanced situation
91‟. It can be 
concluded then that the winner of the competition creates momentum or certain 
trajectories that will be followed by the new actors or network of actors resulting in 
„consolidation and standardisation‟ of the systems. Eventually, the system reaches 
maturity. Putting it another way, Hughes‟ evolutionary pattern illustrates a transition 
from a number of local „closed‟ systems to an autonomous, „open‟ large technological 
system. 
 
 
Figure 5: Evolutionary pattern of technological systems 
Source: Author, adapted from Hughes T. P. (1983, 1987) 
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by Schumpeter. 
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To conclude, the LTS framework – similar to the taxonomy of innovations defined by 
Freeman and Perez – emphasises the need for the clustering of inventions and 
innovations to form a complex system on the one hand, the factors originating from 
within and outside the system that should be taken into consideration to establish a 
prolonged system on the other. For this reason, it stresses the importance of constant 
research, development and deployment activities required to tackle problems within a 
system and to adjust it to the wider, economic, political and social environment it is 
embedded in. As demonstrated in the last phase of the evolutionary pattern, failure to do 
so may result in the emergence of a rival system threatening the dominant position of the 
old one. This point is particularly important for the subject matter of this thesis which is 
analysing the emergence of new technological systems inside the old ones that can solve 
the problems and result in changes in both levels; the established technological system 
and the environment – or using the terminology of Freeman and Perez, clusters of new 
technological systems leading to changes in techno-economic paradigms. This 
framework, therefore, provides an excellent method to investigate the emergence and 
diffusion of radical technologies such as hydrogen fuel cells. It describes how bringing in 
actors from different disciplines can create closed systems around these technologies by 
combining them with the other related radically new technologies such as hydrogen 
production, storage and distribution technologies. It also gives insights into understanding 
the factors that may create opportunities for these new systems to gain a footing within 
the established energy system and eventually open up by either hybridising with the old 
or by transforming the old and generating a new open system. Thus the LTS framework 
can guide us towards understanding the mechanisms required to analyse a long-term 
transition to a hydrogen economy by developing new technological systems inside the 
energy sector.  
 
However, in our understanding this framework fails to illustrate one important aspect of 
what happens after a technological system gains momentum. In the literature it is argued 
this is generally followed by what is described as further network externalities resulting 
in inflexible networks. This is a very important point that needs to be explored as the 
present energy sector is identified not only by its complex relations within and between 
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different sectors but also by its rigid structure. Therefore, it is necessary to refer to the 
work of Arthur (1989) and David (1985, 1986) and revise how the outcome of two or 
more competing technologies can lead to lock-in in an industry and create barriers to the 
entrance of new systems. Following this, the concept of lock-in in the energy sector, 
namely carbon lock-in is introduced to highlight the barriers that alternative energy 
systems need to overcome.   
2.6. Technological Lock-in 
It has been accepted earlier in this chapter that energy sector is well established in the 
sense that all the components in this system such as the technologies, complementary 
components, infrastructure, organisations, research institutes are working in harmony and 
have so far been successful in responding to the changing demand and cost conditions. 
However, this statement should not be regarded as a problem-free energy system. On the 
contrary, today this industry is facing major challenges; resource depletion, security of 
supply concerns, the concentration of reserves in some parts of the world and import 
dependency, environmental degradation and climate change 
   
As engineers and organisations have been searching and innovating based on the 
prevailing conditions of the current regime, their priority has been to improve the existing 
technologies. This inevitably has resulted in under development of technological 
alternatives. Dosi (1982) describes this fact as an „exclusion effect of technological 
paradigms’, and he states that as ‘the efforts and the technological imagination of 
engineers and organisations they are in are focused in rather precise directions they 
become blind with respect to other technological possibilities‟92. Putting it another way, 
regimes identify the capabilities, opportunities and boundaries within the existing 
conditions, under these parameters some technologies are found to be better or they 
promise higher returns to their adoption compared to their alternatives. They therefore 
become the focus of research and development activities creating a technological 
trajectory that let them improve their performance and enjoy increasing returns to scale. 
In the literature, this phenomenon is known as the emergence of a „dominant design‟. 
Once it is established the dominant design is further developed leading to what is known 
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as „technological lock-in‟. This is described by Unruh (2000) as an outcome of technical 
progress driven by path dependent increasing returns to scale
93
.  
 
However, some scholars disagree with the idea that the potentially superior technology 
will win the competition between different technologies. David (1986)
94
 and Arthur 
(1989)
95
 argue that an inferior technology, can dominate the market of potential adopters 
if it gains an initial lead in the adoptions by chance factors which the authors call 
„historical accidents‟ or „insignificant events‟. In order to support their argument, they 
point to two interesting and very well known studies; the competition between the light 
water and gas-cooled nuclear reactors (Arthur, 1989)
96
 and the rivalry between 
QWERTY and Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (DSK) layouts (David 1985, 1986)
97
. In 
these examples, they show that even though neither QWERTY design nor the light water 
nuclear reactors were superior during the early days of their respective competitions, they 
nevertheless managed to gain an early advantage over their rivals. As they became better 
known and underwent more improvement the more the more attractive they became to 
potential adopters.  Arthur (1988) calls this a „bandwagon effect‟ that occurs as a result of 
adoptions which create increased attractiveness to technologies and argues that if these 
bandwagons could have been generated for those technologies which lost the 
competition, they might as well have become superior and dominated the market
98
. 
Emphasising the significance of adoptions for the emergence of a dominant technology in 
a market, he identifies five main drivers leading to increasing returns to adoption;    
 
 Learning by using: Often the more a technology is adopted, the more it is used, 
and the more is learned about it and therefore; the more it is developed and 
improved; 
 Network externalities: Often a technology offers advantages to going along with 
other adopters of it – to belonging to a network of users; 
 Scale economies in production: Often, where a technology is embodied in a 
product, the cost of the product falls as increased numbers of units of it are 
produced. Thus the technology can become more attractive in price as adoption 
increases; 
 Informational increasing returns: Often a technology that is more adopted 
enjoys the advantage of being better known and better understood. For the risk-
averse, adopting it becomes more attractive if it becomes widespread, 
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 Technological interrelatedness: often as technology becomes more adopted, a 
number of other sub-technologies and products become part of its infrastructure. 
This puts it at an advantage in the sense that other technologies, if less adopted, 
may lack the requisite infrastructure or may require a partial dismantling of the 
more widespread technology’s in-place infrastructure99.  
 
As Arthur himself suggests even though the mechanisms are not the same and the starting 
points differ, the competing technologies model and the evolutionary systems approach 
have common characteristics
100
.   
 
Learning processes provide the basis for adoption in Arthur‟s model of competing 
technologies. Increasing adoption and utilisation of technologies improve their 
performance and reduce the uncertainty about them. When technologies are better known 
they become more attractive and can be accepted by more users – this type of agent in a 
regime can be manufacturers, suppliers and/or consumers. The involvement of these 
agents usually lead to the further development and adoption as they tend to complement 
the existing products with sub-technologies which influence the consumers to use more 
of those products. Users tend to prefer the technologies which have their complementary 
parts compatible with other technologies. For instance, a user would more likely to buy a 
car from a manufacturer which provide wider maintenance facilities or a car of which 
parts are well-matched with the components offered by other suppliers. In addition, 
consumers are also influenced by the choice of other consumers. For example in the case 
of utility services such as electricity or heating, customers generally prefer to purchase 
from utility companies with wider networks believing that it would be more reliable as 
more customers are linked to them. This phenomenon of „positive external consumption 
benefits‟101 namely network externalities is studied by Shapiro and Katz (1985, 1986) 
who describe this effect as „the utility that a given  user derives from the good depends 
upon the number of other users who are in the same ‘network’ as is he or she’102. 
Analysing this effect within the concept of regimes, then it can be stated that adoption of 
technologies or consumption of products increases in relation to the number of other 
agents such as manufacturers, suppliers, service providers and consumers using them. 
These externalities result in market growth which increase the production volumes and 
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decrease the unit production costs as fixed costs will be spread over them (scale 
economies)
103
.  
Hence, the tendency of actors for refining and following identified trajectories usually 
results in increasing returns to adoption. The more experience is gained with those 
technologies, the more they will be adopted, and that trajectory will appeal to a wider 
proportion of potential imitators. Therefore, Arthur suggests that under these sources of 
increasing returns, and accumulation of small random events, a technology can gain 
dominant position and become locked-in or can leave the alternative technologies locked-
out
104
. 
 
However, accepting that only technologies lock-in is only partially true. As has been 
illustrated in this section, in the presence of increasing returns, market growth occurs 
which increases the competition not only among the technologies but also between the 
organisations. For instance, a reduction in costs creates further production and 
consumption-network externalities which will affect the other actors involved in a regime 
to take actions towards improving those technologies. These actors can be private 
organisations or the public authorities and/or government organisations that create 
standards, financial bodies and research and educational institutions that ensure further 
market and social adoptions. For this reason, the subject of lock-in can not be analysed 
within a limited framework of technologies but should also encompass lock-in at the 
organisational and institutional level.  
 
Going back to the argument of technological lock-in, when technologies start to display 
increasing returns, they become attractive to investors and firms and therefore a number 
of new small firms enter the market. As Abernathy and Utterback (1982)
105
 describes, in 
the early days of innovations, since neither performance requirements for new products 
are well-defined nor the targets are set, markets, are characterised with uncertainty and 
flexibility, having low barriers to entry. For this reason, during this period, new small 
firms enter the industry and a wide range of products are introduced, which results in 
diversity and competition in the market. Under these circumstances, firms naturally focus 
on improvements on product lines and production processes to increase their market 
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shares, and as a consequence, some small firms grow, some merge to survive and some 
others exit the market
106
. This chaotic situation continues until a dominant design 
emerges. Once the dominant technology is identified, in Nelson‟s (1995)107 words; 
industry goes through a ‘shake out and settles down to established largish firms’ locking-
out the other firms producing alternatives. Subsequently, innovation strategies of firms 
change. Abernathy and Utterback (1982) and Unruh (2000)
108
 explain this as a shift from 
product to process innovations generated by firms which are motivated to achieve 
economies of scale. Such shifts can be very powerful; firms learn more about the 
products, processes, complimentary equipment and infrastructure requirements and cost 
and demand conditions. As a consequence, not only technologies but also firms lock-in to 
a new dominant design.   
 
Nelson (1995), Unruh (2000) and Foxon (2002
109
, 2006
110
) argue that while technologies 
and firms are co-developing and eventually getting locked-in, institutions evolve in the 
meantime. In a study by Foxon (2006), institutions are defined as „any form of constraint 
that human beings devise to shape human interactions‟111. These forms of constraints in 
other words institutions can be of different types. For instance, when the technologies 
start to be adopted, one related aspect would be having trained persons to deal with the 
new technologies, in order to meet this need, „knowledge based institutions‟ such as 
technical schools, societies and universities are set up
112
. In relation, new publications, 
journals and periodicals emerge to disseminate information about the developments in the 
industry. Furthermore, labour unions, industrial associations and trade organisations are 
formed to create standards and rules to protect and represent the rights of people 
involved. Finally, government institutions intervene to standardise and legitimise all these 
interactions between different groups by imposing regulations. Involvement of all these 
institutions can be seen as further network externalities which generate further learning, 
new utilisation and consumption patterns and higher economic returns. Thus, it 
strengthens the adoption of dominant technologies on one hand, and on the other, creates 
a bigger barrier for the alternative technologies/products to enter or survive in the market. 
Thus this final picture of technologies, organisations and institutions implies a system or 
as Unruh (2000, 2002
113
) calls, a techno-institutional complex (TIC), which co-evolve 
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following an emergence of a dominant technological design. Describing technological 
lock-in from an evolutionary systems point of view stems from this understanding that all 
technologies adopted, have created certain trajectories and become part of a system or 
broadly defined a regime and have affected and been affected by different agents of that 
regime. For that reason, technological lock-in is defined as a path-dependent process 
driven by increasing returns to scale
114
 as the agents (consumers, firms, institutions) 
involved in a regime tend to follow a trajectory which becomes more known, profitable 
and therefore less risky. An illustration of mechanisms and interactions creating lock-in is 
presented in Figure 6.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Adoption mechanisms and technological lock-in 
Source: Author 
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2.7. Lock-in and Lock-out in the Energy Sector 
Such competitions and co-evolutionary patterns leading to lock-in have been observed in 
the energy sector. The most important two competitions in this sector have been the ones 
between internal combustion engine (ICE), steam engines and batteries to power cars and 
the battle between two currents; direct (DC) and alternative current (AC). The dominant 
technologies, ICE and AC that have emerged as a result of these competitions have long 
been argued and there is still disagreement that they were superior to their alternatives. 
However, despite the conflicts, these technologies got adopted as they displayed 
increasing returns to their adoption and have had a far-reaching impact on all sectors of 
the economy. For instance, the appearance of gasoline powered ICE have led to 
emergence of complimentary parts (auxiliary units, fuelling infrastructure and road 
infrastructures), process innovations like the mass production system of Ford, new firms 
such as petroleum companies, auto-manufacturers, service providers and also new 
institutions. All these developments around the ICEs have not only locked-in the road 
transportation but also have had spill-over effects on the other industries such as the oil 
industry, air transportation, electricity generation and heating sectors. Similar 
competitions and developments occurred in the power sector.The most cited of which is 
the competition between AC and DC, described earlier in this chapter.  
 
When the battle of currents resulted in favour of AC – more correctly a hybrid design of 
AC and DC, one of the most important consequences was a change in the architectural 
design of electricity production and distribution; a shift from decentralised to centralised 
power generation which allowed production close to resources and long distance 
transmission providing the opportunities to expand the grid, and increase the network of 
users. This era of expansion was further strengthened due to the availability of cheap and 
abundant resources of coal. All these openings led to an identification of a trajectory; 
generating electricity via burning of fossil fuels. Since its acceptance, this trajectory has 
been continuously explored. Larger power plants based on carbon fuels have been 
developed, to supply more fuel to the increasing numbers of such power stations new 
sources of fossil fuels such as gas and oil have been explored, and therefore new power 
stations (CCGT, CHP) have been designed to take advantage of these available sources. 
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As these technological systems displayed increasing returns to their adoption larger firms 
have shown interest, new organisations and institutions have been set up and these 
systems have been used to serve new applications and new sectors such as heating, 
industry and domestic sectors via new types of power stations.  
 
Despite the success in their expansion, the combination of all these technological, 
organisational and institutional developments in these two sectors and the others related 
to them have created a rigid network of energy production and utilisation based on fossil-
fuels. In order to refer to its impacts on the environment, such inflexibility in the energy 
sector is named „carbon lock-in‟. The evolutionary pattern and the choices made along 
this way leading to lock-in, has been associated with many problems this sector is facing. 
On one hand, excessive exploration and consumption of these carbon based sources has 
led to a list of problems. On the other hand, constant research and development activities 
focused on this type of technologies due to their display of increasing returns have left 
the alternative technologies such as renewable energy systems and hydrogen energy 
technologies under developed. Finally, even if these alternatives may prove to solve some 
of these problems, this rigid structure is acting as a major barrier to the entry of these 
cleaner systems. The actors of the current sector are reluctant to explore these 
unconventional options as they require new technologies, trained staff, and additional 
financial resources and might eventually threaten the market shares of the existing 
technologies and wipe out past investments.  
 
However, the existence of technological or carbon lock-in should not be viewed as a 
permanent condition. This is one of the most criticised points in the theory provided by 
Arthur and David that it accepts lock-in almost as an irreversible process and therefore 
fails to describe how such lock-in can be overcome
115
. In our understanding, the adoption 
mechanisms identified in this theory can be used to create new increasing return 
technologies or systems and overcome the lock-in, in the case of applying them to the 
parts of the established system where there is backwardness. This acceptance falls in line 
with the argument of the exploration of reverse salients described by Hughes. Similarly 
Islas (1997) argues that „if the increasing returns to adoption of a new technology are 
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large enough to trigger a self-reinforcing mechanism, depending on the market niche 
captured, the new system can become competitive and overcome the lock-in‟116. In order 
to support his argument he refers to the competition between the steam and gas turbine 
and illustrates that even though, in the early days of the competition, ST emerged as a 
dominant design for electricity generation and created a lock-in, decades later, gas 
turbine, could enter this sector and gain a dominant position. With the development of 
several complementary inventions (by Thomas Savery, Thomas Newcomen, James Watt, 
etc.) in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, it allowed the emergence of the turbo generator 
invented by Sir Charles Algernon Parsons, which, laid the foundations for today‟s steam 
turbines and since its invention, has dominated the power generation industry
117
.  As Islas 
(1999) describes, this lock-in to ST was created due to the initial superior performance 
and successful adoptions of diesel and steam turbines and low thermal efficiency of gas 
turbines (below 3%)
118
. However, the drawbacks associated with this latter technology 
could be solved in the aircraft industry following the turbo-jet engine designs of Hans 
von Ohain and Frank Whittle which linked the combustion chamber to a turbine
119
. This 
invention, when promised higher speed, cheaper fuel options
120
 and increase in the output 
power of the aircrafts
121
, led to number of further developments and eventually to the 
evolution of a complex system around the gas turbine. Islas (1999) defines this complex 
system as: 
 
the product of the complex relationships between new scientific knowledge like 
aerodynamics, new technical understanding which had been building up since the 
work of inventors on the GT at the beginning of the century, new materials (in 
particular the super alloys), new methods and process of manufacture, new 
techniques for experimentation and measurement, new methods of numerical 
calculation, new techniques for testing and quality control, and new developments 
such as the GT, the rocket, and the turbojet.
122
 
 
After this system was used in the military aircraft during the WWП, and proved that it 
worked efficiently, actors from different disciplines showed interest. Following the war 
the gas turbines were transferred and used in different applications; modern planes, cars, 
ships, a variety of industrial applications and power generation. Since at those times, the 
electricity sector has been dominated by steam turbines, these latter turbines could not 
replace the existing ones; rather they were used as complimentary components in the 
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decentralised and low load factor areas where they were more advantageous (rapid start-
up time, ability to meet varying electricity demands, low costs
123
) and the dominant 
steam turbines had flows. Though, even in these areas, the gas turbines utilised in the jet 
engines had to go through a number of modifications to be adapted to generate power and 
also to comply with the techno-economic standards previously set for ST
124
. 
Electromechanical organisations took the initiative to solve these reverse salients and 
constantly improved this technology.  
 
At the end of 1950s, the transfer of the GT as an auxiliary device from aircraft industry to 
the power sector was almost completed in the US. While in Europe, due to the scarcity of 
natural gas and abundant sources of coal, this technology was not favoured for power 
generation. The situation in Europe changed after the major oil crisis in 1970‟s and 
following exploration of North Sea oil and gas which diverted research and development 
activities towards improvement of gas turbines. However, there were still barriers. The 
1975 European Union Large Combustion Plant Directive put forward to protect the 
existing coal and nuclear power industries, constrained the adoption of this technology
125
. 
A new design, namely the combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) linking the existing ST 
with the new entrant GT, which emerged as a result of decades long learning processes 
and adaptations leading to its complimentary components, ended the competition 
between these turbines. This was due to the superior performances associated with the 
new hybrid system; rapid starting and stopping, low operational and capital costs, 
modularity allowing diversity in plant sizes and low electricity drops in the case of 
breakdowns and finally increases in energy efficiency
126
. As its techno-economic 
advantages and further benefits for the environment (lower GHG emissions) became 
apparent, policy measures were taken to allow the diffusion of these new systems. For 
instance,  the withdrawal of European Union Large Combustion Plant Directive in 1984 
and consequent privatisation of this sector led to a 38% increase in the utilisation of 
natural gas for electricity generation between 1990-2000
127
. Finally, the emergence of a 
new system in the presence of lock-in resulted in not only a transition from single cycle 
steam and gas turbines to combined cycle power stations but also a change in the fuel 
mix- a shift from coal to gas.  
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To sum up, all these historical competitions and their outcomes have helped develop the 
theoretical understanding of technical change and transitions. On one hand, they have 
illustrated how technological, organisational and institutional lock-in can occur in the 
presence of increasing returns to adoption and how it can act as a major barrier to the 
entry of alternative, possibly superior technologies. On the other hand, these competitions 
have proven that the sources of increasing returns to adoption can also be viewed as 
required mechanisms to create and adopt new systems by complimenting radical 
technologies with other technologies and supporting them with different network of 
actors such as manufacturing companies, R&D organisations, investment and legal firms. 
Therefore, in our understanding, if these adoption mechanisms and developments and 
problems in the existing systems and surrounding environment are taken into 
consideration in each phase of the evolutionary pattern defined by Hughes, not only 
successful systems can be created but also these systems can overcome the condition of 
lock-in and can eventually lead to a transformations both in the established system and its 
wider environment. This view of a transition, which aims to illustrate a shift from small 
closed systems to open large technical systems with the consideration of the required 
adoption mechanisms, is illustrated in Figure 7. However, the acceptance that a transition 
occurs as an outcome of changes, developments and interaction in these two levels; large 
technological system and the environment is only partially true. As the historical case 
studies show, the emergence of novelties implies the existence of a different level. 
Therefore any study analysing transitions should involve this third level to demonstrate 
the emergence and alignment of new technologies. 
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Figure 7: Evolution of and competition between systems 
Source: Author 
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2.8. Multi-Level Perspective and Socio-technical Transitions 
In the evolutionary systems approach, scholars have illustrated classification of 
innovations and argued that technological transitions occur as innovations are clustered in 
a manner that lead to new systems of which components shape and are shaped by novelty 
in their contexts
128
. Therefore, in order to describe the relations within and between the 
contents and the contexts, they have introduced concepts like paradigms, regimes and 
environment. The approaches reviewed earlier in this chapter; technological regimes and 
paradigms (Nelson & Winter, Dosi), transformation of local systems to large 
technological systems (Hughes) and taxonomy of innovations (Freeman & Perez) have 
stemmed from this understanding. Elaborating on the same thought process, Kemp 
(1994)
129
, Kemp et al. (1998)
130
, Rip & Kemp (1998), Van den Ende & Kemp (1999)
131
, 
Kemp et al. (2001)
132
 and Geels (2002)
133
 have developed a multi-level perspective 
(MLP). In this framework, the authors have identified three levels namely; niches, socio-
technical regimes and landscape to describe a transition as a result of the co-evolution of 
developments at these multiple levels
134
. In their studies, these levels are defined in 
detail: 
 Niches, which are the micro-level in the MLP, are described as protected spaces 
for the development and use of promising technologies by means of 
experimentation, with the aim of learning about the desirability of the new 
technology and enhancing the further development and the rate of application of 
the new technology (Kemp et al., 1998). At this level, technologies are shielded 
from the market competition allowing the development of radical innovations and 
construction of social networks via the use of learning mechanisms. As Geels 
(2005) states, depending on the type of the niche (either technological or market 
niche), this protection can be in the form of public subsidies, strategic investments 
by firms or regular market transactions provide the resources
135
.  
 Technological regime refers to the grammar or rule set embedded in a complex 
of engineering practices, production process technologies, product 
characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of handling relevant artefacts and 
persons, ways of defining problems; all of them embedded in institutions and 
infrastructures (Rip and Kemp, 1998: 340). In order to demonstrate varying 
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interests, characteristics and the linkages between different social groups, Geels 
(2002, 2005) has developed this concept and coined the term socio-technical 
regime which implies the co-existence of regimes of different nature; 
technological, science, policy, socio-cultural and user-market regimes. 
Functioning of this wide socio-technical regime concept is analysed along three 
dimensions; network of actors and social groups, rules and institutions and finally 
socio-technical systems (it must be noted that in the later work of this author this 
dimension is referred to as material and technical elements
136
) which interact to 
build-up and improve the existing regime
137
. While the linkages between these 
dimensions are being established in the niches, they are stable at the regime level. 
On one hand, the stabilised regime can create a barrier for the novelties in the 
niches to break through, on the other, possibility of conflict of interests amongst 
these pillars and/or other problems that can occur in this level due to internal or 
external developments can generate opportunities for the niches to enter
138
. The 
interactions between these pillars are illustrated by Geels (2005) in Figure 8.   
 
Figure 8: Three inter-related analytic dimensions  
Source: Geels F. W. (2005), Technological Transitions and System Innovations; A Co-evolutionary 
and Socio-technical Analysis, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, p: 17 
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can provide insights into understanding how the energy sector works, it is important to 
elaborate on these elements. As Geels (2004) describes, the socio-technical systems cover 
resources such as the artefacts, knowledge, capital, labour to fulfil the functions including 
the production, diffusion and use of technology
140
. These sub-functions are conducted by 
human actors and organisations whose actions are shaped by context that involves the 
existing rules
141
. However, the relation between the socio-technical systems and the 
actors as well as the rules is not one-way. Although  actors act according to the rules they 
are also the ones that produce and change them
142
. At the same time, existing materials 
and technologies within the socio-technical systems structure the activities and 
perceptions of actors
143
. A similar dual relationship exists between the socio-technical 
systems and rules; rules which are embedded in the artefacts and technologies, are also 
constrained by the scientific laws and technical possibilities
144
. To summarise, the meso-
level functions as a result of the co-evolution of these three elements; socio-technical 
systems, human actors and rules. 
It can be seen that the meso-level described by Geels has similarities with the Large 
Technical Systems defined by Hughes. As discussed earlier, large technical systems 
involve physical and non-physical artefacts as well as system builders. As the theory 
suggests, changes in one part of the system affects the other components. In other words, 
all these components co-evolve in large technical systems. The difference is that Geels 
conducts a wider analysis which takes into account the different set of rules; cognitive, 
normative and regulative rules that coordinate activities
145
. Although, some of these rules 
(scientific laws, technical possibilities, regulative rules) are implicit in the LTS theory, as 
Geels (2004) states; the focus of the framework is on material aspects of systems, in 
particular technologies with infrastructures. Due to the similarities with the subject matter 
of this thesis, the concept of LTS will be considered a proxy for the regime and energy 
sector will be treated as an LTS situated at the meso-level.  
 Finally, socio-technical landscape which is the macro-level in the MLP,  
describes an external structure or context for interactions of actors which contains 
a set of heterogeneous factors, such as oil prices, economic growth, wars, 
emigration, broad political coalitions, cultural and normative values, 
environmental problems
146. Similar to the concept of „environment‟ described by 
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Hughes, actors involved in the LTS or socio-technical regime cannot influence the 
landscape in the early days of system development until the linkages between 
different components in the niche and regime level are stabilised.  
 
Geels (2002) describes the relation between these levels as a nested hierarchy where 
niches are embedded within meso-level; socio-technical regimes which are in turn 
surrounded by the macro-level landscape
147
 (Figure 9). Due to this nested structure, a 
transition is viewed as a change that stems from the co-evolution of developments at 
these multiple levels
148
. Therefore, in contrast to conventional theories which use a 
bottom-up or a top-down approach, transitions in this context, can be analysed from a 
combination of both perspectives.  According to Kemp et al. (1998, 2001) and Geels 
(2002) transitions start within the niche level where system builders create and develop 
novelties and support them with complimentary innovations, new organisations, financial 
means and institutional adaptations. However, such bottom-up developments can only 
lead to transitions when top-down changes occur; changes at the landscape level can put 
pressure on the socio-technical regime where window of opportunities can be created for 
the niches to breakdown and gain a footing in this level
149
. As a result, new trajectories 
can surface and a shift from one socio-technical regime to another can come about
150
. In 
the literature, this type of transitions focusing on transformation of socio-technical regime 
via MLP has been named strategic niche management (Kemp et al. 1998, 2001), 
technological transitions (Geels 2002) and system innovations (Geels 2004, 2005). 
Transition taking place along these multi-levels has been illustrated in Figure 10. 
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Figure 9: Multi-levels as a nested hierarchy 
Source: Geels F., 2002, Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfigurations processes: a multi-
level perspective and a case-study, Research Policy, Vol.31, p: 1261 
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Figure 10: Multi-level perspective on transitions. 
Source: Geels F. W., (2002), Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfigurations processes: a 
multi-level perspective and a case-study, Research Policy, Vol.31, p: 1263 
 
Despite its help in analysing the emergence of radical innovations from outside the 
regimes, this transition model has been criticised from different aspects. One of the most 
criticised points was that this framework did not illustrate the break down of niches. In 
order to show how radical innovations can move from niche to regime level, Geels 
(2005) has developed the theory and introduced four phases;  
 emergence of novelty in the context of existing regime and landscape,  
 technical specialisation in market niches; exploration of new functionalities, 
 breakthrough, wide diffusion and competition with the established regime, 
 gradual replacement of established regime, transformations and wider impacts151.  
 
In his analysis, Geels (2005) has discussed that along these phases, radical innovations 
change characteristics; while in the early ages of their development they are fit to the 
requirements of the existing regimes, when new functionalities are found they stretch and 
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that as these novelties are complimented with new technologies and niches accumulate, a 
transition from one socio-technical regime to another occurs
152
. Therefore, a wide 
transition is viewed as a change that takes place when niches are fully developed. In other 
words, the emergence of a dominant design as a result of learning processes, involvement 
of powerful actors, price/performance improvements and new applications in different 
market niches
153
. These parts have been added to the MLP theory by Geels (2005) in 
response to further criticisms. However, this perception of transition has also been argued 
to have gaps since the developments and changes in the analytical levels of the MLP do 
not arise simultaneously, transitional pathways of different nature exist. In the study of 
Geels and Schot (2007), in order to refer to these different timescales and developmental 
status, five transitional pathways have been identified
154
:  
 Reproduction process: in the absence of pressure from landscape level, the 
regime is stable implying the capability to solve its problems without external 
help from outside, i.e. niche innovations. This is not a transitional pathway rather 
the initial condition of the MLP.  
 Transformation path: when there is a moderate landscape pressure and not 
sufficiently developed niches, regimes are transformed by the cumulative 
contributions from the regime and outside actors.  
 De-alignment and re-alignment path: in the presence of strong pressure from 
landscape and under-developed niches, the regime can go through de-alignment 
resulting in openings for multiple niches to co-exist and compete and eventually 
lead to realignment of a new regime.  
 Technological substitution: when the regime level is stable, if pressure from 
landscape appears at a time coinciding with a fully developed niche, novelties 
break through and create a technological substitution in the regime.  
 Reconfiguration pathway: the innovations developed in the niches have 
complimentary relations with the existing regime, they can be hybridised and 
eventually lead to reconfiguration of the regime‟s architecture – larger changes 
compared to transformation path. 
 Sequence of transition pathways: if the pressure from the landscape level is a 
gradually increasing kind, the aforementioned transitional pathways can occur 
consequently; a transition can start with transformation leading to reconfiguration 
followed by substitution or re-alignment and de-alignment.  
 
Currently, in the energy sector, all these transitional pathways can be studied. Today, 
because of changing circumstances in the landscape (climate change, resource depletion, 
increasing oil prices and imports, and security of supply) and problems in the regime 
level; conflict of interests between actors, aging of assets, diversity of resources available 
for technological development in different regions, different alternative energy 
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technologies are found promising; energy efficiency measures, carbon management, 
renewable energy technologies, hydrogen and fuel cells. This illustrates the existence of a 
diverse range of niches; ongoing R&D activities in different directions. In this sense, the 
transitional pathway resembles the „de-alignment and re-alignment path‟ where there is 
competition between these alternative technologies for adoption. On the other hand, as a 
large number of actors involved in the energy sector do not believe that pressure from 
landscape level is of an intense nature (i.e. disbelief in the depletion of oil), they opt for 
incremental changes such as energy efficiency measures and carbon management which 
enable the utilisation of existing structure, resources and capabilities to tackle problems 
like carbon emissions, climate change and security of supply.  
 
In the case that development of these niches solves the problems in the landscape, the 
transition takes the form of a ‘transformation pathway’. However, unlike the previous 
actors some others perceive that these measures can only bring short to medium term 
solutions and that in the long run problems like depletion of fossil fuels, increasing oil 
prices and imports, greater environmental degradation and security of supply can only be 
tackled if the energy sector undergoes much greater modifications. Thus, these agents 
favour the development of niches such as renewable energy technologies and the 
hydrogen economy that will require changes amongst the interlinked dimensions of the 
regime level leading to long-term solutions and hence a „reconfiguration pathway’. The 
„sequence of transition pathways‟, therefore, becomes the most suitable in the current 
context where the aim is to analyse the transition to hydrogen economy in the presence of 
competing niches and gradually increasing pressures from the landscape implying that all 
the aforementioned pathways can co-exist or occur sequentially
155
. However, as the 
recent economic recession has proven even though the current energy sector involves a 
number of competing niches, the pressures at the landscape level can change much faster 
and are more of a much more extreme nature than has been assumed by Geels and Schot 
(2007).   
With this understanding, in an attempt to apply the MLP framework to the current energy 
sector; the hydrogen economy, energy efficiency measures, carbon management, and 
renewable energy technologies are treated as novelties that need development to enter the 
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regime level. Furthermore, the problems the energy sector is facing today become the 
pressures from the landscape level, while, the rigid structure (aforementioned lock-in 
condition) of this sector with its organisations, technologies, institutions and regulatory 
framework forms the regime level. This perspective of the energy sector and wider 
developments is illustrated in Figure 11.   
 
 
Figure 11: Current energy sector from multi-level perspective.  
Source: Author 
 
2.9. Discussions and Conclusions 
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interpret the big picture of energy sector; the components, the networks, current 
problems, challenges ahead and their potential solutions and to narrow it down to the 
subject matter of this thesis where the aim is to develop a combined tool to understand 
how a socio-technical transition to hydrogen economy may come about. 
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To start with, MLP framework proves fruitful to conceptualise the internal and external 
dynamics of the energy sector. By the help of this model, energy industry, in the broadest 
sense, has been studied in three nested analytical levels; „landscape‟ consisting of the 
current problems and challenges ahead (i.e. sustainability challenge, climate change 
pressure, increasing oil prices and imports, increasing energy demand, supply security, 
political instability, etc.), „socio-technical regime‟ representing the network of 
components (technologies, organisations and institutions) and sub-systems in the energy 
sector and finally the „niches‟ which involve the alternative technological systems; i.e. 
potential solutions to the problems in the landscape. Subsequently, each of the 
technological systems in niches is identified as separate transitional pathways and that 
their initiation and development will come from collective efforts of both public and 
private actions. Treating these niches as separate pathways however has not stemmed 
from the understanding that they are isolated from the others, rather the aim has been to 
narrow down the options and introduce the object of analysis; a shift from current energy 
technologies to hydrogen economy of which occurrence is dependent on developments in 
both the existing technologies and the emerging ones at niche level. Having identified the 
focus of transition in this thesis, it has become important to demarcate not only the 
analytical but also the empirical levels in this study, which falls in line with the argument 
of Geels and Schot (2007)
156
 who has highlighted the need for these levels to operate the 
MLP. When the empirical levels are concerned, the Large Technological Systems model 
has surfaced as the most appropriate framework for analysing transition to hydrogen 
economy which is very techno-economic in its nature in the early days of its 
development. The LTS theory is found suitable not only due to its focus on techno-
economic and social aspects of technical change but also because it has enabled us to 
examine the evolution of networks and the inter-linkages between sub-systems in the 
energy sector as well as the interactions between this industry and other disciplines of the 
economy. Following this thought process, these two models have been integrated and the 
meso-level of MLP; the socio-technical regime is treated as a large technological system. 
Our understanding; the combination of MLP and the LTS frameworks, is illustrated in 
Figure 12.   
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Figure 12: A combined tool of LTS and MLP applied to energy sector.  
Source: Author 
 
With the help of this tool, energy sector is then regarded as an open large technological 
system, which has a network of physical and non-physical components as well as sub-
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technologies model have been used and it is accepted that in the case of interlinking these 
new technologies with sub-technologies and complimenting them with a network of 
actors, organisations and institutions, new successful systems can be formed. If their 
development coincides with the window of opportunities that might occur in the regime 
level due to changes in its landscape, these alternative systems can evolve to be 
hybridised with the dominant system or can eventually replace it. Thus, in this thesis, 
transition is viewed as a shift from small „closed‟ systems in the niches to „open‟ large 
technical systems at the regime level which is influenced by the adoption mechanisms 
and the external factors in the landscape. This view of a transition, in other words 
emergence of a new system in the presence of a dominant system, the factors affecting 
and mechanisms required for its evolution are illustrated in Figure 13. This figure is an 
elaboration on previously demonstrated Figure 7. The additional points are the dotted 
niche levels which explain the surfacing of novelties and the actions taken to develop a 
closed system around radical technologies. In this figure, the green lines represent the 
steps of evolutionary pattern while the boxes demonstrate the adoption mechanisms that 
need to take place for these systems to grow, gain momentum and therefore open up to 
become a large technological system which can respond to the problems in the landscape.   
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Figure 13: A combined view of a transition via emergence of new systems 
Source: Author 
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To conclude, the aim of this review has been to find insights from the literature that will 
help develop a tool to analyse the transitional pathways to alternative energy systems, and 
one shift in particular; transition to hydrogen economy based on combination of the 
existing and new technologies to achieve sustainable and clean energy systems. The tool 
presented in this chapter has provided us with the understanding that transitions in the 
energy sector can not be examined in isolated disciplines; rather a systemic approach 
combining different realms of technology, economics, policy and society is required. 
Furthermore, this review has enabled us to ask appropriate questions while searching in 
these related areas, for instance, in the technology field these research questions can be; 
the current status of hydrogen technologies, the complimentary technologies required and 
what they need to achieve to be compatible and/or competitive with the existing 
technologies. Moreover, this review has also surfaced the need to look at the big picture 
of the energy sector, the developments outside this sector, their effectiveness and also 
impacts on this industry and on the emerging technologies. Following chapters are 
structured in this manner that each aspect mentioned in this tool is analysed; the 
developments at the landscape level, the existing status and affairs in the energy sector 
and its related disciplines and techno-economic as well as social position of hydrogen 
technologies.   
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Chapter 3 
TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSITIONS IN THE ELECTRICITY 
SECTOR 
3.1. Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how new technological niches can be formed 
and can follow a pattern of evolution that may result in the emergence of new trajectories 
leading to new systems at the regime level, where there is dominance of another 
technological system. In order to conduct this analysis, the history of electrification is 
used as a case study. The examination of the early years of electrification provides an 
understanding on how a technological system; the direct current (DC) electricity system 
is formed from an invention; the electric lamp by bringing together the interacting 
components such as technologies and actors from different disciplines and by taking into 
account the social, economic and legislative factors to ensure acceptance and adoption of 
a system. It also helps analyse how the problems that might occur during the growth of 
systems and/or the external factors can affect the direction of a transition and lead to 
emergence of competing technological systems such as the alternative current (AC) 
electricity system. This in turn provides the foundations for investigating the possible 
outcomes of the co-existence of multiple technological options which might lead to the 
adoption of one of the competing systems or a hybrid system that combines different 
features of each competing options as was the case with the adoption of hybrid AC-DC 
system. Finally the analysis draws insights into understanding how the establishment of a 
universal system can create a lock-in and have a long-lasting impact such as the current 
carbon lock-in problem the alternative energy systems are facing. 
3.2. Technological Lock-in in the Electricity Sector 
Technological lock-in and a further systems lock-in around the technologies has occurred 
in some sectors of the economy. In this section, it is intended to focus on lock-in in 
energy sector; how new electricity systems were created in the existence of other systems 
and how competing technologies resulted in the evolution of certain technological 
trajectories and increasing returns to their adoption led to today’s current fossil-fuel based 
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energy system in particular power generation and supply system. The first part will 
analyse the emergence of electric lighting systems in the era of gas lighting and the 
outcome of two competing technologies, AC and DC. The second part will focus on the 
growth and establishment of the winner, the AC system in the UK and the consequences 
of its adoption that led to carbon lock-in in the electricity sector in the UK. The emphasis 
is on power generation as it is, and will continue to be the greatest contributor to carbon 
emissions.  
3.2.1. Emergence of Edison’s System and Competing Currents: DC v 
AC 
In order to understand lock-in in the power sector, one should start with analysing the use 
of electric lighting which has created a continuing demand since its invention. The story 
of commercial lighting started with the invention of carbon arc lamp – by Humphry 
Davy, in 1808 – which produced a very strong white light and was the first application in 
street lighting
1
. However, it could not be made on a commercial scale as the only source 
of electricity was the primary battery of which the maintenance was found to be 
prohibitively expensive
2
. Following this, the discovery of magnetic field surrounding a 
conductor carrying electricity was announced in 1820 by H. C. Oersted
3
, which laid the 
foundations for the development of the electromagnetic induction theory. This was the 
principle behind the dynamo that was discovered by Michael Faraday (1831), who 
demonstrated that a bar magnet moving through a coil of wire would briefly produce a 
current, converting mechanical energy into electrical energy
4
. In 1832 Hyppolyte Pixii 
constructed the first hand-driven magneto-electric machine which was the first practical 
generator and was based on Faraday’s principle5. Many other inventors worked on 
improving the performance and the size of generators. Larger generators, with multiple 
magnets and coils that were turned by waterwheels or steam engines, delivered a more 
substantial flow of current, leading to the first really practical uses of electricity
6
 and after 
four decades, by the 1880s the improved dynamos were able to generate electricity 
cheaply enough for the commercial use of electric lighting and power to become 
possible
7
. It was also in the 1840s; the first powerful electric motors were used in 
applications such as a primitive railway locomotive in Scotland and electric boats and 
electric lathes
8
. The evolution of electricity and electric lighting had started in the early 
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19
th
 century, though progress was very slow until the early 1880s. This was due to the 
separate inventions which were not analysed and adopted as parts of a system of 
interacting components and thus failed to demonstrate a working system that could prove 
the feasibility and benefits of electric lighting as a whole.  
 
The two inventions of new electric lamps by Joseph Swan (in the UK) and Edison (in the 
US), has proven this statement to be true. In 1878, both Edison and Swan demonstrated 
incandescent lamps, both of which were technically very efficient. However, it is Edison 
who is remembered as the inventor of electric lamp as he saw this as a mere component 
and managed to build a generating system surrounding his invention. Edison being an 
inventor-entrepreneur with a systems approach, worked on inventing the whole lighting 
system with related components such as meters, dynamos, generators, lamps and 
distribution mains (a system of distribution from a central station enabling individual 
control of lights
9
) rather than just the light bulb
10
. He followed the model of the urban 
gasworks, with its central stations, distributors, meters and light fixtures and therefore 
designed the original light bulb to give the same amount of illumination as the standard 
sixteen-candlepower gas jet, and he even called the underground distributors ‘mains’ and 
‘tubes’.11  
 
 
He described his method in his archives as: 
It was not only necessary that the lamps should give light and the dynamos 
generate current, but the lamps must be adapted to the current of the dynamos, 
and the dynamos must be constructed to give the character of current required by 
the lamps, and likewise all parts of the system must be constructed with reference 
to all other parts, since in one sense, all the parts from one machine, and the 
connections between the parts being electrical instead of mechanical. Like any 
other machine the failure of one part to cooperate properly with the other part 
disorganises the whole and renders it inoperative for the purpose intended. 
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The problem then that I undertook to solve was stated generally, the production of 
multifarious apparatus, methods and devices, each adapted for use with every 
other, and all forming a comprehensive system.
12
 
  
The systems approach he adopted, allowed him to analyse reverse-salients (obvious weak 
points or weak components, in a technology which are in need of further development) 
and identify related critical problems in electric lighting
13. In Edison’s work, the reverse-
salients were economic in nature and the critical problems technical, for that reason, 
while considering a technological system he never ignored the economic, legal and 
legislative factors regarding his inventions. He therefore involved inventors and 
entrepreneurs from different fields who would help him understand the issues such as the 
costs of generating and distributing electricity, fuel and transmission losses
14
.  Nor was it 
lost on Edison that for his system to be adopted the economic aspects of it would play a 
very crucial role. Electricity would have to be supplied at or a lower than the price of gas 
and therefore he diverted his attention to the techno-economic aspects of invention
15
. 
Compiling all these talents and searching in more than one field and working on a variety 
of components was costly, and required funding, which resulted in establishment of the 
Edison Electric Light Company – a patent-holding enterprise for acquiring funds – in 
1878
16
. Edison set up other companies and involved other business associations and 
enterprises to ensure his system was adequately funded, controlled and therefore was 
working in the most efficient way. He was aware that in order to generate demand and 
secure contracts for his system, he had to demonstrate it in public. Thus, Edison built a 
pilot-scale system – the first prototype of a power station supplying electricity in the 
world – for lighting his laboratory at Menlo Park in 1879 (this was a successful 
demonstration that led him secure the contract for Pearl Street Station) and continued 
demonstrating his system in big exhibitions such as the International Electrical Exhibition 
Paris (1881) and Crystal Palace, London (1882)
17
. He and his associates introduced the 
first central electric lighting system at the Pearl Street Station in New York, which was 
then transferred to Holborn Viaduct in London in 1882
18
. This was powered by the first 
public steam power station in the world
19
. The electricity system at Pearl Street Station 
was DC, a form of distribution system which suited heavily populated areas
20
. The DC 
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supply could be provided by a steam-driven generator but augmented with a large battery 
which could keep the supply running if the generator had to be shut down for 
maintenance and could also cope with sudden peak loads
21
.  In addition, it was 
convenient for charging other batteries (those in battery-electric vehicles) and also was 
the preferred supply for variable speed electric motors such as those used on trams and 
early electric trains
22
.  
 
A new system for lighting was created by taking into account the technological, 
economic, social and legislative factors.  The following figure illustrates the factors that 
were considered in building the new system.  
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Figure 1: The creation of electric lighting system  
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Although the electric lighting system had emerged, it had not been fully adopted, the 
technology needed to be improved and this could only be done via further applications. 
Having a vision of creating a worldwide system, Edison transferred his technology to 
other countries. These applications – New York, Chicago, London, Berlin – allowed the 
system builders to learn while using and to define reverse salients as critical problems 
that appeared during the system’s operation. As reverse salients usually appear in an 
expanding system when a component does not march along with other components or fall 
behind or out of line, they require concentrated research and development if expansion is 
to proceed
23
. The reverse salients can arise from within the system and/or from its 
environment and are defined as critical problems solutions of which result in either the 
system growth or the emergence of a new system
24
. Throughout the applications of the 
DC system so many reverse salients appeared and therefore so many refinements took 
place resulting in system growth. These included, amongst others, the reduction in the 
magnetic and electrical losses and therefore reduce electricity generation costs; 
improvements in electric-motor design;  new DC motors for appliances to be connected 
to central station systems; larger motors for central stations and; more reliable motors for 
electric cars, elevators and home appliances
25
. 
 
 However, a critical problem related to the high cost of distribution, especially over long-
distances still remained to be solved. Three inventions followed to tackle this problem; 
the three wire distribution system (Edison, 1883), the use of storage batteries to improve 
both the load factor and DC transmission (Colchester system, 1884), and the utilisation of 
AC with transformers (Gaulard and Gibbs, 1882)
26
. Even though the problem of the high 
cost of distribution could be solved with the application of three-wire distribution system 
(this was adapted by Edison to the DC system, 1883), transmission over long-distances 
was not possible in the absence of storage batteries. George Westinghouse saw this 
problem in Edison’s DC system as a ‘window of opportunity’ to explore the Gaulard and 
Gibbs system which was using the AC and transformers to employ high voltages for the 
economic transmission of electricity and low voltage for distribution at the point of 
consumption
27
, allowing electric power to be supplied over longer distances with less 
voltage loss
28
. This would mean increasing electricity consumption and thus a decrease in 
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costs as the fixed costs would be spread over the increased volumes of production – 
economies of scale.  
 
However, for scale economies to be achieved, this new system required extensive 
refinement as well as be socially accepted. There was an additional problem, that being 
Edison’s DC system had already firmly established itself in the market. During the early 
stages of this competition both of the systems existed and they were utilised in different 
geographical locations. The very first demonstration of the AC system took place in at 
the Westminster Aquarium exhibition in April 1883. In the same year, the first 
application took place in Notting Hill Gate, Gower Street, King’s Cross, Aldgate and 
Edgeware Road underground stations covering an area of fifteen miles
29
. In the following 
year, Gaulard and Gibbs transferred their transformers to Italy where they were placed on 
a fifty mile circuit that lit the Turin Railway Station and stations at Veneria Reale and at 
Lanzo
30
. The first improvements to the Gaulard and Gibbs AC transformer came from the 
engineers of Ganz & Company of Austria-Hungary who not only improved Gaulard’s 
transformer but also created an entire system of arc and incandescent lamps, generators 
and other accessories
31
. In 1885 William Stanley also patented improvements for 
Gaulard-Gibbs transformer and within the same year, S.Z. de Ferranti started installing an 
AC lighting system with transformers wired in parallel with London’s Grosvenor 
Gallery
32. In 1886 Stanley’s system was set up for use in Buffalo, by the Westinghouse 
Electric Company
33
.  
During the early stages of the battle between the currents, both of the systems existed and 
they were utilised in different countries. While, Edison’s system was dominant in the 
densely populated urban markets due to its large generators that could meet peak load 
lighting demands, the single-phase AC system was supplying the surrounding areas
34
. In 
addition, the DC motor was the preferred option in applications such as electric streetcars 
(invented by Charles J. Van Depoele in 1885) and electric traction systems (launched by 
Frank J. Sprague in 1887)
35
. However, the chain of innovations that would end the 
dominance of the DC system started with the invention of Nikola Tesla (1887) who 
showed how two separate AC supplies with the same frequency but displaced in phase 
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could be used to produce a strong rotating magnetic field in a motor, dragging a magnet 
around with it. This laid the foundations for the use of three phase electricity
36
.  
 
Tesla was employed by Westinghouse, which had already started to use AC and 
transformers for lighting the circuits
37
 by adapting the Gaulard and Gibbs system in 1884. 
Tesla’s following invention of the induction motor (1888), which could be used on a 
single phase AC supply and could be made very small, allowed the AC supply to be used 
on new electrical machine tools and domestic appliances, resulted in increasing utilisation 
and adoption
38
.  The three-phase system and the induction motor were key technologies 
that led to the development of the current modern electricity system in which a 
synchronisation process needs to take place whenever a new generator is connected
39
. As 
other uses were introduced, it became necessary to develop an effective meter for  the AC 
which was introduced by Oliver Shallenberger in 1889
40
 – this is now known as the 
rotating disk meter.  
 
Although the induction motor, the three-phase system and the meter strengthened the 
position of the AC system, the existing local electric supply and installed DC generating 
and distribution system made it difficult for the AC to replace expensive DC plants. Even 
though the AC had grabbed a considerable percentage of the market for lighting; power 
for electricity and traction was still dominated by the DC system
41
. This remained the 
same until the rotary converter was invented by Charles S. Bradley in 1888
42
. This was a 
device that combined an AC induction motor with a DC dynamo to make possible the 
connection of the high voltage AC transmission lines to the DC distribution network
43
. 
This invention led to the hybridisation of the two systems which enabled the ‘existing 
local DC distribution networks for lighting and also DC electric streetcar and railway 
plants to be used as the complements of longer distance AC transmission lines and AC 
generators. Similarly, the converter permitted the less costly AC transmission lines to 
become complementary to existing DC generating stations’44.   
 
As the problems with the electricity system were tackled on a continuous basis, the rate 
of adoption increased largely because of the AC system. The more that was learnt about 
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electricity, the more it was accepted and the more demand grew. There were now 
increasing numbers of applications in a variety of fields which this hybrid system could 
supply. However, in order for the DC system to meet this demand, additional research 
was required to reduce the distribution costs. Even if they could be reduced, its 
profitability was still be constrained by the cost of the rotary converters installed to 
transform DC to and from AC
45
. Realising the scale of the competition, Edison 
highlighted the weakness of the AC system. He argued AC was unsafe by demonstrating 
the electrocution of animals. He suggested the AC system could be used for execution 
and that it was hazardous to use high voltage AC both in the underground and overhead 
wires because of the lack of any effective insulation
46
. For all his efforts he was 
unsuccessful. The economic drawbacks of DC, mainly because of the technical advances 
made to the AC system, and severe financial problems led to a reorganisation of all 
Edison companies. In 1889 all the companies were merged into one large one, the Edison 
General Electric Company. A few years later it merged with the Thomson-Houston 
Electrical Manufacturing Company – a manufacturer of electrical machinery that carried 
a line of both DC and AC equipment – and went on to become the General Electric 
Company in 1892
47. These changes and the big exposition at the World’s Fair in Chicago  
(1893) ended the battle of the currents. This resulted in the acceptance of the 
hybridisation of two systems. Platt (1991) identified the fair in Chicago as; ‘...a future, 
dream city including; artificial illumination for all outside and interior spaces, an 
electric street railroad, lights built into water fountains producing dramatic shows of 
dancing colours and power supplied to many electric devices such as telephones, 
telegraphs, fire alarms, and even kitchen utilities (thermostatically controlled oven, water 
heater, coffee pot, etc.)’48. The fair showed the principles of a universal system of 
distribution by demonstrating how electricity generated at a central station could be 
supplied to all these devices with varying loads
49
. Thomas Hughes, in his book 
‘Networks of Power’, described the design of this system; 
 
At the exhibition a 1000-h.p. generator drove a two-phase Tesla induction motor. 
The motor in the display was intended to represent the prime mover of the 
universal system. The motor powered a two-phase generator, which in turn sent 
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current to step-up transformers for transmission and to step-down transformers at 
distribution points. At these points a motor drove an arc-light generator, a rotary 
converter supplied direct current for street car motors, incandescent lamps were 
supplied, and various motors were driven.
50
  
 
The World Fair in Chicago was important not only because it proved the effectiveness of 
harnessing the old and the new system and ended the battle between the AC and DC 
currents but also by displaying a universal system. It completed ‘the transition from the 
era of electric light to the era of electric light and power
51’. This new era would be 
dominated by the AC  and it was confirmed in 1893, when both the General Electric  and 
the Westinghouse companies  submitted plans for the world’s first big poly-phase power 
scheme at Niagara Falls, specifying an AC system consisting of generators, transformers 
and transmission lines
52
.  
 
After the Niagara power station went into service in August 1895, the rapid diffusion of 
AC poly-phase system started and eventually replaced the local DC systems with the 
large networks of AC in the US (central stations were being converted into substations 
linked to AC transmission lines. By 1898 a constant current-transformer had been 
developed to make possible the linking up of arc lighting distribution networks with AC 
transmission lines
53
). This was due to the socio-technical changes that took place such as 
collaboration amongst to develop new technology, manufacturing firms which produced 
the machinery, devices and apparatus for the new system and educational institutions 
which taught the science and practice of the new technology
54
.  
 
It was clear in the US that the battle between the two systems was over and from that 
time onwards, all the actors involved worked towards expansion and standardisation. The 
First World War accelerated this growth by increasing the demand for electricity and led 
the universal system to become the de-facto standard, making the AC the main current 
and electricity an inevitable part of modern world and our lives. The emergence of the 
AC system as a reverse salient that appeared in the Edison’s system; the competition 
between the currents; the major developments and changes that took place during the 
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growth of these two systems and; the outcome of the competition; the three-phase AC 
system is illustrated in the figure below. 
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Figure 2: The emergence of the AC system and the competition between the currents 
Source: Author 
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savings in copper 
(60%), 
suitable for short 
distance 
Electric meter 
Streetcar system, 
Vandepeole  
Electric traction 
system, Sprague 
Dominance in electric 
power & traction in  
presence of AC system 
Informational Increasing 
Returns 
AC system patents, 
Publications in technical 
journals Westminster 
Aquarium Exhibition 1883 
Exhibition in Turin, Italy, 1884 
Hungarian National 
Exhibition, 1885 
Inventions Exhibition, London, 
1885 
Chicago World Fair, 1893 
Growth 
Transfer of Edison’s DC system  
AC & Transformers  
Technological 
Interrelatedness 
AC, Transformer, 
Gaulard & Gibbs as a 
response to 1882 Act; 
Parallel connections and 
other accessories, Ganz 
& Company; 
Polyphase system & 
induction motor, Nikola 
Tesla; 
AC electric meter; Oliver 
Schallenberger; 
Rotary converter, 
Charles Bradley; 
Larger power stations 
Three-phase AC system 
Network Effects 
Westinghouse 
Electric Company, 
Union Switch & 
Signal 
Funds from Turin 
installation 
Ganz & Company 
International Banks, 
manufacturers, utility 
companies,generating 
companies, etc. 
Scale Economies 
Suitability for long 
distance 
distribution, 
connection with the 
dc, small appliances, 
and further 
inventions in 
utilities allowed the 
system expansion 
leading to increased 
consumption 
and reduction in 
costs. 
High demand from 
new munitions 
factories leading to 
further adoption of 
AC with large scale 
power stations.   
More applications (AC) 
Underground stations, Notting Hill Gate, Gower 
Street, King’s Cross, Aldgate, Edgware Road, 1883 
Railway stations in Turin, Veneria Reale, Lanzo, a 
small village in Lanzo, Italy, 1884 
Tours, France, 1885; Rome and Aschersleben, 
Germany, 1886 
Nearly 70 stations in Austro-Hungarian Empire, 1890 
Grosvenor gallery station, London, 1885 
Niagara power scheme, 1895 
Newcastle stations, starting from 1901 
By 1917, 70 companies, 50 different types of 
systems, in London alone. 
Informational 
Increasing Returns 
DC system patents 
Publications in technical 
journals & newspapers 
International Electrical 
Exhibition, Paris, 1881 
Crystal Palace 
Exhibition, London, 
1882 
Demonstrations against 
AC system electrocution 
to further adopt DC   
Growth 
Growth 
Growth 
Growth 
Competition 
 
World War I 
Growth 
Development 
Research 
1882 Electric Lighting Act 
 
Three-Phase AC System 
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3.2.2. Battle of the Currents and Lock-in in the Electricity Sector: The 
UK Experience 
While the rapid diffusion of the AC poly-phase system was taking place in the US after 
late 1890s (69% by 1902 and 95% of the electricity was generated by the universal 
system in the US by 1917
55
), the situation was different in the UK. Until the First World 
War , the universal system established in the US, did not reach the UK and London. The 
competition between the currents was continued. There were the advocates of AC, the 
most important of who were Sir Coutts Lindsay, Lord Wantage and S.Z. de Ferranti. 
Having worked with Ferranti in the Grosvenor Station, Sir Coutts Lindsay had faith and 
trust in him. Therefore, when Ferranti presented his plan of a vast generating station at 
Deptford, from which current could be supplied to lighting 2.000,000 lamps and would 
eventually be sent to London, it was accepted and following this, the London Electric 
Supply Corporation was registered with a capital of ₤ 1,000,000 in 26 August 1887, to 
take over the Grosvenor Gallery Station and to implement the larger project
56
.  
 
The system that was adopted was a single-phase AC system which was situated at 
Deptford, where the land was cheap, unlimited water was available, sea-borne coal would 
be obtained at low prices, and operations could be conducted on a scale quite impossible 
in the midst of a residential area
57
. This system was unique not only because the inventor 
had taken into account the geographical and economic factors but he also had designed 
the largest transformer (10,000 V.) ever and the appropriate mains (the high-tension 
paper insulated cables) for handling such high currents
58
. With the Deptford scheme, the 
aim was to implement a large-scale generating plant in favourable sites and high-voltage 
transmission to the consuming areas, creating a centralised supply to London from 
outside
59
. However, this was not received very well in the political arena with the thought 
that it would create a monopoly of supply and restrict consumers’ right to choose 
between two currents and therefore, the decision of Marindin Committee favoured 
competition between them and limited the Deptford’s area of supply in 188960. The big 
fire at the Grosvenor Gallery in 1890, the exhaustion of the company’s financial 
resources and the economies of scale that were never achieved with such a big scale plant 
with limited area of supply led to the dismissal of Ferranti and the closure of the 
project
61
. 
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One of the important reasons for the failure of Ferranti’s system was the competition 
created by development of another system that utilised DC; high-tension DC systems. A 
number of companies favoured the high-tension DC systems and applied it to a variety of 
different designs. The most important of these was the Oxford System, which was 
characterised by the use of DC generated at high voltage for transmission to substations 
where it was converted to low-tension current with the use of continuous current 
transformers for distribution, and as the system had employed the storage batteries, it had 
allowed the generating machinery to be shut down during the light load period
62
.  
 
The batteries in the DC system were the reassurance for reliability and continuity of 
supply, and when supported with the suitability of DC for the arc lighting and motors, 
and the high costs of generation related to the AC system (the consumption of coal per 
kilowatt hour in AC stations was two to three times higher than the DC stations), the 
advocates of DC had a strong argument against the rival technology
63
 although it was 
constantly being developed. The complicated administrative structure, the trial of 
technologies other than the poly-phase AC system (high-tension direct current systems), 
the legislation (Lighting Act (1882), Local Government Act (1888), and Marindin 
Committee (1889) decision to continue with small-scale electric supply) that had been 
passed between 1880 and 1890, and economies of scale favouring isolated generating 
stations, postponed the transition to poly-phase system in London and the UK
64
. This was 
a period of dispute and had resulted in the implementation of a variety of systems – some 
of the major companies favouring different systems in London between 1887 and 1897 
are shown in the table below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107 
Table 1: Major Electricity supply companies in London, 1887 to 1897 
 
 
Continuous Current 
  
Company Site System  
Charing Cross Electricity 
Supply Co., Ltd. 
Maiden Lane (1887) 
Lambeth (1896) 
DC three wire 200/100 v. 
DC 1000 v. 
Chelsea Electricity Supply 
Co., Ltd. 
Draycott Place (1889) 
Flood Street (1894) 
DC high tension 
DC high tension 
Kensington & 
Knightsbridge Electric 
Lighting Co Ltd.  
Kensington Court(1887) 
Cheval Place (1890) 
DC two wire 100 v 
DC two wire 100 v 
Metropolitan Electric 
Supply Co. Ltd 
Whitehall Court (1888) DC two wire 100 v 
Notting Hill Electric 
Lighting Co. Ltd  
Bulmer Place (1891) DC three wire 240/120 v 
 
St. James and Pall Mall 
Electric Lighting Co. Ltd. 
Mason’s Yard (1889) 
Carnaby Street (1893) 
DC three wire 214/107 v 
DC three wire 214/107 v 
St Pancras Vestry Stanhope Street (1891) 
King’s Road (1895) 
DC three wire 240/120 v 
DC three wire 240/120 v 
Shoreditch Vestry Coronet Street (1897) DC 1,100 v 
Westminster Electric 
Supply Corporation, Ltd. 
St. John’s Wharf (1890) 
Eccleston Place (1891) 
Davies Street (1891) 
DC three wire 220/110 v 
DC three wire 220/110 v 
DC three wire 220/110 v 
 
Alternating Current 
  
Brompton & Kensington 
Electricity Supply Co Ltd. 
Richmond Road (1889) Single phase, 2,000 v. 83 
cycles 
City of London Electric 
Lighting Co Ltd. 
Bankside (1891) Single phase, 2,000 v. 
1,000 cycles 
County of London Electric Wandsworth (1897) Single phase, 2,000 v. 100 
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Lighting  Co Ltd. City Road cycles 
Hampstead Vestry Stoneyard (1894) Single phase, 2,000 v. 90 
cycles 
Islington Vestry Eden Grove (1892) Single phase, 2,000 v. 50 
cycles 
London Electric Supply 
Corporation  
Deptford (1889) Single phase, 10,000 v. 83 
cycles 
Metropolitan Electric 
Supply Co. Ltd. 
Rathbone Place (1889) 
Sardinia Street (1889) 
Manchester Square (1890) 
Amberly Road (1893) 
Single phase, 1,000 v. 100 
cycles 
 
Source : Parsons R. H., (1940), The Battle of the Systems, in The Early Days of the Power Station 
Industry, Cambridge University Press, pp: 136-141 
 
While the London scheme was divergent, the shift towards establishment of the universal 
system would come from elsewhere in the UK. Newcastle and the key name 
implementing the system was Charles Merz, who was the son of J T. Merz, the owner of 
one of the two companies supplying electricity to Newcastle since 1890. The two 
companies were called the Newcastle upon Tyne Electric Supply Company (NESCO) – 
and the Newcastle and District Company, which had installed the first turbines (Parson’s 
steam turbines) in 1889
65
. Charles Merz, who had become a manager and engineer at the 
British Thomson-Houston Company, was asked by the Walker & Wallsend Gas 
Company, which had established the use of gas for industrial purposes, to construct a 
power plant to supply power to industry on the Tyneside
66
. Merz, who had discussed the 
matter with General Electric, was in favour of the polyphase system and had persuaded 
the W&W Gas Company to construct the Neptune Bank power station with the poly-
phase AC system
67
. When it opened in 1901, it was the first three-phase supply service in 
England and therefore was the starting point for the establishment of the universal system 
in the UK.  
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Following his vision of developing a large-scale electric power system, Merz and his 
associates expanded the supply area of NESCO; they purchased the electric supply 
business of W&W Gas Company in 1902. In 1904 they took over the Durham Company, 
which was owned by British Electric Traction to supply its trams
68
. This successful 
expansion was partly because of the good relations the Merz family had with the key 
people in the industry and was partly because of the success they had using legislation to 
grow their company. In 1904 expansion continued and the need for a new plant emerged. 
The response was the Carville power station; the first large generating station of the 
modern type in the world, embodying the ‘complete unit’ system which was dividing the 
station into a number of independent generating units driven by steam turbines
69
. The 
utilisation of steam turbines enabled Merz to achieve low capital costs with a high 
overload capacity, making the Carville Station the lowest-cost power station in the UK, 
resulting in the further growth of the Newcastle system
70
. Interconnections of stations to 
NESCO continued, however, the dominant power supply remained the Carville Station 
until the Dunston Station was built in 1910
71
.  
 
The Newcastle system was not only important because of being the first application of 
the three-phase AC system in the UK, but also it was the first regional supply system and 
because of the economies of scale it achieved, it would be accepted as a model for the 
construction of National Grid in the following decades.  
 
While the east part of the country was settled with the establishment of the NESCO Grid, 
the electricity supply in the rest of the UK was disorganised. The First World War (big 
demand created by the new munitions factories) played a significant role in the rapid 
construction of power stations and companies managing them – in London, there were 70 
separate companies with fifty different types of system and twenty different voltages by 
1917
72
.  
 
After the war, it became apparent that coordination between the variety of companies and 
local authorities was needed and therefore a new Act was passed in 1919, which claimed 
that a coordinating body ‘Electricity Commissioners’ would be appointed by the Board of 
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Trade to establish joint electricity authorities
73
. In 1922 another Act was passed to confer 
further powers on Electricity Commissioners and joint electricity authorities
74
. However, 
the change that would organise the whole electricity supply of the UK came from the 
Weir Committee that recommended ‘a policy of concentrating the generation of 
electricity in a comparatively limited number of  large and efficient stations, all of which 
would be inter-connected by a high-voltage ‘Grid’ system75. This report was the basis for 
the Electricity Act of 1926 which established the Grid and the Central Electricity Board 
(CEB) which was responsible for the selection and interconnection of the most efficient 
stations, as well as the standardisation of the frequency to permit these interconnections
76
. 
The first contract for the construction of the grid was placed in January 1928
77
 and 
National Grid (where only AC stations could be connected and the frequency was set to 
be 50 Hz.) was completed in 1934
78
. At the time of its completion, the Grid compiled 
seven regions of interconnected power stations; six in England and Wales and one in 
Scotland
79
. The success of this centralisation process in terms of achieving economies of 
scale became immediately apparent. The generation costs fell by 24% in the following 
years
80
. These cost reductions combined with the technical expertise gained as a result of 
learning that took place while running these regional networks led to an understanding 
that further scale economies could be achieved if all seven regions were linked. 
Consequently, starting in 1938, all the independent networks were joined together
81
. This 
was the end of the competition and the universal system was adopted at a national level.  
 
However, despite the central control, the existence of a large number of private 
generation and distribution companies with different voltages and frequencies created 
coordination problems. Tackling this problem required standardisation and according to 
Clement Atlee’s government, the solution was nationalisation which was introduced in 
1947
82
. The understanding was that a state-owned monopoly would not only be the most 
efficient way to set standards but also would ensure the allocation of resources required 
to expand the system and to meet rising demand
83
. In fact this approach proved to be 
successful. Post-war economic growth which led to major increases in demand coming 
from not only the industry but also the domestic sector (due to emergence of new 
electrical appliances) necessitated the need for larger generating capacity and the 
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expansion of the grid. The construction of the ‘Supergrid’ began in 195084. It 
encompassed 275 kV pylons capable of carrying more power than the previous 132 kV 
ones and had the flexibility of being upgraded to 400 kV in the future, which occurred in 
1964
85
. At the same time, the increasing distribution and transmission capacity that 
occurred as a result of the continuous centralisation processes led to developments on the 
generation front. Larger generators were built, plant sizes were increased and the 
generation efficiency was improved which led to significant cost reductions in terms of 
labour and fuel costs. Such economies of scale, in turn, made coal transportation 
uneconomic and created a new trend; locating power generation close to resources. This 
approach, known as ‘coal by wire’ was also favoured because of the space requirements 
for larger stations, and the Electricity Act (1957) which obliged the supply industry to 
take into account the conservation of amenities such as natural environmentand historical 
places
86
. Finally, the Electricity Act (1957) finalised the structure of the electricity 
industry. The Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was responsible for the 
generation and transmission of electricity at high voltage (the National Grid was also a 
part of CEGB) to the twelve Local Area Boards (LABs) which distributed and sold it to 
customers within their region. This structure was sustained until the late 1980’s and 
during this period, governments focused on increasing generation and distribution 
capacity and expansion of the grid; not only within England & Wales but also by creating 
interconnections with Scotland, Northern Ireland and France. The structure of the grid 
and electricity generation and supply is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Energy flow in the electricity sector 
Source: Author adopted from Boyle G. Everett 
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Figure 4: Evolution of large-scale electricity generation and distribution in the UK & US 
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However, the centralised structure that was created to generate economies of scale has 
had a far-reaching impact. Centralisation allowed larger generating units to be installed in 
larger power stations. At the time coal was in plentiful supply and cheap. It became the 
main fuel to generate electricity, resulting in another trajectory; electricity generation 
using fossil fuels. Declining oil prices in 1950s and increasing interest in nuclear power 
put oil-fired and nuclear power stations on the map and by the end of the 1970s, most 
electricity was produced from coal (70%), followed by oil and nuclear energy
87
. The path 
followed did not change even after the major oil crisis in 1973. Although the actors 
involved realised that it was risky to depend oil for continued supplies, they could not 
fundamentally change the way electricity was generated because of the large and 
expensive power stations that were already established. Instead, they focused on finding 
new oil reserves. The exploitation of the North Sea oil and gas created a new era for 
electricity generation. In the early days, it was not seen as an option for electricity 
generation, rather it was used to replace first the existing town gas supplies and then coal 
and oil-fired heating in urban areas to reduce SO2 and smoke emissions
88
. Its adoption 
can be seen as an outcome of a combination of changes that took place in the policy 
arena. The withdrawal of the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive (1975) which 
restricted the use of gas for large scale electricity generation
89
, the introduction of 
privatisation and competition in the electricity market and the emergence of new power 
stations; the combined cycle gas turbine stations (CCGT) as the result of two competing 
technologies; steam and gas turbines. This era known as the Dash for Gas changed the 
fuel balance used to generate electricity. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the share of 
output of coal and oil declined dramatically and natural gas became the main source for 
electricity generation.  
 
Even though the balance of the fuel mix has changed, the path of burning fossil fuels for 
electricity generation has remained the same. This tendency towards fossil-fuels is caused 
partially by the centralisation of the electricity supply which led to the establishment of 
the large-scale, durable and expensive infrastructure. As the demand for electricity grew 
over time, the supply needed to be increased, and thus the grid expanded more to service 
the entire country. At the same time, in order to achieve higher economic returns, large 
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scale power generations started to be constructed. The general availability of fossil fuels 
and technical knowledge generated by utilisation of these resources over the years 
favoured generating electricity from these fuels. All these sources of increasing returns 
led to government and legislative support for interconnection and the grid system, which 
has become larger and more capital intensive over years. The accumulation of all these 
factors resulted in the lock-in to a centralised architectural design for electricity supply 
and fossil-fuel based power stations. As will be described in the following chapters, these 
developments in the power sector is one of the reasons behind what is known as carbon 
lock-in that acts as a major barrier against the adoption of low carbon energy 
technologies. Figure 5 demonstrates the events that lock-in in the electricity sector.  
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Figure 5: Lock-in in the electricity sector 
Source: Author 
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example to illustrate how new technological niches can be formed (they can be built in 
different ways). As a solution to a reverse salient that appeared in the old system DC and 
AC could follow a pattern of evolution that starts with invention and results in emergence 
of new trajectories leading to new systems in regimes, where there is dominance of 
another technological system as in the case of the centralised DC electric lighting system, 
which came into existence in the era of gas lighting and the case of the AC system 
emerging out of the shadow of DC. However, it does not imply that technological 
systems evolve following a discontinuous path of invention, innovation and diffusion. It 
suggests rather, ‘technical progress is a collective, social process, many aspects of which 
are characterised by continuity’90 and therefore, throughout the path, there are backward 
mechanisms of continuous invention and innovation in response to changes within the 
systems and/or the environment surrounding them. For that reason, it demonstrates the 
fundamentals of working with a systems approach which allows not only understanding 
the importance of interacting components and thus technological interrelatedness to 
support a major invention but also the significance of the involvement of actors from 
different fields to ensure the acceptance and adoption of a system, creating network 
effects and the generation of economies of scale. It also proves once a successful system 
has been created, it is further adopted because of increasing the returns to scale, 
generating a new path that will be followed by the others, resulting in the transformation 
of the existing technological trajectory and a shift towards the new system in the regime. 
Thus it draws insights into understanding the importance of path-dependent increasing 
returns and the possible outcomes in the presence of them. 
 
Finally, it presents the lock-in that occurred in the electricity infrastructure, architectural 
design, the choice of fuels and the resulting carbon emissions as the outcome of 
increasing returns to scale during the evolution of the universal system for electricity 
generation and distribution. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the lock-in is not a 
permanent condition; it can be changed if alterations occur. As will be discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, the landscape factors have when combined with changes in the energy 
LTS have led to window of opportunities to overcome carbon lock-in and develop 
alternative energy systems.  
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Chapter 4 
Landscape Developments in the Energy Sector 
4.1. Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in this thesis the energy sector is treated as an open 
Large Technical System (LTS) which is situated at the meso-level, and comprises of its 
own components and subsystems, and interacts with the developments at the landscape 
and niche levels. In this setting, the transition to alternative energy systems, and hydrogen 
energy technologies in particular, is viewed as a change that can occur as a result of the 
co-evolution of developments at these multiple levels. In other words, a transition 
requires on the one hand, the creation and development of a small closed technological 
system around hydrogen energy technologies at the micro-level, and on the other, 
changes at the landscape and regime levels leading to openings at the meso-level. In the 
case that such developments coincide, closed hydrogen systems can be opened up and 
diffuse from the niche to regime where they can replace or link with the current 
technologies and gradually transform the current LTS. However, such a transformation is 
not an easy task because of historical developments that have led to the current 
technological, institutional and organisational lock-in in the energy sector. This rigid 
structure of the energy LTS, namely carbon lock-in, acts as the main barrier that 
constrains invention, innovation and the diffusion of carbon-free technologies. However, 
as also previously discussed, such a condition can be reversed if changes to energy policy 
and market can be made. 
  
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the factors at the landscape level that may; 
(i) break this multi-dimensional lock-in; and (ii) provide technological alternatives with 
opportunities and incentives to gain increasing returns to their adoption. The findings of 
the literature and the outcomes of interviews conducted with key people in this sector 
point out that sustainable development, climate change policy and recent developments in 
global energy policy and market such as the security of supply issues and price volatility 
are the main mechanisms that serve these purposes.  
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All these developments have addressed the need for a transition in the energy LTS and 
have led to: 
 new institutional settings 
 changes in energy policy; introduction of new policy instruments and measures; 
 changes in energy market mainly due to price signals for polluting activities; 
 new organisations, and changes in the existing ones, and; 
 increases in R,D&D applications and investments on new technologies. 
  
As a result, new technological transitional pathways have emerged; the second generation 
renewable energy systems, advanced nuclear power, carbon management technologies 
and the hydrogen economy. In other words, these factors have created „windows of 
opportunities‟ in the locked-in energy LTS and provided the alternatives with advantages 
to compete with the incumbent technologies. This is similar to the argument put forward 
by David (1986)
1
 and Arthur (1989)
2
 who contend that an inferior technology can 
dominate the market if it can gain an early advantage in the race to be adopted. The 
process of adoption can be affected by chance factors and the competition between the 
incumbent and emerging technologies ends with the emergence of a dominant design that 
display increasing returns to adoption.  
 
However, this is not a straightforward process because of changes at the landscape level. 
The context of landscape is dynamic as will be discussed later. Between the late 1980s 
and 1990s the landscape pressures (the emergence of sustainability and climate change) 
were of a „moderate‟ nature and evolved gradually. By the turn of the century, however, 
developments at this level had become much more rapid and conflictual in nature. A good 
illustration of the suddenness of change is the speed with which the global economic 
recession took hold. An example of developments that conflict with one another are the 
concerns over the security of supply over the short term and the long term need to meet 
climate change targets. This dynamic nature creates a high level of uncertainty which is 
further increased by the existence of multiple technological options that are not fully 
developed. Under these circumstances, the actors involved in the energy LTS are inclined 
to explore a number of options. Thus, landscape developments can benefit multiple 
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alternatives and create additional competition between the emerging technologies at the 
niche level to fill the gap created in the energy LTS. This competition is especially 
important where the transition to a hydrogen economy is concerned. For instance, in the 
case of the twin challenges of securing supply and meeting emissions targets become the 
dominant factors, the nuclear option and the CCS technologies, which diversify the 
energy mix and reduce CO2 emissions, will be more attractive compared to the others.  
However, in the poor current economic environment combined with the climate change 
regulations, investors could opt for relatively mature technologies such as wind or 
biomass to reduce risk (with the additional prospect of much faster financial returns). 
Such uncertainty and changing priorities are important factors that change the direction of 
competition between hydrogen technologies and the other alternatives. On one hand, 
because of the immaturity and higher costs of hydrogen technologies, competition can 
favour other alternatives and create an early lock-in to these options, delaying the 
transition to the hydrogen economy. On the other hand, as these alternatives are 
interrelated, improvements in them can compliment the development of hydrogen 
technologies and lead to their further adoption. So in this chapter, the two factors that 
affect the transition to hydrogen economy are analysed. Firstly, the openings the 
landscape developments have created at the regime level, and secondly, the consequent 
competition at the niche level that may constrain or foster the adoption of hydrogen 
technologies.  
4.2. Sustainable Development 
Concerns regarding the effects of economic development on the environment really first 
emerged in the 1960s. The study of Carson (1962) analysed the contamination caused by 
chemicals in different parts of environment and pointed out the devastating effects the 
pesticides, particularly the DDT, had on human beings, animals and the food chain
3
. This 
study became highly influential especially after DDT was banned in 1969
4
. However, 
while this study and others were successful in terms of creating awareness about 
environmental problems and the finitude of the world‟s resources, it was the Limits to 
Growth report that provided a broader understanding of the complex interactions between 
human activities, growth and the carrying capacity of the Earth. This MIT study 
published by Meadows et al. (1972)
5
 was enormously influential. It ignited a significant 
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debate about the virtues of economic development and the environment. One of the issues 
identified was the level of CO2 emissions being released into the atmosphere. The report 
paved the way for analysing environmental issues as a policy-making problem. The 
controversial conclusion it came to was that unless any changes were made the world 
would reach its limits to growth within the next one hundred years
6
..  The causes of such 
a catastrophe were described by Meadows et al. (1972)
7
 as: 
  
The basic behaviour mode of the world system is exponential growth of 
population and capital, followed by collapse. (…) This behaviour mode occurs if 
we assume no change in the present system or if we assume any number of 
technological changes in the system. 
  
The argument was that preventing the world from reaching its limits required changes to 
the political, social and institutional settings which could enable the introduction of new 
policies that entailed a joint consideration of environmental and wider development 
issues
8
. As Hajer (1995)
9
 points out, the message of this study was „global problems 
required global solutions‟, which put the emphasis on the role of international institutions 
and government action as opposed to leaving them solely to technology or the market. In 
the later study by Meadows et. al (1992), Beyond the Limits, this point was explicitly 
stated and discussed in greater detail why technology and market mechanisms alone 
could not tackle the problems of a finite world
10
. While the arguments put forward by 
Meadows et al. were supported by further publications it was strongly criticised on a 
number of fronts. Two of these centred around the inadequacy of the data used in the 
computer models (Beckerman,1972; Cole & Curnow 1973)
 11
 and it ignored the potential 
role of technical progress (Freeman,1973)
12
.  
 
During the 1970s the environment as an issue quickly dissipated in the face of the oil 
crises but by no means did it go away. The security of supply and the need to find 
alternatives to oil became the number one priorities on the public policy agenda. 
Although the focus of governments worldwide was on the energy crises, it did not mean 
measures to disseminate knowledge regarding environmental issues ceased. In the early 
1970s organisations such as the UN and OECD initiated new environmental units and 
programmes which investigated the effectiveness of the (then) current government 
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policies in tackling environmental problems, the relationship between environment, 
economics and technology and proposed new policy strategies involving precautionary 
actions, new technologies and economic and fiscal instruments
13
.  
 
The first major example of the need for global action came when it was discovered 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) that are found in aerosol sprays, refrigerators and freezers 
were damaging the ozone layer. The problem initially emerged following the publication 
of two scientific articles in 1974. The reported findings indicated the erosion of ozone 
layer was a result of the accumulation of CFCs in the stratosphere
14
. In 1975, in order to 
examine these results, the UN Environment Programme initiated a study which led to the 
establishment of the UNEP Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer in 1977 to 
further assess the issue 
15
. However, the ozone problem did not receive global attention 
action until a 40% decrease in the ozone layer above the Antarctic region was discovered. 
The alarming fact was it had developed with a very short time frame of approximately 
seven years (1977-1984)
16
. This scientific evidence marked a turning point for 
international negotiations and agreements on the removal of CFCs. The Vienna 
Convention was signed in 1985, which was followed by the Montreal Protocol (1987) 
where 36 nations agreed to reduce CFC production by 20% by 1993, and an additional 
30% by 1998
17
. The final phase of these negotiations took place in London. Amendments 
to the Montreal Protocol (1990) held by the UNEP where industrialised countries were 
convinced to provide the developing countries (Brazil, China and India had refused to 
sign Montreal Protocol) with financial and technological help in order to enable them to 
shift to chemical substitutes of CFCs
18
. By the end of 2005, a total of $1.86 billion was 
allocated and a world wide consensus was achieved
19
.  
 
The developments of the 1970s and early 1980s exposed the need for a new policy 
approach that linked economic, social, environmental and technological development 
together. This new policy approach was developed by the United Nations (UN) World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). In its report, Our Common 
Future, otherwise known as the Bruntland Report, the new policy of sustainable 
development was defined in the following terms:  
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Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it 
two key concepts: the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of 
the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea 
of ‘limitations’ imposed by the state of technology and social organization 
on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.20 
 
The Brundtland Commission implied that technological progress could provide solutions 
to disassociate economic growth from environmental degradation and serve the needs of 
both the developed and developing countries
21
. In order to achieve these broad changes,  
the Brundtland Commission called for international action and coordinated policies. 
Coordination was very much one of the key aspects. One of the barriers identified to the 
move to a sustainable future was how problems were treated in isolation to one another. 
In the main this  was attributed to the fragmented objectives of different groups and 
narrow sector-specific policies
22
. Therefore, it emphasised the importance of recognising 
the inter-linkages between different sectors and the actors involved and pointed out the 
need for a new strategy that would integrate the economic and environmental 
considerations into decision-making processes
23
. While it was acknowledged that these 
transformations would require governmental action, they were not confined to national 
policies. Instead, the idea was to foster international action. In practice, this was to  
include the participation of multilateral institutions, governments, public and private-
sector enterprises as well as individuals
24
.   
 
As highlighted by Meadowcroft (2000), the notion of sustainable development diffused 
downwards from an international level into states and sub-national authorities
25
. 
International institutions such as the World Bank and the European Union showed 
increasing an commitment
26
. The EU gave the first indications of its approval in its 5
th
 
Environmental Action Plan; Towards Sustainability in 1992
27
 and launched its first EU 
Sustainable Development Strategy in 2001 at the Gothenburg Summit
28
. At the national 
level, almost all the OECD countries formed departments for the environment and 
governments started to apply administrative techniques (environmental impact 
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assessment, risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis) to assess the environmental 
impacts of their decisions
29
.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the most important effect of such acceptance was that it 
established a new perception that environmental and economic development are 
interdependent and that transformations to wider social, economic and political systems 
were required to achieve eco-friendly development patterns. Thus, the overall impact of 
the emergence of sustainable development was creating changes to the „traditional policy 
paradigm‟30. In other words, the introduction of this new approach (and concept) created 
a shift away from the traditional policy paradigm, where the dominant objective was 
economic policy, to an alternative paradigm where social and environmental 
considerations started to shape economic policy.  
4.3 Sustainable Development and the Energy Sector 
The transformation of focus towards sustainable growth patterns has had an important 
impact at the sectoral levels. Due to its very significant contributions to economic activity 
and environmental degradation and pollution, the energy sector is ripe for a major 
transformation. Here, the energy sector is analysed as an open large technical system 
comprising components and subsystems such as “direct fuel use” and “electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution”. Therefore, the energy LTS refers to the 
totality of energy use in power, transportation, industry and other sectors. As clearly 
stated by OECD (2001) this large system (the energy sector) has links with three pillars 
of sustainable development; economic growth, social welfare and environmental 
conservation
31
. Firstly, energy services are fundamental for all the economic activities. 
Reliable and affordable energy supplies are essential for increasing production outcome 
which raises per-capita income levels and helps eliminate poverty. In other words, there 
is a relationship between the GDP figures and the energy consumption levels. In the 
recent study of the IEA (2008), it is reported that a 1% increase in GDP has translated 
into a 0.66% increase in primary energy consumption between 1971 and 1990, while the 
corresponding figures for the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2006 were 0.44% and 0.68% 
respectively
32
. The increase in energy intensity observed since the turn of the century is 
associated with the economic development of China and some other developing countries 
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which has raised energy demand
33
.  According to IEA (2008) assumptions which take 
into account the economic recession experienced since the second half of 2007, an 
average of 3.3% p.a. increase in GDP is expected worldwide between 2006- 2030, which 
will be largely driven by the growth in non-OECD countries
34
. Respectively, such growth 
will lead to increases in the demand for energy services; global primary energy demand 
in 2030 will be 45% higher than that of 2006 and non-OECD nations including Russia, 
China, India and countries in Middle East, Africa and Latin America will account for 
87% of this growth
35
.  
 
However, increasing energy demand does not necessarily match resource availability and 
production in these countries. The geographical availability of fossil fuels in great 
demand is restricted to a few regions. Almost 80% of the world oil reserves are 
concentrated in the OPEC region
36
, while 56% of the world gas reserves are found in 
only three countries; Russia, Iran and Qatar
37
. As is discussed later, this variance between 
the concentrations of natural resources and the location of demand has the created the 
problem of import dependency which leaves the importing countries vulnerable to 
political conditions in the exporting nations. Historical experiences have proven that 
political instability amongst the exporters is directly linked to the issues of supply 
security and energy price volatility. As mentioned earlier, shortages in oil supply, which 
occurred due to Arab-Israeli war in 1973 and the Iranian revolution in 1979, led to major 
increases in oil prices, disrupted economic activity and resulted in a global economic 
recession. The current situation is more critical since the traded commodities include not 
only oil but also gas and coal, and the energy demand is increasing both in the 
industrialised world and in the developing regions. In addition, there have been 
remarkable fluctuations in the price of oil. The OPEC basket price of crudes, which has 
risen from a yearly average of $27 a barrel in 2000 to $69 a barrel in 2007, peaked at 
around $140 a barrel in July 2008, and plummeted to $38.6 a barrel in December 2008
38
. 
However, unlike the 1970s, the price spikes were not due to disruptions of supply. This 
was more of a case where the volume of demand exceeded supply, a „by-product‟ of the 
past asset sweating strategies. In addition to this tightness in the physical market, 
speculations in futures market and investors‟ decisions to hedge against the weakening 
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value of dollar have rendered the oil price high
39
. In fact the recent fall in the price of oil 
which started following the strengthening of dollar has proven this link right. The value 
of dollar rose from 1.57$/€ in July 2008 to 1.26$/€ in December 200840. Undoubtedly, 
another significant reason behind the price drop has been the economic recession that has 
slowed down economic activity, especially in the second half of 2008 and reduced the 
demand for oil.  
 
On the other hand, these changes have affected the price of natural gas either through the 
indexation of gas in the long-term contracts or due to competition of these sources in 
certain markets such as the electricity industry
41
. While, the efforts to shift from oil to 
natural gas in the industry and power sector have reduced dependency on oil, the 
depletion of gas reserves in Western Europe and North America is expected to further 
raise the prices of these sources and have an adverse impact on the economies of these 
regions. Finally, meeting the growing demand will require substantial investment to 
energy infrastructure; it is estimated that this figure will amount to $26.3 trillion which 
will be needed in order to expand the existing capacity and replace old supply facilities
42
. 
However, delays or insufficient investment can lead to disruptions to supply and 
negatively affect economic activity worldwide. Thus, there is a complex relationship 
between the energy sector and economic development. And, unless structural changes, 
which lead to a diversification of the energy mix occur, it will be hard to envision a 
worldwide sustainable economic environment.  
 
Secondly, there is a direct link between the energy sector and the environment. Currently, 
the global energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels. In 2006, coal, oil and gas accounted 
for 80% of the global primary energy supply, the share of which is expected to remain the 
same by 2030
43
. In addition, the contribution of renewables was around 13%, 10% of 
which was in the form of biomass and waste
44
. Depending on the type of fuel, the 
production and consumption of these resources have had different effects on the 
environment. These effects, or energy indicators for environmental sustainability, has 
been analysed by the IAEA (2005) under three main headings; atmosphere, water and 
land
45
. To begin with, the atmosphere is pressurised by increasing releases of greenhouse 
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gas (GHG) emissions, the concentration of which results in lower air quality (such as 
acidification and air pollution) and climate change. The combustion and transportation of 
fossil fuels is the main source for these emissions. According to the Stern Review (2007), 
in 2000, the burning of fossil fuels accounted for 57% of the global GHG emissions, 
which included 77% CO2, 14% CH4 and 8% N2O pollutants
46
. Furthermore, energy 
production and use put pressure on the quality of water and land
47
. The extraction of coal 
and oil and construction of hydropower stations and large-scale wind farms has in some 
cases resulted in the scarcity of land-use for agriculture and housing
48
. The use of 
biomass as an energy source in under-developed regions is one of the main causes of 
deforestation and soil degradation. Furthermore, energy activities such as the cooling of 
power stations, the chemical and radioactive waste of coal mines and nuclear power, and 
oil leakages during offshore production affect the thermal and chemical balance of 
water
49
. The returning of water used in these activities to its original source, or the  
leaching of wastes and other substances into the water streams,  not only contaminate but 
also results in the loss of biodiversity such as flora and fauna in marine ecosystems
50
. The 
accumulation of different types of waste also degrades land quality. Radioactive waste 
poses a particular threat to the environment as these substances remain radioactive for 
several hundred years
51
. While GHG emissions, climate change, land and water 
degradation are the main environmental problems associated with energy use, the 
depletion of non-renewable sources that occurs as a result of excessive exploitation 
creates further challenges necessary to achieve environmental sustainability.  
 
To sum up, the energy sector interacts with several different elements of the socio-
economic system. The most important success of the Brundtland Report and the 
subsequent meetings was to bring to the attention of the wider world; the complexity of 
the relationship between the energy sector, and the economic, environmental and social 
dimensions; and to encourage countries to integrate sustainability into their energy 
policies. As stated in the Report any energy strategy should be developed from a 
sustainability perspective and should include the following elements: 
 
 sufficient growth of energy supplies to meet human needs, 
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 energy efficiency and conservation measures, such that waste of primary 
resources is minimised, 
 public health, recognising the problems of risks to safety inherent in energy 
sources; and 
 protection of the biosphere and prevention of more localised forms of pollution52. 
 
This was a clear call for changes to be made to the energy LTS. The introduction of this 
concept and its follow-up rounds has put increasing pressure on the governments, firms 
and individuals to alter their energy production and consumption patterns. At the national 
level, governments‟ response has taken the form of policy changes. Almost all countries 
have applied new policy instruments to pollution control and resource management in the 
energy sector
53
. Governments have reallocated funds for the development of renewable 
and other clean energy technologies. Firms and individuals are also encouraged to take 
energy efficiency measures and/or adopt alternative technologies. While the 
establishment of the sustainability concept has not been the only driver, it has certainly 
played a role in promoting these measures that has led to „reorientations‟ at the regime 
level. For this reason, sustainable development is viewed as one of the catalysts at the 
landscape level that has created windows of opportunities in the energy LTS for the 
emergence of alternative energy technologies. In this thesis, the move towards these 
alternatives is referred to as transitional pathways that can create sustainable energy 
systems.  
 
Today, many transitional pathways can be envisaged. Depending of a variety of different 
factors such economic conditions, geographical location and availability of resources, 
countries can implement a number of different policies and adopt variety of technologies. 
To date, two main approaches have been followed by countries; energy efficiency 
measures and the switching to renewable energy systems. Because of their lower costs 
and smaller changes associated with these technologies, energy efficiency measures have 
proven to be the most attractive option. However, it must be noted that energy efficiency 
is a broad term which implies applications that allow for a larger energy output for a 
given input and therefore reduce the overall fuel consumption and related GHG 
emissions. Due to its broad definition, while energy efficiency measures can be cost-
effective such as energy efficient light bulbs, they can also include costly technologies 
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that reduce losses in energy production and supply such as CCGT, CHP and hybrid 
vehicles. In addition, funds have been increasingly reallocated to the development and 
deployment of renewable energy technologies. As they have low GHG emissions these 
alternative technologies have gained attention in the power sector. However, the 
intermittent electricity provided by some of these sources (wind power), problems with 
their connection to the grid and high costs have been some of the factors that has 
restrained a large-scale shift to these technologies. Despite these drawbacks, increasing 
support from public and private sector, research activities and investment has 
substantially reduced their costs and increased the rate of their adoption (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Learning Curves for power technologies in the EU, 1980-1995 
Source: IEA (2000), Experience Curves for Energy Technology Policy, IEA, Paris, France, p: 22 
 
Nevertheless, when the landscape pressures became much greater and more divergent, the 
deployment of renewables and inadequacy of the energy efficiency measures in tackling 
these challenges created the need for much larger and fundamental change. In other 
words, the co-evolution of these developments at the landscape and regime levels has 
made the actors involved in the energy LTS more receptive to search for and develop 
more advanced technologies. For instance, for countries that are heavily dependent on the 
use of fossil fuels, carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies hold much 
promise. However, although this end-use technology helps reduce CO2 emissions, it does 
not encourage the preservation of primary fuels. On the other hand, concerns over the 
growth of CO2 emissions, has put new forms of nuclear power back on the agenda. 
Although the new nuclear options can yield higher efficiency levels and eliminate the 
problems of fossil fuel depletion and CO2 releases in power generation, the construction 
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of nuclear plants and radioactive waste remain to pose a significant threat to the 
environment despite the promises of more advanced options. Finally, in recent years, 
hydrogen and fuel cells have also become one of these alternatives that have benefited 
from the pressures of sustainability. Firstly, as hydrogen is an energy carrier that can be 
produced from a variety of sources, it can help reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, 
increase the use of indigenous renewables and decrease dependence on imports. 
Secondly, because hydrogen can be used as a transport fuel, it can integrate renewables 
into this sector decreasing the consumption of oil while and reduce the associated 
emissions. Finally, hydrogen and fuel cells can help tackle the current problems in the 
power sector (such as the connections in rural areas and the intermittent electricity 
generated by renewables) via providing storage mechanisms and increasing decentralised 
generation. Thus, due to the solutions it can provide to a multitude of problems such as 
primary resource depletion, environmental degradation, concerns over security of supply 
as well as creating opportunities for the development of rural areas, hydrogen and fuel 
cells have become an attractive option to help address these issues related to 
sustainability. There attractiveness can be seen in the increasing support they have 
received from governments (see Figure 7 for increasing RD&D budgets). However, it 
must be noted that even though hydrogen (when produced from fuels other than 
renewables) can help move towards more sustainable energy patterns, this strong can 
only be achieved with renewables based hydrogen. 
 
To conclude, the establishment of the concept of sustainability has introduced several 
new dimensions to energy production and consumption patterns. This has led to changes 
in the different components and sub-systems of the energy LTS and has initiated a 
transformation in the direction of research, development and deployment activities in the 
energy LTS. As a result new technological alternatives have emerged. On one hand, these 
developments have supported hydrogen technologies in the competition against the 
incumbent technologies. On the other hand, because of their positive effects on the other 
alternatives they have created additional competition between the emerging technologies. 
Therefore, while hydrogen technologies have benefited from the openings sustainability 
has created in the energy LTS, their adoption is dependent on them overcoming the  
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competition at the niche level. As will be discussed in the following sections, other 
landscape developments including new climate change policies and the security of supply 
concerns have had a similar impact on the transition to hydrogen technologies. 
4.4. Climate Change 
While it is a known fact that the Earth‟s climate has always been subject to change, more 
rapid changes have been observed since the start of the industrial era. Following these 
observations, a considerable debate about the causes and effects of climate change has 
emerged in recent decades. The main arguments have involved; the scientific certainty of 
global warming, the relationship between the human activities and climate change and the 
impact of these changes on development issues. More recently, however, as more 
advanced techniques have been developed, much greater understanding has been gained 
about these rapid changes in climatic conditions. They have occurred not just as a result 
of the Earth‟s natural variability but also because of human activities54. The idea  was 
established following the famous definition put forth by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which described this phenomenon as: 
 
a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity 
that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to 
natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods
55
.  
 
The link between human activities and climate change, referred to in this definition, can 
be understood by analysing the greenhouse gas (GHG) effect. After sunlight passes 
through the atmosphere, most of the solar radiation is absorbed by the Earth‟s surface and 
is converted into heat which is emitted back in the form of infra-red radiation
56
. 
Depending on their frequencies, some of this radiation is absorbed and reflected back to 
the Earth‟s surface by greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, while others return to space57. 
Thus the greenhouse gases create a balance between the incoming and outgoing solar 
radiation known as the GHG effect phenomenon. This allows an average surface 
temperature of 15ºC which is suitable for living organisms
58
. Climate change, on the 
other hand, occurs when the radiation balance of the Earth is disturbed because of 
alterations in GHG concentrations in the atmosphere
59
. In other words, an increase in 
GHG levels raises the amount of solar radiation absorbed and re-emitted back to the 
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Earth‟s surface, which intensifies the GHG effect and leads to higher surface 
temperatures, otherwise known as global warming
60
.  
 
The most important greenhouse gases that drive climate change include CO2, CH4, N2O, 
fluorocarbons (HFC, PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)
61
. Although these GHGs exist 
naturally in the atmosphere, modern human activities have encouraged them to 
accumulate. Recent global increases in CO2 and CH4 concentrations have occurred in the 
main as a result of the combustion of fossil fuels, changes in land-use and agricultural 
processes. According to the IPCC (2007), the concentration of these two gases in 2005 
was significantly higher than their normal natural ranges observed over 650,000 years
62
. 
Climatic problems occur because once released, these gases remain in the atmosphere for 
different time intervals. As demonstrated in Table 1, the removal of gases such as CH4 
and N2O can take hundreds of years, whereas for CO2 an accurate removal time cannot be 
estimated because of the continuous natural carbon cycle that exists between the 
atmosphere, oceans and land biosphere
63
. Furthermore, when GHG emissions cannot be 
offset through elimination, they accumulate in the atmosphere and lead to variations in 
the climate such as global warming. It must be noted that while GHG accumulation can 
change the climate in terms of rising temperatures, other factors such as slow changes to 
the Earth‟s orbit, variation in the energy output of Sun, or the albedo effect of the Earth‟s 
surface (described as reflectivity of forests, grassland, deserts, lakes or clouds) can also  
change the radiation balance
64
. For instance, some scientists associate the Ice Age with 
the slow changes to the Earth‟s rotation around the sun65. Other cooling effects can occur 
as a result of natural events such as volcanic eruptions. Nevertheless, despite the cooling 
effects, the statistics show that global surface temperatures have been rising because of 
higher levels of GHG accumulated over the last two centuries. Scientists have become 
increasing confident that the recent warming observed since the beginning of industrial 
era and particularly in the last few decades is largely associated with human activities. 
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Table 1: Global warming potential of different greenhouse gases 
  
 Global Warming Potential for Given Time Horizons 
GHG 20 years 100 years 500 years 
CO2 1 1 1 
CH4 72 25 7.6 
N2O 289 298 153 
 
Source: IPCC (2007b), technical summary, available (online): http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-ts.pdf  
 
Since the emergence of the scientific consensus about the link between climate change 
and human activities which dates back to 1980s, a large number of measures have been 
taken to deal with this global problem. As with the issue of ozone depletion, the process 
of combating climate change was initiated by the international organisations such as the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and World Meteorological 
Organisation (WMO). These institutions not only encouraged dissemination of scientific 
knowledge on climate change but also provided an international platform to discuss 
possible policies and measures that could be implemented to eliminate this problem. 
Following the approval of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, an institutional framework 
was established to facilitate and control the actions of countries. When the Kyoto  
Protocol came into force it was a particularly important moment. For the first time 
governments were legally bound to curb their emissions between  2008-2012. In the light 
of these developments, governments started to implement climate change policies and 
measures and developed national and local strategies to reduce their emissions. 
Consequently, such commitments at the national level triggered changes at the sectoral 
level.  
 
Due to its high level of emissions, the energy sector has become the main target for major 
structural changes. In order to meet the agreed reduction targets, governments have 
introduced a number of policies and measures to change the way energy is produced and 
consumed. More importantly, for the purposes of this thesis, the most significant 
consequence of this top-down pressure is the positive effects on the development of 
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aforementioned technological transitional pathways. While public authorities and 
organisations have supported research, development and demonstration activities for 
green technologies through funding mechanisms, new institutions and universities, and a 
raft of financial incentives and disincentives introduced over time has encouraged the 
involvement of private sector. These financial mechanisms have created an environment 
where a move towards environment-friendly technologies is increasingly viewed as an 
opportunity to increase profits and/or create new businesses. In essence, climate change 
pressures have diffused downwards from the international (landscape) level to the 
national, sub-national and sectoral levels. This diffusion which has gradually transformed 
the perceptions and actions of the actors involved in the energy LTS and has created 
openings for the development and deployment of alternative energy technologies.  
 
 As with sustainability, new climate change policies has encouraged the development of 
the aforementioned technological transitional pathways; energy efficiency measures, 
renewable energy systems, advanced nuclear power, CCS and hydrogen technologies.  
4.4.1. Trends in GHG Emissions and the Impacts of Climate Change 
on Socio-economic Systems 
 Studies show that there has been a significant increase in GHG concentration in the 
atmosphere which started in 1750s and accelerated following the fossil-fuel based 
industrial era of the mid 19
th
 century
66
. During this period, the level of CO2 has risen 
from an average 275 parts per million (ppm) to 379 ppm in 2005
67
. Following a similar 
increasing trend – albeit at a lower rate, in 2005 the amount of CH4 and N2O amounted to 
some 1774 ppb (parts per billion) and 319 ppb, respectively
68
. According to UNFCCC 
projections, a noticeable amount of these gases, 50% of CO2, 18% of CH4 and 6% of N2O 
has accumulated in the atmosphere as a result of human activities and therefore 
contributed directly to global warming
69
. Figure 3 illustrates the increasing GHG levels 
observed over 2000 years. 
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Figure 2: Concentrations of greenhouse gases from 0 to 2000 
Source: IPCC (2007b), chapter 2 
 
As the IPCC (2007) report shows, total GHG emissions accounted for 455 ppm CO2 
equivalent in 2004. Amongst these gases, CO2 had the largest share of approximately 
77% of total emissions, followed by 14.3% CH4 and 7.9% N2O
70
. The human influence 
on these trends becomes apparent when they are analysed at a sectoral level. The energy 
supply has dominated global GHG accumulation with a share of approximatly 26%, 
while industrial applications, forestry, agriculture and transportation have accounted for 
19.4%, 17.4%, 13.5% and 13.1% respectively
71
. Figure 4 below illustrates shares of 
different GHG and sectoral contributions to these emissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 139 
a)
CO2 (Fossil fuel 
use), 56.60%CO2 (Deforestation, 
decay of biomass), 
17.30%
CO2 (Other), 2.80%
CH4, 14.30%
N2O, 7.90%
F Gases, 1.10%
b)
Energy supply, 
25.90%
Transport, 13.10%
Residential & 
commercial 
buildings, 7.90%
Industry, 19.40%
Agriculture, 13.50%
Forestry, 17.40%
Waste & 
wastewater, 2.80%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: a) Share of global GHG in 2004, b) Sectoral GHG emissions in 2004 
Source: IPCC (2007d), chapter 1 
 
It is also reported that the level of accumulation has risen especially over the last three 
decades. The total of GHG levels shown in Figure 4 is 70% higher than those measured 
in 1970s
72
. The increase in this period is attributed to the accumulation of two greenhouse 
gases; CO2 and CH4 emissions which have demonstrated 80% and 40% growth during the 
period in question
73
. The causes of such increases have been examined from different 
perspectives based on fuel types, sectoral activities and/or regional contributions. From a 
sectoral standpoint, the energy sector which is analysed as a large technical system which 
broadly encompasses two subsystems “direct fuel use” and “electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution”, has been the largest contributor of the increase in these 
emissions. It is estimated that the energy LTS is presently responsible for almost 70% of 
global GHG and 80% of total CO2 emissions through supplies of power, heat and 
transportation fuels
74
. According to the IEA (2006), fossil-fuel utilisation in power 
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generation, transportation and industrial applications accounted for more than three 
quarters of energy-related CO2 emissions in 2004
75
. Amongst the fossil fuels, while coal 
has been the largest source with 41%, the combustion of oil and gas has contributed more 
than half of the CO2 emissions (Figure 5)
76
.  
 
Figure 4: a) Sectoral contribution to energy-related CO2 emissions in 2004. b) Fossil fuel contribution 
to energy-related CO2 emissions  
 Includes agriculture and public sector,  Includes marine bunkers and other transportation 
Source: Author, drawn based on data collected from IEA (2006), p: 80 
 
Furthermore, the increasing dependence on these fuels has led to various growth rates in 
different regions. In 2004, almost 50% of the total energy-related CO2 emissions came 
from the OECD countries, of which approximately 45% was released by the US
77
. While 
in some parts of the OECD region such as in Europe, emissions have been stabilised 
because of the switching to more efficient technologies and less carbon-intensive sectors 
and fuels (natural gas and nuclear power), the lack of modern alternatives and increasing 
energy demand have seen emissions rise in the developing world. The developed 
countries, however, are still the largest GHG emitters. In 2004, the average per-capita 
emissions in the OECD countries (11.02 tonnes of CO2) were almost four times higher 
than those measured in non-OECD regions (2.45 tonnes of CO2)
78
. 
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As mentioned earlier, these changes in the GHG concentrations have altered the radiation 
balance of the Earth. Such alterations can cause positive or negative radiative forcing 
(RF) of the climate system which increase or decrease the lower atmosphere and global 
surface temperature
79
. Today, it is well established that the aforementioned increases in 
anthropogenic (human-induced) GHG emissions have had positive effects of around +2.6 
W/m
2
 combined radiative forcing which has been the main driver of climate warming 
observed since the 1750s
80
. While each GHG has had different forcings, according to 
IPCC (2007) estimates, CO2 has been the dominant gas with an RF of + 1.66 W/m
2
 
followed by CH4, Montreal Protocol gases (CFC and its equivalents) and N2O with 
forcings of +0.48, +0.32 and +0.16 W/m
2
 respectively
81
. It must be noted, however that 
the net RF (+1.6 W/m
2
) is lower than the RF caused by anthropogenic emissions due to 
negative radiative effects of total aerosol, cloud and surface albedo
82
.  
 
Consequently, the response of the climate system to the net positive RF has taken the 
form of rising atmospheric and ocean temperatures, the combination of which has led to 
increasing global surface temperatures observed since the pre-industrial times. The recent 
IPCC (2007b) report provides the most up to date data on trends in global temperature 
increases. According to this study, it is estimated that global surface temperature has risen 
around 0.74ºC over the last century – this is 0.14ºC higher than the figure reported in the 
previous IPCC (2001) study
83
. The rate of warming observed in the second half of this 
period has amounted to 0.13ºC per decade which is twice as high as the rates observed in 
the first half
84
. In addition, the surface temperatures between 1996 and 2005 have reached 
the highest levels recorded since 1860s
85
. Although surface temperatures increased both 
on land and oceans, the warming of land (O.27ºC per decade) was twice as fast compared 
to the oceans (O.13ºC per decade)
86
. Even given the natural variations of the Earth, 
scientists are very confident that most of the recent warming has occurred as a result of 
anthropogenic changes (according to IPCC 2007 report, this is more than a 90% 
probability)
87
. This overall heating has affected all the interacting components of the 
climate system; atmosphere, land surface, cryosphere (different bodies of water, snow 
and ice cover) and living things
88
. In other words, human activities which have induced 
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the GHG concentration in the atmosphere, have most likely increased global temperatures 
and have had effected each constituent of this system. 
  
Following the findings of the IPCC (2007b), the physical changes and their effects on 
different systems can be summarised as follows. To begin with, the aforementioned 
increases in temperatures accompanied with decreases in precipitation have led to more 
common droughts since the 1970s. It is estimated that the heat waves experienced in 
Europe and Australia were a result of these changes
89
. On the other hand, changes in 
temperature and precipitation have had opposite effects, leading to wetter seasons. 
Precipitation is the general term used to describe different forms of water falling from 
clouds (rainfall and snowfall) which occur as a result of water vapour condensing in the 
atmosphere
90
. Because the amount of water vapour increases due to climate warming, 
despite the overall decrease, changes in precipitation levels have taken the form of heavy 
rains resulting in floods in some parts of the world
91
. Demonstrating the findings of 
numerous studies, the IPCC (2007b) concludes that precipitation related events have seen 
a distinct downward trend in the Sahel, the Mediterranean, South Africa and parts of 
South Asia making them much drier regions than in the past
92
. Some of the extreme 
events cited include; droughts in Central and Southwest Asia (1998-2003), Australia 
(2002-2003) and Western North America (1999-2004), floods in Europe (summer 2002) 
and, storms and hurricanes such as Katrina, Wilma, Rita and Stan experienced in the US 
and central America between 2004 and 2005
93
. In addition, the increased temperatures 
have also had significant effects on the cryosphere.  In the Northern Hemisphere, snow 
cover has dropped by 5% since the 1980s. Meanwhile, the Arctic Sea ice has continued to 
decline at a rate of 2.7% per decade, which amounts to a 1 metre decrease in the thickness 
of the ice in the central Arctic between 1987-1997
94
. It is has been indicated that 0.77 mm 
of glaciers and ice caps has been lost each year between 1991-2004
95
. Although there is 
uncertainty, the melting of the glaciers, ice caps and Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, 
it is estimated to have led the sea level to rise by approximately 2.8 mm per annum 
between1993-2003
96
. 
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On the other hand, all these physical changes such as changes in temperature, 
precipitation, cryosphere and wind patterns can disrupt the other components of the 
ecosystem could result in the extinction of species or degradation of vegetation cover
97
. 
For instance, although rising CO2 concentrations have been proven to enhance plant 
growth due to the CO2 fertilisation effect, the consequence of higher temperatures put 
stress on the availability of water and decrease land productivity
98
. It is estimated that the 
droughts experienced in Europe led to 30% reduction in gross primary production of 
vegetation in 2003
99
. Furthermore, heat waves trigger forest and wildfires
100
. The 
wildfires which occurred in Portugal, Spain and France are associated with the extreme 
warming of Europe in 2003
101
, while the Siberian fires are assumed to have occurred 
because of the 10% increase in emissions in 2002-2003.
102
.  Vegetation cover is also 
threatened by changes to trends in precipitation and water runoff which intensify floods 
and erosion. Statistics show that the number of floods between 1996-2005 was twice the 
number of natural disasters that occurred between1950-1980, and led to serious damage 
to aquatic ecosystems and agricultural production
103
. In addition to its adverse effects on 
the flora, changes in climatic conditions affect the survival of animal species which is 
highly dependent on vegetation cover. It has been confirmed, for instance, that increasing 
water temperatures degrade the quality of water through a reduction in the oxygen 
concentration which negatively affect the flora and in turn fauna such as the different 
species of fish living in fresh water wetlands, lakes and rivers
104
. Oceanic fish 
populations are also pressurised by rising sea surface temperatures. Since the mid 1980s 
losses have been observed in North Sea tuna, salmon and cod communities
105
. On the 
other hand reductions in ice cover threaten the livelihood of arctic species such as Polar 
bears, seals and other animals. It is suggested that the shrinking sea ice in the western part 
of Hudson Bay, Canada, this has already led to a decrease in the numbers of Polar bears 
living in the region. Numbers have dropped from 1200 in 1987 to less than 950 bears in 
2004
106
.  
 
Today, the consensus is that even if anthropogenic emissions are reduced and the level of 
GHG is stabilised at current levels, the changes that have occurred amongst the 
interacting mechanisms will amplify the global warming that has already been 
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experienced
107
.  For instance, the loss of snow and ice cover or the increasing amount of 
water vapour in the atmosphere that occurs as a result of existing warming is known to 
increase solar radiation absorption further intensifying the initial warming
108
. Although 
the extent of warming is uncertain, according to IPCC (2007b) estimates, in the short 
term the effects of current warming will be minor compared to the effects over the longer 
term, which will account for 30% and 20% of climate change during the periods 2046-
2065 and 2090-2099, respectively
109
.  
 
However, as shown in numerous studies, GHG emissions will continue to increase and 
put pressure on the climate system over the coming decades. The level of increase will 
depend on the political, social, economic and technological changes that will take place 
along the way. Recently, a number of scenarios have been developed to analyse the 
various effects of these different factors on emissions. In the literature, the most 
comprehensive scenarios include the ones provided by the IPCC Special Report on 
Emission Scenarios (SRES)
110
. In the study, six key variables are used to incorporate the 
different demographic, socio-economic and technological driving forces, to analyse the 
potential GHG accumulations by 2100. Although, the results vary, the consensus amongst 
these scenarios is that in the absence of new climate policies, GHG emissions will follow 
a rising trend until the mid 21
st
 century. The utilisation of fossil fuel in the energy LTS 
will remain the dominant cause of these releases, leading to increases particularly in CO2 
emissions that are estimated to grow between 50%-100% by 2020, and 100%-300% by 
2050
111
.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the response of climatic systems to these rising trends will lead to 
higher global temperatures, however, due to the complex interactions in this system, there 
is a great deal of uncertainty regarding future temperature changes. Currently, in order to 
take into account this uncertainty, „climate sensitivity‟ (refers to the level of warming that 
is likely to be experienced when the CO2 levels are held at double (around 550 ppm) their 
pre-industrial values) measures are used to represent the range of potential warming
112
. 
According to the findings of the IPCC (2007b) , the climate sensitivity is very unlikely to 
be lower than 2ºC and the most likely range is in between 2 and 4.5 ºC
113
. Depending on 
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the extent of the temperature increases, future warming will put further pressures on the 
climate system and intensify the aforementioned climate events. While these will have 
negative effects on the availability of food and water, changes in land use and health 
conditions, they will also affect the life styles indirectly through damage to the 
infrastructure and different sectors of the economy. It is estimated that by mid-century, 
extreme weather events will cost between 0.5 to 1% of global GDP with temperature 
increases of between 1-2ºC
114
. On the other hand, a 2.5 ºC increase in temperatures is 
projected to cost the equivalent of between 1.5 to 3.5% of GDP by the end of this 
century
115
. Despite the uncertainties, however, the IPCC (2007) is confident that 
temperatures greater than the 2-3 ºC range will in all probability increase the losses 
globally and therefore advises that GHG emissions must be stabilised between 450 and 
550 ppm
116
. Though, it must be noted that projections differ depending on the inputs used 
in the scenarios.  
 
To sum up, the climate has changed over the last two centuries at a higher rate over the 
last few decades. Scientific studies indicate that these recent changes are largely driven 
by the human-induced GHG emissions that have had adverse effects on all the 
constituents of the socio-economic system. At the same time, studies demonstrate that 
these changes will be intensified with the projected increases in GHG emissions. As will 
be discussed in the following sections, over the last three decades, the emergence of this 
scientific consensus about the link between climate change and human activities has led 
to significant changes to  policy agendas which have in turn triggered transformations at 
the sectoral level. Due to its high level of contributions to the growth in emissions, the 
energy sector has become the focus of attention and the actors involved have looked for 
solutions that has paved the way for the development of alternative energy technologies. 
4.4.2. Climate Change as a Policy Problem  
The scientific aspects of climate change, the interactions between climate, GHG 
emissions, natural and human systems have been researched for over 150 years
117
. This 
long and exhaustive research has led to the main consensus today that the climate is 
changing as a result of anthropogenic emissions and that such changes pose serious 
threats to socio-economic progress worldwide. However, dealing with this issue as a 
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policy problem only started a couple of decades ago. The World Climate Programme 
Conference at Villach, Austria (1985) marked a turning point for the issue of climate 
change, where a scientific consensus emerged on the link between increasing CO2 
concentrations and global warming
118
. The extreme heat waves and droughts in North 
America only served to strengthen these arguments
119
. Subsequently, the issue found its 
way up the political agenda. At the Toronto Conference in 1988, the so-called Toronto 
target to reduce CO2 emissions to 20% below 1988 levels by 2005 was proposed
120
. In 
the same year, the WMO and the UNEP formed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), which would be responsible for producing up-to-date information on 
climate change science and its impact to guide policymakers
121
.  
 
The IPCC issued its first assessment report in 1990. The report identified the potential 
negative impacts of climate change and pointed out that in order to halt this process, 
stabilising GHG emissions at the (then) current levels, which implied cutting these 
emissions by 60%, was required
122
. It also addressed the need for a legally binding 
international treaty to tackle the climate change problem
123
. After almost two years of 
negotiation, the global climate change treaty, namely the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed by 154 nations and the European 
Community at Rio Earth Summit 1992. It came into force on 21 March 1994
124
. As stated 
in the Article 2 of the Convention, the objective was „to stabilise GHG concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system‟125.  
 
Although, no targets or deadlines were set, the ratification of the UNFCCC provided the 
foundations for the establishment of an international climate change regime. While the 
Convention brought the issue of climate change onto the international political agenda, 
following meetings in the Conference of Parties; COP-1 in Berlin (1995) and COP-2 in 
Geneva (1996) paved the way for the quantification of timelines and targets
126
. A 
consensus was finally achieved at the Kyoto Protocol (1996) where parties agreed 
between 2008-2012 developed countries should reduce their emissions by 5% compared 
to 1990 levels
127
. Some of the reduction targets set for different countries in Annex-B 
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were; 8% for EU-15, 7% for the US and 6% for Canada and Japan. In 1999 these targets 
were reviewed at the European Commission and the so called „EU Bubble‟, which 
assigned higher targets for some of the member countries such as Germany (21%), 
Denmark (21%), Luxembourg (28%) and UK (12.5%), was formed
128
.   
 
However, despite the final agreement, negotiations during the Protocol proved difficult.  
Countries such as the US, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand proposed lower 
figures on the basis that such firm targets would be onerous and costly for their 
economies to meet
129
. In order to tackle this problem, three „flexibility mechanisms‟; the 
Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Emissions 
Trading, were introduced. The aim of these market mechanisms was to achieve global 
climate change mitigation in a cost effective manner by allowing countries to offset their 
emissions through investment across their borders. While the Emissions Trading scheme 
was proposed to provide a trading platform for carbon emissions between Annex-1 
countries, the JI and CDM were aimed at the development of clean and sustainable 
projects within and between Annex-1 and non- Annex-1 Parties
130
. 
  
Although the introduction of these mechanisms took place in the Kyoto Protocol, their 
implementation and the official ratification of the Protocol was left to the follow-up 
meetings. However, despite the flexibility mechanisms, political conflicts re-surfaced at 
the sixth COP in The Hague in 2000
131
. The disagreements and the subsequent 
withdrawal of the US from the Protocol, which was claimed to be due to scientific 
uncertainty on climate change and economic consequences of the Kyoto commitment on 
the US economy, almost led to the Protocol‟s demise132. In order for the Protocol to enter 
into force, ratification of 55 countries which would amount to 55% of the CO2 emissions 
of the Annex-1 Parties was required and unless the issues were resolved, similar to the 
US, other parties could also withdraw
133
. Therefore, the conflicting points were revisited 
at the Bonn Agreement (2001) where a consensus was finally achieved
134
. A few months 
later, the rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and its mechanisms were 
finalised at the Marrakesh Accords
135
. Nevertheless, due to withdrawal of the US, which 
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had the highest level of emissions of the group, the Protocol did not come into force until 
February 2005; three months after Russia had finally been convinced to ratify it
136
. 
   
Table 2: Key developments in climate change science and policy 
 
Date Development  
1979 First World Climate Conference 
1985 Villach Conference - scientific consensus on the link between increasing 
CO2 concentrations and global warming 
1988 Toronto Conference – first proposal to cut CO2 emissions  
1990 IPCC First Assessment Report and Second World Climate Conference – 
call for global treaty on climate change 
1992 Approval of UNFCCC at the Rio Earth Summit 
1994 UNFCCC enters into force 
1995 Berlin Mandate (COP-1) 
IPCC Second Assessment Report 
1997 Kyoto Protocol – agreement on legally binding emission reduction targets 
and deadlines 
1998 Buenos Aires of Plan of Action (COP-4) 
2000 The Hague (COP-6) – collapse of talks based on Plan for Kyoto Protocol 
2001 March 
         Apr 
         Jul 
         Oct/Nov 
Withdrawal of the US 
IPCC TAR – evidence on global warming attributable to human activities 
Bonn Agreements (COP-6 resumes) 
Marrakesh Accords (COP-7) 
2002 Delhi Declaration (COP-8) 
2004 Nov  
         Dec 
Ratification of Russia 
Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adaption and Response Measures 
(COP-10) 
2005 Feb 
         July 
Entry into force of Kyoto Protocol 
Formation of the Asia Pacific Partnership (APP) 
2007 Sep 
         Nov 
 
         Dec 
High Level Event on Climate Change – UN Headquarters 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report – stronger evidence on higher future 
emissions and temperature changes  
Bali (COP-13) 
 
Source: Carter N (2007), p: 250 and UNFCCC (2007), p: 11, and CEAC (2006) 
 
While the approval of the Convention and its implementing instruments introduced at the 
Kyoto Protocol were acknowledged as the emergence of a global climate change regime, 
the effectiveness of Kyoto mechanisms towards achieving this goal were criticised on 
several grounds. Firstly, the main concern was that the agreed commitment period and 
targets for ratified countries would not be sufficient for reducing global GHG emissions 
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particularly as the US did not sign for the Protocol and the developing countries 
emissions, of which are projected to increase over the coming decades, were omitted 
from making commitments
137
. Secondly, the flexibility mechanisms such as the tradable 
permits and approval of carbon sinks were introduced to convince countries to ratify 
could become very costly and even increase rather than decrease overall GHG 
concentrations
138
. Thirdly, because of the high level of uncertainty regarding the physical 
and financial effects of climate change, it would be difficult to integrate these 
international policies into national economic and environmental policy objectives
139
. 
Finally, the absence of legally binding, international enforcement and control 
mechanisms could increase the number of free-riding countries and lead to reductions in 
the commitment level of the countries which had ratified the Protocol
140
. Therefore, the 
argument of the critics was that the mechanisms could not deliver much to meet the 
overall goal set in the UNFCCC because of its „economic inefficiency and political 
impracticality‟141.  
 
However, despite the various flaws since they have been established, the Convention and 
the Protocol have been influential in implementing climate change policy and measures 
and have initiated additional measures to set a carbon price to correct this market failure. 
One of the most significant developments of this kind took place at the EU level. Under 
the Kyoto Protocol, the EU approved the reduction target of 8% for the commitment 
period and set its own target to cut emissions by 20% by 2020
142
. Following these 
agreements, the Community passed the European Emissions Directive into European Law 
(25 October 2003) which coerced member countries to integrate the assigned targets into 
their national laws, allocate national caps to targeted sectors and installations and, test, 
monitor and report the developments at the national, sectoral and firm level
143
. 
Furthermore, in order to assist and control the progress of member states, a combination 
of regulations, market-based instruments, R&D expenditures and other measures were 
implemented by the European Climate Change Programme. Amongst these measures, 
one of the most important activities the EU conducted has been the formation of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).  
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The EU ETS, which was launched in January 2005, was organised into two phases; the 
pre-Kyoto period of 2005-2007 aimed at implementing the necessary legislation and 
procedures between the member states and, the first Kyoto Commitment period of 2008-
2012
144
. The first phase was completed as of June 2007 and the National Allocation Plans 
(NAP) of 27 countries including limits for CO2 emissions by installations in specified 
sectors and JI and CDM credits compensating their emissions outside the scheme have 
been assessed and approved as of October 2007
145
. Currently, there are proposals to 
extend the period beyond 2012 and increase the coverage of the sectors that involve 
combustion activities exceeding 20MW, oil refineries, coke ovens, cement production, 
glass manufacture, ceramic products manufacture, pulp production, paper and board 
production and, ferrous metal production and processing during the first phase
146
. It is 
reported that this company level system focusing on industrial applications created in the 
pre-commitment period account for 45% of total EU CO2 emissions
147
 and total trading in 
this regional market amount to some $8 billion annually
148
.  
 
This pioneering scheme has provided the first steps towards creating a global carbon 
trading market and has become the first attempt to set a price for a public good- the 
climate. Although, it is at the infant stage, it has set an example not only to the ratified 
countries but also to those that withdrew from the Protocol. Today, there are a number of 
implemented and proposed schemes. The existing schemes involve the Japanese 
voluntary ETS, the Norwegian system, the Albertan Climate Change and Emissions 
Management Act (Canada), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (USA) and the New 
South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (Australia)
149
. Furthermore, while 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Switzerland have announced their 
upcoming new and additional schemes, there are proposals to establish a market-based 
cap-and-trade program which will link several states in America and two Canadian 
provinces together
150
. 
  
In addition to the ETS which have so far been influential in the creation of a trade 
platform amongst the developed countries, other flexibility mechanisms; the CDM and JI 
have been encouraging sustainable projects and knowledge, technology and financial 
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resource flows within and between the industrialised and developing nations. According 
to the World Bank estimates, as of 2006 approximately $5.2 billion had been invested in 
the developing countries through CDM projects
151
. Similar to the ETS, these mechanisms 
have also had spillover effects amongst the non-Kyoto countries. For instance, even 
though major developed nations such as the USA and Australia did not take part in the 
Protocol, their commitment to the UNFCCC has been forced these countries to take 
action to curb their emissions and assist developing nations. The Asia Pacific Partnership 
(APP) was an outcome of these pressures. In order to comply with the responsibilities 
assigned at the UNFCCC, the USA, Australia, Japan, India, China and South Korea have 
formed the APP; a platform for collaboration towards developing, diffusing and 
transferring cost-effective and clean technologies
152
. This is viewed as an alternative 
approach to the Kyoto mechanisms that aims to induce technological development to 
combat climate change not only within their own boundaries but also outside their 
borders without any commitment to a specific reduction target. 
 
While these flexibility mechanisms and other market based-instruments such as eco-taxes 
and deposit refunds have been increasingly implemented at the international, regional and 
national levels, it is also widely acknowledged that market forces alone can not provide 
sufficient incentives to tackle this global problem. Rather, they need to be complemented 
by other policy instruments; regulations and standards (technology and performance 
standards), subsidies and incentives, voluntary agreements, R&D programmes, 
information instruments (eco-labels) as well as non-climate policies. Although, each one 
of these measures has its advantages and disadvantages, an effective portfolio of climate 
policies and measures can be designed when the specific national circumstances such as 
political and economic structure, institutional feasibility, production and technological 
capability and social norms are taken into account
153
. Today, due to the growth in 
evidence on the effects of climate change and international pressure, an increasing 
number of countries, depending on these factors, have been implementing different 
combinations of these instruments. There are also developments at the sub-national level.  
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Local governments, non-governmental organisations and companies have been 
undertaking initiatives and using variety of instruments which range from trading systems 
to voluntary agreements to address climate change issues. For instance, it is reported that 
more than 600 cities worldwide have taken some form of action to reduce their GHG 
emissions
154
. Furthermore, while NGOs have been active in disseminating information, 
they have also been collaborating with corporations to set environmental certificates and 
standards for the accounting and reporting of GHG emissions of different companies and 
projects
155
. Finally, at the firm level, companies that have seen this green movement as an 
opportunity to differentiate their products to gain a competitive advantage and reduce 
their energy, materials and operational costs, have been engaging in voluntary actions to 
curb their emissions in a cost-effective manner
156
. In addition, an increasing number of 
new firms providing alternative cleaner products, technical assistance and financial 
support are also being set up.  
 
To sum up, all the changes that have taken place over the last two decades have provided 
the foundations for the emergence of a global climate change regime. Even though the 
rules and the links between the components of this regime has not yet been established, 
carbon abatement policies and measures and other related actions initiated by 
international institutions have diffused from an international level into regional, national 
and sub-national (states, cities, sectors and firms) levels. Although these efforts have been 
directed towards cutting emissions from different sources such as agriculture, waste and 
land-use; due to being the dominant cause, fossil-fuel emissions of energy related 
activities have become the main target for abatement measures. These efforts have led to 
the identification of different mitigation options such as changing consumption patterns 
and increasing the efficiency of energy use wherever possible. However, due to the scale 
of the problem, it has also become clear that meeting the target of stabilising GHG 
emissions between 450 and 550 ppm will require the development and deployment of a 
portfolio of advanced technologies. Currently, a number of studies report that depending 
on their learning curves, there are a number of technologies that can serve these purposes 
in the medium and long term. These technological pathways involve; advanced 
renewable energy systems, 4
th
 generation nuclear, carbon capture and sequestration 
 153 
(CCS) technologies and hydrogen energy systems. The potential contribution of these 
technologies in reducing energy related CO2 emissions by 2050 is analysed in the IEA 
Accelerated Technology (ACT) and Technology Plus (Tech Plus) scenarios. As 
mentioned in section 4.2.3., the IEA (2006a) Reference scenario which takes into account 
only the already adopted policies and measures, estimates the energy related CO2 
emissions to increase by 55% by 2030, extending these outcomes from 2030 to 2050, the 
Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) Baseline Scenario predicts 137% increase based 
on higher levels of coal, oil and gas consumption
157
. On the other hand, the ACT MAP 
scenario, which assumes implementation of new policies leading to a higher level of 
technological development in four of the pathways and setting a global carbon cost of 
$25/tCO2, shows that CO2 emissions can be brought down to 6% higher than the 2003 
levels by 2050
158
. In addition, the contribution of each technological path is shown in 
four different ACT scenarios according to which less effective energy efficiency 
measures leads to 27% higher CO2 emissions compared to 2003 levels; whereas the low 
utilisation of CCS, nuclear and renewables results in increases of 21%, 10% and 9%, 
respectively
159
. Although the ACT scenarios picture a climate friendly energy system, 
further CO2 reductions potential is analysed in the TECH Plus scenario where all the five 
technological options, hydrogen and biofuels in particular, gain a significant market share 
by 2050
160
. Consequently, this scenario indicates that CO2 emissions can be reduced to 
16% below 2003 levels (Figure 23).  
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Figure 5: Global CO2 emissions and contributing technological pathways in the Baseline, Act and 
TECH Plus scenarios. 
Source: IEA (2006), pp: 46-48 
 
However, it must be noted that these scenarios (TECH Plus in particular) are based on 
very optimistic cost reduction assumptions that can only occur if significant technological 
development and learning processes take place. Therefore to achieve such results requires 
well focused R&D activities, a large number of deployment programmes, a stable 
regulatory and policy framework providing government subsidies and other forms of 
support for these technologies. On top of this new markets need to be created to 
encourage the involvement of the private sector in the energy sector. Currently, it is 
widely agreed that the effective implementation of climate change policy and measures 
can play an important role in creating incentives for low carbon technologies.  
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4.4.3. Climate Change Policy and the Implications for the Energy LTS 
In Chapter 3, it is argued the energy sector is locked into carbon at three levels; 
institutional, organisational and technological lock-in which act as the main barrier that 
constrains the transition to alternative low carbon technologies. However, as also 
discussed such a condition is not necessarily permanent.  Lock-in can be broken down if 
the landscape developments exert pressure and create openings in the energy LTS while 
the new technologies are supported via different mechanisms until they display increasing 
returns to adoption. The argument in this section is organised in that direction to show 
that the aforementioned developments in the climate change policy realm have initiated 
top-down pressures to break this lock-in and simultaneously have encouraged bottom-up 
changes required to adopt these technologies. 
  
However, as Geels and Schot (2007) point out the timing of interactions between the top-
down pressures and bottom-up developments is of great importance. If windows of 
opportunities created by landscape pressures occur at the time when the niche innovations 
are not sufficiently developed, they cannot move from the niche to regime level and fill 
the opening created in the energy LTS
161
. This was the case with the hydrogen 
technologies in the early 1970s. The emergence of environmental issues which coincided 
with the oil crises created a window of opportunity for the development of hydrogen 
technologies. It was in 1970 when for the first time the term „hydrogen economy‟ was 
coined by John O‟M Bockris162. In the same year, Jones L. W. (1970) published a paper 
arguing that shifting away from fossil fuels to liquid hydrogen in transportation could 
provide a solution to energy conservation and pollution problems
163
. The first 
applications were demonstrated in the following years. In 1972 the Urban Vehicle Design 
Competition, a Gremlin running on hydrogen won the prize for the lowest emissions and 
following the 1973 oil crisis, the development of commercial applications for hydrogen 
fuel cells began
164
. The institutional support also started in this decade. The International 
Association for Hydrogen Energy was established in 1974; the IEA initiated the R&D 
activities for hydrogen technologies (1977) and; the Federal Hydrogen R&D Programme 
was transferred to the US Department of Energy (1978)
165
. However, despite these efforts 
because of the immaturity and high costs of hydrogen technologies, the actors involved 
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opted for less risky options such as the energy efficiency measures. Thus, these 
technologies missed an opportunity and had to wait for almost another two decades to 
regain their attractiveness. 
 
The new window of opportunity emerged following the inclusion of the climate change 
problem into the policy agenda. The approval of the Convention and Kyoto Protocol has 
coerced countries to take measures to try and reduce their emissions. Although, their 
effectiveness has been subject to debate, they have opened the way for the 
implementation of new climate change policies and measures at the regional, national and 
sub-national levels. More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, as the direct link 
between the energy activities and increasing GHG emissions has become more apparent, 
these measures to halt the climate change process are gradually being transposed into 
energy LTS and initiated changes to the different components of this system.  
 
The agreed emission reduction targets and the aforementioned cocktail of instruments; 
regulations, subsidies, carbon taxes, tradable permits as well as voluntary actions 
introduced at different levels, have forced the actors involved to search for and develop 
alternative energy technologies. In other words, technical change was induced as a result 
of these top-down pressures. As clearly stated in the articles (4.1.c, 4.5) of the UNFCCC 
and Marrakech Accords, countries were asked to collaborate in the development, 
diffusion and deployment as well as transfer of these less polluting technologies
166
. In 
addition, in order to facilitate and enhance such technological cooperation, new 
institutional settings (Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Climate 
Technology Initiative and Expert Group on Technology Transfer) and financial 
mechanisms such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Marrakech Funds have 
been formed
167
. Similar to the spillover effects of climate change policies, these 
initiatives promoting technological shifts have been mirrored at all levels. Some of the 
international technology-specific agreements established in recent years involve; the 
International Partnership for Hydrogen Economy (2003), the Carbon Sequestration 
Leadership Forum (2003), the Generation IV International Forum for nuclear energy, the 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (2002) and the APP (2006)
168
. In 
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addition, regional technology programmes such as the Implementing Agreements of the 
IEA and Technology Platforms of the EU have also been established to encourage the 
development and deployment of all the aforementioned low-carbon technologies amongst 
the member countries. Furthermore, governments and local authorities, depending on 
their national circumstances, have undertaken initiatives to implement these alternative 
technologies into real world environments. For instance, in the field of hydrogen energy 
technologies, countries such as Norway, Iceland, Japan, Canada, the US and the UK as 
well as some developing nations have already created a number of niches to test and learn 
more about the potential of these technologies.  
 
The changing direction of R&D activities and the increasing number of niche 
applications, induced by the top-down pressures have played a crucial role in 
understanding the technical drawbacks, complimentary technologies and the 
modifications required to make alternative technologies compatible with the existing 
energy LTS. As the historical case studies discussed earlier have highlighted, in the case 
that such reverse salients are tackled, these alternatives can benefit from other sources of 
increasing returns to adoption. In other words, „learning mechanisms‟ can generate 
„technological interrelatedness‟ and higher „informational returns‟ and lead to „network 
externalities‟ and „scale economies in production‟ (though not necessarily in this 
order)
169
. This condition has already been observed in one of the transitional pathways; 
renewable energy technologies. As discussed in section 4.2.3., the increasing support 
from public and private sectors, the reallocation of R&D efforts and investments, which 
occurred in response to the changes at the landscape level, have substantially reduced the 
costs of these technologies (see Figure 1) and increased their adoption over the last two 
decades or so. The use of biomass for power generation increased from 3.5% to 5.9% per 
annum between 1988-2000 and 2000-2003, whereas, the growth rate of solar and wind 
have seen a significant increase from 4.9%  to 21.8% and to 24.8% per annum in 1971-
1988, 1988-2000 and 2000-2003, respectively
170
. Although it is early to draw conclusions 
on the inducement effects on climate change policies on hydrogen energy technologies, 
recent increases in hydrogen RD&D budgets are associated with this landscape 
development that can trigger similar sources of increasing returns leading to their 
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adoption. It must be noted, however, that hydrogen is not the only transitional pathway 
that benefits from these top-down pressures as shown in Figure 7. The RD&D budgets for 
other transitional pathways have also increased over the last few years. Furthermore, it 
must also be pointed out that such shifts in RD&D figures have occurred not only as a 
result of climate change policies but also due to increasing concerns about increasing fuel 
prices and security of supply issues.  
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Figure 6: Public RD&D budgets of IEA countries 
Source: IEA Energy R&D Statistics, available (online): 
http://wds.iea.org/WDS/TableViewer/dimView.aspx 
Note: (1) includes the budget for carbon capture and storage 
 
Although increases in RD&D activities play an important role in the development and 
diffusion of the low-carbon technologies, they will not be sufficient to achieve 
technological transitions to more advanced options. One of the most important barriers to 
such transformations is the high costs of these technologies. Although the aforementioned 
public RD&D investments are directed towards removing this barrier, other mechanisms 
encouraging the involvement of the private sector are required to lower these costs as the 
alternatives are several times more expensive than the incumbent technologies. It is 
suggested that the effective implementation of new climate change policy instruments can 
serve these purposes by forcing firms to change their routines and decision-making 
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processes. The theory being that at the organisational level, investment in the exploitation 
of technology is driven by individuals or firms with the expectations of gaining or 
increasing profits and therefore such investment decisions adjust to changes in market 
incentives which can lead to novel products and new or larger markets. In other words, 
technical change at the market level occurs largely as a result of firms‟ responses to 
changing price signals and thus innovation and diffusion of alternative energy 
technologies can also be induced by purposive changes in relative prices
171
.  
 
The aforementioned market-based instruments are introduced for these purposes of which 
the objective is to coerce firms into changing their routines, adopt less carbon-intensive 
technologies and engage in R&D to reduce their emissions via the use of price 
mechanisms. Although, it is difficult to identify the exact link between technological 
change and a given instrument, a number of studies in the literature have confirmed that a 
strict policy environment can result in the adoption of alternative technologies. For 
instance, a study of the IEA (2005a)
172
 demonstrates how the demand for hydrogen fuel 
and technologies can increase under different policy incentive levels. In the study, 
different costs of carbon are used as proxies to represent the stringency of different sets of 
new policies and measures that can be implemented to reduce emissions and improve the 
security of supply
173
. The results demonstrate that the use of hydrogen almost doubles 
when the cost of carbon increases from $50/t of CO2 to $100/t of CO2
174
.  Figure 8 below 
illustrates the sensitivity of hydrogen demand to changing carbon prices in four scenarios 
that use the incentive levels of 0 (Base), $25, $50 (MAP) and $100 per tonne of CO2.  
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Figure 7: Hydrogen demand under different policy incentive levels 
Source: IEA (2005a), p: 146 
 
Thus changes in relative prices can make the hydrogen fuel and technologies more cost-
competitive and increase the demand for these technologies. However, as it was 
illustrated in the previous section, when a global incentive level of $25/t of CO2 is 
applied, the utilisation of a number of alternative technologies, which are already adopted 
or close to commercialisation, also increase by 2050. Hence, the same principle applies to 
other emerging technologies. In fact an early introduction of climate change policies can 
benefit these alternatives more and lead to an early lock-in to these options or postpone 
the adoption of hydrogen systems. This is because some of these technologies 
(renewables) are more mature and cost effective, the technical barriers to the 
development of some emerging ones such as the technologies required for the adoption of 
biofuels are lower, and some others like the CCS technologies are considered less 
disruptive as they allow for the use of existing fuels and infrastructure. The effects of 
policy timing on the transition to hydrogen economy are analysed in the study of IEA 
(2005a) which shows that a 15 year delay in the introduction of CO2 reduction incentives 
increases the demand for hydrogen by 3% as it provides time for the R&D and cost 
reduction targets to be met
175
. This implies that timely bottom-up developments are 
crucial to take advantage of the opportunities created by the top-down pressures.   
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However, technological competition which can emerge from climate change policies can 
not be viewed solely as a barrier to the transition to a hydrogen economy. On the 
contrary, such a condition can enhance the adoption of these technologies as shifts to 
hydrogen technologies are highly dependent on the development of some of these 
alternatives. For instance, as will be discussed in the following chapters, technological 
roadmaps indicate that hydrogen will be derived from fossil-fuels in the short term 
because such production technologies are currently available and more mature and cost-
effective compared to the other options. However, the utilisation of these sources will 
produce emissions and therefore will require additional carbon capturing processes (CCS) 
if they are to be the preferred options under the new climate change policies. Thus, the 
development of CCS technologies will benefit rather than impede the transition to 
hydrogen technologies. The IEA (2005a) study shows that in the absence of CCS, 
demand for CO2-free hydrogen declines by 52% by 2050
176
. A similar condition is 
observed for the new generation nuclear power options development of which can reduce 
hydrogen production costs up to 30% and lead to a 36% increase in hydrogen use by 
2050
177
.  
 
On the other hand, it can not be denied that stringent climate change policies will have a 
significant positive effect on the development and deployment of renewable energy 
technologies and fuels in power generation and transportation. As mentioned earlier, the 
Reference and Alternative Policy Scenarios of the IEA (2006a) show that if all the 
proposed policies and measures are effectively implemented, global energy demand for 
hydropower, biomass and other renewables increases by 3.2%, 3.6% and 26.1% 
respectively by 2030
178
. Such increases can have a negative impact on demand for 
hydrogen. For instance, the IEA (2005a) report projects that reductions in the cost of 
renewables in power generation translates into a 5% decline for hydrogen, while  the 
doubling of biofuels can lead to a 9% less demand for hydrogen in transportation by 
2050
179
. The alternative view is that improvements in second generation renewables such 
as wind, solar, geothermal can lead to a higher rate of adoption of hydrogen and fuel cells 
in remote areas with the creation of new niches for distributed power generation where 
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these technologies can be utilised more and benefit from the increasing returns 
mechanisms mentioned earlier.  
 
To sum up, the climate change policies and measures have complimented the positive 
effects sustainability has had on the transitional pathways. They have created openings in 
the locked-in energy LTS and provided the alternatives with advantages to compete with 
the incumbent technologies. However, this top-down pressure has also created additional 
competition between the alternative technologies at the niche level. As shown in the 
scenarios above, while such competition can benefit the adoption of hydrogen 
technologies, it can also constrain the transition to a hydrogen economy. As will be 
discussed in the following section, the uncertainty regarding the transition to a hydrogen 
economy that has been generated to this competition has further increased by the recent 
developments such as price fluctuations, increasing import dependency as well as the 
economic recession. 
4.5. Energy Security and Economic Recession 
As mentioned earlier, the aim of this chapter is to analyse factors at the landscape level 
that can break carbon lock-in and provide technological alternatives with technical, 
economic and political support for their development. In the previous section, the effects 
of two related factors; sustainable development and climate change policies serving these 
purposes are discussed. It is shown that such policy changes can change the rate and 
direction of R&D, create institutional and financial support, and generate positive price 
signals for the emerging technologies and fuels and thus surface increasing returns to 
their adoption. In this section, it is argued that recent global concerns over energy 
security have created similar effects on the development of alternative energy 
technologies. Energy security means uninterrupted and adequate availability of different 
types of energy sources at reasonable prices
180
. However, because of growing energy 
demand and the uneven concentration of energy resources, for many countries achieving 
such security at a national level implies ensuring the availability of not only indigenous 
but also imported resources. Dependence on foreign reserves, nevertheless, can leave the 
importing countries vulnerable to the political vagaries in the exporting countries that can 
result in disruptions to supply and price volatility. Thus, as Khatip (2000), Helm 
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(2002)
181
 and Grubb (2006)
182
 point out, threats to security of supply at different levels 
include;  
 at the global level; inadequate resources due to a lack of investment, price 
fluctuations and geopolitical instability, 
 at the regional level; lack of mechanisms to ensure that networking and trade can 
take place, 
 at the national level; inadequate indigenous sources and reserves, governments‟ 
and/or markets‟ inability or reluctance to allocate financial, technological and 
intellectual resources to develop diverse range of fuels, lack of investment on 
infrastructure and networks, high-priced or inadequate imports due to problems 
at the global and/or regional levels or because of the failure of the government 
and/or market players to generate long-term contracts with exporters.  
 
Currently, these conditions are observed in different parts of the world. Global energy 
demand is increasing, despite the economic recession which has reduced growth rates 
since 2008. Energy demand in 2030 is expected to be 45% higher than that of 2006. 
While demand shows an upward trend, resources are increasingly concentrated in fewer 
regions. This mismatch between supply and demand is exacerbated by the political 
differences between the exporting and importing countries which have led to supply 
disruptions and price fluctuations. In addition, the asset-sweating strategies of the late 
1980s and 1990s which have obstructed investment in the energy infrastructure and new 
generation capacity have added on to the supply disruptions. Under these circumstances, 
countries have become more inclined to change their consumption patterns, change their 
energy mix, exploit local sources and shift to less energy-intensive technologies. In other 
words, these global concerns have complimented the aforementioned sustainability and 
climate change issues in terms of creating openings in the energy LTS, encouraging 
technological developments at the niche level and thus, inducing transitions to alternative 
energy technologies and fuels. However, similar to the other landscape developments, 
concerns over the security of supply have also triggered the competition at the niche 
level. As discussed in the previous sections, because of its potential positive or negative 
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impacts on the development of hydrogen systems, this level of competition has created 
uncertainty regarding transition to hydrogen energy systems. 
  
This uncertainty has been increased by the unexpected economic crisis that appeared in 
late 2007. The economic recession has led to reductions in the energy demand and sharp 
declines in the prices of oil, gas and coal. It has also reduced investment, while a number 
of projects have been delayed or cancelled in the oil, gas and coal sectors, based on the 
declines in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009, it is estimated that the 
investment in renewables would have fallen by as much as 38% by the end of 2009
183
. 
Finally, the economic recession which has changed the priorities worldwide has already 
had a negative impact on climate change agreements. Witness the recent failure to reach 
any serious form of agreement at the Copenhagen Conference.  Thus this sudden change 
at the landscape level which has created a low investment and energy price environment 
has the alternative technologies unattractive in terms of competing against the incumbent 
technologies. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the situation has started to change once 
again. According to OPEC calculations, the monthly basket price of oil has increased 
from 38.4$/b in December 2008 to 68.6 $/b in June 2009. As the IEA (2009) points out 
increases in the oil prices combined with low investment levels will most probably 
exacerbate the already existing security of supply concerns and continue to emphasise the 
necessity of developing alternative energy systems. Although its impact on the direction 
of competition between hydrogen systems and other alternatives is uncertain, because of 
the immaturity and high costs of these technologies, the actors involved in the energy 
LTS can opt for alternatives with lower technology and market risks. On the other hand, 
developments in the alternatives (such as the CCS technologies) and/or problems that are 
associated with the other emerging technologies (connection of renewables to the grid) 
can compliment and increase the adoption of hydrogen technologies.  
4.5.1. Re-emergence of Security of Supply Concerns in 2000’s 
The first condition to achieve energy security is to ensure an adequate resource base 
which can include fossil fuel reserves, renewable energy sources and natural uranium. 
However, when there is a mismatch between the location of production and consumption 
of energy sources, the security of supply concerns emerge as meeting the demand 
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requires imports. This makes the importing countries dependent on the exporters and 
vulnerable to their decisions. The statistics show that import dependency has been the 
case since the early 2000s and will continue in the coming decades. 
 
According to the IEA (2008) projections, unless any policy changes occur, by 2030, 
global primary energy demand will increase by 45%, while 87% of this growth will come 
from non-OECD nations the share of which will increase from 51% in 2006 to 62% in 
2030. The share of OECD countries is expected to fall to around 36%
184
. However, as 
recently observed with the economic crisis, demand is highly sensitive to changes in the 
economic conditions and price fluctuations. Taking these factors into consideration, the 
EIA (2009) report projects that global energy consumption will grow by 55%, 32%, 38% 
and 48% in the cases of high rates of economic growth, low rates of economic growth, 
high oil prices and low oil prices, respectively
185
. Both the IEA (2008) and the EIA 
(2009) estimates show that the majority of this demand will be met by fossil fuels. For 
instance, the EIA (2009) predicts that fossil fuel consumption will account for 83%, 84%, 
82%, 83% and 84% in reference, high and low growth and high and low oil price 
scenarios respectively
186. However, although both of the studies claim that the world‟s 
remaining exploitable fossil fuels are sufficient to meet the growing demand up to 2030 
they also demonstrate that none of the largest consumers have the potential to supply 
fully their own fossil fuel consumption via their indigenous sources. This is particularly 
the case for two of the most fuels in demand-oil and natural gas. 
 
In terms of oil, more than 75% of the world‟s proven reserves are concentrated in the 
OPEC region and another 10% was found in the former Soviet Union countries at the end 
of 2008
187
. Nevertheless, the reserves of the three largest consumers; the US, China and 
India which amounted to around 52 billion barrels accounted for only 3.6% of the world 
total reserves
188
. The statistics show that at the end of 2006, these three countries alone 
accounted for 36% of the total world consumption of liquids (including conventional and 
non-conventional liquids), which was higher than the total share of the rest of the 
countries in the OECD (with around 33%) and the non-OECD region that did not exceed 
30%
189
. Conversely, their production accounted for approximately 15% of total world 
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production which makes these countries heavily dependent on imports
190
. Nevertheless, 
this mismatch between the volume of production and consumption was not observed only 
in these countries; according to BP (2009) statistics. As of 2008, the US, Canada and 
Mexico in America, continental Europe, Japan, China and India were the largest 
importers which imported more than 40 million barrels per day and accounted for 74% of 
the total oil imports
191
. However, more than 51% of these imports were met by the 
supplies from the Middle Eastern and former Soviet Union countries which exported 
approximately 21 mb/day to these countries at the end of 2008
192
.  
 
These statistics thus show there is significant dependence on OPEC and Russian imports 
for crude oil and their products amongst the developed and rapidly developing countries. 
Studies indicate that this dependency will increase over the coming decade. The share of 
contributors, however, will change. The underlying reason for this change will be the 
shifts in consumption patterns. While the demand for oil will grow in the non-OECD 
regions due to rapid growth in Asia, increasing energy efficiency measures, the adoption 
of alternative energy technologies, the switching to less energy intensive sectors as well 
as shifts to non-conventional liquids will reduce the growth in oil consumption in the 
OECD countries. The EIA (2009) reference scenario projects that the consumption of 
liquids will grow by 25% by 2030. However the share of the OECD will fall from 58% in 
2006 to 47% by 2030
193
. In addition, import dependency in this region will also be 
reduced by the increases in the production of non-conventional liquids including biofuels, 
oil sands, extra-heavy oil, coal and gas-to-liquids and shale oil. In the reference scenario, 
the production of non-conventional liquids is expected to amount to 13.4 mb/day by 2030 
and 88% of this production will come from non-OPEC countries
194
. Despite the 
decreases, however, dependence on oil imports in the OECD region will continue; it is 
estimated that the production of conventional liquids (crude oil and natural gas liquids) in 
OPEC and former Soviet Union countries will grow by 12.4 mb/day between 2006-2030 
and the production share of these regions will increase from 41% in 2006 to 54% by 
2030
195
. Consequently, countries such as the US, China and India will be importing 63%, 
75% and 93% of their oil needs via imports and on a regional basis the highest oil 
dependency will be observed in the EU and OECD Pacific areas with more than 90% in 
 167 
2030
196
. Although these figures will change depending on the future price of oil and level 
of economic growth, even in the best case scenario, the consumption of liquids amongst 
the countries outside OPEC and Russia will exceed their production and therefore the 
problem of oil import dependency will continue (see Tables 4 and 5). 
 
Similar to the oil industry, import dependency has also been an increasing concern in the 
natural gas sector. As mentioned earlier, 53% of the world‟s gas reserves were found in 
only three countries; Russia, Iran and Qatar at the end of 2008
197
. In 2006, more than 
62% of the total gas production came from non-OECD countries whose share of which is 
expected to increase to around 69% by 2030
198
. However, unlike the oil industry, the 
projections show that the demand growth for gas will be higher in the non-OECD 
regions. In fact, in some of the EIA (2009) scenarios, the consumption of non-OECD 
countries shows a larger growth that is in the range of 50% to 84% compared to 10% to 
36% of the OECD region. Despite its lower consumption growth rates, however, the 
OECD continues to dominate the imports due to lower production levels and the 
depletion of regional resources. For instance, the imports of the US which accounted for 
only 2% of its gas demand in 2006 is expected grow by 130 bcm and amount to 16% of 
its natural gas needs by 2030, whereas the import dependency of the EU and OECD Asia 
(Japan and Korea) will increase from 57% and 91% to 86% and 98% respectively
199
. 
Where the non-OECD countries are concerned, import dependency will mostly increase 
in China and India. These countries will increase their imports by 125 bcm and 62 bcm 
and will supply 19% and 48% of their gas demand via imports by 2030
200
. On the other 
hand, a large proportion of the increase in demand will be met by the growth in the 
Middle East, Africa and Russia export shares of which will grow by around 490%, 186% 
and 36% respectively by 2030
201
. Exports from these three regions will be equal to 85% 
of total exports in 2030 compared to 79% in 2006
202
. The increases in trade for natural 
gas will be mainly due to developments in the LNG market. In 2006, 55% of the gas was 
transported through pipelines whereas by 2030, it is estimated that the LNG will take 
over and account for 69% of total trade
203
. As a result, similar to oil industry, the natural 
gas trade will become more international and increase by 580 bcm, more than doubling 
the amount traded in 2006
204
.  
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The statistics indicate that the problems of uneven resource concentration and the 
consequent import dependency, which have been experienced in oil and gas industries, do 
not create major concerns for coal. Although, being the second highest fuel in demand, 
the existence of abundant and evenly distributed coal reserves allows a good match 
between supply and demand. Nevertheless, prospects for coal demonstrate that such 
balance will change for some regions in the future. According to BP (2009) statistics, at 
the end of 2008, more than three quarters of the world proven coal reserves were located 
in five countries; the US (28.9%), Russia (19%), China (13.9%), Australia (9.2%) and 
India (7.1%)
205
. It is projected that production will grow in all these countries and their 
collective output will increase from around 77% in 2006 to 80% of the global production 
by 2030
206
. Despite the increase in production, however, demand growth will force some 
of these countries to rely on imports. For instance, India has already started to import 
some of its coal requirements, while the US and China are expected to become importers 
by 2015
207
. The largest coal import dependency will be experienced in the OECD Asia 
area, India and Europe. Imports to Europe, however, are expected decline after a peak in 
2015 which will be because of climate change regulations and the consequent reductions 
in coal demand for power generation.
208
. 
 
To sum up, these statistics prove that recent demand growth and concentration of oil and 
gas reserves in a smaller number of regions have tightened the balance between supply 
and demand and raised the trade for energy sources globally. In short, import dependency 
in most of the countries has grown and the concerns over the security of supply of the 
1970s have re-emerged on the policy agenda, though this time it covers not only oil but 
also natural gas. Although current reserves are concentrated in only a few regions are 
adequate to meet the increasing demand up to 2030, such availability does not imply that 
the problem of security of supply can be evaded by simply removing the barriers to trade 
for energy sources. Due to the scale of demand, the increasing exhaustion of easily 
recoverable resources and ageing of assets, the issue of security goes beyond this link 
requiring not only geopolitical stability to ensure uninterrupted and affordable supplies 
but also massive additional investment. 
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The origins of the problem can be traced back to the decisions made following the oil 
crises of the 1970s. During the decade of the two major oil shocks (1973 Arab-Israeli 
War and 1979 Iranian Revolution), supply interruptions and high oil prices forced 
countries outside OPEC to invest in the upstream oil sector and to meet increasing energy 
demand via sources other than oil. This was also induced by the implementation of IEA 
emergency response mechanisms (1974) that required member countries to hold 90 days 
of net oil imports as emergency response stocks, increase indigenous production, 
introduce measures to reduce demand and shift to other fuels
209
. Due to rising oil prices 
previously costly fields became economically viable such as the offshore production in 
the North Sea. The exploration of which led to increases in supply
210
. In addition, the 
construction of power plants was increased and energy sources utilised in this sector were 
diversified by larger investments in coal and nuclear power
211
. In other words, the priority 
of energy policy in this decade and in the early 1980s was to decrease the dominance of 
oil in the energy mix and developing resource capacity to ensure supply security
212
. The 
outcome was excess capacity which was also due to reductions in demand that occurred 
as a result of shifts to less energy-intensive sectors experienced amongst the developed 
countries
213
. Consequently, the price of oil, which rose from $15.43 in 1973 to $93.08 in 
1980, started to decline (prices are in $2007)
214
.  
 
In an environment of excess supply and low energy prices, the energy policy objectives 
shifted away from supply security and therefore from investment to cost minimisation 
and asset sweating, which would be better served by a market-based approach as opposed 
to state controlled planning
215
. As Skinner (2006) describes, the understanding was that 
under the surplus conditions, the introduction of competition to the energy market would 
not only reduce costs but also enhance the productivity which would enable private firms 
to increase employment
216
.  Given the number of attractions, in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
governments started to introduce new policy instruments, privatisation, liberalisation and 
competition
217
.  
Prior to the 1970s, the oil industry was dominated by the international oil companies 
(IOC) which effectively determined prices
218
. However, by the 1970s when the balance 
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between supply and demand tightened and production started to concentrate in the OPEC 
region, these countries shifted their policies towards nationalising their reserves, which 
allowed them to take control over pricing
219
. In fact their power became obvious during 
the 1973 and 1979 oil price shocks. Once the oil crises had subsided there were several 
changes to the oil market. International oil companies, which lost shares in the OPEC 
fields, could no longer afford their downstream investment (refining) and therefore 
moved away from vertically integrated structure that linked their upstream and 
downstream activities
220
. Thus, they started to sell refineries to the new players
221
. In fact, 
such private sector involvement was later on encouraged by OECD governments via the 
introduction of competition in the downstream market
222
. In addition to this gradual 
transformation to the use of markets, there were also changes to the locations of 
production.  
 
Rising oil prices and OPEC‟s new policies to close acreage to the IOCs led to 
considerable investments in exploration activities outside this region (especially in the 
North Sea, Soviet Union and Mexico)
223
. As a result, the total production share of non-
OPEC increased from 48% in 1973 to 71% in 1985
224
. When increased production 
accompanied with a decrease in demand in this region left OPEC with a surplus capacity 
of around 12mb/day, member countries were forced to increase their supplies in order to 
eliminate this excess capacity and to boost the demand for oil
225
. Thus the outcome was 
global excess supply and low demand which inevitably led to reductions in oil prices. 
Hence by mid-1980s, the security of supply issues experienced amongst the non-OPEC 
nations were transformed into security of demand concerns of oil-exporting countries. 
Having lost a significant market share, Saudi Arabia responded to these developments by 
introducing the netback pricing system
226
. Nevertheless, the new pricing policy when 
combined with the expansion strategies and the increasing capacity outside OPEC prices 
collapsed to $27.22 (in $2007) in 1986
227
. Consequently, netback pricing was replaced 
with the market-related price formulae system and despite the fluctuations during Iraq‟s 
invasion of Kuwait, oil prices continued a downward trend throughout the 1990s. 
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These developments, which led to excess capacity and low prices, resulted in changes in 
the direction of investments. As the security of supply was no longer a problem, 
government control was reduced and subsidies were gradually removed
228
. Later on, 
declining prices, which made the investments unprofitable, led the newly privatised 
sector to move away from investing in the fields of exploration, production and refineries 
to maximising shareholders value via capitalizing on the existing assets and cost cutting 
strategies
229
. However, such underinvestment occurred when demand had started to grow. 
As Fattouh (2007) shows between 1990 and 2004, global oil demand grew by 16 mb/day; 
while non-OPEC supply accounted for 6 mb/day of this increase, the remainder was met 
by the OPEC supplies
230
. Although, in order to meet this demand, exporting countries 
(including some of the OPEC members) restarted acreage opening processes for 
exploration and development, their preference for national oil companies over the IOCs 
led the latter to continue their cost-minimisation strategies
231
. This was also encouraged 
by the falling oil prices which eventually collapsed to $16.69 a barrel in 1998 (in 
$2007)
232
. 
 
Similar approaches were pursued in the power industry where the previous investments in 
capital stock and the consequent surplus capacity implied that heavy subsidies to ensure 
supply was no longer a prerequisite and therefore the new priority was the lowering of 
prices. Thus governments started to implement regulations to liberalise the markets. The 
first attempts were made England and Wales in 1990, which was followed by Norway 
(1991) and the other Nordic countries (1996), Australia (1994), New Zealand (1996), and 
a number of states in America (second half of the 1990s)
233
. Today, following market 
launches in Canada (2001), European countries and the EU, and almost all of the OECD 
countries have liberalised their wholesale markets
234
. The aim of the liberalisation 
process was to enhance economic efficiency by introducing competition which was also 
believed to secure supply as a result of diversity that would be created by allowing open 
access to transmission and distribution systems
235
. Thus the actions were similar to those 
taken in the oil industry; state-owned companies were privatised, subsidies for capacity 
expansion were removed and the private sector focused on cutting costs
236
. These cost-
minimisation strategies, which led to shifts away from investments in fixed capital to 
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lower operating costs, not only deterred investments in coal and nuclear based power, but 
also created the need for exploiting new ways to generate electricity more cost-
effectively.  
 
Natural gas became the most preferred option because of the exploration of new reserves 
and the technological developments that took place in gas turbines, particularly the 
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) stations. In the mid-1980s, the introduction of the 
natural gas fired Futtsu Plant of Tokyo Electric Power proved that electricity output could 
be increased by the use of a series of units that combined steam cycle with gas turbines as 
opposed to single module or only gas fired steam cycle plants
237
. The flexible design of 
these new plants provided an opportunity to minimise the construction costs as capacity 
expansion required only additional modules
238
. Also, higher efficiency levels achieved in 
these plants (compared to coal plants) implied further reductions in operating costs (lower 
fuel costs). Thus, these technological developments coinciding with the new cost 
minimisation strategies created a new trajectory; the use of natural gas for power 
generation. A substantial proportion of investment was allocated to gas turbines which 
amounted to 65% of the total power generation orders between 1991-2001
239
. 
Consequently, the share of natural gas in electricity generation increased from 15% in 
1990 to 20% by 2006 at the expense of oil
240
. Although this was a global trend, it became 
most apparent in North America and continental Europe. The exploitation of North Sea 
gas and easy access to new supplies in Russia (following the collapse of Soviet Union), 
resulting in low fuel costs, favoured the use of natural gas in Europe. In addition, 
emerging climate change issues, which gained strong policy support in the EU, triggered 
these changes. In fact, in the early days of this transition, gas CCGTs, because of the 
solutions they provided to the security of supply and climate change problems, were 
protected to encourage new entrants
241
. These subsidies were eventually withdrawn once 
private sector involvement was guaranteed following the liberalisation of the electricity 
and gas markets.  
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, climate change issues also entered the energy 
policy realm during the 1990s. Excess capacity, decreasing fuel prices and market 
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liberalisation allowed governments to withdraw from the fossil fuel sector and reallocate 
resources to R&D activities and deployment of less-carbon intensive fuels and 
technologies. The reason behind this change was that development and deployment of 
renewables would not only fulfil the GHG reduction commitments but also generate 
diversity in the energy mix and therefore avoid the security of supply concerns in the 
future. Consequently, the share of renewables excluding hydro in electricity generation 
increased from 1.4% in 1990 to 2.3% in 2006
242
. Though, it must be noted that, until 
recently, despite the RD&D efforts, alternative transport fuels and technologies including 
biofuels, electric and hybrid cars and hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles did not receive 
much attention because of low oil prices and thus petroleum products remained the main 
source for transportation activities. 
  
Hence, capital investments in the early 1980‟s, technological and geo-political 
developments allowing diversifications in the energy mix and the cost-minimisation 
strategies adopted during the liberalisation processes led to a secure and low price energy 
sector between the mid-1980‟s and late 1990‟s. However, the situation started to change 
by the turn of the century.  
 
One of the most important changes occurred in consumption patterns. On one hand, 
demand for energy services increased. Between 1973-2006 worldwide energy 
consumption almost doubled rising from 4672 Mtoe to 8084 Mtoe
243
. The underlying 
reason for this was the increase in economic growth experienced in developing regions. 
The total energy consumption share of Asia (including China), Middle East and Latin 
America increased from 19% in 1973 to 36% by 2006
244
. Conversely, the share of the 
OECD region fell from 60.6% to 47.3%, due to measures introduced following the oil 
crises
245
. On the other hand, the aforementioned efforts to shift away from oil, 
exploitation of new reserves, technological development, the new market approach and 
emerging climate change issues favoured some of the sources over the others. For 
instance, in the last two decades, the consumption of electricity grew by 61% and its 
share increased from 13% to 17%, while the share of oil and coal fell by approximately 
5% and 5.6%, respectively, between 1990-2006
246
. This transformation although reduced 
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tensions in the oil sector, but later on it put new pressures on power and one of its main 
suppliers-the gas industry. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, oil remained the dominant 
fuel for transport activities. Economic development and increasing per capita incomes 
towards the end of twentieth century which led to growth in car ownership, increased the 
demand for petroleum products for transport activities from 94% in 1990 to 95% in 
2006
247
. The exceptional growth in the demand for oil in the 2000s surged for a number 
of reasons. After the Asian Financial Crisis (1997/1998) had subsided, the rapid growth 
of China‟s saw its demand for oil soar, In fact it doubled during the 1990s and similar 
trends were observed in other Asian countries
248
. At the same time, the recovery of the 
US economy from the 9/11 terror attacks and the following economic growth experienced 
in the USA and amongst the other OECD countries increased rade between this region 
and the „new manufacturers‟, China, India and other Asian countries which led to further 
increases in the demand for oil for transport
249
.  In addition, the aforementioned increases 
in other regions such as Middle East and South America added to the volume of demand.  
 
However, the energy sector was not prepared for this unexpected growth in demand. As 
discussed earlier, in the oil industry, investment in new generation capacity was in 
decline during the 1990s and most of the increase in demand was met by supplies coming 
from the OPEC region. Furthermore, as the increases in the non-OPEC supply proved to 
be insufficient, rising global demand required the use of spare production capacity. 
Nevertheless, the negative effects of underinvestment in production did not emerge until 
the 2000s. In this new era, greater increases in demand coinciding with some geopolitical 
developments, such as the strikes in Venezuela (2002), the attacks on oil equipments in 
Nigeria (2003-2004) and the US invasion of Iraq (2003) eroded the already limited spare 
capacity from 7 mb/day in 2002 to less than 1 mb/day by 2004
250
.  The lack of investment 
in the downstream market had similar consequences. Spare refining capacity fell from 21 
mb/day in 1981 to almost zero by 2004
251
. In addition, other developments such as the 
hurricanes in America (2004-2006), fires in oil facilities, leakages in the pipelines (BP 
2005, Shell 2006) and the new political disputes between Russia and its neighbours 
which led to oil cuts in 2007- 2008 added to the supply shortage problems that have been 
experienced outside OPEC. As expected, growing demand, a lack of spare capacity 
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accompanied with these supply interruptions have had an adverse impact on the price of 
oil, which increased from $29.06 in 2002 to $72.39 a barrel (in $2007) at the end of 
2007
252
. It reached a record level of $131.22 a barrel in July 2008 
253
.  
 
As a result of these developments, the security of oil supply concerns re-emerged on the 
public policy agenda. Nevertheless, the current problem is larger compared to the 1970s. 
Firstly, the fluctuations in the price of oil are greater and more frequent. According to the 
OPEC monthly basket price data, following the peak in July 2008, oil prices declined to 
$38.6 a barrel and then increased to $68.36 a barrel in June 2009. 
254
. Secondly, there is a 
greater dependency on imports because of the aforementioned increases in the 
geographical concentration of reserves. Thirdly, imports are affected by not only the 
political instability in the Middle East but are also highly vulnerable to new controls 
asserted by countries outside OPEC such as Russia and Mexico. This is due to a 
resurgence of „resource nationalisation‟ policies in recent years which has restricted the 
IOC‟s from owning or exploring reserves, and increased the dominance of national oil 
companies which accounted for 57% of the world oil production in 2006
255
. 
Renationalisation policies can create serious problems as national interests can conflict 
with international needs (depletion policies) and lead to supply disruptions and/or 
shortages. Fourthly, even if the politics are dealt with, higher demand and the increasing 
production of lower quality crude oil (heavy oil containing higher sulphur compared to 
sweet oil) in the exporting countries necessitates larger investments in exploration and 
refining activities
256
. Moreover, additional investments are required worldwide to 
increase capacity, replace aging assets, and to improve downstream assets as well as to 
develop new technologies and alternative fuels. According to IEA (2008) estimates; 
meeting the aforementioned growth in oil demand growth between 2007-2030 will entail 
global investment of $6.3 trillion ($2007), while 80% of this sum is needed for the 
upstream market, refining and shipping amount to $1.26 trillion
257
. Finally, oil prices and 
economic conditions which are highly volatile, can pose serious problems as the 
worsening of financial markets and/or decreases in demand and oil prices may deter the 
necessary investments. For instance, the IEA (2009) show that upstream projects in the 
amount of 2 mb/d of peak oil and 1 bcf/d of peak gas were cancelled between October 
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2008 and April 2009, while another 35 projects with the capacities of 4.2 mb/d of oil and 
2.3 bcf/d of gas were postponed by 18 months
258
. The total value of these cancelled or 
delayed projects is expected to amount to $170 billion by the end of 2009, $100 billion of 
which has already been reduced since mid-2008
259
. The situation is similar for the 
downstream market where refinery projects with capacities of 1.6 mb/d have been 
cancelled or delayed
260
. Currently, these cutbacks in investment and supply do not create 
problems because of larger reductions in demand which is expected to fall to 83.2 mb/d 
that is 2.6 mb/d less compared to 2008
261
. However, as discussed earlier, worldwide 
consumption is projected to grow even in the low growth and high oil price scenarios. 
Therefore the IEA (2009) points out that due to the long lead times of the projects, the 
recent reductions in supply combined with the recovery of demand will probably lead to 
supply disruptions in the mid-term and exacerbate the already existing security of supply 
concerns
262
. 
 
Today, nevertheless, the issue of security of supply is broader; it encompasses concerns 
not only for oil but also for electricity and gas. The problems in these two sectors are 
inter-related and similar to the oil industry. They are associated with the developments 
that took place in the last two decades. In the power industry, privatisation and 
competition, which led to a fall in electricity prices during the 1990s, deterred investment 
in new generation capacity, transmission system and peaking and back-up capacity
263
. At 
the same time, following liberalisation, the entry of new players, connection of new types 
of generators, larger use of embedded generation technologies not only increased 
congestion in the transmission and distribution systems but also expanded the electricity 
markets. Although at the time, these changes did not create problems because of excess 
capacity, by the 2000s the lack of investment accompanied with increasing demand 
created serious problems in the electricity system. Major power cuts in the USA and 
South-Eastern Canada (August 2003), UK (August 2003), Switzerland and Italy 
(September 2003), Sweden and Eastern Denmark (September 2003) and Eastern 
Australia (August 2004), occurred as a result of failures in the network services, showed 
the need for additional investment on transmission and distribution systems
264
. On the 
other hand, the Californian electricity crisis (2001), which demonstrated that increases in 
 177 
electricity prices were inevitable under the circumstances of a shortage of supply and 
increasing demand which stretched capacity limits, highlighted the importance of 
developing new generation and back-up capacity
265
. In the literature, the reasons behind 
these failures have been associated with two main problems; asset sweating strategies 
pursued following liberalisation and ineffective regulatory control in managing natural 
monopolies. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, due to the physical characteristics of 
electricity, the transmission systems were left as monopolies. Nevertheless, irrespective 
of the reasons, the outcomes have become clear, by the turn of the century the power 
sector started to suffer from increasing prices and disruptions to supply and that, 
significant investment is required in order to meet increases in demand and achieve 
security in this sector. For instance, median industrial electricity price in the EU 15 and 
G7 countries more than doubled, rising from 2.79p/kWh in 2000 to 5.97p/kWh in 
2008
266
. In addition, based on the growth rates between 2000 and 2006 it is projected that 
by 2030 total final consumption of electricity will increase by 79%
267
. Meeting this 
demand growth necessitates substantial global investment of $13.6 trillion ($2007) while 
50% of this figure is needed for transmission and distribution systems, the other half is 
required for new generation capacity
268
.  
 
However, similar to the oil industry, the power sector has also been affected by the recent 
developments. While the economic crisis reduced the demand for electricity which fell by 
2.5% and a further 4.9% in the last quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009, the slump in 
the oil prices translated into a drop in the price of electricity
269
. Although these changes 
have eroded immediate concerns over meeting demand and increases in electricity prices, 
their impact on investment can pose a serious threat to the security of electricity supply in 
the coming years. In this low electricity price environment, investment is expected to fall.  
In 2009 orders for new power plants were expected to drop by anywhere between 30% to 
50% 
270
. While reductions in investment in new capacity may not create a problem under 
conditions of low demand, any decline in investment in transmission and distribution 
systems which are already vulnerable, will have a damaging impact on the security of 
electricity supply. In addition, lower electricity prices have made costly nuclear and 
renewable electricity generation unfavourable. Investment in renewables in the first 
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quarter of 2009 was 42% lower than in the final quarter of 2008
271
. Although there is a 
high level of uncertainty regarding the direction of future investment, a continuation in 
the decline in investment in alternatives may lead to a shift to gas and coal-based plants, a 
decrease in the diversity in the electricity generation mix, and exacerbate the existing 
concerns about the security of supply of electricity.  
 
In the case that such a shift occurs, ensuring the security of the electricity supply will 
become an even bigger challenge as there have been increasing problems in the gas 
industry since the turn of the century. As mentioned earlier, cost-minimisation strategies 
that favoured the use of natural gas for power generation led to benign shifts away from 
coal and nuclear power. In addition to the power sector, gas has become increasingly 
utilised in the industry, residential, agriculture and other end-use sectors. Such increases 
in consumption has led to an exhaustion of resources and shortages in upstream markets 
in certain regions, which led to the the issue of import dependency to emerge and 
vulnerability to geo-political development in the exporting countries. As demonstrated 
earlier, while the reliance on imports has grown worldwide, disruptions to supply because 
of political disputes have become more frequent. For instance, in Europe, the peaking of 
production in 1996 led the EU 27 to import 57% of its consumption in 2005
272
. Due to 
cost-effectiveness of pipeline distribution compared to LNG, imports to this region have 
been restricted to a few neighbouring countries, mainly from Russia (24%), Norway 
(13%) and Algeria (11%) which account for 84% of the gas imports when LNG imports 
are included
273
. However, the downside of the reliance on imports became apparent 
following the changes to Russia‟s oil and gas policy that led to the renationalisation of 
pipelines and reserves in the country – Gazprom has a monopoly over exports; the 
pipelines and two thirds of the reserves belong to this national company
274
. The 
dominance of Gazprom which prevents competition allows Russia to manipulate gas 
distribution. Commercial disputes over the price of gas between Russia and Ukraine in 
2006 and 2009, resulted in supply cuts to Ukraine that has the key pipeline which 
distributes more than 50% of European gas needs
275
. Although, the conflict has been 
resolved, it is highly likely that further problems will emerge because of the structure of 
the Russian gas pipeline system which was built based on reserves located in two fields; 
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West Siberia and Caspian countries including Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan
276
. While the Siberian supplies are owned by Russia, after break up of the 
Soviet Union, the Caspian reserves are no longer under their ownership, though Gazprom 
continues to supply an important amount of Ukrainian exports through Turkmen gas
277
. 
Although Turkmenistan can supply the Ukraine directly because of Gazprom‟s ownership 
of key parts of the transportation system between these two countries, Russia can still 
assert control over gas flows
278
. However, despite the influence Russia has, this reliance 
on Turkmen gas can create serious problems in the coming years, as Asian countries such 
as China have announced their intention to make agreements with the Caspian region to 
increase imports
279
. In the case that gas flows are diverted towards these regions, Europe 
will become more inclined to diversify its trade patterns via LNG imports which would 
pressurise the already tight supply-demand balance in the North America and Pacific 
region (Japan and Korea)
280
.  
 
Thus similar to the oil industry, increasing gas consumption over the years and the 
growth in imports combined with the political and commercial developments amongst the 
exporting countries has created concerns over the security of gas supplies. While this was 
once a more regional concern, it has become global with the development of LNG 
markets. However, there are further problems that threaten security in the gas industry. 
One of the major challenges is price volatility. Although low prices dominated the 1990s, 
by the turn of the century, price showed a large increase from $2.71/mbtu in 2000 to 
$10.79/mbtu by 2008
281
. Nevertheless, plummeting oil prices led to dramatic decreases 
and the price of gas dropped to $6.95/mbtu in the last quarter of 2008 and to $4.91/mbtu 
in the first quarter of 2009
282
. Due to its links with the oil, the recent recovery in oil 
prices is estimated to reflect in the price of gas and increase it in the coming months. In 
addition to price volatility, there is increasing concern over investment issues. According 
to IEA (2008) estimates, meeting the aforementioned growth in demand and replacing the 
aging infrastructure as well as building new capacity will require an investment of $5.5 
billion, while 61% of this amount will be needed for exploration and development 
activities, investment in transmission and distribution lines and LNG chain will amount to 
approximately $2.15 billion
283
. However, as previously discussed reductions in energy 
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prices and the economic recession which has dampened demand, has had a negative 
impact on investment, projects have either been cancelled or postponed. Although these 
cutbacks do not create major issues because of the low levels of demand, it is estimated to 
generate larger problems in the future as gas consumption is set to grow even in the high 
oil price and low economic growth scenarios.  
 
To sum up, the evolution of a number of factors; growing energy demand, the increasing 
concentration of energy sources (in particular oil and gas) in certain regions, along with 
privatisation and liberalisation has created a mismatch between the location of 
consumption and production in the last two decades. This has become most apparent 
since the turn of the century and has led to significant increases in trade for energy 
sources, leaving a large number of countries dependent on imports. Such reliance 
combined with the recent geo-political and commercial disputes amongst the exporting 
countries as well as the major increases in the energy prices have generated concerns over 
the security of supply. This new energy LTS, which was characterised by high demand, 
scarce sources and high energy prices, makes the previously expensive alternative energy 
technologies cost-competitive. Under these circumstances, the actors involved in the 
energy LTS who started to „lose faith‟ in the existing technologies, became more inclined 
to change their activities
284
. As previously discussed, the implementation of stricter 
climate change regulations was another factor that triggered this transformation. 
However, as the alternatives were not fully developed to tackle these problems, the actors 
opted for developing a number of technological options including hydrogen technologies 
to reduce uncertainty and risks. As a result, new competition emerged at the niche level 
between the emerging technologies. Thus, while the security of supply concerns (similar 
to climate change pressures) created openings in the energy LTS for the alternatives, the 
transition to hydrogen technologies became dependent on overcoming the competition at 
the niche level. However, these favourable conditions changed with the emergence of 
other developments at the landscape level. The economic recession and the collapse in 
energy prices has led to a reduction in investment in energy technologies because of their 
high costs and risks involved. Alternatives have become unattractive options for 
investment purposes. As will be discussed while these changes have created difficulties 
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for the development of the hydrogen economy, the transition to these technologies will 
very much depend on the how long it takes to recover from the effects of the recession 
and the policies countries will follow.  
4.5.2. Recent Global Energy Issues and Implications for the Energy 
LTS 
It was argued in the previous sections that the context of the landscape is dynamic. 
Developments at this level can exert pressure and transform the rules and activities in the 
energy LTS.  As Geels and Schot (2007) describe, if this transformation which generally 
entails moderate changes and/or improvements in the existing development trajectories 
do not solve the problems and at the same time landscape pressures become greater, the 
actors involved will be more inclined to search for and develop radical but symbiotic 
niche innovations
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. The resurgence of security of supply concerns provides a good 
example of this argument.  
 
As discussed in the previous sections, the emergence of environmental issues and the oil 
crises in the 1970s have compelled the actors involved to develop alternative options 
including hydrogen to move away from oil. Nevertheless, because of their immaturity 
and high costs, hydrogen technologies could not take advantage of this opening in the 
energy LTS. Despite the missed opportunity, however, these changes at the landscape 
level have put hydrogen technologies on the R&D agenda. These research activities were 
later on encouraged by climate change pressures. While the entry of climate change 
issues onto the policy agenda has supported the development of hydrogen technologies, 
because of the aforementioned excess supply and low energy price environment in the 
1990‟s these technologies were still considered costly and therefore the focus was on the 
renewables (wind in particular) which were more mature and relatively economic. 
However, the situation changed with the re-emergence of energy security issues by the 
turn of the century.  
Growth in demand, the depletion of and decreases in production of fossil fuels in certain 
regions and the increasing import dependency created the necessity of diversifying 
energy mix and deploying indigenous sources. Although one of the aims of promoting 
renewables in the 1990s was to prevent this problem, during the growth of these systems 
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a number of reverse salients occurred; difficulties of dealing with the intermittent 
electricity output, grid connections and expansion as well as the higher costs of biofuels 
emerged as major drawbacks. As a result, it became apparent that increasing their 
deployment would be difficult unless their costs were reduced and they were further 
developed and complimented with other technologies. Subsequently, these problems at 
the landscape level and in the energy LTS have created new opportunities for the 
development of hydrogen and fuel cells as these technologies could act as a means for the 
storage of electricity, enhance distributed generation in the power sector and allow the 
integration of renewables other than biofuels into transport sector. Because of the 
solutions they can provide, hydrogen technologies have gained support, which has 
increased especially after the increase in energy prices. As discussed earlier, market-
based instruments that have been introduced to adopt less carbon-intensive technologies, 
have created changes in relative energy prices. Similarly, with high energy prices 
hydrogen technologies which were considered uneconomic in the past have started to 
look more cost-effective. However, it has not only been hydrogen that has benefited from 
the change in prices. Other alternatives have also as well as shown in Figure 7.  Public 
R&D budgets for all the transitional pathways have grown. As these technologies started 
to promise increasing returns to adoption, the private sector‟s involvement has also 
increased, for instance investment on bio-refineries demonstrated an almost five-fold 
growth whereas investment in renewables-based power generation assets increased from 
approximately $10 billion to over $80 billion between 2004-2008
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. There has been 
growing interest in CCS technologies as they allow for the use of cheap coal sources 
while preventing carbon-related emissions. In addition, synthetic and bio-fuels have also 
become attractive options because of how they can contribute to shift away from oil.  
 
Thus as Geels and Schot point out as the landscape pressures became more disruptive 
with the re-emergence of the supply security issues and the previous solutions proved to 
be inadequate, the problems grew worse and made room for the emerging technologies. 
However, because none of the aforementioned alternatives were sufficiently well 
developed, multiple technologies were supported in order to reduce the risk and 
uncertainty. As a result alternative technologies have started to compete to fill the gap 
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created in the energy LTS. Hence,  the resurgence of the security of supply concerns that 
has amplified the already growing pressures from climate change issues and the co-
existence of multiple under-developed technological options led the energy LTS to go-
through a „de-alignment path‟. The idea until mid-2008 was that the outcome of the 
competition within and between the alternative and incumbent technologies would 
eventually lead to a dominant design that would prepare the ground for a re-alignment of 
a new energy LTS that would increasingly involve alternatives. Therefore, the 
understanding was that the outcome of this competition would determine the direction 
and rate of the transition to hydrogen technologies.   
 
However, the recent economic recession and collapse in energy prices has once again 
changed priorities worldwide. Constrained budgets combined with low energy demand 
and prices, has slowed down and reduced the investment in the energy sector. This new 
situation can have different effects on the transition to hydrogen technologies. Firstly, a 
poor outlook of future economic growth, a legacy of the economic recession, is expected 
to reduce the GHG emissions could change the perception that there is an urgent need to 
develop a diverse range of greener alternative technologies. Secondly, the economic 
recession will affect investment. For instance, a reduction in the investment in renewable 
energy technologies has already been observed.  Investment in bio-refineries in the first 
quarter of 2009 was around $1 billion, down from around $4.5 billion in the second 
quarter of 2008. Similarly, investment in the renewables-based power generation assets 
have fallen and was expected to drop by 38% by the end of 2009. Although the impact of 
the economic recession in the investment in advanced nuclear and CCS has not yet been 
calculated, the IEA (2009) indicates that there will be cutbacks in the investment and 
delays in the related projects. As discussed in section 4.3.3, because of the interactions 
between the alternatives and the hydrogen economy, setbacks in these technologies can 
have a negative impact on hydrogen technologies. On the other hand, since these new 
conditions could deter early lock-in to alternatives such as nuclear and renewables based 
power, synthetic and bio-fuels, they can also benefit the transition to hydrogen 
technologies. Finally, low energy prices can have similar effects. As the IEA (2005) 
points out, because of the immaturity and high costs of hydrogen and fuel cells, rapid 
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increases in oil prices will support synfuels and force hydrogen to wait for a new 
investment cycle
287
. Therefore, recent price reductions can be considered as factors that 
have given time for the development of hydrogen technologies. However, this will also 
depend on the investment on hydrogen technologies; as the recent cutbacks in R&D for 
hydrogen in transport proposed by the Obama administration have shown, governments 
can change course in the current economic environment. On the other hand, the 
opposition from the private sector is an important indication of the ongoing development 
and deployment activities in this field. Similarly, growing interest in the EU; increasing 
budgets and the new initiatives such as the Fuel Cell and Hydrogen JTI have proven that 
despite the economic recession different countries will have different perspectives. Thus, 
whether this new landscape development will conflict with the positive impact of the 
other landscape developments that have had on the alternatives and in turn will encourage 
or deter the development of hydrogen technologies will depend on the decisions of the 
actors involved in the energy LTS.    
4.6. Conclusions  
It was argued in this chapter that a transition to hydrogen technologies can occur if 
developments at the landscape level that can create openings in the locked-in energy LTS 
coincide with the developments at the niche level. In this section, one part of the 
transition, the top-down pressures, namely landscape developments have been studied. As 
Genus and Coles (2008) point out, identification of the „start point‟ of transitions is 
problematic. However, the analysis of the evolution of landscape developments over a 
long period of time (since the early 1970s) has demonstrated that the transition to 
hydrogen technologies was initiated by the oil crises in the 1970s.  During this era, efforts 
to find oil substitutes paved the way for the hydrogen technologies and led to new 
institutions which worked on the research and development activities for these new 
technologies. Although these technologies missed this opportunity because of their 
immaturity and high costs, the emergence of new landscape developments have created 
renewed interest in hydrogen technologies. The emergence of climate change issues on 
the public policy agenda in the 1990s has encouraged the actors involved to exploit the 
renewables. However, the reverse salients that were encountered during the growth of 
these new systems created room for the development of hydrogen and fuel cells. These 
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technologies promise a means for electricity storage, higher electricity generation 
efficiency and enable a shift to more distributed generation systems in the power sector. 
In addition, they have presented an opportunity to integrate renewables into transport 
sector as well as reduce emissions via more efficient vehicles. Although their high costs 
continue to be a barrier against their commercialisation, the re-emergence of another 
landscape development, the security of supply concerns has created changes in the 
relative prices. The increases in the energy prices particularly between early the 2000s 
and mid-2008 have increased the attractiveness of these technologies. Thus, the climate 
change pressures and the security of supply concerns complimented each other and 
created window of opportunities in the locked in energy LTS for the development of 
hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. 
 
However, in addition to hydrogen and fuel cells, other transitional pathways including 
renewables, advanced nuclear option and CCS technologies have also benefited from 
these changes at the landscape level. As most of the transitional pathways are at an 
emerging or a pre-commercial stage, the actors involved have become more inclined to 
develop multiple options. Hence, new competition between the emerging technologies at 
the niche level has emerged. This competition has become an important factor that will 
affect the transition to hydrogen technologies. In the case that competition results in 
favour of an alternative such as renewables, hydrogen can be locked-out and might need 
to wait until another investment cycle. On the other hand, as the alternatives are 
interdependent, developments in the other transitional pathways could compliment the 
adoption of hydrogen technologies. Thus while the landscape developments have 
supported the development of hydrogen technologies, the competition they face might 
encourage or constrain the transition to a hydrogen economy. 
 
Finally, another landscape development; the economic recession can also affect the 
adoption of hydrogen technologies. As demonstrated in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the 
first quarter of 2009, there has been a decline in the investment in alternative 
technologies. This new trend can help the transition to hydrogen via eliminating a 
possible lock-in to renewables and provide time for the development of hydrogen 
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technologies. On the contrary, if it leads to a reduction in investment in hydrogen and/or 
delays in these projects it can also prevent the move towards these technologies. 
 
To sum up, the analysis demonstrates that the landscape developments since the late 
1980s have become much greater, more divergent and sudden. The security of supply 
concerns have amplified the climate change pressures and created openings in the locked-
in energy LTS. In other words they have provided the alternatives with advantages to 
compete against the incumbent technologies. While hydrogen technologies have 
benefited from these developments, they have also been exposed to a new level of 
competition at the niche level. This favourable environment, however, was changed by 
the economic recession. Although, it is early to draw conclusions on the effect of the 
recession on the transition to hydrogen technologies, it can be concluded that in this new 
environment, it will very much depend on governments‟ strategies and policies. 
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Chapter 5  
Energy Policy in the UK 
5.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, landscape developments including sustainable development, 
climate change and security of supply concerns have pressurised nations and other actors 
involved in the energy LTS to change the way energy is produced and consumed. 
Although the situation was similar in the UK, the affect of these pressures were 
strengthened by the changes made to UK energy policy and market structure. The most 
important change that led to this difference was the shift away from nationalisation to 
privatisation in different parts of the energy sector. On one hand, the government’s 
withdrawal and the profit-maximisation strategies of the newly established private sector 
resulted in under-investment which when coincided with the decreases in North Sea oil 
and gas supplies exacerbated the pressures inserted by global increases in oil prices and 
political differences that led to import interruptions. On the other hand, revenues gained 
from the privatisation allowed the government to focus on establishing the climate 
change policy agenda.  
 
The accumulation of these factors created a necessity to develop indigenous, low carbon 
energy sources and technologies. However, due to scale of the problem and the 
immaturity of the alternative technologies, the government opted to develop a diverse 
range of technologies including renewables, CCS and hydrogen and fuel cells. This 
strategy of not picking winners created competition between the alternative options. The 
landscape developments which would help determine the eventual outcome of this new 
competitive race were GHG and the depletion of indigenous fossil fuel reserves, both of 
which favoured hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. However, following the emergence 
of new landscape developments; the global economic recession and the major 
fluctuations in oil prices, the costs of hydrogen technologies have become a major 
concern. As a result, the government reallocated resources to develop other alternatives 
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that are less costly and can be deployed in a timely manner. This approach has intensified 
the existing competition between the alternatives and hydrogen technologies. as this 
competition can compliment or constrain the transition to hydrogen technologies, it has 
increased the level of uncertainty regarding the adoption of these technologies in the UK. 
5.2. Energy Policy: Changes in the Regulatory and Market 
Structure, 1970-2009 
Over the last four decades, the UK energy policy has gone through a major 
transformation; a shift away from nationalisation to privatisation and competition. These 
changes in the energy policy when coincided with the landscape developments have had 
an impact on the other components of the UK energy LTS. The introduction of 
privatisation and competition coincided with the exploration of North Sea oil and gas as 
well as the global drops in the energy prices. The result was excess supply which in turn 
led the new actors (the private sector) involved in the energy LTS to focus on reducing 
costs in order to maximise profits. The new structure and the shift in focus enabled the 
emergence of new technologies and resources; mainly the CCGT plants that could take 
advantage of the abundant natural gas resources and the distributed power generation 
technologies such as renewables and CHP plants. However, while the contribution of the 
latter was minor, the majority of the investment during this period went into the CCGT 
plants. Investment in other energy sources such as coal and nuclear were reduced because 
of high prices compared to natural gas and the reluctance of the private sector.  
 
However, the situation of excess supply changed by the turn of the century; North Sea oil 
and gas began to dwindle and oil prices started to increase. These conditions coincided 
with underinvestment, the aging of assets, an increase in demand, and the re-emergence 
of concerns over the security of supply. In light of the situation, the UK government 
focused on promoting the use of technologies that could exploit indigenous resources 
such as renewables, CCS and hydrogen and fuel cells, which was also influenced by the 
simultaneous developments in climate change policy. Thus, the landscape developments 
combined with the changes in the energy policy created openings for the development of 
alternative energy technologies in the UK energy LTS. Nevertheless, the situation 
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changed once again with the emergence of new landscape developments; the global 
economic crisis and the sharp fluctuations in oil prices in 2007-2008. This new economic 
environment has had a negative impact on the alternative technologies because of their 
high costs and created a high level of uncertainty regarding their future adoption. The 
following sections analyse these changes that have occurred to UK energy policy and 
market and discuss their impact on the alternative technologies.  
5.2.1. Evolution of Markets 
5.2.1.1. Primary Sources: Coal, Oil and Gas 
The most important development that changed the coal, oil and gas industries in the UK 
was the discoveries of natural gas (1965) and oil (1969) in the North Sea
1
. Prior to then 
there was a high dependence on oil from the Middle East. The operations of British 
Petroleum (formerly the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; AIOC) in this region provided a 
major proportion of the UK’s oil supplies. However, the nationalisation of the AIOC 
assets in Iran (1950), the Suez Crisis (1956) and the withdrawal of British forces from the 
Middle East (finalised in 1971) marked the end of British control and secure imports 
coming from this region
2
. Nevertheless, despite these events, growing world oil 
production and decreasing oil prices during the 1950’s and 1960’s increased Britain’s 
demand for oil
3
. These circumstances boosted the investments on exploration of new 
resources. Discoveries of natural gas (1965) and oil (1969) in the North Sea were the 
outcomes of these activities, though due to high costs, they did not contribute to the 
supply instantly.  
 
The situation for the North Sea oil changed following the 1973-74 oil embargoes and the 
consequent price increases which rendered these fields economic. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, this landscape development (and the following 1979 crisis) was transposed 
into security of supply concerns amongst the oil importing countries shifting the priorities 
of these governments towards holding oil stocks, increasing indigenous production and 
decreasing energy demand. Although Britain was not an exception, its problems were 
more severe due to additional supply interruptions caused by the coal miners’ strikes. The 
government responded to these multiple problems by establishing the Department of 
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Energy (1974) which was responsible for implementing the government’s new policies 
regarding energy conservation and development of new energy sources as well as 
supporting previously nationalised industries (coal, gas and electricity) and nuclear 
power
4. In the oil sector, the Department’s functions included ensuring the government’s 
interests of expanding oil and gas resources in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf 
(UKCS) and supporting oil exploration and production activities through Offshore 
Supplies Office
5
. When the North Sea oil became financially feasible, it attracted a large 
number of private companies. While the Department controlled their activities via the use 
of taxes and discretionary licenses, government involvement in the North Sea started to 
grow following the purchase of Burmah Oil (a shareholder in BP) which increased its 
shares in the BP from 48% to 68% in 1975 and the creation of the British National Oil 
Company (BNOC) in 1976
6
.  
 
The BNOC, which acted as both a governmental agency and a large producer/trader, 
benefited significantly from the discretionary licences and therefore expanded rapidly, 
becoming a price setter in the North Sea
7
. Another state-owned company active in the oil 
industry was British Gas Corporation (BGC) which held shares in offshore and onshore 
Wytch Farm fields
8
. Thus, even though the industry was not fully nationalised, there was 
a heavy state involvement which became clear by the early 1980’s when 73% of all the 
offshore contracts were given to British companies
9
.  
 
All the government’s efforts and investment proved successful, the UK oil industry 
expanded rapidly. Britain switched from being an importer to an exporter and became the 
sixth largest oil producer in the world by 1983
10
. Although increases in indigenous 
production (not only oil but also other energy sources) and decreases in demand helped 
Britain overcome the 1979 oil crisis and become self-sufficient in the 1980s, these 
investments when coincided with the global economic recession of the 1970s made it 
difficult to maintain state-ownership. Britain had large financial deficits in the mid-
1970’s and paying the previously requested loans to cover these deficits forced the 
government to sell off its oil assets. Sales started with the stakes in BP in 1977 and 
continued until 1981 during which the governmental shareholdings dropped from 68% to 
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39%
11
. However, full privatisation did not take place until the Oil and Gas Act 1982 
under the terms of which three actions were introduced. Firstly, the operational and 
trading parts of the BNOC were split into two companies; Britoil would be responsible 
for the oil production and remaining operations would be left to the BNOC
12
. Secondly, 
BGC was withdrawn from the oil business, while Wytch Farm was sold in 1984; the 
offshore oil assets were transferred to a newly formed company, Enterprise Oil which 
was later on floated on the stock market (1984)
13
. Finally, the Act involved the gradual 
introduction of competition into gas networks
14
. Following this Act and the final sale of 
the government’s shares in BP in 1987, British oil industry was wholly privatised.  
 
However, the evolution of the gas market proved more difficult. Unlike oil industry, there 
was no private company involvement in the gas sector. It was nationalised in 1948 and 
the Gas Council was given the task of controlling 12 Area Gas Boards which were 
responsible for the production and distribution of town gas in their regions
15
. This 
structure was maintained until the Gas Act (1972) which created British Gas Corporation 
(BGC); a national monopoly and monophony which vertically integrated the purchase, 
production and supply of gas
16
. In the mean time, shifts away from town gas had started 
to occur. When the price of coal (the main source of town gas) exceeded that of 
electricity, alternative sources including imported natural gas from Algeria and oil 
became more appealing
17
. However, following the discoveries of gas in the North Sea, 
the government initiated a transformation process which included laying down a new 
pipeline network and converting domestic appliances and commercial boilers that would 
enable the use of natural gas
18
. This transformation took almost a decade and was 
completed by 1975
19
. Despite its costs, the transition provided the opportunity to switch 
to fuels other than oil for heating purposes and in the era of oil shocks, low gas prices 
further increased the use of this source.  
 
Nevertheless, after the second oil crisis of 1979, the government expressed concerns that 
unless the price of gas was increased, demand would exceed the supply and could lead to 
supply disruptions
20
. Therefore, in 1980, BGC was forced to raise the gas prices by 33% 
and the following year, a new tax on gas supply was introduced (Gas Levy Act,1981)
21
. 
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However, price increases were not the only changes; the liberalisation process which was 
initiated with the Oil and Gas Act 1982, started structural changes in the gas industry. 
This Act, not only allowed third party access to the pipelines owned by the BG but also 
removed its monophony powers
22
. Thus, in theory competition was introduced into the 
gas industry when customers taking more than 732,000kWh/year (25,000 therms) were 
free to choose their supplier
23
. Nevertheless, the market power of BG, which deterred the 
entrance of new suppliers and buyers, delayed actual competition.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, increasing production outside OPEC, falling oil prices and 
reductions in energy demand had shifted the balance between supply and demand and 
eroded the concerns over security of supply in the second half of 1980’s. The situation 
was not different in the UK; a shift away from energy-intensive sectors, investment in the 
1970s in the energy infrastructure and the development of North Sea oil and gas had 
resulted in increased supply, eliminating the need for government investment. At the 
same time, the aforementioned sectoral shifts, which led to decreases in industrial 
production and increases in unemployment, had raised public expenditure
24
. Under these 
circumstances, the government opted for privatisation to raise revenues, create job 
opportunities and enhance the efficiency of the gas industry.  
 
The Gas Act (1986) was introduced in this setting under the terms of which British Gas 
(BG) was privatised and a new regulator; the Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas) was formed. 
However, besides raising revenues of around £9 billion following the floatation on the 
stock market
25
, the Act did not create structural changes that would alter the monopolistic 
operation of BG. In fact, BG remained to be the only supplier until 1991 and used its 
dominance to dictate prices and gas supplies to customers
26. When BG’s abuse of its 
position was realised following a series of inquiries, it became clear that ensuring 
competition would require stricter regulations which led to the Competition and Service 
Act (1992) that lowered the competition threshold set in the 1982 Act to 73,200kWh/year 
(2,500 therms)
27
. However, full competition occurred after the Gas Act (1995) came into 
force. In the proceeding years, BG went through a number of demergers separating the 
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vertically integrated supply, shipping, transportation, and storage businesses, while 
introduction of full supply competition took place between 1996 and 1998
28
.  
 
These regulatory and market changes in the gas industry led to a significant shift in the 
use of natural gas. The underlying reason for this shift were low gas prices that occurred 
as a result of competition and the aforementioned investments on exploration and 
development of gas in the North Sea which led to excess gas supply. As will be discussed 
later, liberalisation of the electricity sector, high coal prices, new energy efficiency and 
environmental regulations as well as technological developments were other factors that 
led to the ‘dash for gas’ in the 1990s. During this period, indigenous gas production more 
than doubled, increasing from almost 529,000MWh in 1990 to around 1,260,000MWh in 
2000
29
.  The UK started to export in 1992 and in 1997, due to surplus capacity, it became 
a net exporter supplying gas to Ireland and European markets through the Belgium 
interconnector, which began operations the following year
30
. Production exceeded 
consumption in gas and oil until the early 2000s, during which the UK enjoyed abundant 
supplies and low fuel prices.  
 
Although, exploitation of North Sea oil and the ‘gas bubble’ reduced the pressure in the 
energy sector generally, it put increasing pressure on the coal industry. Similar to gas and 
electricity, coal was a state-owned industry nationalised in 1948. This was the era when 
coal was used as an input for both town gas and electricity. At the time of nationalisation, 
it was a large industry employing 720,000 workers with 1,445 mines in operation
31
. In the 
following two decades the industry experienced a severe contraction. By 1970 the 
number of mines had dropped to 293, while the number of workers was approximately 
293,000
32
. This contraction accompanied with the reductions in payments to employees 
created tensions between the National Union of Miners (NUM) and the National Coal 
Board (NCB) leading to the national strike in 1972
33
. Two years later, the NUM 
announced another strike in order to increase the wages and payments for the security of 
miners
34
. The timing of the strikes was critical, it had coincided with the 1973 oil crisis 
when the government was depending on coal to move away from oil. Therefore the 
security of the coal supply had become the key solution to which took the form of 
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subsidies. The Plan for Coal (1974) was a costly expansion package that entailed 
improving the existing fields and opening of new ones with the objective of increasing 
production to 150 million tons by 1985
35
. However, as discussed earlier, the decade of oil 
crises was also the period when reductions on the demand side were achieved as a result 
of energy efficiency measures and a switch to less energy-intensive sectors. By the 1980s, 
it was apparent that the expansion of the industry was not necessary, though subsidies 
could not be withdrawn because of concerns over possible strike action. Nevertheless 
despite being under pressure caused by the recession in the early 1980s, the government 
was determined not to let the miners gain the upper hand. Legislation was introduced 
(Employment Act 1980, 1982 and Trade Union Act 1984) to reduce union power, which, 
as expected led to the miners’ strike in 198436. The strike was in the end unsuccessful. 
While, this was a major step in terms of breaking union power, structural changes in the 
industry began following the liberalisation of the gas and electricity sectors. 
 
As will be discussed in detail, the introduction of privatisation into the electricity industry 
initiated a shift away from the use of coal to natural gas for power generation. In order to 
avoid an immediate contraction and another strike, in the early days of privatisation, the 
government protected coal through contracts which obliged the electricity generators to 
buy high volumes of coal at predetermined prices between 1990 and 1993
37
. Towards the 
end of the contract, when the ‘gas bubble’ took over and the price of indigenous coal 
exceeded that of the imports, it became clear that demand for coal from the electricity 
industry would fall
38
. In response to the expected reductions in demand, the government 
announced the closure of 31 of the British Coal’s fifty pits39. Similar to the previous 
situation, this proposal also created concerns and tension and led to another round of 
contracts to be signed by the electricity generators and suppliers for the period of 1993-
1998
40
. 
 
However, despite the support, it became obvious that the coal industry would face 
problems in the long run. Contracts between British Coal (BC) and National Power, 
Powergen and Scottish Power, which were priced at £ 1.51 per gigajoule, were above the 
price of coal imported into the EU (£ 0.98/GJ)
41
. The efficiency levels achieved in the 
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coal plants (37%) were significantly lower than the competing CCGT plants with around 
50%
42
. Furthermore, stricter environmental regulations including the Large Combustion 
Plant Directive in the EU and Environmental Protection Act (1990) of the UK, Water 
Resources Act (1991) in England and Wales and Control of Pollution Act (1974) in 
Scotland were imposing new charges on the coal industry
43
. There were also subsidence 
and health payments that increased the overall costs covered by the BC
44
. These problems 
became apparent in the balance sheet of the British Coal; between 1990 and 1993/1994, 
operating profits of BC amounted to £774 million, however, when the aforementioned 
costs were deducted, the result was a deficit of £641 million over the three years period
45
.  
The solution to these problems took the form of privatisation. Following the Coal 
Industry Act 1994, BC’s mining business including five regional coal companies and 
seven collieries was offered to the private sector
46
. Though, this was not a full 
privatisation; the ownership of the coal reserves was left to the Coal Authority established 
in October 1994 which was also given the responsibility to license coal mining, provide 
information and to deal with subsidence damage claims
47
. However, unlike the gas and 
electricity sectors, the introduction of privatisation did not expand the market for coal. 
Between 1990 and 2000, the number of mines operating in Britain dropped from 65 to 19, 
total output fell to 31.2 million tons down from 92.8 million tons and the number of 
employees fell from 49,000 to 9,000
48
. This contraction was due to the cost-cutting 
strategies of private firms which favoured imports and gas over indigenous coal and the 
new environmental regulations which became much stricter towards the late 1990’s. As 
will be discussed, the industry continued to shrink in the 2000s despite the Aid Schemes 
provided by the government.  
 
To summarise, between the 1970s and late 1990s, the fossil fuels industry in the UK went 
through major transformations. The main events that initiated these changes were the 
landscape developments; two oil crises experienced in 1973 and 1979 led to not only 
changes in the demand patterns but also resulted in increasing resource allocations to the 
exploitation of North Sea oil and gas and coal production. However, by the early 1980s, 
changes in the landscape including abundant oil supplies and lower prices and the 
unforeseen incidences at the regime level; shifts away from the energy-intensive sectors 
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that led to reductions in demand, the coal crises and the economic recession transformed 
Britain’s energy policy. The new objective was to improve economic efficiency in the 
short term and the introduction of privatisation and competition was viewed as the 
method that would serve this purpose, at the same time raising revenues and reducing 
costs. Following liberalisation in the oil, gas and electricity sectors, natural gas emerged 
as the winner in the 1990s. In addition to market and regulatory changes, other reasons 
behind the gas bubble were the advances in offshore technologies which increased North 
Sea output and decades long developments at the niche level. As discussed in Chapters 2, 
3 and 4, these niche developments involved the technological transfer of gas turbines to 
the power generation sector, the emergence of the hybrid design; CCGT and the learning 
processes that increased the technological and economic efficiency of these plants. As a 
result, these developments at multiple levels altered the UK energy balance. The energy 
mix was significantly changed, while in 1970 consumption of gas accounted for 11% of 
the total, it rose to 36% by 2000 in the expense of coal and oil shares of which dropped 
from 31% and 47% to 3% and 45% respectively (Figure 3)
49
. At the same time, 
indigenous production (the total amount of coal, oil and gas) grew and exceeded the total 
inland consumption which rendered the UK self sufficient over these three decades 
(Figure 1). However, rapid shifts in the consumption patterns combined with the decline 
of North Sea oil and gas output started to reverse this situation. As will be discussed, by 
the turn of the century, imports began to increase and with the rising oil and gas prices, 
security of supply concerns re-emerged. 
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Figure 1: Total production and consumption of coal, oil and gas between 1970 and 2007 
Source: Drawn based on data collected from BERR (2008), pp: 341-345 
5.2.1.2. Secondary Sources: Electricity & Heat 
For most of the post-war period, the electricity industry in the UK remained under state 
control. As discussed in Chapter 3, following nationalisation in 1947 and the Electricity 
Act introduced in 1957, the electricity industry in England and Wales became vertically 
integrated and controlled from top down by the Electricity Council and the CEGB; a 
state-owned monopoly. The CEGB was responsible for the generation and transmission 
of electricity at high voltage (the National Grid also a part of CEGB) to the twelve Local 
Area Boards (LABs) which distributed and sold it to the customers within their region. 
This structure was sustained until the late 1980’s and during this period, governments 
focused on increasing generation and distribution capacity and expansion of the grid; not 
only within England & Wales but also by creating interconnections with Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and France. As described by Helm (2007), the rationale behind the 
(then) expansionary strategies was that ‘economic growth at 3% was translated into 
growth in electricity demand of around 7%’ and therefore, in order to meet such growth 
in demand, new power plants (coal, nuclear and oil) were constructed
50
. However, the 
landscape factors (described in the Chapter 4) and the aforementioned incidences in the 
energy LTS, which created significant changes in the supply and demand patterns during 
the 1970s and early 1980s, proved this assumption wrong and led to a new structural 
design in the late 1980s.  
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During the decade of oil crises, the coal and nuclear power were treated as the main 
supply side solutions in the power sector which would increase electricity output and help 
decrease the reliance on oil. Nevertheless, landscape factors were not the only pressures, 
there were problems within the UK energy LTS. As mentioned earlier, the coal industry 
was the main supplier to the electricity sector and following the oil price increases, 
demand for this source from all other industries had risen
51
. However, the salary cuts 
during the 1960’s, which led to the miners’ strikes in the early 1970s, resulted in supply 
disruptions
52
. Thus, these coinciding developments forced the government to tackle the 
issue of security not only of oil but also coal and in turn the electricity supply. The 1974 
‘Plan for Coal’ and construction of new nuclear reactors were the actions that emerged 
from this setting
53
. The underlying principles were straightforward; coal expansion would 
ensure the stability in this industry and reduce oil dependency, whereas nuclear power 
would diversify the energy sources, reducing the market share of coal for power 
generation. However, at the time of these decisions, changes in the demand patterns were 
not expected; the economic recession following the oil crises, the shift away from energy 
intensive sectors to service industries and the introduction of energy efficiency measures 
a response to the IEA mechanisms (another landscape development discussed in Chapter 
4) reduced the demand for electricity. Thus, contradictory to previous predictions of 
increasing demand, the outcome in the 1980s was excess supply. 
 
However, despite the surplus capacity which should have resulted in price reductions, the 
increasing costs of coal production, investment required to maintain power generation, 
distribution and transmission, and the resources required to expand capacity (nuclear in 
particular) were driving electricity prices up
54
. These flaws emerged following the audits 
conducted by Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 
1986) which pointed out economic and technical inefficiencies in the coal and power 
sectors
55
. The problem was the monopolistic structure; in the absence of competitors, 
there was no incentive to reduce the costs in either of the industries. Thus, similar to the 
fossil fuel industries, the solution took the form of breaking-up monopolies and 
encouraging private sector involvement. The expectation was that a competitive 
environment would not only create technical and economic efficiency but also would lead 
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to security of supply by diversifying energy sources and eliminating the power of coal 
miners
56
. 
 
The first signals for privatisation in the power sector came with the Energy Act (1983) 
which encouraged the entrance of new generation companies by obliging LABs to buy 
from these new entrants
57
. Nevertheless, it failed as the aforementioned structure acted as 
a high barrier to entry to new firms. The problem would be tackled over a six year period 
of discussions which led to the Energy Act (1989). It marked the end of an era-a centrally 
controlled state-owned electricity industry. The Act included; (i) breaking-up vertical 
integration between generation, transmission and distribution, (ii) introduction of 
privatisation and (iii) competition in the generation and supply fronts
58
. As the lessons 
were learnt from the previous attempts, the government initiated the privatisation process 
by breaking up generation into two private companies; National Power and Powergen 
whereas the nuclear stations due to their high sunk costs was kept under the state 
ownership
59
. At the same time, the distribution side was privatised by transforming the 
previous LABs into Regional Electricity Companies (REC); twelve in England & Wales 
and two in Scotland
60
. Nevertheless, the grid remained a special case. Due to the non-
storable characteristics of electricity, supply and demand have to be kept in balance all 
the time
61
. Balancing electricity flows implies keeping frequency and voltage between 
certain thermal and stability limits as failure to do so can result in disconnections of the 
equipment and lead to a blackout
62
. However, because demand can fluctuate due to 
variety of reasons and there can be losses at the generation front, an efficient transmission 
system also requires maintaining reserves – spare generation and transmission capacity in 
order to avoid disruptions to supply
63
. Therefore, achieving the security of transmission 
necessitates a centralised control mechanism. For these reasons, although privatised, the 
grid was left as a monopoly (the National Grid Company) of which the majority was 
initially owned by the RECs before later being floated on the stock exchange in 1995
64
.   
 
With the Electricity Act (1989), an independent regulator, Office of Electricity 
Regulation (Offer), which was headed by the Director General of Electricity Supply, was 
created in order to ensure competition, avoid intervention and to protect consumer 
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interests
65
. While Offer was responsible for England, Wales and Scotland, Northern 
Ireland had a separate regulator
66
. Privatisation and competition was enhanced by the 
floatations on the stock market and by the gradual opening up of the supply side. Ten 
years after the Act there were 24 new generating companies in England and Wales
67
 
while this number increased to 30 by the end of 2007 – though BERR (2008) notes that 
this number is less than 30 as most of these producers are joint ventures
68
. 
  
However, such diversity did not occur as a result of the successful promotion of 
competition conducted by Offer, initial entry was encouraged more by the 
aforementioned coal contracts (1990-1993) and the structure and the pricing mechanism 
of the Pool. Following privatisation, the Pool – compulsory wholesale electricity market 
– became the platform that connected generators with suppliers and wholesale customers 
via the transmission system run by the NGC
69
. The Pool was working with a single price 
system where the final price was formed based on the price of most expensive 
generator
70
. Although the expectation was that the eventual competition amongst the 
generators would lower the prices; coal contracts, which had ensured that the generators 
would buy this source despite its high costs, had effectively increased the pool price. 
Though, due to the nature of the contracts, neither the generators nor the suppliers would 
be negatively affected; the generators were protected through obligatory purchases by the 
RECs which would in turn pass the high costs of coal-based electricity on to customers
71
. 
Under these conditions; high pool prices and comparatively low entry costs made the 
generation market a profitable business and in effect stifled competition
72
.  In addition, 
under the terms of the Electricity Act (1989), the RECs were allowed to enter into 
generation; it was stated that duty to supply ‘may require the (supply) licence holder to 
enter into agreements with other persons for the use of any electric lines and electric 
plant of his’73. As mentioned earlier, the RECs were the monopoly suppliers in their 
designated areas and the supply price caps had provided them with the opportunity to 
pass extra costs on to the guaranteed number of customers. Therefore, due to low risks, 
they also began to invest in power generation.  
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Although the Electricity Act paved the way for the break-up of the state-owned 
(vertically integrated) CEGB and the floatation of the NGC in 1995, a private form of 
integration between generation, distribution and supply started to emerge
74
. This move 
towards re-integration occurred as a result of the bids put in for the RECs by domestic 
generating companies, multi-utilities and American firms which later on sold their shares 
to British and European generators
75
. As Helm (2004) demonstrates, by the turn of the 
century, it came to the point where electricity market could be described as a ‘vertically 
integrated oligopoly’, consisting of some small generators but mainly five integrated 
companies PowerGen, London/EDF, Innogy, Scottish Power and Scottish and Southern
76
. 
However, such concentration was allowed on the basis that a competitive market 
structure was achieved by the incremental introduction of competition on the supply side; 
customers with peak loads of more than 1 MW and 100 kW were free to choose their 
suppliers by 1990 and 1994, respectively. The remainder was opened up to competition 
between 1998 and 1999
77
. Nevertheless, as will be discussed the negative outcomes of 
this consolidation; namely the gaming problems later on led to replacement of the Pool 
system with NETA. 
 
At the same time, all these transformations in the electricity market and regulatory 
structure led to several changes including shifts in the fossil fuel mix, a decline in nuclear 
power, a wider deployment of large-scale renewable energy systems and emergence of 
embedded generation technologies including small-scale renewables and CHP. Firstly, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the most important cause and effect of the privatisation and 
excess supply was the tendency towards cost-cutting strategies. As also discussed, the 
exploration of new gas resources in North Sea and the technological developments that 
provided the CCGTs with lower construction and labour costs and higher efficiencies 
favoured the adoption of these plants. The outcome, therefore, was the ‘dash for gas’ 
during the 1990s. However, such a shift in the fossil fuel mix would not have happened, 
if it was not for the structural changes that occurred during privatisation that allowed 
RECs to enter into generation. This was an important boost for the ‘dash for gas’ which 
was enhanced by the withdrawal of the 1975 European Union Large Combustion Plant 
Directive
78
 (discussed in Chapter 3), and the exploration of new gas reserves and earlier 
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privatisation of gas industry which led to low gas prices
79
. In the following period, the 
RECs entered into contracts with the independent power producers which held long-term 
gas contracts with the gas producers
80
. By 1993, eleven of the twelve RECs in England 
and Wales were involved in generation
81
. CCGT plants, which had become the main 
option due to aforementioned reasons, accounted for 13.634 MW of the total installed 
capacity of 23.358 MW between 1989 and 2000
82
. Consequently, share of natural gas in 
power generation increased from %0.07 to 34% in the expense of coal and oil shares of 
which fell from around 64.5% and 9.4% to 35% and 1.9% respectively between 1989 and 
2000
83
.  
 
Secondly, following privatisation, despite government support for the nuclear power 
industry it experienced a period of considerable contraction. As discussed earlier, in the 
late 1980s, the price of oil was very low and the UK was enjoyed abundant supplies of 
coal, oil and gas and reduced demand. Under these circumstances, new investment in the 
nuclear industry was considered not to be financially viable. Following electricity 
privatisation, the private sector’s interest in cost-cutting strategies and the consequent 
adoption of CCGT plants intensified these arguments. Though the government had 
anticipated such a downfall and therefore supported the nuclear industry with subsidies 
which took the form of Non-Fossil Fuel Obligations (NFFO) introduced in 1990 and 
Fossil Fuel Levy (FFL) to fund the subsidies
84
. Similar to the coal contracts, under the 
NFFO, the RECs were required to purchase electricity generated by nuclear (and also 
renewables) at a premium price and their loss would be compensated by the reallocation 
of FFL
85
. The aim of the scheme was to provide the nuclear industry with funds and time 
to become competitive in the new market structure. However, despite the increases in 
output, the capital costs of a nuclear plant (£1340 per kW in 1993 prices) were still three 
times higher than those of the new CCGTs
86
. This became the main argument in the 1995 
Nuclear Review which concluded that given the cost conditions, neither the nuclear 
capacity expansion nor the public funds to support the industry could be justified
87
. Thus 
a partial privatisation was proposed; leaving the Magnox plants under the state 
ownership, British Energy (BE) was privatised in 1996
88
. Despite the changes, 
nevertheless, following the decreases in the price of electricity generated by fossil fuels 
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and the 1998 supply liberalisation that allowed customers to switch to cheaper options, it 
became apparent that nuclear based electricity could not compete with the other sources 
and thus construction of new nuclear plants could no longer be rationalised
89
. This 
situation would in fact be proven in 2002 when the shares of British Energy would fall by 
90% as a result of the further price drops (that occurred after the introduction of NETA) 
and the costs associated with the new climate change arrangements (the Climate Change 
Levy cost BE around £100 million per year)
90
. Although, the government kept the 
company solvent by providing loans, their strategy to end public funding and leave the 
matter of new nuclear build to private sector, which was known to lead to sweating of 
nuclear assets, remained the same
91
. The strategy was in fact confirmed in several reports 
including the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution Report (RCEP 2000), PIU 
Energy Review (2002), the Energy White Paper (2003) and its follow-up annual 
implementation reports. The outcome was a reduction in nuclear output though the 
decline was not felt immediately. In fact, due to the investments made in 1970s and 
1980s, the contribution of nuclear to power generation rose from 21% to 24% between 
1990 and 2000
92
. However, as the plants were gradually decommissioned its share had 
dropped to 17% by 2007
93
.  
 
Thirdly, the NFFOs which were initially introduced for supporting nuclear power opened 
the way for the further development of renewables. This was also encouraged by the 
emergence of climate change concerns in the early 1990s. Between 1990 and 1999, five 
rounds of NFFO were introduced and the funds allocated to renewables increased from 
£30 million in the first round to £127 million in 1998-1999
94
. Finally, after liberalisation, 
embedded or distributed generation technologies including small-scale renewables, 
CCGT and CHP plants that are connected to direct customers and the distribution system 
became attractive. The private sector’s involvement in these technologies was driven by 
the advantages of lower capital and transmission costs, shorter construction times and a 
faster return on investment
95
. On the other hand, the government’s support was based on 
the need to reduce emissions, energy diversity and higher energy efficiency that could be 
achieved by adopting these technologies
96
. As a result, use of renewables to produce heat 
rose from 0.35 MToe to 0.6 MToe, while the amount of renewables used to generate 
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power almost tripled from 0.7 MToe to 1.9 MToe between 1990 and 2000
97
. Also, the 
number of CHP schemes increased from 266 to 1346 in the same time period
98
. Though, 
despite the increases, due to a number of reasons that will be discussed later, the 
contribution of these alternatives to power generation remained small. For instance, 
although the onshore and offshore wind technologies gained the largest support from the 
NFFOs, their share in the total fuels utilised to generate electricity was less than 0.1% in 
2000
99
.  
 
Thus, due to declines in coal and nuclear utilisation as well as the little contribution of 
renewables, the relation between the coal and electricity industries in the 1970s was 
replaced with the new link between gas and electricity sectors in the 1990s. The RECs 
were now suppliers of not only electricity but also gas
100
. In fact the convergence was so 
obvious that in order to effectively regulate these two industries Offer and Ofgas was 
merged in 1999, establishing the Office for Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 
responsible for promoting competition and protecting the interests of electricity and gas 
consumers
101
. In addition, with the formation of the aforementioned new multi-utility 
firms, some of these companies were also offering multiple services including gas, 
electricity, water as well as telecommunications. Thus as a result of this integration, a 
small number of large players had gained significant market power which when 
combined with the Pool rules that were governed and could be changed by the members, 
created the gaming problems
102
.  This market manipulation kept the electricity prices 
above the competitive levels and despite the introduction of the Market Abuse Licence 
Condition (MALC 1999) which altered the licences of the largest generators, it was 
decided that a comprehensive solution required structural changes in the way the Pool 
operated
103
. Hence, the following year the Utilities Act (2000) was introduced. Under the 
terms of this Act, the problem of convergence and its negative impact on competition was 
addressed by providing Ofgem with new powers to regulate the two industries and by 
separating the electricity distribution and supply businesses
104
. Furthermore, the Act 
provided the foundations for the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA), which 
redesigned the electricity market, commenced in 2001
105
 
.  
 212 
The aim of the NETA was to reduce prices and increase efficiency via enhancing 
competition. The most important change that led to decreases in prices was the 
replacement of compulsory trading under the control of the Pool with the bilateral 
contracts between generators and suppliers in England and Wales
106
. As this 
transformation abolished the single price system, generators and/or suppliers were forced 
to find ways to reduce prices through contracts in order to appeal to a larger number of 
customers
107
. Once finalised, contracts would be submitted to the system operator (NGC) 
an hour before the dispatch period that took half an hour
108
. In addition, improvements in 
efficiency were encouraged by the Balancing Arrangements which penalised the 
participants that did not remain within the contracted volumes
109
. Although treated as a 
normal commodity, due to the non-storable characteristics of electricity, the task of the 
NGC to balance the system was maintained. In the case that there was surplus or shortage 
in supply and/or demand, NGC matched supply with demand by selling or purchasing 
electricity via the funds created by the aforementioned out of balance charges
110
. Despite 
its complexity, NETA proved successful, the following year electricity prices fell by 
20%
111
, and in 2005 with the introduction of BETTA, the wholesale market was 
expanded to include Scotland.  
However, as will be discussed in the following section, the situation of excess supply and 
low prices did not last long. Increasing gas and electricity prices, growing dependency on 
gas, decreasing diversity in terms of the fuels utilised for generation and the blackouts 
experienced worldwide and in London surfaced concerns regarding security of networks 
and supply.  
5.2.2. Security of Supply: Energy Market Outlook to 2025 
As discussed in the previous section, between the 1980s and early 2000s, the UK enjoyed 
abundant fossil fuel supplies and low energy prices and became self-sufficient in terms of 
meeting its energy needs. Nevertheless, this situation changed when the production of the 
two largest sources; oil and gas peaked in 1999 and 2000, respectively
112
. Between 2000 
and 2007, indigenous fossil fuel production declined by 37% down from around 266 to 
167 MToe, while total consumption demonstrated a modest decrease of 2.7% (Figure 
1)
113
. As shown in Figure 2, consumption of gas and coal fell by 3% and 1% respectively 
whereas the share of oil increased from 41% in 2000 to 45% in 2007
114
. This 
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transformation in the energy mix was due to changes that occurred as a result of greater 
emphasis placed on climate change policies in recent years. Energy efficiency measures 
introduced in the industry, domestic and other sectors including commerce and public 
administration reduced the consumption levels leading to an overall 1% reduction in 
demand in these sectors between 2000 and 2007
115
. On the other hand, despite the efforts 
to promote fuel efficient vehicles, demand in the transport sector rose by 5% which is 
associated with the recent increases in oil consumption as petroleum products have been 
the dominant fuel consumed in this sector – petroleum accounted for almost 99% of the 
total transport consumption in 2007
116
. Similarly, electricity consumption increased from 
18% to 19% within the same period. As shown in Figure 4, these changes in turn led to a 
growth in imports and as of 2004 Britain became a net importer of gas and of oil in 2006. 
At the same time the contraction in the coal industry continued. By 2001 imports 
exceeded local production for the first time and accounted for 70% of total coal 
consumption in 2007
117
.  
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Figure 2: Total inland consumption by fuel type in 2007 
Source: BERR (2008), pp: 341-344 
Note: (1) Includes coal, coke, breeze and other solid fuels, (2) involves coke oven gas, town gas and 
natural gas, (3) excludes town gas, (4) involves renewables and heat sold 
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Figure 3: Total consumption by final users, 1970 to 2007 
Source: BERR (2008), pp: 347-352 
Note: Other includes agriculture, public administration and commerce. 
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Figure 4: Production, consumption, and trade in oil, gas and coal, 1970 to 2007 
Source: Drawn based on data collected from BERR (2008), pp: 335-375 
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However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the depletion of indigenous resources and growth in 
import dependency represent only two dimensions of the security of supply issue and 
does not necessarily lead to supply shortages. Rather, the issue becomes a concern when 
these factors are combined with others such as changes in fuel prices, geopolitical 
incidences and lack of long-term contracts leading to insufficient imports as well as 
under-investment that may result in problems in the infrastructure and networks. By the 
turn of the century, it had become apparent that all these conditions existed in the UK. 
Indigenous fossil fuel production was in decline and the UK energy LTS was further 
pressurised by the developments at the landscape level and national energy policy did not 
sit well in an environment where conditions surrounding supplies were becoming 
increasingly tight.  
 
It was demonstrated in Chapter 4 that during the 1980s and 1990s, the energy sector went 
through privatisation and liberalisation process focus of which became cost reductions 
through the sweating of assets. Consequently, in the oil industry, low levels of investment 
in exploration, production, refining as well as transportation activities and the rising 
demand led to significant increases in global price of oil in the 2000s when indigenous 
production in the UK started to decline. Similarly, in the natural gas industry the excess 
from the North Sea and the private sector’s orientation towards profit-maximisation 
resulted in a lack of investment in storage capacity and pipelines. Furthermore, the 
adoption of the spot market model which created a path to balance supply and demand on 
a short term basis due to price competition, discouraged long term contracts with the 
exporting countries
118
. Although these strategies proved successful in the existence of 
surplus capacity, they made the UK vulnerable to supply interruptions and price 
fluctuations during times of import dependency. In fact these factors were the causes of 
price spikes during the winter in 2005/2006. Cold snaps during this winter led to strong 
demand for natural gas which when coincided with an explosion at the Buncefield Depot 
eliminated the already limited storage capacity
119
. Although the expectation was to draw 
down from the interconnector in Zeeburg, due to the same winter conditions experienced 
in Europe, exporting countries directed their supplies towards their domestic and long-
term contracted customers which constrained the availability of gas in Europe and in turn 
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at the end of the pipeline in Belgium. The outcome was major fluctuations in the spot 
market price which changed between 10 and 30$/MBtu between December 2005-March 
2006. This was one of the first incidents to create problems in the gas industry; though, 
recent events discussed in Chapter 4 demonstrated that this situation can be reiterated by 
the policies of exporting countries such as the limiting of supplies by Russia that have 
had a negative impact on the availability of supply in continental Europe. In addition to 
geopolitical vulnerability, concerns over the security of fossil fuel supplies became even 
more pronounced as the increases in the global price of oil fed through into both gas and 
coal prices
120
.   
 
Finally, the aforementioned estimates on the increasing import dependency confirmed the 
seriousness of the security concerns. Thus, by the turn of the century, external factors 
such as excessive price fluctuations and geopolitical developments combined with 
internal factors, for example, import dependency, would require government support to 
increase investment and to form strategic alliances with exporting countries have all 
served to reawaken the security of supply concerns in one of the subsystems of the UK 
energy LTS-direct fuel use.  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the energy LTS consists of a number of subsystems 
that interact with each other through supply and demand. Due to this interaction, changes 
in one part of the system affect the others. Therefore, the aforementioned problems in the 
‘direct fuel use’ have had a direct impact on the ‘electricity’ subsystem, mostly because 
of the dash-for-gas that led to changes in the fuel mix utilised for power generation. By 
the turn of the century, use of natural gas in power generation continued to grow and 
accounted for 36% of the electricity generation. However, growing dependence on 
natural gas in the power sector when coincided with increases in electricity consumption 
and decreases in the UK gas production as well as rising gas prices not only tightened the 
electricity supply demand balance but also raised the price of electricity. These changes 
in turn affected other fuels; for instance, losses caused by natural gas shortages in 
2005/2006 were partly compensated by coal-based electricity. Though recent switches to 
coal were also due to a decline in nuclear output, which raised the share of coal in 
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electricity generation from 35% to 39% between 2000-2007. Nevertheless, despite the 
resource potential, due to the aforementioned contraction of the industry and stricter 
climate change policies (EU Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD)), the contribution 
of coal to electricity generation is expected to decrease. Similarly, as the nuclear plants 
are gradually decommissioned by the second half of coming decade, the share of nuclear 
will also decline. The White Paper (2007) demonstrates that 22.5GW of existing power 
stations may close by 2020; 8.5GW of coal-fired capacity (due to the EU LCPD by the 
end of 2015), 2.5GW of oil power stations and 7GW of nuclear power stations by 
2020
121
. As a result, according to the DECC (2008) key scenario; 44% of electricity 
supply in 2020 will come from natural gas whereas coal, nuclear and renewables will 
account for 25%, 9% and 16% of the total supply, respectively
122
. These changes will not 
only decrease the diversity of fossil fuels but also give further rise to dependence on 
natural gas and will make the power subsystem even more exposed to problems 
experienced in the gas industry such as price fluctuations.  
 
On the other hand, in addition to drawbacks on the generation fronts, problems of a 
different nature occurred in other parts of the electricity system. As mentioned earlier, the 
asset sweating strategies deterred investment in networks, peaking and back-up capacity 
and storage mechanisms in the 1990s. Nevertheless, because of the period of excess 
supply, the negative effects of such under investment did not materialise until the 2000s. 
The blackout experienced in London in August 2003, which occurred as a result of the 
installation of a wrong fuse and resulted in power cut to 410,000 people, was an 
important incident that highlighted the vulnerability of the networks to minor faults. 
Furthermore, concerns about the balance between electricity supply and demand grew as 
the power cuts in the other parts of the world, mentioned in Chapter 4, proved that in the 
absence of adequate peaking and back-up capacity, the lack of any proper balance could 
lead to similar power cuts and price fluctuations in the UK. Finally, it became apparent 
that increasing the number of connections to the transmission and distribution network  
(renewables and CHP) could create congestion and also result in supply disruptions 
unless the grid was modified or electricity storage mechanisms were developed. Thus, by 
the turn of the century, similar to fossil fuel industry, the aforementioned developments in 
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the power subsystem created new issues, most notably, the security of the electricity 
supply and networks.  
Nevertheless, as opposed to the security of supply concerns in the 1970’s where the 
solution to the problem took the form of immediate resource allocations to the 
exploration and development of new fossil fuel sources, the government’s response to the 
more recent supply concerns was slow. This inertia was due to the market-based ‘hands 
off’ approach of the last two decades. Firstly, following privatisation and liberalisation, 
the UK government left the investment and operational decisions to the regulator and 
market players which opted for the sweating of assets. Because this strategy proved 
successful in terms of raising revenues, meeting increasing demand and reducing energy 
prices for a long time, the government maintained its strategy of relying on markets even 
when indigenous energy production started to decline. Secondly, in the light of these 
positive outcomes, the government withdrew from the energy markets and shifted its 
focus away from the security of supply towards tackling climate change issues. For a 
number of reasons that will be discussed in the following section, climate change policy 
entered the UK policy realm in the early 1990s and received increasing attention and 
support. The White Paper (1998), the report by Royal Commission of Environmental 
Pollution (RCEP 2000), the Climate Change Programme (2000) and the White Paper 
(2003) were important stepping stones that set stricter environmental regulations and 
emission reduction targets. In order to meet these targets, greener pathways including 
energy efficiency measures, renewable energy systems and distributed energy 
technologies were identified and their further development and deployment was 
supported through the introduction of market-based instruments and governmental 
subsidies. In other words, by the turn of the century, it became apparent that the UK 
government became more inclined to address the issue of generating diversity, which was 
required to ensure the security of supply, from the climate change point of view. 
  
Because of this new focus, the strategy to develop greener alternative technologies and 
fuels continued even after the aforementioned developments started to indicate security of 
supply issues. In fact these issues strengthened the strategy and created further openings 
in the energy LTS. As experienced in the 1970s oil crises, with the different dimensions 
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of security of supply concerns governments try to tackle the problem through the 
introduction of measures to reduce demand and increase indigenous production to reduce 
imports and stabilise energy prices. In addition, new trading mechanisms are created to 
secure imports. Today this approach is still being pursued; the only difference is an 
additional dimension. The need to reduce emissions has changed the choice of fuels and 
technologies. For instance, decreases in the North Sea oil encouraged the development of 
biofuels and hydrogen which can be produced from indigenous resources. In addition, 
new vehicles such as hybrids, electric and fuel cell vehicles have become far more 
attractive as they promise to use of sources other than oil and to reduce the consumption 
of oil in the transport sector. Similarly, in the power industry, in order to exploit the large 
potential provided by indigenous resources such as coal and renewables, the government 
initiated new initiatives to remove barriers against the development of large scale 
renewables, distributed energy technologies (small-scale renewables and CHP), new 
electricity storage means such as hydrogen and novel batteries and clean coal 
technologies including co-firing with biomass, CCS and higher efficiency conversion 
processes
123
. 
   
The UK government’s support for these technologies became most apparent in its recent 
documents; Energy Review (2006), Climate Change Programme (2006) and Energy 
White Paper 2007. As clearly stated in the White Paper (2007), delivering energy security 
and achieving a transition to a low carbon economy would necessitate saving energy and 
providing more support for low carbon technologies. While this strategy was partly 
driven by the European Commission’s agreement in March 2007 that set stricter targets 
for emission reductions (20% reduction by 2020), the motivation was also due to 
increasing energy prices
124
. In this new energy environment; lower indigenous 
production, higher imports and high energy prices provided positive price signals for the 
alternative technologies which had been considered costly in the past. Under these 
circumstances, actors involved in the UK energy LTS became more inclined to develop 
alternative technologies.  
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However, these favourable circumstances changed following the economic recession. 
Energy prices dropped dramatically, investment was cut and energy projects were either 
cancelled or delayed in different parts of the world. As discussed in Chapter 4, the impact 
of the economic recession varied in different countries depending on their national 
strategies. In the UK the strategy to address security of supply from the climate change 
point of view has continued. As will be discussed in the following section, stricter 
emission reduction targets implemented by the EU and the new targets set by the UK 
reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to tackle the climate change problem. The creation of 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (October 2008) and the new legislation 
including the Energy Act (2008), Climate Change Act (2008) as well as the Planning Act 
(2008) are clear indications of the UK government’s focus on the twin challenges.  
 
However, despite the focus, increasing concerns over the security of supply and the 
recent financial crisis has altered the priorities regarding alternative energy technologies. 
For instance the aforementioned gap of 22.5GW that is expected to be lost in the power 
sector by 2020 has given the nuclear option a complete new lease of life. In the Energy 
White Papers (2003) and (2007) it was clearly stated that the government would leave the 
construction of new nuclear power plants to market forces. However, the shift in focus 
became apparent in the White Paper on Nuclear Power (2008) which demonstrated that 
nuclear was viewed as a low carbon, reliable and an affordable technology capable of 
generating diversity and therefore the government would bring forward a legislative 
framework to supporting the construction of new plants
125
. For the same reasons, CCS 
technologies which are at an early stage in their development have received significant 
support as they allow for the use of indigenous (and economic) coal resources and 
promise to reduce natural gas imports. Finally, larger resources have been allocated for 
the development and deployment of renewables for power generation. The recent UK 
Low Carbon Transition Strategy (2009) confirmed government’s focus on these three 
options in the power sector. In the document, it is was announced that the Government 
will increase the financial incentives for renewables, introduce a new financial and 
legislative framework for CCS and encourage the involvement of industry by setting up 
an Office for Renewable Energy Deployment and an Office for Carbon Capture and 
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Storage, similar to the Office for Nuclear Development established in September 2008
126
. 
The situation is not much different in the transport sector. With the re-emergence of 
security of supply concerns and the economic recession as well as the uncertainty 
regarding the potential of technologies, the UK government has become inclined to 
develop wider range of alternative technologies and fuels. The most important change has 
involved the shift towards electrification. As declared in the Low Carbon Transition 
Strategy (2009) due to the increasing decarbonisation of electricity supply in the UK, 
electricity is considered a potential low emission fuel which can diversify the fuel mix in 
the transport sector
127
. Similarly, as hydrogen and biofuels promise a shift away from oil 
while reducing the emissions from transport, these fuels have become increasingly 
attractive, Naturally, the tendency towards the use of new fuels has opened the way for 
further development of new types of transport modes such as hybrid, plug-in hybrid, fully 
electric and hydrogen powered vehicles
128
. Finally, in order to reduce fuel consumption, 
research on improvements to the design and efficiency of internal combustion engine has 
also been encouraged. As the Low Carbon Transport strategy has identified, the roadmap 
for a transition to low carbon transport involves; increasing the deployment of more 
efficient internal combustion engines and hybrid vehicles in the short-term, the 
introduction of plug-in hybrids to the market and demonstrations of electric and fuel cell 
vehicles by 2020 which will be followed by the commercialisation of fully electric and 
fuel cell vehicles by 2050
129
.  
 
To sum up, changes in the energy policy and market between the 1980s and early 2000s 
combined with the increasing consumption, decreases in indigenous coal supply as well 
as diminishing capacity in North Sea oil and gas have changed the energy balances and 
made the UK a net energy importer by the turn of the century. These changes when 
coincided with the increases in global energy prices and political disputes amongst the 
exporting countries saw the security of supply issues re-emerge. These new developments 
in the energy LTS which was characterised with fluctuating energy prices and low 
indigenous production created window of opportunities for the development of 
alternative energy technologies in the UK energy LTS. However, although the security of 
supply concerns have had a positive impact on alternative technologies, the main factor 
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that encouraged the development and deployment of these technologies has been the 
emergence of climate change issues. The emergence of climate change onto the UK 
public policy agenda and the regulations that have become ever more stringent has altered 
the perceptions of decision-makers and players in the energy market. The need to reduce 
emissions has become an important component of energy policy and influenced the actors 
involved in the UK energy LTS to shift to alternatives. As will be discussed in the 
following section, over the last two decades, climate change policy has become so 
entrenched that the UK government pursued its strategy to develop greener alternatives 
even after the deep economic recession crisis and the sharp decline in energy demand and 
prices that have increased the relative costs of these technological options.   
5.3. Climate Change Policy and the Emergence of Alternative 
Energy Technologies  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the 1970s was the era when intellectual capital on 
environmental issues was accumulated. It was the period of institutionalisation which was 
followed by a more professional approach that brought the environmental concerns onto 
the international political agenda in the late 1980s. These developments were the 
landscape factors that increasingly pressurised governments to take action. The most 
important achievement of this kind was tackling the ozone depletion problem which 
ended with the approval of Montreal Protocol. The UK signed the Protocol in 1987. This 
was an important stepping stone that put the climate change into the UK policy arena as 
at the time CFCs were considered to cause not only ozone layer erosion but also global 
warming
130
. The issue of climate change gained a stronger policy stance following the 
Brundtland Report (1987) and the Villach (1985) and Toronto (1988) Conferences. The 
influence of these developments in shaping the environmental policy in the UK became 
apparent with the famous speech of Margaret Thatcher to Royal Society (Sept 1988) 
where she identified three environmental problems; (i) increasing GHG emissions that 
could lead to global warming, (ii) ozone layer erosion and (iii) the acid rain issue
131
. 
Respectively, in her speech, she acknowledged sustainable development, emphasised the 
link between environmental and economic development and pointed out the need to 
search for causes and effects of climate change and its wider policy implications
132
.  
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However, these developments were not the only factors that led to a shift towards 
tackling climate change in the UK. In the 1980s when the environment emerged as an 
issue on the international policy agenda, Britain was marked ‘the dirty man of Europe’ 
because of its resistance to take action to deal with the acid rain problem
133
. The claim 
was the acidification of Scandinavian natural environment was caused by UK air 
pollution and was first raised by the Swedish Government at the 1972 UN Conference in 
Stockholm
134
. Although, at the time the issue did not receive political support, following 
the agreement in 1979 Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution imposed 
by the UN Economic Commission for Europe to reduce air pollution via the use of best 
possible technology
135
 and the consequent announcement of Germany to cut their SO2 
emissions in 1982 forced the UK to address the problem
136
. As shown in Table 1, with 
the involvement of different actors in the following years conflicts between the necessity 
of taking immediate action and the importance of acting upon the scientific evidence, 
emerged. The procrastination was based on the argument that given the scientific 
uncertainty, commitment to the 30% SO2 reduction targets and the retrofitting of the coal 
based power plants with the costly Flue Gas Desulphurisation (FGD) equipment proposed 
at the Protocol on Reduction of Sulphur Emissions in 1985 would become a financial 
burden and have negative impacts on the UK industries
137
. Although, the CEGB accepted 
to retrofit FGD to 3 of its existing coal plants in 1986 (when scientific evidence 
confirmed the positive impacts this equipment would provide), governmental response to 
the SO2 reduction targets did not come until the agreement of EU Large Combustion 
Plant Directive in 1988
138
. The main reduction was, however, achieved following the 
privatisation of electricity sector that led to the aforementioned shift away from coal to 
natural gas.   
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Table 1: Developments on the acid rain issue in the UK 
 
Date Development 
1972 Swedish government raised issue of acid rain at the UN conference in 
Stockholm. However, due to declines in the SO2 emissions in the past 
years and the oil crises, tackling the issue in the UK was postponed. 
1979 UN Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Long Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution was agreed by the UK. 
1980 UK Review Group on Acid Rain was established to examine the acid 
deposition on British soil. 
1982 
(June) 
The Institute of Terrestrial Ecology published a report demonstrating the 
link between acidity levels in the UK and fish death in Scandinavia 
1983 Friends of the Earth started to campaign on the issue 
1983 
(Sept) 
CEGB announced the Surface Waters Acidification Programme (SWAP) 
and declared to take action depending on the results. 
1984 (Feb) Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution identified acid rain as one 
of the most important pollution issues of the present time 
1984 
(May-July) 
House of Commons Select Committee for the Environment held an inquiry 
into the acid rain problem 
1984 
(Sept) 
Select Committee issued its report which argued that the scientific 
evidence was satisfactory and advised the government to join the 30% 
Club that required a 30% reduction in the SO2 levels of 1980 by 1993. It 
also recommended retrofitting the plants with FGD to achieve a 60% 
reduction in SO2 emissions by 1995. 
1984 (Dec) Government’s response took the form of a proposal for 30% reduction in 
the SO2 levels of 1980 by the end of 1990’s and a rejection for the FGD 
retrofitting due to the high costs. 
1985 (July) 1979 Convention’s follow-up Protocol on Reduction of Sulphur Emissions 
or Their Transboundary Fluxes, which required 30% reduction in the SO2 
levels of 1980 by 1993, was agreed. The UK did not sign for it. 
1986 
(Sept) 
The Government announced the installation of FGD to all new coal based 
power stations. The CEGB volunteered to retrofit 3 existing plants with 
FGD as a result of SWAP outcomes.  
1988 The UK agreed to the 1988 Large Combustion Plant Directive of the EU 
which required reductions of 20%, 40% and 60% by 1993, 1998 and 2003 
respectively. 
Source: Hajer M. A., (1995), pp: 104-174 and Skea J. (1995), pp: 189-209 
 
Thus, the landscape factors combined with the UK’s desire to transform their image put 
the climate change into the UK policy agenda. British focus on climate change was 
confirmed in the White Paper (1990) which stated that ‘global warming was one of the 
biggest challenges the world was facing’139. In order to overcome this challenge, 
technological pathways including energy efficiency measures, renewable energy systems, 
CCGT plants and nuclear were identified
140
. These measures were proposed to meet the 
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target of reducing GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2005 which was brought forward to 
2000 in line with the EC commitments
141
. The influence of another landscape factor; the 
concept of sustainable development was also apparent in the Paper which promoted the 
idea of precautionary principle in tackling climate change issues. This was an important 
change in British environmental policy; despite the scientific uncertainty, Britain would 
take action to reduce GHG emissions, whereas with the acid rain issue this was used as an 
excuse to postpone action. Even though the critics argued that the Paper was conflicting 
as it not only promoted the precautionary principle but also put emphasis on scientific 
evidence
142
, transformation in the policy approach was proven when the UK signed for 
the UNFCCC (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997) although the latter was not ratified 
by some countries due to associated high costs that could not be rationalized given the 
scientific uncertainty.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Kyoto Protocol was particularly important as it set 
quantities and timelines for GHG reductions. Under the Protocol, the EU was assigned a 
target of 8% while the UK’s target was set by the EU to be 12.5% reduction by the period 
2008 and 2012. The UK also set a domestic target to reduce emissions by 20% by 2010 
and a 60% reduction by 2050 was suggested in Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution (RCEP 2000) report
143
. However, achieving these targets was onerous; as 
discussed earlier, the main goal of government policy was to privatise the energy 
industries which led to a competitive market structure and in turn reduced energy prices. 
Therefore although these developments created openings for development of alternative 
technologies, falling fuel prices (both in the UK and globally) in the 1990s made the 
aforementioned technical pathways financially unattractive to the private sector
144
.  
 
Hence, meeting the Protocol’s obligations and the domestic targets created the need for 
new measures that would encourage the industry to increase its efficiency and promote 
the adoption of alternative technologies. This was addressed in the Climate Change 
Programme (2000) which identified a group of market based instruments including the 
Climate Change Levy (CCL), the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and Climate Change 
Agreements (CCA – dependent on the Integrated Pollution and Prevention Control 
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Directive of the EU) to improve energy efficiency in business, public and industrial 
sectors
145
. Following the recommendations of the Marshall Report (1998), the CCL was 
launched as a downstream energy tax paid by the industrial and public sectors
146
. The 
Carbon Trust was also established in 2001 to recycle the revenues gained from the CCL 
back to these sectors to encourage them to invest emissions reduction
147
. However, as 
suggested in the Marshall Report (1998)
148
 in order to decrease the burden on the energy-
intensive sectors and sustain their international competitiveness, the CCL was 
complemented with CCAs which provided the industries that committed themselves to 
activities to increase their efficiency with an 80% discount from the Levy
149
. In addition, 
the ETS, which set emission caps for the 32 direct participants (DP) and allowed them to 
meet their cap by their own means or by trading excess or shortfall of emissions with the 
other DPs, was launched in 2002
150
. Participation was encouraged by allocating a total 
incentive of £215 million provided by Defra and by offering a reduced rate of CCL to the 
DPs
151
. The UK ETS continued until December 2006 and became a part of the EU ETS 
as of January 2007
152
.  
 
In addition to the introduction of economic instruments, based on the recommendations 
of the RCEP Report, which projected that the 60% reduction target would require 
increased energy efficiency, greater use of nuclear power and renewable energy 
technologies as well as the implementation of CCS, the government set sectoral targets 
and initiated new measures to promote the adoption of alternative technologies
153
. As 
discussed earlier, because nuclear power lost its attractiveness in the 1990s and due to the 
high costs of CCS technologies, energy efficiency measures, renewables and embedded 
generation technologies including CHP became the main options that received support. 
As identified in CCP (2000), endorsements and actions for the development of these 
alternatives included: 
 energy efficiency in business and industrial sectors: introduction of CCL, CCA 
and UK ETS; establishment of Carbon Trust; new regulations including Pollution 
Prevention Control Act (1999) and Building Regulations Part L (BR 2000); and 
voluntary agreements such as Energy Efficiency Best Practice Programme 
(EEBPP) and Energy Efficiency for Commerce Partnership; 
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 energy efficiency in residential sector: BR 2000; Energy Efficiency Commitment 
(EEC 2002-2005), new Home Energy Efficiency Strategy (new HEES 2000), 
Affordable Warmth Programme (in collaboration with Transco), Energy 
Efficiency Partnership for Homes, EEBPP; 
 energy efficiency in public sector: EEBPP, New Deal for Schools, new targets to 
improve energy management and efficiency in public buildings, local 
governments and hospitals;  
 allocation of a sum of £50 million CCL fund to promote renewables (£17 million) 
and energy efficiency measures (£33 million); 
 a new target to increase renewables based electricity to 5% by 2003 and 10% by 
2010; 
 new subsidies for renewables; NFFO 3, 4 and 5 which were replaced by the 
Renewables Obligation in 2002 following the supply liberalisation; 
 exemption of the renewable generation from CCL; 
 new capital grants for offshore wind and energy crops; 
 new Energy Crops Scheme;  
 NETA to remove market barriers for the development of renewables and CHP; 
 a new CHP target to increase the installed capacity to 10,000 MWe by 2010; 
 exemption of good quality CHP generation from CCL154.  
 
The government’s commitment to tackling climate change and its focus on the adoption 
of these pathways; energy efficiency measures and renewables were reconfirmed in the 
Policy Innovation Unit’s (PIU)155 review which recommended 20% renewables by 2020 
and the White Paper (2003)
156
 that adopted the long term target of 60% reduction of GHG 
emissions by 2050 with considerable achievement by 2020. As identified in the Paper, 
cuts of 15-25 MtC by 2020 were required to reach the 60% target by 2050 and such 
reductions were expected to come from energy efficiency measures, renewable energy 
sources and EU ETS that would account for 8-12 MtC, 5-9 MtC and 2-4 MtC 
respectively
157
. In the following years, in order to achieve these targets, more resources 
were allocated to the individual technologies. For instance, in addition to RO (2002), 
photovoltaic power received RD&D grants including the Domestic and Large Scale Field 
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Trial (£10 million), Major Photovoltaic Demonstration Programme (£31 million between 
2002 and 2006) and an R&D Programme worth £2.5 million annually, while biomass was 
supported by the launch of the  Bioenergy Capital Grant Schemes in 2002 (£66 
million)
158
. Furthermore, the use of biofuels in the transport sector was encouraged by the 
introduction of tax reductions of 20p/litre for fuels containing biodiesel (2002) and 
bioethanol (2005)
159
. In addition, alternatives were supported by establishing new RD&D 
institutions such as the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC 2004) and Energy 
Research Partnership (2005) and by increases in the RD&D budget.   
 
However, while these developments created openings in the UK energy LTS, their actual 
impact on the transition to alternative energy systems was limited; promoting the use of 
diverse range of renewable energy technologies proved difficult. There were multiple 
reasons behind the failure. Firstly, the transmission and distribution network was 
organised to accommodate large scale plants as opposed to small scale embedded 
technologies such as CHP and renewables
160
. Overcoming these technical problems 
would require a more active (a system that can allow reversal of the electricity flows) and 
decentralised system which would in turn necessitate costly structural changes
161
. 
Secondly, the objectives of the market and the government were conflicting. As discussed 
in detail, following liberalisation the main responsibility given to Ofgem was to ensure 
competition and price reductions while the private sector pursued cost-cutting strategies. 
The high costs of renewables and the modifications required to adopt them, therefore, 
made these technologies financially unattractive to both the Ofgem and the private sector. 
Thirdly, following the liberalisation of supply, it was no longer possible to pass the costs 
on to customers
162
. Although new NFFOs were introduced to tackle this problem, they 
failed to induce deployment due to; (i) their tendency towards ‘picking the winners’ 
(different amount of payments to the so-called technology bands); (ii) low cost caps 
favouring more mature and cost-effective technologies; (iii) the limited length of time 
that was not sufficient either for acquiring planning permission or for allowing cost 
reductions to take place through technological development and (iv) the lack of must-take 
contracts or penalties
163
. When distribution was separated from supply under the Utilities 
Act (1998), NFFOs were replaced with the RO (2002)
164
. Even though this new scheme 
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increased the cost cap from 3p/kWh to around 7p/kWh and provided all eligible 
renewable technologies with similar amounts of funds, emerging renewables, costs of 
which were higher than the 7p cap, were disfavoured against more mature technologies 
such as wind
165
. Furthermore, the private sector became reluctant to invest over concerns 
over unresolved problems related to planning permission and the uncertainty regarding 
the government’s long term commitment (10% target was to be sustained at the same 
level between 2010 and 2026)
166
. Consequently, annual targets set in the RO could not be 
achieved. During 2002/2003 1.8% of the electricity generated came from the RO 
contracts compared to the 3% target
167
. Also, NETA was creating new obstacles. The 
aforementioned out of balance charges and half-hour dispatch period led to major 
balancing difficulties and were a financial burden for the small renewable generators with 
intermittent character and other small scale generation technologies such as CHP
168
. In 
addition, with its focus on price competition, NETA effectively endorsed short-term 
contracting as opposed to long-term, take or pay contracts which were required to 
encourage private sector involvement
169
. Finally, the RO which was specific for the 
electricity sector did not support the renewables in the second largest carbon-emitting 
sector, transportation. Thus, while the climate change targets and the consequent schemes 
created opportunities for the development of near commercial technologies, 
government’s private sector policy which led to an independent regulator and a new 
market structure and the path dependent related aspects inherent in the operational 
structure undermined their further commercialisation and the deployment of emerging 
alternative technologies. 
 
This argument falls in line with the findings of the Renewables Innovation Review 
(2004)
170
 conducted by the DTI and its supporting documents. Analysing the innovation 
systems for six new and renewable technologies, the Review demonstrated that in the 
case that institutional barriers were removed and timely grid upgrades were introduced 
onshore and offshore wind technologies could deliver 2010 renewables target whereas the 
longer term 2050 target would require the development of technologies other than wind 
including wave and tidal, energy crops, solar PV and hydrogen fuel cells
171
. However, as 
pointed out in one of the supporting documents, because these renewables varied in terms 
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of their market penetration and technological maturity levels, meeting the targets was 
dependent on the introduction of different types of policy needed to support technologies 
at different stages (Figure 6)
172
. Examining the impact of the UK policy environment on 
the creation, diffusion and application of new knowledge in the renewables sector, studies 
concluded that due to aforementioned problems in the innovation systems, the UK failed 
to move technologies along the innovation chain from RD&D to pre-commercial and 
from pre-commercial to commercial stages
173
.  
 
 
Figure 5: S-curve of new and renewable energy technologies and policy instruments recommended 
for their technological development 
Source: Drawn based on the Figures illustrated in DTI (June 2003), p: 15 and 23 
 
However, although these problems deterred timely, large scale adoption of the 
renewables, they have also provided window of opportunities for other alternative 
technologies. As discussed in Chapter 2, during the expansion of a new system, ‘reverse 
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salients’ of different nature (technical, organisational, financial, legal) can occur and they 
generally point out the need for complimentary innovations. In the renewables case, 
while failure to meet RO targets created the necessity to take further action to deploy a 
wider range of renewables; the intermittent character of these technologies (except for 
biomass) which raised the grid connection and electricity storage problems opened the 
way for the development of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. These technologies have 
also become attractive as they could integrate renewables into the transport sector and 
reduce fuel consumption via more efficient fuel cell vehicles. In other words, the 
transition to a hydrogen based economy promises to provide solutions to the twin 
problems of climate change and security of supply issues. However, due to their 
immaturity and high costs, other options have also been explored. For instance, 
increasing climate change pressures and the realisation that renewables alone would not 
be able to overcome the new security of gas and electricity supply problems put the 
advanced nuclear option and cleaner coal technologies such as CCS onto the agenda. 
Similarly, the re-emergence of security of oil supplies and increasing emissions in the 
transport sector opened the way for the development of cleaner fuels such as biofuels and 
synfuels produced from coal and gas. Thus, climate change pressures and security of 
supply concerns which led to changes in the perceptions and actions of the actors 
involved in the energy LTS as well as the reverse salients that occurred during the 
deployment of renewable energy systems created openings in the locked-in energy LTS 
for the aforementioned transitional pathways. However, as none of these options were 
sufficiently developed, the government opted for developing wide range of technologies 
in order to reduce uncertainty and risks. 
 
This was done through introducing new support mechanisms and setting stricter emission 
reduction targets. For instance, the Climate Change Programme 2006 updated the CCP 
2000 package and announced additional support for developing renewables, CCS and 
distributed and micro generation technologies for power generation and biofuels, 
hydrogen and related vehicles in the transport sector to reduce the UK’s CO2 emissions 
by 15-18% by 2010
174
. The Energy White Paper (2007) and its supporting documents 
identified an even wider set of emerging and pre-commercial technologies development 
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of which was argued to be necessary to cut CO2 emissions by 60% by 2050 with real 
progress by 2020
175
. In the same year the Climate Change Bill, which set out a 
framework to reduce emissions by 26-32% by 2020 and 60% by 2050 against 1990 
levels, was introduced into Parliament
176
. As discussed in the previous section, these 
support mechanisms, legally binding targets when complimented with increases in energy 
prices made the aforementioned transitional pathways advantageous. In this new 
environment, alternative technologies promised to display increasing returns to their 
adoption and therefore gained became more attractive to both the public and private 
sectors.  
 
However, as also demonstrated, these parameters changed in the second half of 2008. The 
economic recession reduced investment in energy technologies. Falling energy demand 
and sharp declines in the energy prices saw the issue of the high costs of alternative 
technologies re-emerge. In addition, there have been concerns that the new emission 
projections which are lower than previous forecasts because of lower economic growth 
and the new priority-the economic recession will slow down the momentum to deal with 
climate change issues.  Thus in this new energy LTS,  which is identified with low energy 
prices and energy demand and the issue of climate change being usurped by more 
immediate concerns about the global economy, the shift to low-carbon energy 
technologies has been ‘delayed’.  
 
Nevertheless, contrary to the global picture, the evolution of a strong climate change 
policy agenda and the recognition of the link between climate change and the energy 
sector that has been established over the last two decades has led the UK government to 
pursue its strategy to support measures and technologies to tackle this problem. The 
creation of the Department of Energy and Climate Change is a clear indication that 
despite the shift in global focus, the UK government will continue to address this global 
problem through encouraging the development of alternative energy technologies. This 
commitment was given further credence when the Climate Change Bill became law in 
November 2008. This legislation is the world’s first long-term legally binding framework 
set targets to reduce UK GHG emissions by 34% below 1990 levels by 2020, and to cut 
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emissions by 80% by 2050
177
. The need to deal with issue has also been necessitated by 
pressure from the EU to reduce GHG emissions. Following its Strategic Energy Review 
(2007), in January 2008, the EC proposed a set of policy measures and different emission 
reduction targets for member countries which was approved in December 2008
178
. This 
package of climate and energy measures included; reducing GHG emissions by 20% 
below 1990 levels, supplying 20% of EU’s energy from renewables, increasing the 
amount of alternative fuels including biofuels, hydrogen and electricity to 10% in 
transport sector by 2020
179
. The EC proposals for the UK include a 20% of energy supply 
and 10% of transport fuels to come from renewables as well as a reduction of 16% in 
GHG emissions released by sectors that are outside the EU ETS
180
.  
 
In order to respond to these challenges, the UK government set out a Low Carbon 
Transition Plan which proposed new policies, financial measures and technological 
pathways to cut carbon emissions in different sectors such as power, industry, domestic 
and transport. As discussed earlier, the technological options for the power sector 
included renewables, CCS and nuclear whereas for the transport sector, cleaner fuels 
including sustainable biofuels, hydrogen and electricity and new transport modes such as 
hybrid, plug-in hybrid, fully electric and hydrogen powered vehicles as well as more 
efficient internal combustion engines were identified as pathways that can lead the UK to 
move to a lower carbon economy.  
 
As the recent actions have proven, despite the changes at the landscape level, external 
pressures from the EU and the establishment of a national climate change policy agenda 
has driven the UK to pursue its strategy to develop and deploy alternative energy 
technologies. However, due to the recent changes at the landscape level such as the 
economic recession that saw concerns over the costs of these alternatives re-emerge and 
the security of supply concerns, the government opted for a wider range of technologies 
in order to reduce risks and uncertainty. Thus, while this persistence has created further 
window of opportunities for the adoption of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies, support 
provided for other technological options has intensified the competition between the 
alternative technologies. On the other hand, the urgency of security of supply concerns 
 235 
and the immaturity of alternative technologies which has led the government to take 
action to improve the efficiency and carbon foot print of the established technologies has 
exacerbated the already existing competition between the incumbent and emerging 
technologies.  Hence, as will be discussed in the following section, while the climate 
change regulations have created openings for the hydrogen technologies, their future 
adoption is subject to the outcome of these two competitions.  
5.4. The emergence of Hydrogen Technologies on the UK Public 
Policy Agenda  
It was demonstrated in the previous sections that landscape developments have created 
changes in the UK energy LTS. On one hand, climate change issues which have gained 
increasing policy support worldwide since the 1990s have influenced the UK government 
to establish a climate change policy agenda. On the other hand, privatisation coincided 
with increases in oil and other energy prices, a dearth of easily recoverable oil and gas 
reserves and geopolitical conflicts re-awakened the security of supply concerns in the 
UK. All these changes at the landscape level and the UK energy LTS have pointed to the 
need for greener, indigenous energy sources and therefore created window of 
opportunities for the development and deployment of alternative energy technologies. 
However, due to divergent characteristics of landscape developments which have 
changed priorities in the UK energy LTS and immaturity of alternatives, actors involved 
in the energy LTS have become inclined to support a diverse range of technological 
options in order to reduce uncertainty and risks. For instance, while the emerging climate 
change issues in the early 1990s put the renewables (mainly wind) on the policy agenda, 
the RD&D budget for these technologies fell following privatisation that led to reductions 
in electricity and fossil fuel prices and the dash-for-gas which reduced the GHG 
emissions in the power industry. However, increasing pressures from the landscape; the 
depletion of North Sea oil and gas reserves, increases in the oil and gas prices since the 
early 2000s and stricter climate change regulations combined with the problems in the 
UK energy LTS (decreasing diversity and the aging of assets) changed the situation by 
the turn of the century. As shown in Figures 6 and 7, in order to tackle these problems, 
the UK government has increased its RD&D budget for not only the renewables but also 
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other alternatives including energy efficiency measures, advanced energy storage options, 
CCS technologies as well as advanced nuclear options.  
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Figure 6: UK RD&D budgets between 1990 and 2000 
Source: IEA (2008), ‘Energy Statistics’, available (online): http://www.iea.org/stats/rd.asp  
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Figure 7: UK RD&D budgets between 1990 and 2000 
Source: IEA (2008), ‘Energy Statistics’, available (online): http://www.iea.org/stats/rd.asp  
 
Hydrogen and fuel cells have been one of the technological pathways that have benefited 
from these developments. Despite the research in academia and the efforts of the former 
DTI which has been funding industrial research on fuel cells since 1992, up until the turn 
of the century, research on hydrogen and fuel cells was carried out in a fragmented 
manner in the UK
181
. The first official document that recognised the potential of these 
technologies in tackling dual challenges of climate change and security of supply issues 
was the RCEP (2000) report.  
 
In this report, it was proposed that the utilisation of fuel cells for CHP and transport 
applications and hydrogen as means to store electrical energy could reduce not only 
demand for fossil fuels but also the carbon related emissions
182
. The CCP (2000) report 
published in the same year and the PIU Review (2002) also made similar references to 
the potential contribution of hydrogen and fuel cells in tackling the dual problems. 
Taking these recommendations into consideration the energy White Paper (2003) 
identified hydrogen and fuel cell technologies as options that could reduce import 
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dependency, increase distributed power generation and the use of renewables by creating 
back-up mechanisms to the intermittency issues as well as decrease fossil fuel utilisation 
and in turn the CO2 emissions in the transport sector. This White Paper was particularly 
important as it announced the funds for a research programme dedicated to fuel cells, 
preparations for a new roadmap and the launch of a platform namely UK Fuel Cells 
which would bring together the industry and academia to search and develop fuel cells in 
the UK. In other words, this was the first official document that organised the research 
and industrial activities in the hydrogen and fuel cells field. The following year, the UK’s 
first framework for hydrogen that established a long-term vision and identified the 
strengths and weaknesses of the UK in the hydrogen field was published. The analysis 
conducted in the study demonstrated that while hydrogen could provide cost-competitive 
and low CO2 options in the transport sector, it could not be as effective in the stationary 
power and heat applications except for niche applications such as remote areas where 
hydrogen could compliment the intermittent renewables and provide storage means
183
. 
Though, the study made reference to the fuel cells and pointed out that FCs running on 
fuels other than hydrogen could become competitive in these fields. This was confirmed 
in the Fuel Cell Development and Deployment Roadmap (2005) where it was argued that 
the stationary applications could create an early market for fuel cells due to government’s 
commitment to increase distributed generation, CHP applications and UK’s extensive 
natural gas networks which could provide infrastructure for fuel cells to run on 
hydrogen
184
.  
 
These documents were important stepping stones that have put hydrogen and fuel cells on 
the UK policy agenda. Essentially, they have demonstrated that hydrogen and fuel cells 
could contribute to achieving the UK’s targets and identified how these technologies 
could be integrated into different subsystems of the UK energy LTS. These included;  
 a transport sector where hydrogen could be used as a substitute for petroleum 
products and fuel cells could replace the conventional propulsion engines 
 a power sector where hydrogen could provide electricity storage means providing 
the grid with support for load balancing with the intermittent energy technologies 
such as renewables 
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 distributed power generation where hydrogen can be used in remote areas 
particularly in CHP applications depending on the power and heat demand of the 
users.  
As the applications became clearer, support for these technologies has increased. There 
has been growing interest particularly in the transport sector. In order to develop new 
vehicles and fuels, the government published its Powering Future Vehicles Strategy in 
2003 and 2004 which demonstrated that fuel cells and internal combustion vehicles 
running on hydrogen could offer opportunities to reduce emissions from road transport. 
As announced in the strategy document, to encourage the adoption of these technologies, 
the government launched the Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership (LowCVP) in 2003 which 
brought together different stakeholders from automotive and fuel industries, academia, 
environmental groups as well as local government
185
.  In the same year the Department 
for Transport launched the New Vehicle Technology Fund (NVTF) which supported fuel 
cell vehicles for road applications. In addition, based on the recommendations of the 
LowCVP Bus Working Group, the new Low Carbon Bus Vehicle Programme was 
launched which allocated £3 million to enable  the purchase and running of up to 150 
low-carbon buses that were at the demonstration stage
186
. These programmes proved 
successful in terms of emerging niches and engaging different actors. For instance, in 
January 2004, three hydrogen buses started to run in London as a part of the EU project 
CUTE which was partly funded by the NVTF
187
. This project was important as it initiated 
the work for hydrogen infrastructure by permitting BP to install first hydrogen refuelling 
facilities in East London. It also brought together private and public sector; while the fuel 
cell buses were provided by (the then) DaimlerChrysler, and the First Group of Transport 
for London was responsible for the operation of these buses.  
 
The government’s support continued in the following years. The Transport White Paper 
(2004) announced that the Government pledged to exempt hydrogen from fuel duty to 
encourage the uptake of these vehicles
188
. In May 2005, £6.5 million was allocated to the 
Centre of Excellence (CENEX) for low carbon and fuel cell technologies in the transport 
sector
189
. In June 2005, they announced a funding package of £15 million for hydrogen 
and fuel cell demonstration projects part of which was committed to develop hydrogen as 
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a transport fuel
190
.  In addition, to encourage and facilitate the activities of different 
groups, network facilities such as the aforementioned LowCVP, CENEX and Low 
Carbon and Fuel Cell Technology Knowledge Transfer Network (May 2006) were 
established.  
 
As a result of all these support mechanisms research, development and deployment in 
hydrogen and fuel cell technologies has gained momentum in the transport sector. As 
confirmed in the Energy Review (2006) and Climate Change Programme (2006) 
hydrogen and fuel cells were viewed as technologies that can contribute to achieving the 
targets government set in terms of emission reductions and diversifying the fuel mix in 
the transport sector. This momentum can also be attributed to the increasing pressures at 
the landscape level; the oil price which followed an upward path between the early 2000s  
and peaked in mid-2008,  combined with climate change issues  that became ever more 
urgent led the UK government to adopt stricter regulations. As demonstrated in the 
previous section, the UK government has increased its emission reduction targets over the 
course of time. In the Energy White Paper (2007), the government announced its 
intention to address both the security of oil supply and emission reduction problems in 
the transport sector by factoring carbon costs into prices through the introduction of the 
new carbon pricing mechanisms such as vehicle excise duty, the Renewable Transport 
Fuel Obligation as well as including aviation and road transport into the EU ETS
191
. The 
aim of these measures was to send the right price signals to the industry to encourage the 
adoption of alternative technologies. Although the White Paper did not make a specific 
commitment to hydrogen and fuel cells, the Low Carbon Innovation Strategy published 
alongside the Paper stated that hydrogen powered vehicles and fuel cells could provide 
solutions to the twin problems over longer timescales
192
.    
 
However, these technologies were not the only options that benefited from these support 
mechanisms. As demonstrated in these documents, due to the scale of the problem and 
the different maturity stages of technologies, the government decided to support a diverse 
range of technologies that included improvements in the fuel efficiency of internal 
combustion engines, first generation biofuels and near-commercial hybrid vehicles in the 
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short term and the longer-term options of second-generation biofuels, hybrid and fully 
electric vehicles. Thus, while the aforementioned mechanisms have supported hydrogen 
and fuel cell technologies, the government’s strategy of not picking winners has created 
competition between the alternative options. Though this competition is not new; the 
renewables agenda pursued by the government had already seen biofuels emerge which 
has received significant support over the last decade. However, it became apparent that 
achieving the government’s new emission reduction targets would require greater 
decarbonisation of the transport sector. Hence, the new dimension that emerged in the 
White Paper (2007) was the electricity option. As it is well-known electric cars are not 
new; a number of car manufacturers introduced EVs in the late 1990s and but did not 
proceed with this option. The argument put forward was that given the shift to renewables 
based electricity production; the use of hybrid, electric and hydrogen based technologies 
could provide an opportunity to integrate renewables into the transport sector. This 
approach became clearer in the Low Carbon Transition Plan (2009) and DfT’s Low 
Carbon Transport (2009) report which illustrated that the transition to alternative modes 
in transport could start with the adoption of mild and full hybrid vehicles that will be 
followed by plug-in hybrids, full electric vehicles and finally fuel cells
193
. In order to 
encourage the development and deployment of these alternative vehicles, the government 
has provided £400 million, £140 million of which was allocated to Low Carbon Vehicle 
Innovation Platform
194
.  As a part of this programme, a competition was launched where 
different types of hybrids including combinations of ICEs, electric vehicles, fuel cells, 
plug-in hybrids received funding to be tested on the roads. While the fuel cells benefited 
from this programme, the priority was the hybrid and electric cars. As announced in the 
DfT (2009) report, the government allocated £250 million for the deployment of electric 
and plug-in hybrid cars and £30 million for the development of early infrastructure for 
these vehicles.  
 
To sum up, fast changing landscape developments and in turn the UK government’s 
responses to these pressures have changed the priorities in the UK transport sector. 
Enthusiasm for hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles in the early 2000s that grew with the 
stricter climate change regulations and the increasing oil prices started to fade away with 
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the emergence of new landscape developments; the economic recession and the sharp 
declines in oil prices. In other words, the urgency of security of supply issues when 
combined with the economic recession and the major fluctuations in energy prices 
diverted the focus away from costly hydrogen and fuel cell technologies to other 
alternative fuels and vehicles that can be deployed in a more cost-effective and timely 
manner. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the costs of hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles 
can be reduced if they can produced by mass production. This implies a centralised 
system which necessitates a new infrastructure for production, storage and distribution of 
hydrogen. Building such an infrastructure is very costly and requires major changes to the 
current energy system. However, these requirements are less onerous for other alternative 
fuels and vehicles. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, alternative fuels such as 
biofuels or syn-fuels can use the current infrastructure and be run on the existing vehicles 
with relatively less modifications. Although, their potential in reducing fossil fuel 
consumption and GHG emissions is not as high as the fuel cell vehicles running on 
hydrogen, they provide incremental solutions to current problems. Similarly, although 
different types of hybrid vehicles are not as efficient as the FC vehicles in terms of fossil 
fuel consumption and GHG levels, the use of electricity in the transport sector is viewed 
as an economically viable option as these vehicles can run on current fuels, do not require 
major transformations to the current infrastructure and their incremental costs over 
ICEVs are less than that of the FC vehicles.  
 
In addition, because of the government’s policy of promoting renewables in the power 
sector for almost two decades; the integration of greener electricity in the transport sector 
promises major emission reductions in the future. For these reasons the UK government 
has increased the R&D support for the alternative options, which has consequently 
created a fierce competition amongst the technologies at the niche level. As will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7, this competition can deter the adoption of 
hydrogen and fuel cells by eliminating the need for these technologies in the transport 
sector. On the other hand, developments in these technologies can compliment the 
adoption of hydrogen. For instance, Glamorgan University which received funding from 
the Energy Savings Trust introduced a tribrid hydrogen mini-bus in Wales in 2008 that 
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uses a fuel cell, lead acid battery and ultra-capacitors
195
. In this bus the high levels of 
power required for high load acceleration and regenerative brake are supplied by the 
ultra-capacitors whereas the low and medium power requirements are delivered by the 
battery and fuel cell
196
.  Due to its unique and efficient combination, this bus does not 
suffer from the limitations other vehicles suffer from and therefore is expected to be 
commercialised at a cost of £90000-£95000, significantly much less than the fuel cell 
buses running in London with costs of around £2 million. Similarly in London the 
complimentary impact of hybrid technologies on fuel cells have been observed. After 
almost two years of hesitation, the Major Boris Johnson has authorised the order of new 
buses which will be hybrid-FC as opposed to the FC buses that have been running in 
London since 2004. Although a competing technology, the increasing focus on hybrid 
technologies has benefited the fuel cell vehicles. It must be noted that due to a lack of 
operational data there is high level of uncertainty making it difficult at this stage to judge 
whether or not competition will favour fuel cells.  
 
On the other hand, hydrogen technologies have applications beyond the transport sector. 
Since the early 2000s the UK government has identified a number of areas in the heat and 
electricity sectors where hydrogen and fuel cells can contribute. This is a consequence of 
the aforementioned developments that took place in the landscape and the UK energy 
LTS. The introduction of privatisation and competition in the electricity sector fostered a 
move away from a centralised to a more distributed structure in the power sector. 
Although it was not a large scale shift, it generated opportunities for renewables, CHP 
schemes as well as micro-grids. Another change was the implementation of ever stricter 
climate change regulations and the security of supply concerns which led the UK 
government to set more ambitious targets and allocate larger resources for the 
development and deployment of technologies that will exploit indigenous renewable 
sources. All these changes in turn have had a positive impact on hydrogen and fuel cell 
technologies.  
 
To start with, one of the areas identified was to use of hydrogen for the purposes of 
electricity storage. This was due to the growth in demand for electricity at peak hours and 
 244 
the deployment of renewables with intermittent characteristics (wind in particular). 
However, the early enthusiasm for hydrogen as a means for large-scale electricity storage 
to avoid the need for extensive back-up power plants faded away as the costs of hydrogen 
remained significantly higher than the other options. As demonstrated in a report by the 
National Grid the storage technologies that are considered up to 2020 involve pumped 
storage, compressed air energy storage, different types of battery technologies and 
flywheels
197
. 
 
Other windows of opportunities have emerged as a result of the aforementioned efforts of 
the UK government to encourage distributed energy technologies over the last decade. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, since the introduction of privatisation and competition, 
interest in distributed power generation technologies has grown in the UK. Although, the 
initial focus was on CCGT plants, the focus has spread with the emergence of climate 
change issues which gave rise to the development of other distributed technologies. This 
was also in relation to the renewables agenda which has been pursued since the early 
1990s. As demonstrated in the Energy White Paper (2003), the government addressed the 
problems and introduced a number of measures to remove the barriers against the 
connection of distributed renewable and CHP technologies to the network
198
.  
 
As demonstrated in the Energy Review (2006), the UK government’s current definition 
for distributed energy involves electricity generation and heat technologies that are not 
connected to the transmission network or heat grid
199
. This broad definition encompasses 
a variety of technologies including power generation plants connected to a distribution 
network, small plants supplying electricity to communities or a single household, micro 
generation technologies (PV, micro wind, micro hydro, heat pumps, biomass, micro CHP 
and small-scale fuel cells) as well as the combined heat and power plants. Since the 
White Paper (2003), the UK government’s commitment to develop and deploy these 
technologies was strengthened by the Defra’s CHP Strategy200, the DTI’s Micro 
Generation Strategy
201
 as well as the DTI’s Distributed Energy review202. In addition to 
the support provided by these schemes, new incentives were introduced in the Energy 
White Paper (2007) and the most recent Low Carbon Transition Plan. The strategy to 
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move towards distributed energy has benefited fuel cell technologies.  These documents 
pointed out the potential of fuel cells in adopting the distributed generation technologies 
including CHP applications in the UK. In addition, the increasing focus on small scale 
renewables (and the overall renewable agenda) has highlighted the potential benefit of 
integrating renewables with hydrogen and fuel cell units, where excess electricity could 
be stored in the form of hydrogen and re-converted into electricity or used as a fuel for 
transport purposes.  
 
Today a number of systems including FC-CHP and hybrid renewable-FC units are 
available in the UK. Although, they are still at demonstration stage, these applications act 
as niches that provide the learning required to improve the technologies and reduce costs. 
For instance, the hybrid renewable-FC systems have been receiving increasing support in 
Scotland because of the immense potential of wind in the region. The first fuel cell 
integrated wind system was launched in Unst, Scotland. The Pure Energy system 
incorporates wind turbines with an electrolyser; the output, hydrogen is stored and 
supplied to an industrial estate and also is also fed into hybrid fuel cell car that provides 
the only licensed zero emission car in the UK
203
. The Hydrogen Office established in 
Scotland and funded by the European Regional Development Fund and Scottish 
Enterprise is a similar project which will use the surplus wind energy to electrolyse water 
and store hydrogen for different uses
204
. The Hebrides Hydrogen Park, which currently 
produces hydrogen from electrolysis that uses electricity produced by waste, plans to 
integrate wind turbines to produce hydrogen which will be used for transport and 
stationary purposes
205
.  
 
Scotland has also demonstrated the UK’s first hydrogen powered house which was 
installed in 2004 in Berwickshire. The house employs a PEM fuel cell that uses natural 
gas and produces 100% of the heat and 70% of the electricity requirements for an average 
household
206
. Another similar project is the Hydrogen Houses Unplugged project which 
is based in the Shetland Islands, Scotland, which was announced in 2007. In the first 
stage of this project, a fuel cell based CHP system running on hydrogen produced by 
solar and wind energy will provide heat and electricity to two houses. This will be the 
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world’s first fully independent household grid. The second stage will involve the 
development of a hydrogen refuelling station that will provide renewable-based hydrogen 
to vehicles.  
 
Although the residential CHP is first introduced in Scotland, London was the first city to 
launch a community-wide scale fuel cell-CHP scheme. Woking Borough Council 
introduced this 200 kWe fuel cell-CHP system in 2003; the fuel cell provides electricity 
to Woking Park’s lighting and heat and power to the pool in the park207. The CHP scheme 
also delivers energy to the Leisure Centre and the excess electricity is supplied to the 
sheltered housing scheme of the Council
208
. A number of other fuel cell applications have 
been installed and announced in Wales, the Midlands, Scotland, the Tees Valley, London 
and other parts of the UK
209
.  
 
As these examples demonstrate, changes at the landscape level and the UK energy LTS 
have supported hydrogen and fuel cell technologies in the heat and power sectors. They 
have led to the creation of niches that are crucial for learning mechanisms to take place 
and help adopt these technologies. However, hydrogen and fuel cells were not the only 
technologies that benefited from these landscape developments, nuclear and CCS options 
also received substantial support in recent years. The shift in focus has been mainly due 
to the aging of assets, the urgency of security of electricity supply, the climate change 
issues as well as the recent economic recession. The idea behind this recent interest was 
that t nuclear power plants could make a significant contribution to filling in the 22.5GW 
gap that will occur as a result of the decommissioning of plants by 2020, while the CCS 
technologies could make use of the indigenous coal resources without the release of GHG 
emissions at relatively low prices. Despite their high costs, nuclear plants are favoured 
because of their maturity and low CO2 emissions. As discussed earlier, while the interest 
in CCS technologies has emerged over the last five years, the first indications of the 
government’s intention to support nuclear technologies were given in the Energy White 
Paper (2007). This was made much more specific in the Nuclear White Paper (2007) and 
the recent Low Carbon Transition Plan (2009). Despite the short period of time, the 
urgency of the aforementioned pressures has put these technologies firmly on the UK 
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policy agenda. In November 2009 the UK government approved the construction of 10 
new nuclear power stations
210
. Thus, although the landscape developments have 
supported the hydrogen technologies, the fast changing nature of these pressures when 
combined with the problems in the energy LTS another option has emerged. Although 
these technologies do not compete directly, they can pose a significant thread to the 
adoption of hydrogen technologies in the power sector. Once they are operational these 
large-scale plants (either nuclear or coal with CCS) might eliminate the need for smaller 
distributed generation technologies such as fuel cells. On the other hand, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 6, because of the synergies between hydrogen and nuclear and CCS 
technologies, they might as well compliment the hydrogen pathways by using cheap 
nuclear based electricity to produce hydrogen via electrolysis or by applying the CCS 
technologies to reduce the GHG emissions of the fossil fuel based hydrogen pathways 
that are considered in the shorter term. Similarly, large-scale renewable technologies can 
have both positive and negative impacts on the transition to hydrogen technologies in the 
heat and power sectors. The adoption of these technologies with the aforementioned 
storage technologies might create a lock-in and reduce the need for small-scale 
renewables which could in turn have a negative impact on fuel cell technologies. 
Conversely, as hydrogen can be produced directly or indirectly from different renewable 
sources, improvements in these technologies could compliment the developments in 
hydrogen technologies.   
 
To sum up, landscape developments and the evolutionary change of UK energy policy 
has created window of opportunities for hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. However, 
although these factors have emerged the hydrogen and fuel cells as possible solutions to 
the current problems in the transport, heat and power sectors, their similar impact on the 
alternative options have fostered competition. Given the number of different variables, 
there is a high level of uncertainty and such competition will either benefit hydrogen 
technologies or constrain the transition of the adoption of hydrogen technologies in the 
UK.  
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5.5. Conclusions 
As discussed in the previous sections, there have been major changes both in the UK 
energy policy and market structure over the last four decades. These changes which were 
influenced by the landscape developments have created window of opportunities for the 
development of alternative technologies in the UK energy LTS. Hydrogen and fuel cells 
are some of these technologies that benefited from these changes. The government has 
initiated a number of measures and allocated resources to increase their development. 
 
However, due to fast changing nature of the landscape developments, the effects have 
been very varied. While the climate change issues and the security of supply concerns 
triggered the developments in hydrogen technologies, the unexpected economic recession 
and the sharp fluctuations in the energy prices in 2007 and 2008 changed the situation. 
Due to the urgency of security of supply concerns and the financial crisis, the UK 
government has shifted its focus away from very costly hydrogen technologies towards 
other alternatives that are more cost effective and closer to commercialisation. Although 
this does not mean that hydrogen technologies are being ‘abandoned’, the government’s 
efforts to foster diversity has created competition between these technologies and the 
other alternatives. This competition can have multiple outcomes. Developments in the 
competing options can lead to increasing returns to their adoption creating an early lock-
in to these technologies. On the other hand, because of the synergies between these 
technologies, improvements in the alternatives can compliment the development of 
hydrogen technologies. Finally, the competition could result in the establishment of 
hybrid designs that allow the existence of all the alternatives. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 7, the efficiency gains that are observed in these systems are likely to favour this 
option though unexpected events could still change the outcome.  
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Chapter 6 
Developments at the Niche Level: Hydrogen & Fuel Cells  
6.1. Introduction 
It was argued in the previous chapters that the landscape developments and in turn the 
changes in the UK energy LTS have created window of opportunities for the emergence 
of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies and that transition to a hydrogen economy can 
provide solutions to the current problems energy sector is facing. Understanding this link 
between the hydrogen technologies and the current issues in the energy LTS requires an 
analysis of how these technologies can be integrated into the current energy LTS. 
Therefore the aim of this chapter is to describe what is meant by the term hydrogen 
economy. As will be described, similar to the energy LTS, the hydrogen economy can be 
considered as a large technical system which involves its physical and non-physical 
artefacts. This chapter however, focuses on solely the technical components required to 
establish a hydrogen system.  
 
Similar to the electricity sector, hydrogen which is an energy carrier is produced from a 
primary energy source. Once produced, hydrogen needs to be stored, transported and/or 
distributed via storage means, pipelines and/or electricity to be converted into useful 
forms of energy. This conversion is done by different technologies including fuel cells, 
internal combustion engines and/or gas turbines. Depending on the demand, the final 
product can take the form of transport fuels, electricity or heat. Thus compilation of all 
these steps forms the technical backbone of the hydrogen economy. What makes this 
energy system unique is that hydrogen can be produced from many types of energy 
sources including fossil fuels, renewables and water. This diversity is one of the biggest 
advantages that can create solutions to the current security of supply concerns as in 
theory the utilisation of hydrogen allows shifts to any type of resource depending on the 
availability. Another significant advantage is related to green house gas (GHG) 
emissions. Hydrogen does not lead to CO2 emissions when combusted and therefore 
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provides an opportunity to tackle climate change issues. Finally, running hydrogen on 
fuel cells, the energy efficiency levels of which are higher than the existing conversion 
technologies, can lead to highly efficient and clean fuel, electricity and/or heat 
production. Due to the advantages this energy carrier provides, hydrogen economy is 
considered a system that can eventually transform the carbon-based energy sector. 
 
This chapter is organised in a manner that introduces each step that is required to realise 
the hydrogen economy. This will provide an understanding of how hydrogen and fuel 
cells can be integrated into the current energy LTS and what the linkages between these 
technologies and the incumbent and alternative technologies are.  In each section, a 
transition roadmap is also presented to demonstrate how this shift away from the current 
carbon economy to hydrogen economy is envisaged. 
6.2. Hydrogen Production 
Hydrogen is the most abundant element, making up 75 percent of the mass of the 
universe
1
. However, because hydrogen occurs in compound of some sort, such as water 
(H2O molecule), it needs to be extracted from hydrogen-rich materials through the use of 
some form of energy
2
. The advantage of hydrogen is that it can be produced from a 
variety of feed-stocks including fossil fuels, renewable sources, nuclear as well as water
3
. 
A brief summary of the various feed-stocks, process technologies, different sources of 
energy utilised and resulting emissions is presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1 Major hydrogen production processes 
 
Source: Hydrogen Production Overview, National Hydrogen Association, August 2004, Hydrogen 
Factsheets, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells 
Although, currently a large number of process technologies exist, electrolysis was the 
first commercial technology utilised to produce hydrogen in the 1920s, which shifted 
towards fossil fuels in the 1960s
4
. According to the IEA (2005), fossil fuels accounted for 
96% of the hydrogen produced in 2003; 48% of the hydrogen was produced from natural 
gas, 30% from oil, 18% from coal and 4% from electrolysis
5
. Of total hydrogen 
production, 40% was used in chemical processes, 40% in refineries and 20% for other 
uses
6
.  
 
Due to state of the technologies, electrolysis and natural gas reforming are the most 
promising processes to initiate a shift towards a hydrogen economy. However, where the 
costs are concerned, natural gas and other fossil fuels are most likely to become the 
primary sources to lead the first phase of the transition to hydrogen. According to OECD 
predictions and the roadmaps of the US Department of Energy, the pathway for hydrogen 
will be dominated by fossil-fuel based hydrogen production in the short-term, followed 
by an increased involvement of renewables and possibly nuclear energy in the long-
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term
7
. The predictions of the US DOE and OECD for hydrogen production in the short 
and long run are presented in the following figures. 
 
Figure 1: US DOE Roadmap for hydrogen production 
Source: US Department of Energy, (February, 2002), A National Vision of America’s Transition to a 
Hydrogen Economy to 2030 and Beyond 
 
Figure 2: Main hydrogen pathways, the long-term figure 
Source OECD/IEA, (2006), p: 7 
 
Large-scale hydrogen production is only probable in the longer term
8
. In the short and 
medium term, the production options for hydrogen are first based on distributed hydrogen 
production from the electrolysis of water and on the reforming of natural gas and coal
9
. 
Larger centralised hydrogen production plants are more likely to be introduced at a later 
stage
10
. These plants will probably be based on biomass or fossil fuels with CO2 capture 
and storage
11
. 
Gasification of coal 
Reforming of natural gas/biomass  
Biophotocatalysis  
Photolytics to split water 
Electrolysis using renewable & nuclear 
Thermo-chemical splitting of water using nuclear 
2010 2020 2030 2040 
Production 
processes 
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6.2.1. Hydrogen Production from Fossil Fuels 
As mentioned earlier, hydrogen can be produced from fossil-fuel based feed-stocks such 
as natural gas, LPG, liquid hydrocarbons and coal, on both large and small scale through 
a variety of processes that are determined depending on the feedstock and the scale of 
operation
12
. Amongst these, natural gas reforming and coal gasification are the most 
widespread used, mature technologies to produce hydrogen. Currently, deriving hydrogen 
from natural gas via steam reformation provides the least-expensive method and is widely 
used for large scale hydrogen production in refineries and the chemical industry whereas 
small scale reformers are tested in refuelling stations for road transport applications
13
. 
Natural gas provides an efficient feedstock due to its high hydrogen-to-carbon ratio (it 
can include 70% to 90% CH4), which reduces the amount of by-product CO2
14
. However, 
as mentioned in other chapters, due to recent declines in natural gas reserves, this source 
is considered as a transitional fuel for distributed hydrogen generation applications as 
opposed to a long-term option for centralised hydrogen production
15
.  
 
On the other hand, although coal gasification is a more expensive method compared to 
natural gas reforming, due to the maturity of this process and abundant reserves, this 
source has become attractive in recent years. To achieve higher efficiency and a potential 
reduction in costs, research is directed towards the co-generation of hydrogen and 
electricity from coal in centralised IGCC plants, rather than conventional coal-fired 
plants
16
. However, the costs related to these technologies are further increased by a 
required additional process called CO2 capture and storage which separates and stores the 
CO2 emitted as a by-product of hydrogen production from fossil-fuels. 
  
Finally, fossil fuels can be used indirectly to produce hydrogen via electrolysis. In this 
process, hydrogen is derived by the splitting of water via electricity which can be 
generated by fossil fuels, that is, coal or natural gas. However, since this practice also 
includes emissions related to the fossil fuel consumption, hydrogen R&D programs 
involving electrolysis from fossil energy sources tend to include work on carbon capture 
and storage methods
17
. In the following sections, these process technologies are 
discussed. 
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Currently, global hydrogen production amounts to approximately 40 million tons a year 
(slightly more than 1% of the world‟s energy demand18), more than 95 percent of which 
is produced from fossil fuels
19
 and used in refineries as a process gas, in chemical 
industry and in metal manufacturing
20
. 
6.2.1.1. Steam reformation (SMR) 
Steam reforming is a process which converts hydrocarbons such as natural gas and 
naphtha/gasoline and water vapour into hydrogen and carbon monoxide through the use 
of heat
21
. This process starts with the removal of sulphur from the feedstock
22
. After 
purification, hydrogen is extracted by reacting natural gas with steam at temperatures of 
700 to 850 °C and pressures of 3 to 25 bars
23
. In addition to H2, the product gas contains 
CO2, steam, unreacted methane (CH4) and CO
24
. Due to the large amount of CO (around 
12%), this gas is further converted to CO2 and H2 through the water-gas shift reaction (2). 
After the shift section, the CO2 and other impurities are generally removed by pressure 
swing adsorption (PSA) or chemical scrubbing (these processes are generally named 
purification)
25
. Typical plant sizes for this process vary; while the smallest size can be 
500-300 Nm
3
/hr

, the maximum potential can be as high as 950.000 Nm
3
/hr
26
.  
CH4 + H2O + Heat → CO + 3 H2 (1) 
CO + H2O → CO2 + H2 + Heat (2) Water-gas shift reaction 
Today 80% of global production of hydrogen is accomplished by steam methane 
reforming
27
. Although steam reformation is a relatively efficient and inexpensive process, 
increases in the price of feedstock (i.e. natural gas) can render the hydrogen produced via 
this method highly expensive. Therefore R&D activities focus on cost reductions; the US 
DOE aims to reduce the cost of hydrogen produced from natural gas by 25% by 2013
28
. 
At the same time, there is ongoing research on increasing the process efficiency (utilising 
waste heat for other purposes) to increase the energy output for a given fossil-fuel input. 
Finally, because steam reformation generates CO2 emissions, carbon capture and 
sequestration technologies are explored to prevent emissions
29
. Currently, a number of 
IEA countries including Austria, Belgium, Germany, Korea and the Netherlands have 
undertaken research into the steam reformation of fossil fuels
30
.  
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6.2.1.2. Partial Oxidation (POX) and Auto-thermal reforming (ATR) 
Partial oxidation (POX) of natural gas involves the partial combustion of methane with 
oxygen gas which yields CO and H2 (3)
31
. This is an alternative process to steam 
reforming and can be applied to any hydrocarbon feedstock (such as natural gas, coal or 
oil) that is compressible
32
.  
CH4 + ½ O2 → CO + H2 + Heat  (3) 
POX processes gained attention in the 1990s for developing onboard fuel reformers for 
cars and buses, some of the developers of such reformers include Argonne National 
Laboratory, the Epyx Corporation, International Fuel Cells, Johnson Matthey, Northwest 
Power Systems and Shell
33
. However, the efficiency of this technology is around 50%; 
significantly lower than the SMR process of which efficiency is between 65%-75%
34
.  In 
the Dutton (2002) report, the research areas for this process are identified as; reactor 
design, plasma reformation, increasing compactness; (combining reforming and water-
gas-shift processes) and outlet gas clean-up (for fuel cells)
35
.  
Hydrocarbons can also be used to produce hydrogen in the auto-thermal reforming 
process which combines partial oxidation with steam reforming
36
. Despite the high 
efficiencies achieved in the SMR, the POX and ATR can be more preferable for the 
automotive applications due to their compactness. Additionally, the simplicity of the 
system and lower costs achieved in small units can render these two processes more 
advantageous compared to SMR. A brief comparison of these processes is illustrated in 
Table 2. 
Table 2: Comparison of technologies for H2 production 
Technology SMR ATR or POX 
Benefits High Efficiency 
Emissions 
Costs for large units 
Smaller size 
Costs for small units 
Simple system 
Challenges Complex system 
Sensitive to natural gas qualities 
Lower efficiency 
H2 purification 
Emissions/flaring  
Source OECD/IEA, (2006), p: 8 
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6.2.1.3. Coal Gasification 
Coal gasification is one of the oldest techniques utilised to produce hydrogen
37
. This 
method was originally used for the production of town gas which, as discussed in 
previous chapters, was used in the UK and other countries before the switch to natural 
gas
38
.  In this process, a gas mixture of H2, CO and CO2 is produced when coal is heated 
up to 900°C and is consequently reacted with steam in the presence of a catalyst
39
. A 
typical reaction for the gasification process is given in equation (4)
40
: The amount of CO 
and H2 produced increases if gasification takes place above 1000ºC
41
. The CO is further 
converted to CO2 and H2 through the water-gas shift reaction, described in equation (2)
42
.  
C(s) + H2O + Heat → CO + H2  (4) 
Although, hydrogen production from coal is commercially mature, it is a complicated 
process due to the difficulties in handling a solid fuel that is less reactive compared to 
natural gas
43
. On the other hand, even though, the studies demonstrate that the cost of 
coal-based hydrogen is higher than that of hydrogen from natural gas, increases in gas 
prices, decreases in gas reserves and abundant coal supplies make this technique highly 
attractive
44
. Therefore, a large number of countries including Australia, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, the UK and the US have initiated research programmes to develop new 
technologies to improve the coal gasification process
45
. Research areas include the 
development of advanced reactors to increase hydrogen output, novel membranes to 
separate hydrogen from contaminants, technologies combining hydrogen separation and 
the water-gas shift reaction and, new concepts that utilise fewer steps
46
. 
6.2.1.4. Pyrolysis: Kvaerner Process 
The Kvaerner process is a pyrolysis method which can use natural gas, heavy oils and 
other hydrocarbons to produce hydrogen with zero CO2 emissions as long as the source 
of electricity is from renewables. This is a novel process that is used to decompose 
natural gas into hydrogen and commercially saleable carbon black (carbon black is used 
in the rubber, tire, plastics, paint and ink industries, and also used in some new 
metallurgical industries, where it serves as a reduction material and a carbon additive or 
carburiser in steel and foundry operations)
47
. Decomposition that separates hydrocarbons 
into pure carbon and hydrogen, takes place at 1600ºC, and produces no significant 
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emissions rather all usable products with almost 100% efficiency; the product split is 
48% hydrogen, 10% heat and 40% carbon black
48
. Typical reaction for this process is 
illustrated in the following equation
49
. This process promises to be cheaper than the SMR 
when the sales of carbon black are taken into account. However, despite the advantages, 
it has not been commercialised except for one plant that started operation in 1999.     
CnHm + Electric Energy → n C + m/2 H2 (5) 
6.2.2. Electrolysis 
Hydrogen can be produced from water through electrolysis processes that split water into 
hydrogen and oxygen. Although it has been known for 200 years, a small portion of 
world's hydrogen is produced by water electrolysis due to lower costs of hydrogen 
produced from natural gas
50
. As substantial amounts of electricity is required for water 
electrolysis, this method of producing hydrogen is only economic in the countries where 
the costs related to electricity generation is low such as large hydro-electricity users of 
Egypt, Brazil, Iceland, Canada, Norway and Zaire, or France, Belgium and Switzerland 
where nuclear electricity production is high
51
. However, despite the related costs, 
electrolysis can still play a significant role in other countries attempting to shift to 
hydrogen economy during the transition period as water is much more available than the 
fossil fuels. In addition, electrolysis can provide a cost-effective means of producing 
hydrogen on a distributed scale; due to their compactness, electrolysers can be situated at 
the existing refuelling stations supplying hydrogen to fuel cell vehicles which on one 
hand can reduce the costs by eliminating the costs of transportation and distribution of 
hydrogen, on the other hand, can link renewables to the transport sector in the case that 
the electricity input comes from these sources
52
. Furthermore, electrolysers when 
combined with fuel cells can provide effective electricity storage mechanisms. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, one of the most important barriers to greater 
deployment of renewables is their intermittent electricity output; during off-peak hours, 
electrolysers can convert water into hydrogen which can be stored and re-converted to 
electricity to be supplied during the peaks in demand
53
. The final advantage of water 
electrolysis can be identified as the maturity and the simplicity of the process itself; when 
direct current electricity is passed between two electrodes buried in a current-conducting 
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electrolyte, hydrogen and oxygen are split and collected at the electrodes, as in the 
following equation
54
. 
H2O + electricity → H2 + ½ O2 (6)  
There are currently two commercial types of electrolysers to produce hydrogen via water 
electrolysis, alkaline electrolysers and proton exchange membrane (PEM) electrolysers. 
Alkaline electrolysers use an aqueous solution of KOH as an electrolyte whereas PEM 
electrolysers use a solid acidic polymer membrane which allows the H
+
 ions to move 
from anode to cathode, where it forms molecular hydrogen; H2
55
. While both 
electrolysers are suited for stationary applications, due to their compactness, PEM 
electrolysers are also suitable for mobile applications
56
. On the other hand, the reaction 
efficiency of alkaline electrolysers is higher because of the lower ionic resistance of the 
liquid electrolyte
57
. Despite their different advantages however, both of the electrolysis 
processes suffer from high electricity needs and in turn costs, therefore, R&D activities 
mainly focus on increasing their electrical efficiency
58
.  
 
In the electrolysis process, as the temperature increases the required electrical energy 
decreases, and this in turn leads to higher process efficiencies
59
. To take advantage of this 
principle, researchers have been developing high temperature electrolysers since the 
1980‟s60. Although high efficiencies have been achieved at 800-1000ºC, these 
electrolysers are still at the R&D stage. Process efficiency can also be increased when the 
electrolysis operates at higher pressures; today high-pressure electrolysers are being 
developed for this purpose. However, similar to high temperature electrolysers, these 
technologies are also at the testing stage.  
6.2.3. Solar Hydrogen 
As discussed in the previous section hydrogen can be produced via electrolysis electricity 
input of which can come from photovoltaic cells (PV) that convert sunlight into 
electricity. Today, systems that combine PV and electrolysers are commercially 
available
61
. However, as the cost of PV-based electricity is between six and ten times 
higher than the conventional grid power, hydrogen produced via this method is highly 
expensive
62
. Therefore, in order to reduce these costs, researchers have been working on 
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photoelectrochemical cells; a device that directly dissociates water into hydrogen and 
oxygen using photon energy. Honda and Fujishima who first introduced the concept of 
separation of water into hydrogen and oxygen without electricity, proposed the use of 
semiconductors such as TiO2 as photoanode
63
. Based on this principle, Graetzel and his 
colleagues have developed a new device photoanode of which comprises of two layers; 
dye-sensitizer and semiconductor
64
. The light is absorbed in a porous layer of 
semiconductor composed of nanocrystalline TiO2 particles which is sensitized for visible 
light by the adsorption of coloured dyes
65
. As the photons are absorbed, the dye is excited 
and releases two protons and two electrons; while the former dissociates water into 
hydrogen and oxygen atoms, the latter is carried to the cathode through an external 
circuit
66
. Finally in the cathode a reduction occurs as the two electrons react with H
+
 
received from photoanode and H2 is formed
67
. 
 
Figure 3: Basic concept of photoelectrochemical hydrogen production from water-splitting 
Source: Luzzi A, (2004), Photoelectrolytic Production of Hydrogen, Annex 14, IEA, p: 5 
 
Although this tandem process promises cost reductions due to reduced steps, it is still at 
the research stage. Due to its advantages, a number of countries have undertaken research 
which led to improvements in solar-to hydrogen conversion efficiencies of up to 16%. 
However, before commercialisation can be a real consideration, several challenges 
remain in a number of areas. To solve the various problems research is now being 
concentrated areas include novel materials for photoanode, increasing the process 
efficiency and corrosion resistance.  
Photoanode Cathode 
Na2SO4 
V 
R 
Excitation of TiO2 by 
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TiO2 + 2hv → 2e
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e- 
Reaction with the protons:  
 
H2O + 2p
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2H+ + 2e- → H2 
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6.2.4. Biomass and Hydrogen 
Biomass is a very broad term which is used to describe material derived from plants or 
from animal manure that is a processed form of plant material
68
. Bio-energy is the 
general term for energy derived from biomass – materials such as wood, straw or animal 
wastes, which were living matter relatively recently
69
. In order to produce useful forms of 
energy, biomass can be combusted to generate heat and power or can be converted 
directly to bio-fuels and eventually to hydrogen to be used in other sectors, such as 
transportation. Although, when combusted, biomass releases CO2, it does not add onto 
the GHG emissions as the released carbon dioxide was previously stored by the biomass 
during photosynthesis
70
. Because of its suitability for a variety of applications and its 
contribution to help reduce GHG emissions, biomass based hydrogen has become 
attractive in recent years. 
 
Today, hydrogen can be produced from biomass by variety of technologies directly or via 
storable intermediates. In the literature, the processes have been classified under two 
main paths; biological and thermochemical, however, as an advanced technology; photo-
biological production is discussed under the biomass rather than the solar hydrogen 
section, this process has been identified as the third route to hydrogen production from 
biomass. Following figure illustrates the pathways leading to hydrogen produced from 
biomass.  
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Figure 4: Three routes for hydrogen production from biomass. 
Source: Hydrogen from biomass: State of the Art and Research Challenges 
 
The thermochemical processes for hydrogen are gasification, pyrolysis and high pressure 
aqueous. While, pyrolysis is the oldest technology that has been utilised for biomass 
conversion, gasification is the most developed and promising process in converting 
biomass to useful forms of energy. Pyrolysis provides the simplest thermochemical 
process which depending on the products required (solid, liquid or gas) can take the form 
of slow or fast pyrolysis. While the traditional process; slow pyrolysis converts wood into 
charcoal, fast pyrolysis is used for hydrogen production
71
. In the fast pyrolysis, the 
feedstock is heated at high temperatures of around 500 to 1300ºC
72
. The products of the 
process can be in the form of gas (including H2, CH4, CO, CO2); liquid (biofuels); and/or 
solid composed of char, carbon and other inert materials
73
. Most of the pyrolysis 
processes produce bio-fuel. This product is then utilised to form hydrogen by the 
processes of catalytic steam reformation followed by water gas-shift reaction in order to 
increase hydrogen yield (equations 7, 8 and 2)
74
. 
Pyrolysis: Biomass + Energy → Bio-oil + Char + Gas  (7) 
Steam reforming: Bio-oil + H2O → CO + H2  (8) 
Even though the most common practice is the two steps pyrolysis reaction, hydrogen can 
be produced by pyrolysis directly if higher temperature and time are allowed
75
. Although, 
in this case hydrogen is produced directly, in order to increase its yield, SMR and gas-
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shift reactions can be applied (equations 9, 1 and 2)
76
. As the goal with pyrolysis is to 
increase the hydrogen yield, today most of the research is focused on finding the reactor 
type (fluidised bed reactor type provides the highest yield) and heat transfer mode as well 
as the types of biomass resources to be used
 77
. 
Fast pyrolysis: Biomass + Heat → H2 + CO + CH4 + other products (9) 
 
Another thermochemical process is gasification that is a form of pyrolysis carried out in 
the presence of O2 and at higher temperatures in order to optimise the gas production
78
. 
After the moisture content of the feedstock is removed, the dried biomass is gasified by 
heating above 700ºC where a synthetic gas is generated
 79
. The syngas, which contains 
CO, CO2, CH4, H2, some hydrocarbons and inert gases, is converted into hydrogen by the 
SMR and following water-gas shift reaction
80
. Currently, research mostly focuses on the 
preparation of higher-quality fuels as low quality and cheap fuels require more advanced 
conversion processes and large scale systems adding on the costs
81
. Another research area 
involves a new process namely supercritical gasification that allows gasifying biomass 
with high moisture content. In this process, wet biomass is decomposed into small 
organic molecules or gaseous hydrogen by treating it in hot (647 K) and pressurised (22.1 
MPa) water
82
. Although, supercritical gasification is at an early R&D stage, the process 
has become attractive due to its high gasification efficiencies and potential to reduce 
costs by allowing the use of wet biomass waste streams
83
. 
 
In addition to thermochemical processes, hydrogen can be produced by biological 
processes; while anaerobic digestion and fermentation allow the production of hydrogen 
through the conversion of storable intermediates, bio-photolysis provides a direct 
production method. Anaerobic digestion, takes place in the absence of air (anaerobic), in 
airtight sealed containers where necessary conditions are created for the bacteria to digest 
organic material to generate a gas mixture of methane and carbon dioxide
84
. The product 
of this digestion; biogas can be used to produce heat for cooking and space heating or as 
fuel to be used in internal combustion engines to generate electricity and/or as a vehicle 
fuel
85
. Similar to AD, fermentation is a well-established, anaerobic process where sugar 
is extracted from starch (i.e. maize, wheat) and sugar crops (i.e. sugar cane, sugar beet) 
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by enzymes and in turn is converted to mostly ethanol (C2H5OH) with yeast
86
. Although 
the initial product is methanol, ethanol is separated by removing of water and other 
impurities with a process called distillation
87
. While methanol can be a substitute for 
petrol, ethanol can be used as a supplement or can be used directly with suitable engine 
modifications
88
. In addition to their direct uses, these storable intermediates including 
methane, methanol and ethanol can be converted to hydrogen by the aforementioned 
steam reformation process
89
.  
 
Finally, hydrogen can be produced directly by bio-photolysis
90
. This process generally 
involves two steps; the photosynthesis that splits water into H
+
 and O2 and secondly the 
reduction of hydrogen atom by the help of a hydrogen producing enzyme hydrogenase to 
produce H2
91
. Today researchers are working on different types of bio-photolysis that are 
based on single-step artificial photosynthesis
92
.  
To sum up, currently a number of processes exist to convert biomass to hydrogen. This 
feedstock provides a reliable energy source as it is abundant and renewable. Amongst the 
processes gasification and pyrolysis are the most promising in terms of maturity and 
costs; however, currently there are no commercial biomass plants. 
6.2.5. Nuclear Energy and Hydrogen 
Nuclear energy is one of the many other sources that can be utilised to produce hydrogen 
directly or indirectly. As mentioned earlier, one of the typical methods of hydrogen 
production involves electrolysis main source of which is electricity. The required 
electricity for either conventional or high temperature electrolysis can be provided by the 
nuclear power plants. Additionally, nuclear reactors can be used as a heat source for high 
temperature electrolysis by coupling them with the electrolysers
93
. A variety of nuclear 
technologies is available for this purpose; supercritical water-cooled reactors, gas-cooled 
reactors, lead–bismuth-cooled reactors, and molten-salt-cooled reactors94. While this 
process can eliminate CO2 emissions and can achieve high thermal to hydrogen energy 
efficiency, these are expensive technologies due to costs associated with nuclear plant 
and the electrolysis
95
.  
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The aforementioned steam methane reforming (SMR) process which requires high 
temperatures to generate hydrogen from fossil fuels can also benefit from the heat 
produced by the nuclear reactors
96
. The Japan Atomic Research Institute is currently 
working on demonstrations of coupled SMR and high temperature engineering test 
reactor (HTTR)
97
. With this process, the natural gas requirement and in relation CO2 
emissions can be decreased but can not be eliminated as the reforming and the 
consequent water gas-shift reaction would still need natural gas
98
. Yildiz (2006) 
illustrates that SMR coupled to a high temperature helium-cooled reactor (MHR) can 
achieve a 60% energy efficiency level and that SMR-MHR can be cost-competitive with 
the conventional SMR method
99
.  
 
Nuclear heat can also be utilised in thermochemical cycle processes, to split water into 
hydrogen and oxygen. The thermochemical cycles are processes where water is split into 
hydrogen and oxygen by chemical reactions that require high temperatures
100
. The 
necessary heat can be supplied by nuclear energy or by solar energy, and, even by a 
combination of the two energy systems
101
. Currently, several hundred thermo-chemical 
reactions for water dissociation have been reported. However, according to Besenbruch 
(2000), who have studied 115 reactions, two cycles, namely sulphur-iodine (SI) and 
calcium-bromine-iron (Ca-Br or referred as UT-3) cycles hold the highest potential for 
commercialisation and applicability to nuclear heat
102
. The SI cycle which was first 
developed by General Atomics and Japan Atomic Research Institute in the mid-1970‟s, 
decomposes water by the use of high temperature heat and intermediary materials that are 
to be recycled
103
. This process mainly consists of three chemical reactions
104
: 
I2 + SO2 + 2H2O → 2HI + H2SO4  (120ºC) 
H2SO4 → SO2 + H2O + ½ O2   (830ºC-900ºC) 
2HI → I2 + H2     (300ºC-450ºC) 
 
The first reaction is known as the Bunsen reaction and results in the formation of 
sulphuric acid and hydrogen iodide which are decomposed according to the following 
two reactions
105
.  The decomposition of sulphuric acid requires high temperatures 
between 800 and 900ºC. This heat energy can be supplied by nuclear reactors; high 
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temperature engineering test reactor (HTTR) or the recently developed high temperature 
gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) output of which reaches 950ºC and can produce hydrogen 
without CO2 emissions with the efficiency level of around 50%
106
. On the other hand, 
calcium-bromine-iron (Ca-Br-Fe or UT-3) cycles which are also found favourable for 
hydrogen production, achieve less thermal-to-hydrogen efficiency of around 40%
107
. 
Although, these thermochemical reactions do not use fossil-fuel feedstock and therefore 
are attractive in terms of emission reductions, they are at a very early R&D stage. Thus, 
amongst these hydrogen production processes, nuclear reactors combined with SMR and 
the electrolysis, which are already mature and commercial; provide the most promising 
options in the short and medium term.   
6.2.6. Hydrogen from the Chemical Industry 
Today a huge amount of hydrogen production originates from the chemical industry.  In 
this sector, hydrogen is mainly produced as a by-product of the chemical processes such 
as production of chlorine, acetylene, cyanide, of which purity varies between 60 to 
95%
108
. However, this hydrogen is not utilised for the purposes of a hydrogen economy, 
it is mainly burnt for heating requirements or without any use as waste as nearby 
consumers are lacking
109
. It is estimated that annually 1.2 million tonnes of hydrogen is 
produced globally as a co-product of the chloralkali process, providing the cheapest 
existing source of hydrogen
110
. Despite the low costs, the desirability of thus produced 
hydrogen is limited due to the harmful emissions (mercury) and fixed location of the 
process
111
.  
6.2.7. Hydrogen Production Costs and Learning Effects 
It was mentioned in the previous sections that hydrogen can be produced from a variety 
of sources via a large number of processes. Although enough experience has been gained 
with some of these processes (the fossil fuel and electrolysis paths), others are still at the 
R&D stage requiring further development and demonstration activities. While an 
understanding of the status of the technologies is important, identifying hydrogen 
transition pathways also requires an analysis of their costs and the learning effects that 
can reduce these costs in the future. Today, there are a number of studies that have 
investigated hydrogen production costs. However, because these technologies are new 
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and therefore no standards for analysis have yet been established and due to different 
publication dates, various inputs such as the resource costs, plant sizes as well as the 
value of the currency, a comparison between these studies is difficult. In order to provide 
a consistent analysis amongst the processes, in this section, the findings of Padro and 
Putsche (1999) which analysed most of the aforementioned processes are mainly used. 
Also to represent the updated estimates and the level of uncertainty, other studies are 
cited wherever appropriate.  
6.2.7.1. Costs of Hydrogen from Fossil Fuels 
Processes for hydrogen production from fossil fuels mainly involve SMR, pyrolysis, 
partial oxidation and gasification. Currently, SMR is not only the most applied but also 
the least expensive process available for producing hydrogen. However, this technology 
when applied to natural gas resources can have varying costs due to the changing price of 
the feedstock. The findings of the literature demonstrate that the cost of hydrogen 
produced by SMR varies between 5 $/GJ to 11 $/GJ
112
. However, these calculations are 
based on the natural gas price of 2.96 $/GJ
113
 which is lower than the current prices and 
therefore recent studies estimate higher costs for this process (Table 2 in Appendix). 
Another factor that causes this wide range in costs is the size of plants. SMR benefits 
from economies of scale; the cost of hydrogen decreases as the size of the unit increases 
(Table 1 in Appendix). Furthermore, as this is a CO2 emitting process, while considering 
the overall economics of this method, costs of carbon capture and storage technologies 
need to be taken into account. However, as this technology is very immature, there are 
various estimates available. For instance, Gaudernack (1998) illustrates that addition of 
CCS technologies can increase the cost of hydrogen by 25%
114
 whereas the OECD 
(2005) predicts a rise of 15 to 22% (Table 3 in Appendix)
115
. Despite the higher price of 
hydrogen production at smaller plants, the large scale centralised production is less 
favoured due to the high costs of distribution and the transportation infrastructure
116
. It 
has been suggested that distributed hydrogen generation with small scale units will be 
more applicable as these technologies have the greatest potential for cost reductions
117
. 
For instance, Howkins (2006) shows that when design standardisation and mass 
production occur, the price of small scale reformers can be reduced and can lead to a 
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reduction in the cost of hydrogen of around 20 to 30%
118
. However, in the case of CCS 
requirements, the related costs associated with small plants will increase
119
. 
 
Another proven technology for the conversion of natural gas into hydrogen is the 
pyrolysis process. Pyrolysis or commercially known as the Kvaerner process releases no 
emissions and therefore does not require additional CCS processes. Rather it produces 
carbon black as a co-product which can help reduce the cost of hydrogen production due 
to its large market potential (demand from rubber and metallurgical industries)
120
. Taking 
these factors into account, Gaudernack (1998) illustrates that the hydrogen produced by 
the Kvaerner process with the carbon black revenue (5.8$/GJ) is more cost effective 
compared to the SMR processes with (7.5$/GJ) or without (6$/GJ) the CCS technologies 
(Table 4 in Appendix)
121
.  
 
In addition to the SMR and Kvaerner processes, the gasification of coal is an attractive 
technology to produce hydrogen. Padro (1999) demonstrates that the price of hydrogen 
produced by this method is around 10-12$/GJ (Table 5 in Appendix)
122
. However, these 
costs are calculated based on very high coal prices and therefore they are two to three 
times higher than the cost analysis of more recent reports; the costs of current gasification 
technologies without CCS vary between 5.4$/GJ and 6.8$/GJ (Table 6 in Appendix)
123
. 
While this process does not benefit from economies of scale, the cost of this technology 
is highly sensitive to the price of the feedstock which accounts for 25% of the overall 
costs
124
. Since coal is abundant and its price is lower than the natural gas, despite the high 
contribution of feedstock cost, this process is assumed to be more favoured in the future. 
However, as this process releases GHG emissions, for it to benefit from climate change 
regulations, it will require the application of CCS which will in turn increase the final 
cost of hydrogen. Hawkins (2006) demonstrates that this increase can vary between 7 to 
20%
125
.  While the recent calculations on current costs of gasification are similar to those 
of SMR, there is potential for further reductions. For instance, if new plants that co-
produce hydrogen and electricity via the help of fuel cells (SOFC) are developed, the 
overall costs of hydrogen can fall to 2-3$/GJ demonstrating more than 50% reductions
126
. 
Similarly, co-production of liquid fuels (Fischer-Tropsch, hydrogen and methanol) and 
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electricity can increase the energy efficiency by 40-50% and reduce overall costs
127
. In 
addition, the development of new membranes which can eliminate the need for water 
shift reactions and sulphur purification can contribute to cost reductions by 30%
128
.  
 
Finally, the partial oxidation of hydrocarbons is a promising process for converting fossil 
fuels into hydrogen. However, not only is its overall efficiency lower, the capital costs 
are higher compared to SMR plants because of the need for air separation (air separation 
is needed as this process uses pure oxygen) and gas separation units
129
. According to the 
findings of Padro (1999), the cost of hydrogen produced via this method can change from 
6.94 to 10.73 $/GJ (Table 7 in Appendix).  
 
To sum up, currently SMR, Kvaerner and gasification technologies are the most cost 
effective technologies amongst the fossil fuel conversion processes. Currently, although 
the SMR is the most utilised method and therefore is considered the most suitable option 
for the transition in the short-term; due to decreasing reserves and increasing price of 
natural gas, it is probable that coal gasification will be a more preferred option for 
hydrogen production in the future. On the other hand, where GHG emissions are 
concerned, coal because of its higher contribution to growing CO2 emissions is less 
advantageous compared to natural gas.  Nevertheless, as all the aforementioned processes 
use fossil fuels, all these processes have the same problem. Although carbon capture can 
provide a solution, it leads to significant increases in the price of hydrogen. Therefore, 
developments in CCS technologies are very important to achieve reductions in the costs 
of emission-free hydrogen technologies which will make them attractive under the 
current climate change regulations. Also as discussed, learning mechanisms that can lead 
to the development of other factors such as process standardisation, mass production, 
novel materials and co-production of hydrogen with other fuels and electricity can also 
reduce the price of fossil-fuel based hydrogen.  
6.2.7.2. Costs of Hydrogen from Renewable Energy Sources 
Hydrogen can be produced from renewable energy sources directly or indirectly. While 
solar energy and biomass can be utilised in both ways, the other renewable resources can 
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be used to generate electricity as an input to electrolyser system to produce hydrogen. 
Although the costs of producing hydrogen via this feedstock are more expensive than the 
conventional fossil fuel conversion technologies, recently, renewable hydrogen has 
become attractive due to concerns over climate change and the security of supply issues.  
 
Renewable hydrogen production processes release zero CO2 emissions with one 
exceptional resource; biomass. Even though, when combusted, this feedstock emits CO2, 
it is considered a non-polluting resource due to photosynthesis. Biomass is favourable not 
only because of concerns about GHG emissions but also because it provides an abundant 
and reliable resource. While it can be used to generate electricity for indirect hydrogen 
production, a number of direct conversion technologies are also studied. Amongst them 
the thermochemical processes such as pyrolysis and gasification are the most mature and 
cost effective techniques due to previous experience gained with using these processes 
for fossil fuels. However, no commercial demonstration for hydrogen production via 
these methods exists except for Shell which has introduced gasification of biomass/coal 
facility with the ratio of 1/3 at their Buggenm refinery
130
. Padro (1999) estimates that 
total production costs of these two processes are in the order of 8.86-15.52 $/GJ and 8.69-
17.10 $/GJ respectively
131
. These estimates are generally in line with recent studies, 
however, only NRC (2004) which uses high capital and feedstock costs predicts higher 
costs for gasification that change from 15.57$/GJ to 33.95$/GJ
132
. As feedstock costs are 
particularly important in determining the price of hydrogen, the emergence of a biomass 
market, which can lead to higher yields and lower costs, is widely assumed will 
contribute to reducing the cost of hydrogen in the future
133
. Another potential for cost 
reduction is mass production and standardisation is a real possibility if learning takes 
place. According to Hawkins (2006), learning effects can halve the capital costs of 
biomass gasification
134
. Finally, the application of CCS technologies, although increases 
the final hydrogen price, is assumed to render these processes highly attractive by 
creating a carbon sink that can allow savings under current climate change regulations
135
.  
  
Another thermochemical process; supercritical biomass gasification promises low 
production cost with an estimated value of around 3 $/GJ – though this method is at the 
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early R&D stage therefore the value is subject to change
136
. In addition to 
thermochemical processes, biological routes such as fermentation and anaerobic digestion 
are under research. Photo-biological production; direct and indirect bio-photolysis which 
convert solar energy into hydrogen is a further method in development with estimated 
costs of 20 $/GJ and 10 $/GJ
137
.  
 
Utilisation of solar energy can also provide direct conversion for hydrogen production. 
Rather than two-step indirect production of connecting photovoltaic cells (output: 
electricity) to electrolysers (output: hydrogen), direct photo-electrolysis methods which 
combine electricity generation and water splitting in one device, are developed to achieve 
higher potential and lower costs
138
. These processes on a laboratory scale and the set cost 
of hydrogen production (this is a target set by US DOE) via this technology is in the 
region of 9.5-14.20 $/GJ
139
. However, NRC (2004) argues that these tandem devices 
(Graetzel cells) with an estimated overall cost of 3.87 $/kg, will not become 
economically competitive compared to the conventional methods of hydrogen 
production
140
. 
 
The costs of hydrogen produced from PV cells and concentrating solar systems as well as 
the other renewable energy sources such as wind are described in the following section 
on electrolysis, as these are indirect production processes generating electricity for the 
electrolyser system.  
6.2.7.3. Costs of Hydrogen Produced via Electrolysis 
As discussed electrolysis is a mature, commercial process that provides the advantage of 
utilisation of any resource that can generate electricity. In the regions where fossil fuel 
reserves are scarce or expensive, the required electricity input for electrolysis can be 
provided by renewable or nuclear energy sources. Another advantage with this technique 
is that when coupled with renewable energy technologies, it is suitable for distributed 
hydrogen production eliminating the cost for distribution and transportation – though due 
to scale economies a future centralised production might be more cost effective. In 
 277 
addition, it emits zero CO2, if the electricity is supplied by renewable energy 
technologies.   
 
The main factor affecting the price of electrolytic hydrogen is the electricity cost; 
Hawkins (2006) shows that electricity can account for 60 to 80% of the hydrogen price in 
electrolysers with sizes over 1MW
141
. Therefore current R&D activities focus on 
improving electrical efficiency or reducing electricity requirements via high pressure or 
high temperature electrolysis systems that can replace some of electricity requirement 
with heat. Another element increasing the price of hydrogen is the high capital costs of 
the electrolyser units; as NRC (2004) demonstrates, currently, 700kW electrolyser system 
supplying 20 kgH2/hr costs around 1000$/kW where the price of hydrogen is 6.56$/kg
142
. 
If the expected learning (that benefit from research for fuel cells) takes place, the capital 
costs of electrolysers can fall by a factor of 8 by 2030
143
. This will in turn translate into 
reductions in the final hydrogen price; for instance the cost of hydrogen produced in the 
aforementioned 700kW electrolysers would fall to 3.93$/kg demonstrating a reduction of 
around 40%
144
. Finally, economies of scale play an important role; in the study of Ivy 
(2004), it is shown that hydrogen costs increase from 4.15$/kg to 8.09$/kg and 19.01$/kg 
for the decreasing sizes of electrolysers of 1000, 100 and 20 kg/day (Table 8 in 
Appendix)
145
. In addition, the OECD (2005) predicts that the costs of hydrogen produced 
in larger scale centralised electrolysis systems have the potential to fall from 34.4$/GJ in 
2010 to 17 $/GJ in 2030
146
.  
 
On the other hand, when hybrid systems that couple renewable energy technologies with 
electrolysers are concerned, costs are expected to be higher. This is due to higher capital 
costs and prices of electricity provided by the renewables. However, these coupled 
systems provide potential solutions to the problems of increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions and the intermittent character of these energy sources. According to Padro & 
Putsche (1999)
147
, the least expensive renewable-electrolyser system is the wind based 
with costs in the order of 11-20.2$/GJ followed by PV and concentrated solar energy 
with the values of around 24.8-41.8 $/GJ and 34.14-64.72$/GJ respectively (Table 9 in 
Appendix). However, as this study is mostly based on estimates, the values presented are 
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significantly lower than more recent reports. For instance, Hawkins (2006) shows that 
when the current status of wind technology is taken into consideration, hydrogen 
produced via wind-electrolyser system with no grid back-up costs around 75$/GJ which 
is estimated to fall to 20$/GJ if the expected learning with wind turbines and PEM 
electrolysers that will reduce their costs and increase their efficiency take place (Table 8 
in Appendix)
148
. On the other hand, in the case that grid back-up is used for the times 
when wind is not available, hydrogen costs fall from 75$/GJ to 47$/GJ
149
. As the NRC 
(2004) discusses, similarly, cost reductions are possible with PV-electrolyser systems 
costs of which drop by from a striking 198$/GJ (28.19$/kg) to 67$/GJ (9.52$/kg) with 
grid back-up or to 43.5$/GJ (6.18$/kg) with development of higher efficiency PV units 
and electrolysers
150
. 
6.2.7.4. Comparison of hydrogen production costs 
The previous sections have illustrated the reported costs of producing hydrogen from a 
variety of resources via using different technologies. In order to provide a better 
understanding, production costs of all technologies have been summarised in this section. 
This is done by illustrating the reported lowest and the highest cost data regardless of the 
plant size.  
 
It is clear from Figure 5 that fossil fuels provide the least expensive methods for 
producing hydrogen; SMR and Kvaerner processes are the cheapest in the orders of 5.4 
$/GJ and 5.8$/GJ followed by partial oxidation and coal gasification with 6.94 $/GJ and 
9.87 $/GJ respectively. However, it must be noted that these values do not represent the 
costs of required carbon capture and storage technologies, when included; the lowest 
figures vary from the data presented in the following figure. On the other hand when 
renewable based hydrogen production costs are concerned, biomass proves to hold the 
highest potential for short to medium term commercialisation with the values of 8.69 
$/GJ and 8.86 $/GJ for biomass gasification and pyrolysis respectively. Even though, 
biomass is accepted as a neutral carbon emitting process due to photolysis, CCS 
technologies may still need to be applied which will result in cost increase. However, 
other renewable energy systems such as solar and wind require no CCS and therefore, no 
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additional cost is required than the ones illustrated in the figure. Nevertheless, these 
figures – 11 $/GJ  for wind-electrolysis, 24.8 $/GJ for PV-electrolysis and 34.14 $/GJ for 
concentrated solar- electrolysis – are the estimated values for the years 2000 and 2010, 
and are subject to decrease as improvements with the renewable energy technologies and 
the electrolysers are likely to be achieved in the following years. Finally, direct 
production of hydrogen from renewable resources hold promise for low cost hydrogen 
production, however, it must be noted that these technologies such as supercritical water 
gasification, direct and indirect biophotolysis are at the laboratory scale and thus 
significant changes should be expected with the working prototypes.  This brief analysis 
falls in line with the hydrogen production transition pathways and therefore demonstrates 
the importance of costs in determining transition to the hydrogen technologies. 
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Figure 5: Hydrogen production costs 
Source: author adapted from Padro C. E. G. & Putsche V. (1999), Basye L., Swaminathan S., (1997), 
Dutton G., (2002) and Ni et al. (2006). 
Note 1: SMR: steam methane reforming, CG: coal gasification, POX: partial oxidation, BG and BP: 
Biomass gasification and pyrolysis, SWG: supercritical water gasification, Biop: biophotolysis, E: 
electrolysis, HTE: high temperature electrolysis.  
Note 2: • Only one value is presented, these are estimated figures at laboratory scale and thus are 
subject to change.        
  These figures are estimated values for years 2000 and 2010, and are subject to change. 
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6.3. Hydrogen Storage 
As discussed in the previous sections, there is a variety of options for producing 
hydrogen. However, similar to other fuels such as oil and natural gas, if hydrogen is to be 
adopted as an energy carrier in the future, developing technologies to store this fuel will 
be equally important in order to meet fluctuations in demand. Currently, hydrogen can be 
stored in three main forms; gaseous, liquid or solid. When liquid or gaseous, it can be 
stored as pure hydrogen while it exists in compounds when stored at the solid state
151
. 
Although, there are number of technologies to store hydrogen in different forms, storage 
still remains one of the key barriers in moving towards hydrogen economy. Problems are 
mainly due to natural properties of hydrogen. Because of its low energy density; 
hydrogen stores less energy on a given volume or mass compared to other fossil fuels 
such as gasoline which necessitates larger storage units for this fuel
152
. Energy density is 
measured in terms of either volumetric density (kgH2/m
3
) or gravimetric density which 
can be defined as the amount of energy stored per overall weight (1wtH2% = 186 
Wh/kg)
153
. Additionally, long refilling times, releasing temperature and high costs create 
further barriers against the use of hydrogen in transportation applications
154
. Though, 
they are less severe for off -board large scale storage systems as requirements for weight 
and volume are less binding for these systems
155
.  
 
Due to the weight, volume and temperature restrictions of passenger vehicles current 
R&D activities mostly focus on onboard storage options and targets for hydrogen storage 
are mainly set for transportation applications. These targets are set according to current 
driving ranges achieved in gasoline vehicles. According to a European Commission 
report (2003)
156
 with an average driving range of 400 km, a conventional combustion 
engine car burns 24 kg of petrol, while an internal combustion engine and a fuel cell car 
require 8 kg and 4 kg of hydrogen respectively. The OECD/IEA (2005) demonstrates that 
the target is to store 5kg of hydrogen with 6% gravimetric density to achieve the average 
range of 500km in a mid-size FC vehicle
157
. In addition, release temperatures should be 
in the range of 80-150ºC while the refilling time must not exceed 3 minutes
158
. Due to the 
restricted volumes of road vehicles, another parameter becomes the volume of hydrogen 
stored. Amongst the current storage options, while gaseous storage at 700 bars and 
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liquefied hydrogen can meet the aforementioned criteria and require the least volume of 
around 140 to 160 litres, their volumes are still seven to nine times bigger compared to 
the gasoline tanks that provide similar energy content
159
. On the other hand, although 
solid-state storage, which is three to four times less voluminous than the gaseous 
hydrogen, can tackle the volumetric problems, these options are still at the R&D stage
160
. 
Thus, when transitional pathways for hydrogen storage are concerned, due to their 
technical prospects, storing hydrogen at the gaseous and liquid state in pressurised tanks 
is probable in the short and medium term. While in the longer term, depending on the 
technological improvements, the transitional pathway for hydrogen storage is likely to be 
dominated by hydrogen stored at the solid state. The predictions of the US DOE for 
hydrogen storage in the short and long run are presented in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Transitional pathways for hydrogen storage, US 
Source: US Department of Energy, (February, 2002), A National Vision of America’s Transition to a 
Hydrogen Economy to 2030 and Beyond 
 
6.3.1. Gaseous Hydrogen Storage  
Hydrogen can be stored at the gaseous state in cylindrical tanks or in glass microspheres. 
Although, storing hydrogen as gas is a mature technique, the biggest challenge stems 
from low energy levels stored per unit volume of hydrogen
161
. Today, steel tanks where 
hydrogen is pressurised to 200-250 bars
162
 (20-25 MPa) are the most commercial 
methods utilised for storage. These tanks, made of steel or aluminium, have volumes of 
up to 50 litres, and can have even larger capacities with lower pressure requirements – the 
largest capacity achieved is about 15000m
3
 with pressures of around 12-16 bars
163
. 
Although these tanks are commercially available, current research is directed towards 
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composite fibre cylinder tanks which achieve lighter weights while enduring high 
pressures
164
.  
 
The composite fibre tanks are generally composed of three layers: a polymer layer for 
blocking hydrogen gas from escaping, a carbon fibre composite shell and an outer shell 
for impact resistance
165
. These tanks are light, they meet the codes for pressures of 
around 350-700 bars and are safety tested
166
. While the 350 bar tanks are in commercial 
use and can be found in FC buses, their large volumes render these options unsuitable for 
passenger vehicles with smaller tanks. Today, in order to reduce the volumes, higher 
pressure composite gas tanks in the region of 700 bars with a gravimetric density of 12 
wt% have been developed
167
. Although they are still at the R&D stage, 1 out of 10 FC 
vehicles were equipped with such storage systems in 2005
168
. One of the largest hydrogen 
based transportation projects Clean Urban Transportation Europe (CUTE) also employs 
compressed gas cylinders with pressures of 150 to 200 bars
169
. Currently, improvements 
in gravimetric density with the composite tanks have been achieved, these advanced 
composite cylinders have gravimetric densities of 10 wt% and 5 wt%, but they are still at 
the laboratory stage
170
. Despite the ongoing research on composite gas tanks in several 
countries including Canada, France, Spain, Switzerland, European Union (EU STORHY 
Project), Japan and USA, none of the commercial demonstrations have met the 
aforementioned targets for onboard hydrogen storage applications
171
. 
 
The utilisation of glass microspheres is another technique under research for hydrogen 
storage. With these glass bottles, it is technically possible to achieve a gravimetric 
density of 5.4 wt% H2 with relatively low pressures, thus safety requirements can be met 
while reducing container costs
172
. However, the high pressures required to fill these tubes 
and high temperatures (300ºC) for releasing hydrogen into the fuel cells which work at 
temperatures around 70-80ºC surface are the main drawbacks, thus further research is 
needed with these technologies
173
.  
 
Finally, hydrogen can be stored as gas in bulk amounts. This is an important aspect when 
the hydrogen supply security is concerned as just-in-time delivery of hydrogen
174
 can not 
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guarantee supply to large numbers of applications. Such large demand can be met by 
storage in underground cavities or via aquifer storage methods. These underground 
reservoirs involve cavities that occurred following dissolution of salt formations or 
nuclear blasts, however these techniques aside from storage in salt cavities, are not 
developed
175
. In favourable places, salt cavities can provide storage capacities of a few 
million m
3
 of hydrogen, while aquifer storage capacities can reach the order of 100 to 
1000 million cubic meters
176
. However, it must be noted that almost one third of the 
capacity is occupied by cushion gas which is inactive base gas that can not be used while 
the rest two thirds are useful working gas
177
. These methods have been utilised to store 
natural gas, helium and other gases for a few decades, thus much experience is gained 
with them
178
. Some of the examples include storage of natural gas in salt cavities by Gaz 
de France (1969), town gas (in Beynes, France, 1957-1974) and helium storage (in Texas 
since 1963) in aquifers, and hydrogen storage in salt cavities placed in the subsoil of a 
petrochemical plant in Teeside, UK, with a storage capacity of 2 million m
3
 H2 per 
cavity
179
.   
6.3.2. Liquid Hydrogen Storage 
Hydrogen can be stored as a liquid at cryogenic temperatures or in ammonia (NH3)
180
. 
Liquefaction of hydrogen takes place below the cryogenic temperatures (33 ºK or -243ºC) 
at 20ºK (-253ºC). Liquid hydrogen at these temperatures allows the storage at 
atmospheric pressures. Additionally, when liquefied increased mass enables hydrogen 
contain higher energy levels and this high energy density (72kg/m
3
) renders it more 
advantageous compared to gaseous hydrogen and other fuels
181
. To compare, 1 kg of 
liquid hydrogen contains 120 MJ approximately three times the energy of gasoline and 
diesel with 44 MJ
 182
.  Despite the advantages however storage at cryogenic temperatures 
is an energy intensive process and requires an approximate value of 30 to 40% of 
hydrogen energy content
183
. 
  
Today, the most common vessels to store liquid hydrogen are highly-insulated spherical 
tanks which are made up of three layers; steel or aluminium inner layer followed by 
vacuum and steel outer layer
184
. These containers are known as Dewar vessels with 
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various capacities ranging from a few litres to the maximum of 3,800 cubic meters, 
utilised by NASA on rocket launch sites
185
. Currently, smaller tanks are available; in 
France 360m
3
 tanks are utilised at the Ariane rocket launch site
186
. The size of vessel 
becomes an important issue when the evaporation (boil off) losses are concerned; the rate 
of hydrogen loss increases as the tank size decreases
187
. It has been reported that boil off 
losses from large tanks are less than 0.1% per day
188
, while the losses in transportation 
vehicles such as the prototypes produced by BMW amount to 1% per day
189
. In addition, 
high volume and weight of liquid hydrogen storage system due to required ancillary 
equipment and fixings make it difficult to utilise in passenger vehicles. Because of these 
shortcomings, liquid hydrogen is costly, however, it is still considered promising due to 
its high energy density. Today, a number of prototypes of liquid hydrogen vessels have 
been introduced; BMW has launched a liquid hydrogen fuelled internal combustion 
engine car and the Musashi Institute of Technology of Japan have introduced cars and 
vans working with LH2
190
, while a German gas supplier Linde has developed tanks 
suitable for hydrogen buses
191
.  
 
In addition to the liquefaction process, hydrogen can be stored in liquid intermediates 
such as ammonia (NH3) and methanol (CH3OH)
192
. The advantage of using such 
intermediates is the ability to convert them into hydrogen when it is needed and thus 
heavy bulk storage systems are not required. Ammonia is considered a promising storage 
medium due to its general availability and suitability with the existing distribution 
infrastructure
193
. This is mainly due to the experience gained with ammonia production 
for fertilisers and trials to use it in transport applications such as fuel for rocket 
engines
194
.  Ammonia can be cracked into hydrogen and nitrogen in the presence of a 
catalyst at temperatures above 700ºC
195
 onboard vehicles or in filling stations
196
. 
Methanol, another hydrogen containing compound can be used as a storage medium 
where hydrogen can be produced via steam reformation (CH3OH + H2 → CO2 + 3H2)
197
. 
Although use of methanol and steam reformation as a conversion method are mature, low 
efficiency of the overall system hinders utilisation of this compound as a storage 
medium; however, it has been reported that it can become feasible if fed to direct 
methanol fuel cells (DMFC) which are at the research stage
198
.  
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6.3.3. Solid State Hydrogen Storage 
Hydrogen can be stored at the solid state by forming compounds with some metals and 
alloys, named metal hydrides. The most common two techniques for storing hydrogen in 
metals are H2 gas phase charging (otherwise known as chemisorption) and electrolytic 
water splitting
199
. In the gas phase charging, molecular hydrogen is applied to the surface 
of the metal where it dissociates into atoms that are absorbed into the metal lattice 
forming metal hydride at moderate temperature and pressures (M (Metal) + x/2 H2 ↔ 
MHx)
200
. Hydrogen can be discharged from the metal hydride as heat is applied, which is 
usually the exhaust heat generated by the engine
201
.  Metal hydrides can also be formed 
by adsorbing the hydrogen on the metal which is generated by electrolytic water splitting 
(M + H2O + e
-
 ↔ MHx + x/2 OH
-
)
202
: 
 
Metal hydrides for hydrogen storage have been of interest to scientists for many years 
particularly because of their ability to demonstrate high volumetric hydrogen density
203
. 
Thus so many types of hydrides have been identified to have the capability to store 
hydrogen. Summarizing findings of two studies Yurum et al (1995)
204
 and IEA (2006)
205
, 
metal hydrides can be analysed under three headings: elemental hydrides, intermetallic 
compound hydrides and complex hydrides. Although, most of the metallic elements can 
form elemental hydrides, only a few of them are suitable for reversible hydrogen 
applications
206
 as their stability varies at acceptable temperatures of 0 to 100ºC; either 
extremely stable or unstable
207
. On the other hand, intermetallic compounds which are 
described as a combination of two metallic elements (AaBb); element A capable of 
forming stable (strong) hydride and element B forming unstable/weak hydrides, can form 
reversible hydrides under moderate temperatures
208
. There are different types of 
intermetallic compounds, although, properties of each one of them differ, generally, they 
demonstrate low gravimetric densities smaller than 2.5 wt% and suffer from high weights 
which does not create a problem for stationary storage, but surface as a major concern for 
storage onboard the vehicles
209
. While higher gravimetric densities can be achieved with 
some of the hydrides, increased temperatures for releasing hydrogen in these hydrides 
make them unsuitable for small transportation applications
210
. Finally, complex hydrides 
which can be broadly divided into two; transitional and non-transitional metal complex 
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hydrides, are considered promising as they can store more hydrogen per unit weight than 
conventional hydrides
211
. However, despite their higher gravimetric densities, more 
research on these hydrides is still required in order to increase their reversibility
212
. 
Recently, amongst the complex hydrides, non-transitional metal complex hydrides, 
particularly alanates [AlH4]
-
, amides [NH2]
-
 and borohydrides [BH4]
-
 have been favoured 
due to their light weights and comparatively higher gravimetric densities
213
. When 
hydrogen storage capacities are concerned borohydrides with maximum theoretical 
storage densities of 7.4 to 20.8 w% offer higher potential compared to alanates of which 
values range between 7.5 and 10.6 w%
214
. On the other hand, alanates require lower 
temperatures than brohydrides to release hydrogen, yet they still have a problem as 
dehydrogenation occurs in two steps
215
. 
 
To sum up, metal hydrides are considered promising and safer compared to other storage 
techniques due to high volumetric densities, low pressures and heat requirements as well 
as the solid state storage which hinders leakages and thus explosion dangers. While these 
advantages render solid-state storage suitable for both stationary and onboard storage, it 
also has disadvantages. The most important drawback with this method is the low 
gravimetric density which makes these options highly heavy (10 to 20 times more than a 
gasoline tank) and in turn limits driving range to 93 to 186 miles
216
. Though despite the 
disadvantages, Toyota has recently started to use hydrides for their fuel cell vehicles
217
 
while Daimler-Benz have been using it in their hydrogen vehicle programme since the 
1970s
218
.    
 
Another process for solid-state hydrogen storage is the utilisation of chemical hydrides. 
Mostly studied example is sodium borohydride (NaBH4) as it is easy to handle and 
contains high hydrogen levels compared to other hydrides such as NaH, LiH or 
NaAlH4
219
. Hydrogen stored in this hydride is produced as the hydride reacts with water 
in the presence of a catalyst in hydrolysis reaction (NaBH4 + 2 H2O → 4H2 + NaBO2)
220
. 
Even though hydrogen produced via this process is very pure and suitable for PEM fuel 
cells and for storing on-board vehicles, the high costs of sodium borohydride acts as a 
major drawback
221
. Recently Chrysler has used this system in its Town & Country 
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Natrium minivan
222
 while Samsung Engineering demonstrated a prototype fuel-cell 
scooter working with sodium borohydride
223
. 
 
Finally, hydrogen can also be stored at the solid state by the use of carbon based 
nanofibres. The foundation of carbon nanofibres was laid in 1985 with the invention of a 
new form of carbon (other than the known forms of diamond and graphite); a ball shaped 
molecule fullerene C60 and C70
224
, of which the diameter is approximately 0.7nm
225
 – 1 
nanometer equals to 10
-9
 meters. Since then research has focused on storing hydrogen on 
these fullerene-like nano scale structures. Currently, the emphasis has been drawn on 
exploring three types of nanofibres for hydrogen storage: graphite nanofibres, single-
walled and multi-walled carbon nanotubes.  
6.3.4. Hydrogen Storage Costs 
As shown in the previous sections, there are a number of storage options. However, due 
to their technical prospects, four storage techniques; gaseous storage – above and 
underground, liquid storage and solid storage (metal hydrides) are considered promising. 
Nevertheless, as economics plays a significant role in determining the choice of 
technologies, costs need to be analysed to provide an understanding of the possible 
transitional pathways. Therefore, in this section, factors effecting hydrogen storage costs 
are presented.  
6.3.4.1. Costs of Gaseous Hydrogen Storage 
Hydrogen storage as gas can mainly be divided into above and underground storage. As 
mentioned earlier, cylindrical tanks with pressures of around 350-700 bars are the most 
commercialised methods for above ground storage. When the capital costs are concerned, 
the costs of these tanks surface as the main contributor 40 to 80% of which come from 
material costs (different performance carbon fibres)
226
. The most important two factors 
that affect the tank costs and in turn the capital costs are pressure and storage times. 
Simbeck & Chang (2002) illustrate that hydrogen storage tanks operating at 140 
atmospheres cost 400 $/kg which rises to 2100$/kg for tanks working at 540 
atmospheres
227
. Currently, costs of the aforementioned 700 bars compressed gaseous 
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tanks utilised in buses are in the range of 2400$/kg and 3300$/kg, while the target is to 
decrease these costs to 67$/kg
228
. Similarly, longer storage times have an increasing 
impact on costs; for short-term storage, hydrogen price per GJ varies from $1.53 to $4.21, 
while it is between 7.35$ and 36.93$ for longer periods (Table 12 and Figure 2 in 
Appendix)
229
. In addition to capital costs, operational costs such as depreciation costs and 
energy requirements have an increasing impact on the overall costs of gaseous storage. 
However, these costs are minor compared to capital costs which amount to 76% of 
overall costs
230
. Though, it must be noted that, the overall costs benefit from economies 
of scale; increased hydrogen flow decreases tank and capital costs, and therefore total 
costs in return (Figure 1 in Appendix). 
  
Finally, when large quantities of hydrogen storage are concerned, underground cavities 
provide the most cost-effective method. As mentioned earlier these cavities can be rock 
caverns, salt cavern or depleted gas or oil cavities. Similar to above ground storage, the 
major contributor to the overall underground costs are the capital costs. According to IEA 
(2005)
231
 calculations for a cavern with one filling and extraction per year, capital costs; 
including cavern costs and cushion gas costs account for 84% of the total costs with 
almost 2.27$/GJ, while the total storage cost amount to some 2.7$/GJ. This figure falls in 
line with the findings of other studies which estimate the overall cost to vary between 1 
and 5 $/GJ (Table 12 in Appendix)
232
. However, it must be noted that these costs are 
sensitive to hydrogen flow and storage times. While increasing storage times increase the 
capital and the total costs, the overall costs benefit from economies of scale; increased 
hydrogen flow decreases capital costs and total costs in return.  
6.3.4.2. Costs of Liquid Hydrogen Storage 
As mentioned earlier, currently, the most effective way to store hydrogen as liquid is 
liquefaction. However, as it is an energy intensive process, energy becomes the highest 
contributor to the operating costs. Amos (1998) illustrates that more than 82% of the total 
costs are due to electricity requirements for liquefaction
233
. Though, Padro (1999)
234
 
argues that these costs can vary between 60% and 82% for 1 day storage and can 
decrease to 32% to 68% for 30 days storage. Where the capital costs are concerned, costs 
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of storage vessel and their size become an important issue due to evaporation (boil off) 
losses which increase as the tank size decreases. In addition to boil-off losses, increasing 
storage days raise the total storage costs (Figure 6 in Appendix). On the other hand, 
similar to the gaseous storage methods, liquid storage costs are sensitive to hydrogen 
flow; the costs reduce as the economies of scale are achieved (Figure 5 in Appendix). 
Padro & Putsche (1999) show that total storage cost is 17.12 $/GJ for a size of 131 GJ 
facility, while it falls down to 5.13 $/GJ for capacities of 20300GJ
235
. Yet, as shown in 
Figure 5 in Appendix electricity costs provide a limit and therefore overall costs are 
reduced until reaching electricity costs
236
.  
6.3.4.3. Costs of Solid Hydrogen Storage 
Hydrogen can be stored in the solid form as metal hydrides, carbon-based nano-fibers and 
chemical hydrides. Currently, the only detailed studies of the economics of solid storage 
have been conducted for metal hydrides. It must be noted that some studies for carbon-
based storage and chemical hydrides have been reported by Schwarz and Amankwah 
(1993)
237
, Newson et al (1998)
238
 and Berry (1996)
239
, however, due to their immaturity, 
these methods have not been discussed in this section. 
 
The economics of metal hydride storage show differences compared to gaseous and 
liquid storage mechanisms. This is mainly related to the capital costs which are 
dominated by the costs of hydride materials. Amos (1998) illustrates that around 33% of 
the total costs are operating costs whereas capital costs amount to 67% of the total 
storage costs
240
. Due to the dominance of material costs in capital costs, this method 
shows little sensitivity to hydrogen flows
241
. While they do not benefit from economies of 
scale; overall costs increase in parallel to storage days (Figures 11 and 12 in Appendix). 
As shown in Table 14 short term storage costs vary between 2.89$/GJ and 7.46$/GJ 
which increase to 205.31$/GJ for 30 days of storage.  
6.3.5. Comparison of Hydrogen Storage Options 
As discussed in the previous sections, a number of factors including hydrogen flow, 
storage time and energy requirements have impacts on the costs of hydrogen storage. 
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These costs are further altered depending on different circumstances such as the 
availability of different forms of energy, the geology and the method of delivery
242
. Due 
to these numerous parameters, choosing an option is difficult. However, as Amos (1998) 
demonstrates some generalisations can be made; for instance, both underground storage 
and liquid hydrogen are suitable for long-term storage and large quantities of gas, 
whereas compressed gas and metal hydrides are more appropriate for storing small 
quantities of hydrogen
243
. A broad comparison between the costs can also be made 
depending on the costs they add onto those of production. According to the calculations 
of Hawkins (2006b), added costs for underground storage (0.12-0.3$/kg) and compressed 
gas (0.15-1.6$/kg) are smaller compared to liquid hydrogen and metal hydrides which are 
in the range of 1-1.5$ and 0.4-4$ respectively
244
.   
6.4. Hydrogen Transportation and Distribution 
Hydrogen distribution is an essential step in creating a hydrogen energy system. Today, 
hydrogen can be distributed using the aforementioned storage mechanisms via roads, 
railways or sea. However, a distribution system based solely on storage mechanisms can 
not be relied upon; larger scale distribution systems such as pipelines need to be in place. 
Thus; if a hydrogen economy is to be established to the fullest extent, an effective 
distribution system including both delivery via the use of storage mechanisms and 
hydrogen distribution network are required. 
 
Where the transition to a hydrogen economy is concerned, amongst all the distribution 
technologies, delivering gaseous or liquid hydrogen via compressed trucks or the existing 
pipelines provide a short-term option. There are ongoing debates over the medium to long 
term distribution technologies, mainly because of the decisions that need to be made on 
the architectural design of the future hydrogen system. Depending on the design, 
distribution methods will differ; for centrally produced merchant hydrogen (hydrogen 
that is not produced and consumed on site but delivered to distant end-users
245
) a 
distribution pipeline network, hydrogen trucks, railcars and/or barges might be required, 
while for a distributed hydrogen system, local pipelines, liquid or gaseous hydrogen 
trucks would serve the purpose. The distribution methods can also vary according to 
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different applications such as transportation, household heating or combined heat and 
power. Finally, hydrogen demand and delivery distances will be critical factors for 
choosing the appropriate distribution method; Amos illustrates that for long distances, 
pipelines and liquid hydrogen trucks or barges are suitable, whereas for short distances 
trucks filled with gaseous hydrogen or metal hydrides would be cost effective. In the 
same study, pipelines are favoured for meeting high demands and for lower quantities 
required, compressed gas and metal hydrides are found to be cost effective.  
 
Depending on the demand, geographical conditions, applications and availability and 
maturity of technologies, each country or region will have their own roadmap. Below, the 
roadmaps of the US and Europe are presented; the US favours pipelines and storage 
mediums for an integrated centralised and distributed hydrogen energy system, whereas, 
the European strategy in the long run, is directed towards a more centralised system 
where pipeline networks play a greater role.   
 
Figure 7: Transitional pathways for hydrogen delivery, US 
Source: US Department of Energy, (February, 2002), A National Vision of America’s Transition to a 
Hydrogen Economy to 2030 and Beyond 
 
 
Figure 8: Transitional pathways for hydrogen delivery, EU 
Source: European Commission, (2003), Hydrogen Energy and Fuel Cells: A vision of our future, 
available (online): http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/cut_en.html  
Clusters of local 
hydrogen 
distribution grids 
Local clusters 
of hydrogen 
filling stations   
Widespread hydrogen pipeline infrastructure 
Inter-connection 
of local hydrogen 
distribution grids 
 
2010 2020 2030 2040 
Distribution 
Technologies 
2010 2020 2030 2040 
Distribution 
Technologies 
Pipelines, 
Trucks, rail, barges 
Onsite „distributed‟ facilities Integrated central-
distributed networks 
 292 
6.4.1. Hydrogen Distribution via Storage Mechanisms 
Currently, hydrogen in solid, liquid or gaseous state is delivered via storage mechanisms. 
Gaseous hydrogen is mainly distributed by the use of compression cylinders mounted on 
trucks or tube trailers. Amos (1998) reports that these cylinders can store 1.8 kg hydrogen 
at 40 MPa (400 bars), while the capacity of tube trailers made up of several of these 
cylinders range between 63 and 460 kg, operating at pressures of around 20 to 60 MPa
246
. 
However, hydrogen amounts to only 2 to 4% of the overall weight of the vessel and thus 
creates a problem
247
.  
 
Liquid hydrogen, on the other hand, can be delivered via highly-insulated spherical tanks 
placed on trucks or railroad wagons
248
. Liquid hydrogen distribution provides a higher 
delivery capacity compared to gaseous hydrogen; while tank trucks can transport 360 to 
4300 kg of hydrogen, railcars can be loaded up to 2300-9100 kg of liquid hydrogen
249
. It 
must be noted that both gaseous and liquid hydrogen are suitable for small to medium 
volumes of hydrogen distribution, when higher amounts of hydrogen are required, 
delivering it by barges or ocean tankers across the sea or transporting it via aircrafts are 
considered as alternative options
250
. Barges are designed based on the principles applied 
to liquefied natural gas and it has been reported that each barge can hold 21,200 kg of 
hydrogen with no boil-off for a 50 days trip
251
. Currently, NASA has three barges for 
their space programme, while the Euro Quebec Hydro Hydrogen Pilot Project is 
searching for possibilities of using these vessels for long distance transportation across 
the oceans
252
. Transporting LH2 by air is yet considered for fast delivery to avoid boil-off 
losses
253
. Despite their advantages, the last two options for LH2 delivery are at the R&D 
stage and thus further work needs to be conducted for them to be commercialised. 
Finally, metal hydrides provide an option for distributing hydrogen at the solid state.  
After storing hydrogen as metal hydrides, they are placed in the containers which can be 
loaded onto a truck, railcar or a ship to be carried to the point of use
254
. This is a 
completely a safe method as low pressures and temperatures are required and due to solid 
form there is no possibility of spillage.  
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Summarising the three methods, it can be concluded that, gaseous and solid hydrogen 
distribution provide a low-volume supply over short distances, while liquid hydrogen is 
more suitable for relatively larger volumes over longer distances. 
6.4.2. Hydrogen Distribution via Pipelines 
Currently, all the studies estimate that ultimately hydrogen energy will be delivered in the 
gaseous form in pipelines imitating the current natural gas distribution network in order 
to achieve economies of scale. Hydrogen can be distributed in these pipelines broadly in 
two ways; as solely hydrogen gas or a natural gas blend containing up to 15% of 
hydrogen gas in natural gas pipelines or hydrogen gas in newly built hydrogen 
pipelines
255
. In the early stages of a transition to hydrogen energy systems, the existing 
natural gas pipelines can provide a cost-effective solution to high volume hydrogen gas 
distribution. However, as hydrogen has different properties than natural gas, the existing 
pipelines will require modifications if they are to distribute hydrogen. The two major 
problems are hydrogen embrittlement of steel pipelines or welds possibly leading to 
internal cracking
256
 and higher insulation requirements due to very small size of 
hydrogen; leakage of hydrogen gas through cracks or corrosion pinholes is 2 to 3 times 
higher compared to natural gas
257
. Yet, these problems mainly occur when pure hydrogen 
is concerned, for a mixture of gases no modifications may be needed. On the other hand, 
new hydrogen pipelines are not so different from the local low pressure natural gas 
distribution lines; they are built out of steel, operating at pressures of around 10 to 20 
bars – local natural gas pipelines work at lower pressures of around 2 bars258, with 
hydrogen flows of 310-8900 kg/hr
259
. However, the difference is that in order to achieve 
the same energy output of a natural gas pipeline, hydrogen pipelines need to be larger in 
diameter due to higher volumetric density of natural gas which is approximately four 
times that of hydrogen
260
. Therefore, the investment costs of hydrogen pipelines will be 
higher compared to the cost of natural gas pipelines
261
. Despite the costs, hydrogen 
pipelines have been available since the late 1930s; the oldest one running 210 km was 
built in Germany (1938), while the longest one at 400km runs between Northern France 
and Belgium
262
. Currently, in the UK, the available pipelines linking production plants 
and heavy industry are located in Teesside and in Port Talbot, Wales
263
. However, they 
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are far too short to make a hydrogen economy a reality. An estimation of the size of 
overall hydrogen pipeline infrastructure required, a brief look at the current pipeline 
network is useful. Today the total length of natural gas pipelines is approximately 
270,000km in the UK, accessed by more than 95% of the population
264
. Thus, meeting 
such demand via hydrogen will require huge investment in the infrastructure and 
therefore, during the evolution of hydrogen energy systems, the use of the natural gas 
pipelines for high volume hydrogen distribution is the preferred option.  
6.4.3. Hydrogen Refuelling Stations 
A full hydrogen distribution system can not be envisaged without considering the 
facilities to refuel hydrogen vehicles. If hydrogen buses or cars are to be commercialised, 
one of the very first concerns of the users will be the filling stations required. Today, due 
to the existing, well-developed hydrocarbon infrastructure, many developers of hydrogen 
fuelled vehicles are in favour of on-board fuel processing option which produce hydrogen 
onboard the vehicle from fossil-fuels such as methanol or gasoline and can be used in 
fuel cells
265
. However, such utilisation complicates the fuel cell design, involves 
emissions due to hydrocarbon utilisation and increases the cost of vehicles
266
. It was 
reported that in 2006, there were about 100 hydrogen refuelling stations built; 90% of 
which were gaseous hydrogen stations
267
. In the UK, the first hydrogen refuelling station 
was opened by BP, at Hornchurch, Essex, in 2005, which used underground liquid 
hydrogen storage
268
.  
 
Currently, there are two designs for refuelling stations; hydrogen produced on-site 
(distributed) the station via SMR, POX or electrolysis and hydrogen delivered to station 
via centralised production. Typical elements of a refuelling station with on-site hydrogen 
production involve hydrogen production, purification and compression, storage and 
hydrogen dispenser
269
. While these stations can be used for dispensing hydrogen to 
vehicles, they can also be used for generating electricity from hydrogen using fuel cells. 
Forsberg et al. (2006)
270
, presents a fuelling station based on methane production where 
hydrogen is produced from methane on-site or via electricity from grid, dispensed to 
vehicles or converted back to electricity to be supplied to a grid (Figure 36). However, if 
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these stations are to benefit from the current climate change regulations they need to 
focus on designs that will allow for the integration of renewable energy technologies for 
transport applications
271
.  
  
 
Figure 9: Multi-functional refuelling stations 
Source: Forsberg P. and Karlstrom M. (May 2006) 
6.4.4. Hydrogen Distribution via Electricity 
Hydrogen can be distributed to consumers in the form of electricity. It was mentioned 
earlier that hydrogen can be produced via electrolysis of which electricity input can come 
from renewable energy technologies. Reversely, fuel cells can convert this hydrogen back 
to electricity which can be distributed by the national grid. However, due to the number 
of steps involved the DTI (2005)
272
 illustrates that this pathway has a low system 
efficiency (20-35%, at best 50%
273
) compared to efficiencies of 70-80% of other systems 
using electric batteries and suffer from higher costs. Nevertheless despite the drawbacks, 
this path of distribution is considered promising as it can provide a solution to the 
intermittent character of renewable electricity generation and improve their integration 
with the national grid. 
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6.4.5. Hydrogen Transportation and Distribution Costs 
6.4.5.1. Costs of Hydrogen Distribution via Storage Mechanisms 
As mentioned earlier, hydrogen can be distributed via storage mechanisms. Gaseous 
hydrogen can be transported via trucks or tube trailers. Depending on the distance 
travelled and the amount of hydrogen carried, distribution costs of gaseous hydrogen via 
trucks and rail can change between 4.7$/GJ to 79.7$/GJ and 20.73$/GJ to 24.77$/GJ 
respectively (Table 15)
274
. While the capital costs depend on distance travelled and vessel 
capacity, operating costs are mainly dominated by fuel and labour costs
275
. At a given 
hydrogen flow, total costs of truck delivery increase in parallel to distance travelled 
whereas overall costs of railway distribution are not affected by distances (Figure 9 in 
Appendix). On the other hand, both of the options are insensitive to hydrogen flow rates 
and therefore do not benefit from economies of scale (Figure 10 in Appendix).  
 
Liquid hydrogen can be transported via trucks, rails or ships. As Padro (1999) illustrates 
distribution costs of liquid hydrogen via rail is the most cost effective with a range of 
0.25-2.14$/GJ followed by truck and ship delivery with ranges of 0.24-4.7$/GJ and 
13.34-15.44$/GJ respectively (Table 16 in Appendix)
276
. While the overall transportation 
costs increase in line with the distances travelled, they are not sensitive to the distributed 
amounts and thus do not benefit from economies of scale (Figures 11 and 12 in 
Appendix). The overall costs include the vessel costs which involve fuel, labour and boil-
off costs. Although, the liquefaction costs are considered in the storage section, it is 
important to note that potential reductions in these processes have positive impacts on the 
distribution costs. For instance, the IEA (2005) estimates that truck distribution of 1000 
kg of liquid hydrogen, which costs 2.5$/GJ, can decline to 0.5$/GJ for plane refuelling 
and to 2$/GJ for cars in year 2030 mainly due to projected decreases in liquefaction 
investment costs and electricity prices
277
. 
  
Finally, solid state hydrogen in the form of metal hydrides can be distributed by trucks, or 
rails. Similar to gaseous hydrogen, distribution of metal hydrides is more expensive 
compared to liquid hydrogen. While the cost of distributing it via rail can change between 
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20.73-24.77$/GJ, transportation via trucks is more expensive which is in the range of 
4.7$/GJ to 79.7$/GJ (Table 17 in Appendix)
278
. As mentioned earlier, metal hydrides as a 
storage medium is not sensitive to hydrogen flow rates but are mainly dominated by the 
hydride cost itself, and thus the distribution of such hydrogen does not benefit from 
economies of scale. As a result the delivery costs via trucks are only sensitive to 
distances; costs are higher for longer distances – it must be noted that railway distribution 
is only sensitive to distances when they are very long (Figure 13 in Appendix). However, 
where there are more trucks or railcars required and therefore larger amount of hydrogen 
is distributed total costs increase in relation (Figures 14 and 15)
279
.  
6.4.5.2. Costs of Hydrogen Distribution via Pipelines 
When large amounts of hydrogen distribution are concerned, pipelines provide the most 
cost-effective method. As hydrogen pipelines are studied in the main based on the 
experiences with natural gas pipelines, the costs for hydrogen are estimated in the same 
manner.  The literature suggests that the pipeline costs are mainly dominated by the costs 
for installation
280
 and this varies depending on the diameter of the pipeline
281
. Showing 
the impacts of diameter on the costs, Padro (1999) illustrates that a 4-inch natural gas 
pipeline costs some 100,000$/mile whereas a 42-inch would amount to some 1.5 million 
$/mile
282
. Similarly, IEA (2005) states that achieving same energy capacity from a 
hydrogen pipeline would require twice the diameter and higher pressures which would 
render the costs of hydrogen pipelines to be six times higher than that of their natural gas 
counterparts
283
. However, this prediction is high compared to the findings of other 
studies; Ogden (1999)
284
 estimates the total costs of hydrogen pipelines is between 1.5 to 
3 times the natural gas pipeline costs and Pottier (1995) calculates a figure of 1.8. On the 
other hand, Oney et al. (1994) argue that changing the pressure of hydrogen production 
from atmospheric pressure to 0.65 MPa, the same transmission costs can be achieved for 
both hydrogen and natural gas; at a distance of 500 km and delivery rate of 1.0 GW
285
. 
As shown in Table 18, costs of hydrogen transmission via pipelines can change between 
0.49 and 17.41$/GJ
286
. While these costs increase in line with the distances, they decrease 
with rising hydrogen flow, that is, a higher pipeline capacity (Figures 16-17 in 
Appendix).  
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As mentioned earlier during the transition period, natural gas pipelines can be used, but to 
be fully effective new hydrogen pipelines are required which are costly. In order to show 
the extent of the investment required, the IEA (2005) estimates some 0.2 million $/km for 
construction of the main pipelines – for service pipelines the figure is some 1900 $/km287. 
In this case, to construct hydrogen pipelines as long as the natural gas pipelines in the 
UK, the investment required would amount to some $54 billion for 270,000km of 
pipelines, excluding the investment for service pipelines. However, in Ogden (1999), it is 
suggested that the costs can be reduced by using different distribution structures for 
different end-use applications. While hydrogen produced centrally and distributed via the 
pipelines to refuelling stations could be appropriate for transport applications, for 
household heating and combined heat and power applications, hydrogen or hydrogen-
natural gas mixtures delivered in the existing natural gas pipelines could provide a 
solution to high investment costs
288
.  
6.5. Hydrogen Pathways 
In the previous sections, hydrogen production, storage, distribution and conversion 
technologies and their related costs have been discussed. However, how all these can be 
linked to form a hydrogen energy system has not yet been illustrated. In the literature, the 
structure of hydrogen energy systems has been discussed under the headings of 
architectural design or hydrogen pathways; which are divided into centralised generation 
and distribution, and distributed (onsite) hydrogen production. 
 
An example of a distributed generation infrastructure has been described in the section of 
hydrogen refuelling stations. However, it must be noted that, a distributed system does 
not necessarily imply solely generation being on-site refuelling stations but it also covers 
off-grid stationary power generation sites close to demand. Depending on the resources 
chosen, fuel reformers and/or electrolysers
289
 fed by renewable and/or grid electricity can 
be utilised. As these systems are established either on-site or close to demand, they do not 
require transportation and distribution networks. Furthermore, because distributed 
generation is considered for remote areas or local regions, the production capacities will 
be smaller because of lower demand. On one hand, this type of hydrogen generation can 
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be cost effective since existing resources and infrastructure such as natural gas, water and 
electricity can be used and the costs of distribution can be avoided. On the other hand, 
because of its small scale, such production costs cannot benefit from economies of scale 
and additional CCS technologies required for carbon cleaning may not be feasible and/or 
highly expensive for such volumes
290
. Despite the disadvantages, distributed hydrogen 
generation can provide a solution to the high investment costs of building infrastructure 
in the short term during the transition period. 
 
A centralised pathway, which can be defined as hydrogen generation close to the 
resources and delivered to the users via distribution mechanisms, is advantageous as it 
can use a diverse range of resources and generates large volumes of hydrogen, enabling 
economies of scale. However, in order to generate zero emission hydrogen, where fossil 
fuels or grid electricity are used it is essential to apply CCS technologies which represent 
a major challenge, both because of the additional costs and also due to the unproven state 
of these technologies
291
.   Furthermore, despite the low unit costs, the initial investment 
costs are very high and a very expensive distribution infrastructure is required.  
 
As hydrogen can be produced from variety of feedstock, and stored and distributed via 
number of technologies, different combinations of both distributed and centralised 
hydrogen systems can be considered. Simbeck and Chang (2002)
292
 and Ogden et al. 
(1999)
293
 illustrate some possible pathways based on existing technological capacity and 
associated costs for distributed and centralised hydrogen systems. In the report by 
Simbeck and Chang (2002), costs of distributed generation are found to be higher than 
that of centrally produced hydrogen; with values of 4.53-12.12 $/kg and 1.00-6.17 $/kg 
respectively. These figures are represented in tables 19 and 20 in Appendix. 
6.6. Hydrogen Conversion Technologies & End-Uses 
As shown in the previous sections, currently with the available technologies, it is 
technically feasible to build a hydrogen infrastructure. Also as discussed, the costs of 
hydrogen can be reduced as most of the processes benefit from economies of scale. 
However, both the large scale production and construction of the infrastructure will 
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depend on the volume of demand. On the other hand, unless the infrastructure is in place 
or the costs of hydrogen technologies are reduced, demand will be restricted. This 
„chicken and egg‟ problem provides the main barrier against the transition to a hydrogen 
economy. However, recent developments in the end-use technologies such as fuel cells 
and the increasing number of demonstrations in recent years which have allowed their 
penetration into different markets such as power and transportation, have initiated 
solutions to this problem.  
 
For instance, onboard reformation of hydrogen from hydrocarbons has provided an 
interim solution to commercialising FC vehicles before the hydrogen supply 
infrastructure is put in place
294
. Some of the fuel cells which have been tried on stationary 
applications have proven their technical feasibility and have moved to the early 
commercialisation stage. Although, most of these demonstrations have been financed by 
government funds, they have allowed learning processes to take place which in turn has 
led to their increasing adoption. In other words, „technology push‟ created via these 
niches has started to generate demand. However, if a transition to a hydrogen economy is 
to take place via the development of these end-use technologies, they need to gain a 
significant market share which can only occur if further technological improvements and 
cost reductions are achieved. Thus, in the following sections, hydrogen end-use 
technologies including, fuel cells, internal combustion engines and gas turbines, their 
technological status, learning prospects, R&D needs and the evolution of demand since 
their introduction are analysed to provide an understanding of their role in adoption of 
hydrogen as an energy carrier.   
6.6.1. Fuel Cells 
Although the fuel cell was invented more than 150 years ago, in 1839 by W. R. Grove, 
due to lack of knowledge on electro-magnetics and introduction of electro-dynamic 
generators, internal combustion engines and gas turbines to the market in the late 19
th
 and 
early 20
th
 centuries, this technology was left under-developed
295
. However, the energy 
crisis of the 1970s and more recent concerns over climate change and fluctuations of oil 
prices spurred interest in alternative energy systems and fuel cells. Fuel cells are favoured 
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because of their high conversion efficiency levels and their suitability to power a variety 
of applications such as transportation, stationary and portable devices.    
 
A fuel cell can be defined as a device that converts chemical energy of fuels into electric 
energy and heat in an electrochemical reaction. Simply, the total reaction taking place is 
the combustion of hydrogen (2H2 + O2 → 2H2O)
296
. However, despite the similarities, 
fuel cells differ from conventional power plants or combustion engines. The difference is 
that in combustion engines, fuel is burnt to produce heat which is converted into 
mechanical energy and subsequently into electric energy, whereas in fuel cells these steps 
are not required, rather electric energy is generated directly from combustion of hydrogen 
in an electro-chemical reaction
297
. Due to the reduced number of steps, the electrical 
efficiency of a fuel cell, which can reach 70%, is higher than the conventional power 
generation technologies (45-50%)
298
.  
 
Although the reactions that produce electricity via hydrogen and oxygen differ depending 
on the type of fuel cell, the working principle of a fuel cell (acid electrolyte) can be 
described based on two reactions; oxidation of H2 at the anode and formation of H2O at 
the cathode. When hydrogen fuel is supplied to the fuel cell, it is oxidised into hydrogen 
ions releasing electrons; while the ions flow through the electrolyte to produce water with 
the oxygen at the cathode, electrons are passed through an external electric circuit 
generating electricity (Figure 18 in Appendix)
299
. Although, electricity can be generated 
by a single cell, the output will amount to some 0.7 Volts, thus, to achieve a higher 
outcome, these cells are combined together in series, named fuel cell stacks
300
. However, 
due to possible voltage drops with this connection, a better method of interconnection, 
“bipolar plates”, which connect the overall surface of the electrodes allowing a more 
efficient electric current passage, can be used
301
. These plates are also stacked together to 
form the overall „fuel cell sub-system‟302. Nevertheless, for a fuel cell system to be 
complete these stacks/subsystems need to be supported generally by three modules; a fuel 
processing module, power conversion and conditioning module and thermal management 
module
303
.  
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Initially fuel is supplied to the fuel cell which can take the form of pure hydrogen or other 
fuels carrying hydrogen
304
. Today, a variety of fuels including natural gas, biogases, 
syngas and others such as methanol and ethanol can be used in fuel cells directly or 
indirectly after going through processing such as reforming or gas cleaning (Table 21 in 
Appendix)
305
. However, pure hydrogen is mainly favoured due to higher electrical 
efficiency levels achieved compared to other fuels. For instance, converting high-purity 
hydrogen in a PEMFC can reach electrical efficiencies of around 50% while it drops to 
35% and 30% with the supply of natural gas and methanol, respectively
306
. Once the fuel 
is processed, it is supplied to fuel cell stack where it is converted to electric current in the 
DC form
307
. Since most of the electric and electronic equipment work with AC, the 
electric current also needs to be converted from DC to AC. Furthermore, inverters are 
required to convert DC to single or three-phase AC systems which will vary depending 
on the application; while single-phase supply will be suitable for small CHP systems and 
domestic appliances, for larger scale systems such as grid and industrial CHP, three-
phase AC inverters are needed
308
. In addition to electrical output, the other product of 
fuel cells; heat, needs to be controlled as overheating can decrease cell performance and 
result in varied voltage outputs
309
. Different devices are used to meet the cooling 
requirements depending on the size, application and type of the fuel cells. Considering 
the applications; heat exchangers for releasing heat are favoured for CHP applications 
and fans and radiators are utilised for vehicles
310
. 
 
To sum up, a fuel cell system consists of three main sub-systems; fuel processing, power 
conversion and conditioning and thermal management. Hydrogen is produced and refined 
in the fuel processing subsystem and then converted into electricity in the power related 
modules. Electricity is in turn regulated and supplied to a variety of applications such as 
power for grid, industry, domestic appliances and transport applications. However, as 
discussed in the following section, different types of fuel cells have been developed to 
meet the requirements of various applications.  
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6.6.1.1. Fuel Cell Types 
Fuel cells can be categorised based on different criteria; the most common of these are 
working temperature, fuels and electrolytes employed. Today mainly five types of fuel 
cells are being developed; PEMFC and AFC as low temperature, PAFC as medium 
temperature and MCFC and SOFC as high temperature fuel cells. The Worldwide Survey 
(2006)
311
 illustrate that amongst these types, PEMFC has been identified as the key 
technology focus by almost half of the industry, followed by solid oxide and direct 
methanol fuel cells employed by 14% and 9% respectively (Figure 19 in Appendix). 
  
Polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cell (PEMFC) was first introduced by General 
Electric in the 1960s and used by NASA to provide power for the Gemini space 
project
312
. It is now considered the most promising fuel cell type
313
. These cells use a 
very thin solid polymer membrane electrolyte made up of Teflon™ like material 
characteristics of which allow a very good separation of hydrogen fuel and air, increasing 
the operational efficiency
314
. The PEMFC runs at low temperatures of around 80ºC and 
as reaching this temperature to start operation requires little time; these cells benefit from 
the advantage of quick start-up
315
.  Furthermore, they have the highest power density 
(power-to-volume ratio) of around 300 to 1000 mW/cm
2 
amongst all the fuel cells
316
. Due 
to their high power density and rapid start-up, PEMFCs are mainly favoured for transport 
and portable power applications
317
 but are also applicable to low power CHP systems
318
. 
Despite these advantages, however, low operating temperatures, which result in very 
slow reactions, necessitate effective catalysts (such as platinum)
319
. As platinum is 
sensitive to CO, in order to avoid catalyst poisoning; extremely pure hydrogen must be 
supplied to such cells
320
. However, in a direct methanol fuel cell (DMFC), a different 
type of PEMFC using solid polymer membranes and Pt catalysts, methanol, rather than 
pure hydrogen can be used
321
. Nevertheless, this technology although benefits from 
cheaper fuel utilisation, has very low efficiency levels compared to other fuel cells and 
thus requires further R&D efforts
322
. 
  
Alkaline fuel cells are one of the most developed fuel cells and were the first to be 
applied; they provided electrical energy and drinking water to space missions, including 
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the US Space Shuttle
323
.  The AFCs use potassium hydroxide solution as an electrolyte 
and run at low temperatures of around 60 to 120ºC allowing them to benefit from quick 
start-up times as PEM fuel cells
324
. They do not require high noble-catalysts such as 
platinum which provide them with the advantage of low costs that are further lowered 
due to the very cheap electrolytes utilised
325
.  However, despite the advantage of costs 
related to these electrolytes, they suffer from high sensitivity to CO and CO2, which 
hinder the utilisation of air and decrease their efficiency
326
. In order to overcome this 
problem, extremely pure H2 and O2 are required, adding significantly on the overall costs 
of this type of fuel cells.  
 
The phosphoric acid fuel cells (PAFC) are the most commercialised fuel cell types in use. 
Phosphoric acid fuel cells use water-free phosphoric acid gel as an electrolyte
327
. 
However, as this acid is found at the solid state at 42°C, fuel cells employing such 
electrolytes need to operate at higher temperatures of around 150 to 200°C
328
. These fuel 
cells also use Pt catalysts but are less sensitive to CO poisoning compared to alkaline and 
PEM fuel cells
329
.  Therefore, they can work on less pure hydrogen and some other 
hydrocarbons
330
. Although electrical efficiency levels are lower of around 40%, due to 
high temperatures employed, these cells can achieve 85% efficiency
331
 by using both the 
heat and electrical outcome in combined heat and power systems. The PAFC systems 
have already been tried in a number of stationary applications including hospitals, 
nurseries and hotels and new power plants with capacities of 50-200 kW and 1-5 MW 
have been constructed
332
. The trials ran for a long time to gain experience and prove the 
technical feasibility of these cells which led to increases in the number of applications
333
. 
However, as Ellis (2001) points out, for the economic feasibility to be achieved, 
associated costs need to be cut down by a factor of three
 334
.  
 
Molten carbonate fuel cells (MCFC) are high temperature fuel cells of around 650°C and 
use alkaline carbonates (i.e. Li2CO3, K2CO3) as electrolytes
335
. Unlike the low and 
medium temperature fuel cells, these cells can use catalysts such as Ni, rather than Pt due 
to high temperatures allowing high reaction rates
336
. An additional advantage of the high 
temperatures is that they enable fuel reforming within the stack via internal reforming 
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process which allows the use of different fuels such as hydrogen, natural gas and 
biogases without external equipment required
337
. Finally, such temperatures provide these 
cells with the ability to tolerate impurities such as CO, which can in fact be used as a 
fuel
338
 for the cell after going through aforementioned water-gas shift reactions. The 
utilisation of cost-effective catalysts and the absence of external reforming result in 
reduced costs. However, despite many advantages provided by the high temperatures, 
they reduce the cell life and durability
339
. These fuel cells are suitable for stationary 
power applications with fossil fuels (natural gas or coal based power plants) and for CHP 
applications
340
. When used for CHP systems, their efficiency can reach some 90%, while 
their electrical efficiency is around 50%
341
. 
 
Solid oxide fuel cells (SOFC) employ ceramic solid electrolytes and operate at even 
higher temperatures than molten carbonate cells (800-1000ºC)
342
. Operating at high 
temperatures, these fuel cells, like MCFC, also benefit from employing cheap catalysts, 
utilisation of different fuels due to internal reforming and high resistance to impurities. 
However, these temperatures decrease the durability of materials and cause slow start-up 
times which make them unsuitable for transport applications
343
. On the other hand where 
the stationary applications are concerned, they have proven to be very efficient like their 
molten carbonate counterparts. Their efficiency can reach some 90%, while their 
electrical efficiency is around 50%
344
. 
 
To sum up, different types of fuel cells have been developed. Depending on their 
characteristics such as operating temperatures and power density these cells are 
applicable to various applications. Also based on their tolerance to impurities, they can 
run on different types of fuels with or without a reformer. The characteristics and 
applications of different types of fuel cells are summarised in Table 22 in Appendix.  
6.6.1.2. Fuel Cell Applications; Costs & Learning Effects 
Today, fuel cells are being applied to several sectors of the economy; mostly used for 
buses, some light duty-vehicles and combined heat and power generation systems. 
However, recent improvements in this industry have proven that these conversion 
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technologies can be developed for powering many other applications such as boats, 
scooters, wheel-chairs, and laptops. In the following sections, the most common 
applications being road transport and the power and heat sector are analysed. 
6.6.1.2.1. Transportation Applications 
Fuel cells are favoured for transport applications due to their higher efficiency levels, 
ability to use wide range of fuels and contribution to CO2 reductions. If the transportation 
industry is analysed depending on the vehicles, three subsections can be illustrated; light-
duty vehicles, buses and specialty vehicles such as boats, yachts, scooters, wheelchairs 
and utility vehicles
345
. As mentioned earlier, due to their high power density, rapid start-
up times, the most suitable fuel cells for transportation are PEM fuel cells. However, it is 
noted by Crawley (2007)
346
 that in 2006 SOFC and PAFC were also introduced for 
utilisation in light duty vehicles, although the PEMFC still dominates this market. The 
situation is not much different for buses. Almost all the FC buses employ PEM fuel cells 
with outputs ranging from 70 kW to 200 kW
347
.  
 
The FC buses were the first to be tested on the roads as their operational requirements are 
less restrictive compared to light duty vehicles. Fuel cells applied to buses require lower 
power-to-weight and volume ratios because of larger spaces. The performance 
requirements of FC buses are easier to predict and meet as they run on defined routes and 
finally, refuelling is less complicated as the buses end their routes in central stations or 
depots where they will be fuelled centrally
348
. Due to these advantages, a number of 
demonstration programmes have been conducted in different regions of the world. The 
largest of these was the Clean Urban Transportation for Europe (CUTE) project, which 
started in 2003 and operated with 27 Fuel Cell Citaro buses in public transport of nine 
European cities; Amsterdam, Barcelona, Hamburg, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Porto, 
Stockholm and Stuttgart
349
. In addition, ECTOS (Ecological City Transport System) 
programme provided Iceland public transport with 9 FC buses, while in Perth, 3 Daimler-
Chrysler buses were tested under STEP (Sustainable Transport Energy Project) 
initiative
350
. Upon completion, a follow-up project that brought together these three 
programmes has been initiated; namely, HyFLEET: CUTE project involves the operation 
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of 47 buses (both FC and ICE) in 10 cities
351
. There are a number of other projects 
running in other parts of the world such as in the US, Japan, Canada, China, India, Brazil 
and Mexico. Recently, so many other projects have been announced, the most striking of 
these is the BVG of Berlin which is preparing to order 250 hydrogen buses that will 
amount to 2% of the whole bus fleet of the city
352
. As of 2008, the total number of buses 
produced was around 115 (Figure 20 in Appendix)
353
. Although, this number is more 
than three times the amount produced up to 2002, it is still a very low number to achieve 
the necessary economies of scale. For FC buses to become cost-competitive with the 
existing technologies, their market penetration needs to be significantly higher than the 
current levels. As Jerram (2008) demonstrates, fuel cell producers argue that the 
production of 1000 buses, which amounts to 2% of the annual bus demand, is required to 
make major cost reductions
354
.  
 
While the low volume of demand for buses (50,000/pa) acts as a barrier against 
increasing the volume of FC bus production, it does not create a major problem for light 
duty vehicles as demand for which amount to some 46 million a year
355
. Increasing 
landscape pressures combined with the realisation of this potential and experience gained 
with FC buses has encouraged investment in FC vehicles and has even led to an early 
competition between auto-makers. Many of the major car and other utility vehicle 
manufacturers have launched prototypes of passenger cars, motorcycles, scooters and 
other specialty and utility vehicles. As of 2008, the cumulative number of FC vehicles 
was around 1300 which was twice the amount of 2006 (Figure 21 in Appendix)
356
.  
 
However, despite the progress over the years and the announcements of new launches of 
new fleets, FC cars are still far from commercialisation. If these vehicles are to be 
adopted, they will need to compete against the incumbent internal combustion engine 
vehicles (ICEV) and the key factor will be the cost-competitiveness. According to the 
IEA (2005) calculations, a single FC vehicle costs around 167,000 $
357
. This overall cost 
involves the cost of fuel cell stack, hydrogen storage, electric engine, the reformer for 
vehicles using fuels other than hydrogen and the battery for hybrid vehicles
358
. Although 
the cost of the fuel cell stack (generally the manually produced PEM fuel cell stack) 
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dominates the overall cost with around 1800 $/kW ($144,000), the IEA (2005) 
demonstrates that they can be reduced to 100 $/kW if the membranes, bipolar plates, 
catalysts and fuel cell stacks are mass produced
359
. In addition, the development of new 
materials for membranes and an increase in power density from 2kW/m
2
 to 3kW/m
2
 are 
required to achieve this reduction
360
. Similarly, technological learning and large-scale 
production is expected to reduce the costs of other components of the FC vehicles; for 
instance, the cost of hydrogen storage system is estimated to fall from 1000$/kg to 
500$/kg in the pessimistic scenario and to 275$/kg in the optimistic scenario of the IEA 
(2005)
361
. All these learning processes in turn translate into reductions in the costs of the 
FC vehicles which are projected to decline to between $21,950 and $27,075 by 2030. 
Although the literature suggests a wider range between $15,000 and $36,000, studies 
agree that this range is only achievable with large scale production of at least 500,000 
units
362
. There is also consensus amongst the studies that even with the optimistic 
learning rates the FCV will still be more expensive compared to ICEV, for instance IEA 
(2005) suggest that the FCV will be $2200 to $7,625 more expensive than its ICE 
counterparts in 2030
363
, whereas the estimates of the EC (2007) demonstrate that the 
incremental costs of FCV over ICEV can be in the range of 11,663€ and 24,335€364.   
While cost-competitiveness is the key factor that will affect the deployment of FC 
vehicles, there are also non-cost related factors. As discussed in the previous chapters, 
recent landscape developments including security of supply and climate change issues 
have been pressurising the transport sector to make substantial changes. Under these 
circumstances, transport technologies that allow for the switching of fuels other than oil 
and vehicles with higher fuel efficiency and lower GHG emissions will have a 
competitive advantage. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7, the FCV offers 
not only savings in petroleum and fossil energy consumption but also significant 
reductions in GHG emissions.   
6.6.1.2.2. Stationary Applications 
In order to provide a better understanding of the fuel cell stationary applications, it is 
important to give a brief insight into the current conventional technologies utilised to 
generate power and heat. In the past, power stations were only considered for generating 
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electricity; for this purpose, coal, oil, natural gas fired-steam turbine power plants, gas-
turbine power plants and nuclear plants have been developed. Later on, with the 
increasing demand for electricity, boosting the efficiency of these power plants became 
crucial, for this purpose, combinations of these technologies are designed.  Power plants 
which use a combination of steam turbines and gas turbines where the waste heat of gas-
turbine is supplied to a steam turbine, named combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) have 
achieved higher electrical efficiencies of 50% compared to 30% efficient steam turbine 
plants
365
. However, even with the CCGT-based power plants, some 50% of the fuel 
energy is wasted in the form of heat. Today, new designs, namely combined heat and 
power plants (CHP), which generate electricity and supply the wasted energy for heating 
purposes, are available. These power plants can be in different combinations; steam 
turbine, gas turbine and/or combined cycle gas turbine CHP plants and their total 
efficiencies can reach up to 90%
366
. Depending on the demand, they can take the form of 
small-scale CHP supplying power, heat and hot water to residential and small-
commercial markets and large-scale CHP heat output of which can be supplied to 
industry as process heat
367
 and to local buildings and communities in the form of hot 
water distributed in pipes, known as district heating
368
. Recently, even smaller CHP units 
have been developed aimed for single household uses with electrical output of only few 
kilowatts
369
.  
 
These technologies use predominantly fossil fuels such as oil, coal and natural gas. 
However, the combustion of fossil fuels for energy production results in GHG emissions. 
As described throughout this thesis, concerns over climate change and security of supply 
have seen renewable resources emerge as contenders for potential use in electricity 
production. However, although, power generation is possible from renewable energy 
systems, their utilisation is limited due to their intermittent character which makes them 
difficult to be connected to the grid or to be utilised reliably as stand-alone systems – the 
renewable energy is not available all the time and therefore the excess electricity output 
needs to be stored in some form for the times renewable sources are not available. 
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In theory, fuel cells can be integrated into all these areas of electricity and heat 
generation. However, in practice, they are more preferable in certain applications than the 
others when the efficient use of initial resource and the costs are taken into account. For 
instance, one route is the use of hydrogen for large-scale electricity generation. Hydrogen 
produced from any type of primary source can be supplied to fuel cells which convert this 
fuel into electricity. Nevertheless, due to the number of steps involved, this path leads to 
high levels of parasitic losses during the production, storage and distribution of hydrogen. 
In addition to low efficiency, due to the aforementioned costs of hydrogen production, 
this path is significantly more expensive than the direct use of resources for electricity 
production. However, if other fuels are used, these paths can become the preferred route 
as fuel cells can achieve higher efficiencies than the conventional fossil-fuel power 
plants
370
. This will however depend on the type of fuel cell used. Currently, the most 
preferred fuel cells for large scale electricity generation involve the solid oxide and 
molten carbonate fuel cells due their tolerance to impurities, flexibility in fuels and high 
efficiencies. Additionally, due to high temperatures, these fuel cells provide opportunities 
to be utilised for CHP applications. 
 
Molten carbonate fuel cells have already been used for large-scale stationary units. 
FuelCell Energy, one of the largest developers of MCFCs has installed more than 40 of 
its direct fuel cell (DFC) power plants (it is called DFC, as it can directly use fuels such 
as natural gas, methanol, ethanol and biogas via its internal reforming technology
371
) with 
sizes of 250kW, 1 MW and 2MW to different locations in three continents; America, 
Europe and Asia
372
. The FCE‟s direct fuel cell systems are co-generating heat and power 
and their electrical efficiency is around 45-48%, while total efficiency can reach up to 70 
to 80% depending on the application, location and demand
373
. The FCE‟s main focus is 
hybrid designs integrating MCFC with small gas turbines. MTU, another MCFC 
developer, has demonstrated an MCFC-CHP system with an electrical output of 250kW 
which has been supplying both electricity and thermal power to Rhon-Klinikum hospital 
in Bad Neustadt reached an electrical efficiency of 47% and it has been reported that in 
the case of hybridising fuel cell with a gas turbine the electrical efficiency can be 
increased to 60%
374
. The OECD (2005)
375
 reports that theoretically the DC conversion 
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efficiency of a 100kW MCFC system can be 47%, however when integrated with a gas 
turbine, the electrical efficiency level can be 47% in 300 kW hybrid systems, while it can 
reach up to 53% for a 20 MW system. Other reported MCFC developers involve Ansaldo 
in Italy and Spain, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electrics and 
Hitachi in Japan
376
.  
 
Solid oxide fuel cells are other high temperature fuel cell types that have been developed 
for large stationary power units. These fuel cells have high electrical efficiency levels of 
around 50-60% which can increase to 70% when hybridised with gas turbine and can also 
reach up to 85% total efficiency when used in CHP applications. Today, the most 
important developer in this field is Siemens Westinghouse in 2000, in conjunction with 
Southern California Edison. They have demonstrated the world‟s first hybrid SOFC/GT 
power plant with a capacity of 220kW, 200kW of the total was supplied by the SOFC 
while the remaining 20kW came from the micro-generator
377
. This hybrid system which 
worked for 3400 hours, achieved the highest ever efficiency level of 53% that have been 
achieved by any other large FC systems
378
. In 2003, Siemens-Westinghouse has also built 
a 250kW, atmospheric pressure SOFC/CHP system in Kinetrics facilities in Toronto
379
.  
 
The PAFC has also been tested for large scale power systems. UTC Fuel Cells, the major 
developer in this field has built more than 260 units in 19 countries in five continents
380
. 
Their fuel cell; PureCell™ has a power output of 200 kW and when used in CHP 
applications, it can reach efficiency levels of up to 90%
381
. Amongst its many 
applications, the UK‟s first fuel cell CHP station was built in Woking. Since 2003 this 
unit has been supplying electricity and heat to Leisure Centre and pool in the park and at 
the same time provides domestic hot water to Leisure Lagoon
382
. However, it must be 
noted that with PAFC applications, significant performance degradation and maintenance 
problems over a short operating life time has been reported
383. Finally, Ballard‟s PEM 
fuel cell demonstrations can be shown as the only PEM based stationary system with an 
output of 250 kW, and has achieved electrical efficiency of 40%
384
. However, due to low 
temperatures associated with these fuel cells, they can not be used for combined heat and 
power generation and therefore unless the temperature is increased the total efficiencies 
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achieved are limited to electricity efficiency levels. Recently, increasing numbers of 
governmental organisations and private companies have shown interest in installing 
large-scale stationary fuel cells and as demonstrated in Figure 22 in Appendix, the 
number of units built globally has doubled over the last decade.  
 
As mentioned earlier, fuel cells can also be used for small-scale stationary applications 
with power ranges of 1 to 20 kW for residential purposes via distributed energy supply
385
. 
These small units can provide power, heat, and hot water and can also be used as back-up 
power systems in emergencies. Such installations can take the advantage of supplying 
energy for residential systems in remote areas where there are problems with grid 
connection. They can also be connected to the grid and in the case of shortages they can 
use grid power, on the other hand, where excess power is generated, it can be supplied 
back to the grid. Currently, the most favoured fuel cell types for grid-independent 
applications and micro-scale CHP systems are PEM and SO fuel cells, though it must be 
noted that PAFC was the very first fuel cell type utilised for domestic CHP systems, 
however, due to the long heat-up times, problems with stack degradation and cost 
reductions that can be achieved with PEMFC, this type is no longer considered for this 
scale of applications
386
.  
 
These installations are also important as they allow for the integration of renewable 
energy systems into our daily energy consumption. As mentioned earlier, renewable 
energy is not available all the time and this causes problems for these systems to be 
connected to the grid. However, as fuel cells can be applied to applications independent 
of the grid, they might as well use renewable electricity to generate hydrogen from water 
which can be supplied to a fuel cell system generating power and even heat for local 
residents. The first installation of such a system integrating renewable energy systems 
and hydrogen fuel cells has been demonstrated on Utsira Island, Norway. The fuel cell 
utilised is a 10 kW PEMFC and it works in conjunction with a 55 kW ICE generator
387
. 
In this demonstration hydrogen is produced by electrolysis of which the electricity input 
is supplied by wind turbines. This is a grid-connected system, providing power to ten 
households in the island. Other similar demonstrations using fuel cells combined with 
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renewable energy systems have been announced; the Australian base on Antarctica and 
another installation in Prince Edward Island in Canada has also created hydrogen 
communities based on wind turbines and fuel cells
388
. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
renewable-fuel cell hybrid systems have been implemented in the UK and have received 
attention particularly in Scotland where there is high potential for wind. Today, many 
units of small-scale FC stationary applications are available. Currently, some of the most 
important players in the field are Ballard Generation Systems, UTC, Plug Power, GE, and 
many others are entering the market. Hence, the number of units demonstrated and 
installed is increasing. Figure 23 in Appendix illustrates the increasing number of units 
built globally. It must be noted that this figure is adapted from the findings of Fuel Cell 
Today, which defines small stationary applications as units with power output smaller 
than 10 kW.  
 
To sum up, fuel cells can be used for distributed and centralised production of power and 
heat for stationary applications such as power plants, housing and domestic appliances 
and for industrial use. The type of the fuel cell varies depending on the application. The 
US DOE (2007)
389
 report states that while high temperature fuel cells; SOFC and MCFC 
are the most preferred types for large scale stationary applications due to their fuel 
flexibility, high efficiency and the potential for CHP, SOFC and PEMFC can be used for 
small stationary applications. However, as demonstrated the PEMFC has also been tried 
for larger scale applications with an output of 250 kW. It is also noted that if PEM fuel 
cells achieve higher temperatures of around 120ºC, they can be applied to small-scale 
CHP units. With the current technological status, the reason for not preferring high 
temperature fuel cells for a single or small number of households is the associated 
changing demand loads (the demand for electricity, hot water and heating peak during 
morning and evening times) which can not be met immediately due to the low heating-up 
times of high temperature fuel cells
390
.  
 
Although, fuel cells have been increasingly used in stationary applications, in order to be 
fully commercialised their performance needs to be improved. Generally, the targets set 
by the US DOE
391
 for stationary fuel cells can be summarised as; 40,000 hours of reliable 
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operation under temperatures of -35 to 40 ºC, quick start-up times especially to meet the 
changing loads of household demands, high operating temperatures (or high heat 
recovery), CHP efficiencies of more than 80% and finally competitive costs and better 
performances compared to their conventional competitors. Though it has been pointed 
out that targeted costs of FC stationary applications (1000 $/kW) are more achievable 
than the targets set for FC vehicle costs (50$/kW)
392
. Therefore, despite the focus on 
transport applications and indications of the roadmaps, some experts believe that the 
stationary applications of fuel cells might lead the way in the transition to a hydrogen 
economy.  
6.6.2. Internal Combustion Engine 
In the previous section, the chemical conversion of hydrogen into electricity via fuel cells 
was described. Hydrogen can also be used in combustion engines where hydrogen is 
burnt similar to the combustion of other fuels such as natural gas or petrol. However by-
products of the reactions differ; as the fuel is hydrogen when combusted with oxygen, 
water is the only product generated and thus it can be considered a clean combustion. On 
the other hand, as in most of the cases, rather than pure oxygen, air will be used for the 
combustion, and therefore nitrogen oxides (NOx) can be produced
393
. 
2H2 + O2 → 2H2O 
H2 + O2 + N2 → H2O + N2 + NOx  
 
Hydrogen can be directly used in the existing combustion engines as gas mixtures; it has 
been pointed out that one commercial gas mixture Hytane containing 80% natural gas 
and 20% hydrogen can be used directly in the existing ICE vehicles and has the potential 
of decreasing emissions by more than 20%
394
. However, if more emission reductions are 
the objective, the ratio of hydrogen in the gas mixture needs to be increased which 
requires modifications on the combustion engines. Modifying petrol engines to be 
compatible with hydrogen is a mature technology, the very first engine conversion was 
done in the 1920‟s by Rudolf Erren395 and since then this technique has been further 
developed. Today, car manufacturers like BMW (BMW Hydrogen 7) and Ford (Ford U) 
have demonstrated their hydrogen-ICE cars. Ford has announced that their Modul U car 
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which employs an updated version of Ford‟s 2.3 litre I-4 engine (this engine is utilised in 
Ford Ranger, Ford Mondeo and Mazda), is fuelled with hydrogen, releases almost zero 
emissions and is almost 25% more fuel efficient than its gasoline counterparts
396
. In 
addition to light-duty vehicles, buses running on ICE have also been demonstrated; 
Hythane bus powered by a 180 kW ICE with a driving range of 400km, manufactured by  
Novabus, has been operating in Quebec since 1995
397
. 
 
Finally, in addition to transportation applications, ICE used for stationary applications to 
provide heat and electricity from natural gas can also be converted to run on hydrogen. 
As mentioned in the fuel cells section, in the Utsira project, 55kW hydrogen-ICE has 
already been used in conjunction with fuel cells for stationary power generation. 
6.6.3. Gas Turbines 
Utilisation of hydrogen in the existing conversion technologies can create stepping stones 
in adapting to the hydrogen economy in the short and medium term. Therefore, gas 
turbines which work by the heat generated from burning of gas mixtures (natural gas, 
propane, methane), can provide an alternative option to convert hydrogen into useful 
energy. As mentioned earlier, when combusted hydrogen creates water vapour and some 
oxides of nitrogen, thus running gas turbines on this gas can help decrease CO2 emissions 
released from electricity generation
398
. Furthermore, when fed with hydrogen, the 
efficiency of gas turbines can be increased because of the high temperatures that can be 
achieved by the burning of this gas
399
.  As hydrogen has already been supplied in the 
form of syngas (synthesis gas is a mixture of carbon monoxide and hydrogen) to some 
gas turbine technologies such as combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT), such conversion is 
feasible
400
. However, Larsen et al. (2004)
401
 points out that more R&D efforts are 
required to tackle problems such as high flame causing damage to burners, increasing 
NOx emissions due to the high flame temperatures and hydrogen embrittlement of metal 
components in the system. Finally, due to their lower costs, hydrogen gas turbines can 
provide a more cost-effective alternative to fuel cells during the early ages of transition. 
Currently, GE and Hydro Norsk are working on hydrogen gas turbines for stationary 
applications
402
. The Japanese government has also announced work on hydrogen-based 
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power systems (including combustion turbines) which can achieve efficiency levels of 
greater than 70% by 2020
403
.   
6.7. Conclusions  
The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of how different resources and 
technologies can be brought together to build a new energy system otherwise known as 
the hydrogen economy. As demonstrated in different sections, a transition to a hydrogen 
economy is expected to start with the production of hydrogen from fossil fuels and move 
towards the electrolysis of hydrogen where the electricity input can be renewables and/or 
nuclear and eventually to the direct production of hydrogen from renewables. The two 
main reasons behind this pathway are the maturity and relatively low costs of the fossil 
fuel based pathways. However, this is not necessarily the only option. Ongoing R&D 
activities in the field of renewables can reduce the costs of these technologies and result 
in reductions in renewables based hydrogen pathways. Where the storage of hydrogen is 
concerned the transition pathway is expected to start with the gaseous storage followed 
by the liquid and solid storage technologies. Similar to the production pathways, 
technological maturity and the costs are the main reasons for this route. Finally, 
delivering gaseous or liquid hydrogen via compressed trucks or the existing pipelines 
provide a short-term option. A transition in the medium to long term depends on a 
number of factors. For instance, the European strategy over the long run is directed 
towards a more centralised system where pipeline networks play a greater role.  Where 
the end-use technologies are concerned, fuel cells are the most attractive options. 
However, because of their high costs, the transition might start with the currently 
available technologies such as gas turbines and internal combustion engines which might 
compensate for the high hydrogen production costs. On the other hand, when run on 
hydrogen, fuel cells achieve the highest efficiency levels and therefore can attract 
attention despite the high costs.  
 
As the findings of the literature demonstrate most of the technologies required to 
establish a so-called hydrogen economy are technically feasible. Even though further 
R&D is required to commercialise these technologies, the biggest barrier against their 
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adoption remains are their high costs. As illustrated, most of these technologies are 
sensitive to economies of scale thus in the case that they are produced through mass 
production, cost reductions are a very real prospect. However, moving to mass 
production and/or adopting a centralised structure that can reduce costs there needs to be 
a high level of demand. On the other hand, increases in demand are directly related to the 
costs of hydrogen and fuel cells. This „chicken and egg‟ problem creates an important 
barrier that needs to be overcome to enable transition to these technologies. This problem 
can be tackled by creating niches which can enable learning processes to reduce costs and 
generate network externalities to promote the adoption of these emerging technologies. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the UK government has already taken a number of 
initiatives to apply hydrogen and fuel cells. However, the UK government also promotes 
the creation of niches in other alternatives. Thus, unless hydrogen technologies can 
promise higher returns on investment, they might not be able to compete against the other 
options and take advantage of the window of opportunities within the UK energy LTS. 
The outcome of this competition, therefore, is one of the most important factors that will 
determine the future adoption of these technologies. A comparison between the hydrogen 
and alternative technologies and the possible outcomes of this competition are provided 
in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
Competing & Complementing Technologies 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, different components of the hydrogen technological system has 
been analysed in order to demonstrate the interdependencies between hydrogen and other 
technologies. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the technological options that compete 
with hydrogen in two areas; transport and stationary applications.  
 
It was argued in the previous chapters that the energy LTS is characterised by a condition 
known as carbon lock-in that acts as the main barrier against the diffusion of low carbon 
technologies. Also as mentioned previously, landscape developments and the related 
changes at the regime level have created a number of opportunities in the locked-in 
energy LTS for the emergence of alternative technologies. These opportunities emerged 
when the aforementioned pressures created the need for new technologies. For instance, 
in the UK, climate change regulations and the new emissions targets has favoured new 
low carbon technologies. Other factors such as price volatility and an increasing 
dependence on imports have only reinforced the need and highlighted the potential 
profitability of switching to technologies that will exploit indigenous sources other than 
fossil fuels. However, despite the changes, the energy LTS is still ruled by the standards 
set by the incumbent technologies and unless the alternatives achieve similar standards, 
they will not be able to capture the opportunity provided by the landscape developments. 
This was the case with the electrical vehicles (EV). Enthusiasm in the 1990s for EVs 
faded away when these cars could not achieve the speed and driving range of 
conventional vehicles. Hence, in order to take advantage of the openings in the energy 
LTS, the alternatives will not only need to meet the new criteria but also achieve the 
standards existent in the current energy LTS. In other words alternative technologies need 
to offer solutions to the current problems in order to take an initial lead in a series of 
adoptions which will improve these technologies, reduce the associated risks and 
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therefore render them more easily accepted by the potential adopters. As Arthur 
describes; learning effects, network externalities, economies of scale, informational 
increasing returns and technological inter-relatedness can create a bandwagon effect and 
lead to increasing returns to adoption of a new technology
1
.   
 
However, competition between the incumbent and emerging technologies is not the only 
parameter that needs to be considered where transitions are concerned. As Geels (2007) 
argues when the landscape developments are divergent and fast and the technological 
options are not yet fully developed to tackle problems at the regime and landscape levels, 
a variety of technologies can develop
2
. This in turn fosters additional competition 
amongst the emerging technologies. This has been the case in the energy sector. The fast 
changing and divergent landscape developments including security of supply concerns, 
climate change and sustainability issues and the recent economic recession have led to 
the development of a diverse range of technologies. On one hand, it became clear that the 
incumbent technologies would need to be seriously modified to reduce their consumption 
levels of fossil-fuels and decrease the level of GHG emissions. For these purposes R&D 
activities have focused on new designs or modifications on the existing technologies to 
allow use of wider range of resources, development of new fuels, increasing the 
efficiency levels and reducing CO2 emissions. On the other hand, these pressures have 
encouraged the development of alternative energy technologies including renewable 
energy systems, advanced nuclear options, CCS and hydrogen energy technologies. In 
other words, due to the uncertainty created by the divergent and sudden landscape 
developments; actors involved in the energy LTS have become inclined to explore a 
number of technological options in order to reduce risks.  
 
Where the transition to a hydrogen economy is concerned, the existence of multiple 
technological systems has three broad implications. Firstly, due to the technological 
interrelatedness between hydrogen and other systems, improvements in the latter can 
compliment the adoption of hydrogen technologies. For instance, as shown in the 
renewable hydrogen pathways, learning in renewables can increase the efficiency and 
reduce the costs of not only these technologies but also renewables based hydrogen, or 
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developments in CCS technologies can encourage hydrogen production from fossil fuels 
via promising zero emissions. Secondly, as opposed to its complimenting effects, 
improvements in the existing technologies or developments in the alternatives can hinder 
the transition to a hydrogen economy via eliminating the need for alternatives or through 
creating an early lock-in to one of these systems. This was the case in the 1980s when the 
landscape pressure of tackling air pollution created a window of opportunity for the 
development of steam and Stirling engines for vehicles to reduce CO and NOx emissions 
in the transport sector. However, following improvements in the gasoline and diesel 
engines, work on the former was dropped
3
. Hydrogen technologies face a similar threat. 
For instance as discussed in the previous chapter, the UK government has identified a 
number of alternative fuels which can reduce GHG emissions and diversify fuel mix in 
the transport sector. These include biofuels, electricity and hydrogen. Given the less 
onerous modifications required for biofuels (can be used in the existing vehicles in blends 
with the existing fuels) and electricity (an already available fuel from the grid and/or 
renewables), these technologies can lock-in the market and leave out the hydrogen option 
which requires a new infrastructure for production, storage and distribution.  
 
Thus, while the changes at the landscape level can pave the way for the development of a 
new technological system, their similar affects on the incumbent and/or other alternatives 
increase competition and hence the adoption of a technology becomes conditional upon 
overcoming the competition between its rivals. Finally, the existence of multiple options 
can lead to an intermediary pathway. As discussed throughout this thesis, a number of 
competitions in the energy sector have ended with the adoption of a hybrid design such as 
the universal AC-DC system or the CCGT that combined steam and gas turbines. The 
hybridisation of hydrogen with the current or the alternative technologies can take place 
and result in the adoption of tandem systems. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
the UK government has already declared its intention to develop a variety of hybrid 
options in the transport sector which include different combinations of ICE, FC and 
electric vehicles. Although, the outcome of this hybridisation exercise is uncertain, it will 
definitely play a supporting role in terms of developing FC systems for transport 
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applications which can in turn lead to an adoption of hydrogen based vehicles in the 
longer term as the necessary learning takes place.  
 
Thus, due to a number of possibilities that can arise from the existence of multiple 
technological options, an analysis on transitions to hydrogen technologies necessitates an 
understanding of the complimenting and competing options. Therefore, this section 
examines the options that are considered to provide solutions to the problems in the 
energy LTS. As described previously, the energy LTS is a compilation of a number of 
components including different end-users such as the transport, domestic, industry, 
commerce and business needs of which vary from transport fuel to heat and electricity. 
As hydrogen and fuel cells can provide the means to meet these different energy 
demands, the competing technologies are analysed based on the final energy they 
produce. Therefore the following analysis compares hydrogen and fuel cell technologies 
with the existing and alternative options in transport and power sectors. Due to the 
combined use of heat and power generation, the heat applications are also considered 
under the stationary applications subsection. Because of the focus of this thesis, this 
comparative analysis is limited to the choices of the UK government.  
7.2. Transport 
As discussed in the previous chapters, a large technical system can comprise of a number 
of components that include its own subsystems. In that sense, the transport sector which 
is a subsystem of the energy LTS can be considered a technical system with its own 
subsystems and components. Depending on the applications, the transport system can be 
divided into further subsystems including aviation, marine and road transport. The 
following analysis focuses on the road transport applications in particular the light duty 
vehicles. This subsystem was chosen as it allows for the integration of all of the 
alternative options considered for the transport sector in the UK. Also due to its large 
contribution to GHG emissions and oil consumption, it provides a meaningful platform to 
analyse the potential of competing technologies in providing solutions to these problems. 
As mentioned throughout this thesis, the most pressing landscape developments are 
climate change and energy security issues. Therefore, the competing options are 
compared on two dimensions; firstly the amounts of energy they use which provide an 
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indication of the fossil fuel energy consumption and secondly the amount of GHG 
emissions they release to evaluate their environmental impacts. As economics plays a 
significant role in transitions, the associated costs are also discussed. This analysis is 
based on the findings of the EC (2007) Well to Wheels study, and the E4Tech (2007) 
report commissioned by the UK government.   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the increasing and divergent landscape pressures 
have influenced the actors involved to search for a number of alternative options. In order 
to reduce risks, the UK government has allocated resources both to enhance the 
incumbent technologies and to promote the development and deployment of a diverse 
range of low carbon fuels and alternative vehicles (Figure1). As demonstrated in the UK 
Low Carbon Transition Plan (2009), in terms of the incumbents the aim is to improve the 
efficiency of ICE vehicles and to use light weight materials which can in turn decrease 
the fossil fuel consumption and GHG emissions
4
. E4Tech (2007) study demonstrates that 
both the diesel and gasoline ICE vehicles can become 15-20% more efficient by 2020 by 
engine down-sizing, developments in fuel injection systems, reducing weight and energy 
losses in driveline technologies and accessories and decreasing drag and rolling 
resistance
5
. While these modifications can reduce the CO2 emissions by 25-30%, they are 
expected to increase the costs by around 75% for gasoline engines and by almost 100% 
for the diesel engines
6
.  
 
Although, these measures can deliver some benefits, they will not be able to achieve a 
shift away from the use of oil or sufficient reductions in GHG emissions to meet the 
targets set in the UK. Therefore, in addition to these modifications, the UK government 
supports shifts to alternative fuels and vehicles. As demonstrated in the King Review, 
some of the key alternative fuels for the UK involve compressed natural gas (CNG), 
biofuels such as bio-ethanol, bio-diesel and biogas, hydrogen and electricity. 
Additionally, the alternative vehicles that have received governmental support are 
different types of hybrids, electric and fuel cell vehicles. 
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Figure 1: UK industry’s view on the developments in the road transport 
Source: DECC (July 2009), p 141 
 
To start with, the most dominant fuels in the UK are gasoline and diesel. These fuels have 
high volume-energy and mass energy density, they are easily storable and they have an 
established infrastructure for distribution and refuelling. Additionally, the incumbent 
fuels are energy efficient; they require little amounts of energy during their production 
path. However, as these fuels are produced from mainly oil, use of these fuels adds to the 
existing security of oil supply problems. Moreover, despite the efficiency advantages 
from well to tank, their well-to-wheel fuel consumption levels are high as these fuels are 
dominantly used in the ICE vehicles which have large amounts of energy losses. Finally, 
as the ICE vehicles work based on the combustion of these fuels, they lead to high levels 
of emissions. To sum up while the existing transport technologies are mature and well 
established; they are poor in terms of fuel efficiency and the GHG emissions. 
However, both the fossil fuel consumption and the GHG emissions can be improved if 
the current vehicles are run on alternative fuels. The alternative fuels that can be used in 
the current vehicles as neat and/or blended fuels are ethanol, bio-diesel, synthetic diesel 
(that can be produced from coal, wood and natural gas) and hydrogen. Also the current 
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vehicles can be modified to be dedicated to and/or to use bi-fuels such as combinations of 
gasoline with compressed natural gas (CNG) and compressed biogas (CBG) produced 
from waste. Depending on the production route, these fuels lead to different levels of 
reductions in the fossil-fuel consumption and GHG emissions. According to the 
calculations of the EC (2007) study, the reference cases which are the ICE vehicle with 
PISI (port injection spark ignition) powertrain running on gasoline and the ICE vehicle 
with DICI (direct injection compression ignition) powertrain running on diesel consume 
255 MJ and 212MJ of fossil fuels per 100 kilometre and release 196 g CO2eq/km and 164 
g CO2eq/km respectively
7
. If the aforementioned modifications are made to these vehicles 
the fossil fuel consumption can be reduced to 216 MJ/100km and 200 MJ/100km for 
gasoline and diesel which decreases the GHG emissions to 164 g CO2eq/km and 152 g 
CO2eq/km respectively
8
. In the case that the PISI ICEs are run on bio-fuels, fossil-fuel 
consumption ranges between 32 MJ/100km and 209 MJ/100km and the corresponding 
GHG emissions vary between 32 g CO2eq/km and 210 g CO2eq/km
9
. While the fossil fuel 
consumption to produce CNG can be in the range of 123 to 164 MJ/100km, synthetic 
fuels, produced from either coal or gas, require more energy and lead to higher fossil fuel 
consumption levels
10
. Though it must be noted that they still provide some benefits as 
most of the fossil fuels utilised in this pathway do not involve petroleum.  
 
As discussed previously, hydrogen can be produced from variety of sources and 
depending on the pathway, fossil fuel consumption can be as high as 578 MJ/100km 
when electrolysis is used and can drop down to 32 and 13 MJ/100km for the pathways 
based on wind electrolysis and gasification of biomass such as wood
11
. In relation the 
GHG emissions vary; for instance while the use of hydrogen produced via electrolysis in 
PISI ICEs produces 339 g CO2eq/km of GHG, wind and biomass based hydrogen emits 16 
and 18 g CO2eq/km of GHG respectively
12
. Though it must be noted that if carbon capture 
and sequestration technologies are used the GHG levels of the fossil fuel based pathways 
can be reduced. For instance, hydrogen produced by natural gas running on ICE would 
emit  165 g CO2eq/km of GHG which would fall down to 63 g CO2eq/km with CCS, 
whereas the corresponding GHG levels for hydrogen produced by coal would be 391 g 
CO2eq/km and 86 g CO2eq/km of GHG with CCS. Although the CCS application increase 
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the overall energy consumption by 3% and 20% for natural gas and coal pathways 
respectively the high GHG gains of 62% and 78% compensate for the energy losses. Due 
to the significant GHG reduction potential, CCS technologies play a significant role in 
adopting fossil fuel based hydrogen pathways particularly where the climate change 
regulations are concerned. Though, it must be noted that as this technology can be 
applied to other alternative fuel pathways; it leads to similar positive results for the other 
technologies. 
 
 To sum up all the alternative fuels provide the potential to shift away from oil, however 
some of them such as the syn-diesel result in higher fossil fuel consumption and hence 
the higher GHG emissions. Amongst all the alternatives, biofuels particularly the CBG 
promises the highest potential in terms of fossil fuel consumption and GHG reduction 
levels. If the selection is based only on these two criteria hydrogen running on ICE 
vehicles can only compete against the biofuels if this fuel is produced from renewable 
energy sources such as wind and biomass. A full comparison of fossil fuel consumption 
and GHG emissions of different types of fuels are provided in the Figures (2-5) below . 
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Figure 2: WTW Fossil fuel consumption of diesel and its alternatives running on DICI ICEV 
Source: EC (2007a), App. 1 
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Figure 3: WTW GHG emissions of diesel and its alternatives running on DICI ICEV 
Source: EC (2007a), App. 1 
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Figure 4: WTW Fossil fuel consumption of gasoline and its alternatives running on PISI ICEV 
Source: EC (2007a), App. 1 
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Figure 5: WTW GHG emissions of gasoline and its alternatives running on PISI ICEV 
Source: EC (2007a), App. 1 
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However, the transition to a hydrogen economy in the transport sector is not limited to 
the potential of hydrogen running on ICE vehicles alone. As described earlier, fuel cells 
are more fuel efficient than the ICE vehicles and emit zero tank-to-wheel emissions when 
fed with hydrogen. Therefore, if run on FC vehicles, the high efficiencies achieved in 
these vehicles can compensate the high levels of fossil fuels consumed during the 
hydrogen production pathways. Thus, fuel cell vehicles can increase the attractiveness of 
adopting hydrogen as a fuel. However, fuel cells are not the only alternative vehicles that 
offer advantages over the ICEs. Similar to FCVs, hybrid and electric vehicles also 
promise reductions in GHG emissions and fossil fuel consumption levels and receive 
increasing support from the UK government.  
 
Hybrid vehicles combine an ICE which runs on petrol, diesel or biofuels with an electric 
power train that includes electric motor and electricity storage means such as batteries
13
. 
There are different types of hybrid vehicles; mini, mild and full hybrids that are under 
development. In the mini hybrids the engine which shuts down when the vehicle is 
stationary is started with the battery whereas with the mild hybrids the energy from the 
braking is used to start the engine and accelerate. Full hybrid vehicles on the other hand 
run both on the electric motor and the main engine; these vehicles use the battery power 
at low speeds and run on the engine at higher speeds where the efficiency of the ICE is 
high
14
. Although the electric driving range is very low of around 2 km, by using electrical 
power from the battery for driving at lower speeds where the ICE has low efficiency, the 
overall efficiency of these vehicles is increased compared to the conventional ones. 
Similarly plug-in hybrid vehicles apply the same principle
15
. The difference is that the 
battery in these vehicles is charged by plugging into the power grid. Because of the larger 
capacity of the batteries used in these vehicles, they have a more extensive range than the 
aforementioned hybrids
16
. Although the current focus is on the ICE hybrid vehicles, 
FCVs can also be hybridised with batteries that store the recovered braking energy and 
provide energy to the powertrain energy supply that is additional to the conventional 
vehicle battery which is required for start-up
17
. Finally, electric vehicles work based on 
only the battery power. Similar to FCVs, if the battery is charged with electricity 
generated by renewables these vehicles result in very low emissions. However, due to the 
 341 
low power density of the batteries the driving range with these vehicles is limited. It is 
reported in the King Review (2007) that the 2-seater EV Smart has a range of 62 miles 
while the Tesla 2-seater has a range of 200 miles
18
. In addition, the long recharging times 
is a problem, for instance, the batteries of the aforementioned cars can be recharged 
between 3.5 and 8 hours
19
. Filling a hydrogen tank in an FC vehicle would take around 6 
minutes
20
. 
 
The EC (2007) report demonstrates that both the hybrid and FC vehicles result in fuel and 
GHG savings; for instance when run on gasoline both of the vehicles save around 62 
MJ/100km of fossil fuels and 48 g CO2eq/km of GHG from tank to wheel compared to the 
PISI ICEV 2002 version. The calculations also illustrate that similar percentages of 
savings are achieved by running hybrids on the other alternative fuels (Figures 6-7). 
However, larger savings are observed when these vehicles use hydrogen as a fuel. The 
tank to wheel energy consumption of PISI ICE running on hydrogen equals to 190 
MJ/100km; if the same fuel is fed into a hybrid ICE the consumption declines to 149 
MJ/100km, whereas in the FC and FC hybrid vehicles this amounts to 94 and 84 
MJ/100km, respectively. As the hydrogen does not release emissions when combusted or 
used in an FCV, the tank-to-wheel emissions of running hydrogen in these vehicles result 
in zero emissions. In addition, the aforementioned well-to-wheel energy consumption and 
GHG levels of different hydrogen pathways fall significantly when this fuel is supplied to 
hybrid ICE, FC and FC hybrid vehicles because of the higher efficiencies of these 
vehicles. As demonstrated in Figure 8, the highest fuel savings are achieved by the hybrid 
FC vehicles which amount to around 55% followed by the FC and hybrid ICE vehicles 
with around 50% and 21% respectively. In relation the GHG emissions result in similar 
reductions. These results show that when run on FC vehicles, most of the hydrogen 
pathways can become competitive with the gasoline ICE vehicles in terms of both the 
fossil fuel consumption and GHG emission levels. 
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Figure 6: Tank-to-wheel energy consumption of different alternative vehicles (MJ/100km) 
Source: EC (2007a), App. 1 
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Figure 7: Tank-to-wheel GHG emissions of different alternative vehicles (g CO2eq/km) 
Source: EC (2007a), App. 1 
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Figure 8: WTM energy consumption & GHG emissions of hydrogen running on different types of 
vehicles 
Source: EC (2007a) App.1 
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Although, the FCVs demonstrate significant benefits over their ICEV counterparts, they 
are more energy intensive than electric vehicles. The E4Tech (2007) calculations 
demonstrate that the tank-to-wheel fossil fuel consumption of EVs is 58MJ/100km, that 
is, around 40% less than the FC vehicles
21
. However, depending on the hydrogen 
production pathway they can lead to higher GHG emissions; for instance, it is estimated 
that while a FCV running on hydrogen produced via grid electrolysis emits 162 g 
CO2eq/km of GHG that is more than double the amount released by an electric vehicle 
with 77 g CO2eq/km of GHG, FCV running on hydrogen from natural gas leads to slightly 
lower emissions of 73 g CO2eq/km of GHG
22
. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the EVs 
have a limited driving range and increasing it requires larger batteries. As the weight of 
the vehicle increases, it becomes less fuel efficient which results in larger fuel 
consumption and in turn higher GHG emissions
23
. Taking this point into consideration, 
Thomas (2009) shows that for a driving range of 300 miles (400km), an EV would emit 
200 g CO2eq/mile more than an FC hybrid car running on hydrogen produced from 
natural gas
24
.  
 
As these calculations demonstrate, if the selection is based on these two criteria of fuel 
efficiency ( fossil fuel consumption levels) and GHG emission levels, then the FC cars in 
particular, the FC hybrids provide the highest potential amongst all the alternative 
vehicles. However, as mentioned earlier with the emergence of new landscape 
developments such as the global economic recession and major fluctuations in oil prices, 
the costs of these technologies have become an ever more important parameter that will 
affect the choices of decision-makers and hence the direction of transitions. Therefore, 
before drawing any conclusions, relative prices need to be taken into consideration. The 
EC (2007) report demonstrates a number of estimates of the incremental cost of the 
alternatives over the ICEVs. For instance, the vehicles that can use the current fuels 
without the requirement of a new distribution infrastructure such as the hybrid ICEVs 
running on gasoline and diesel can have an incremental cost of 6,220€ and 7,630€  
respectively whereas the incremental cost of a hybrid FCV with a reformer fed by 
gasoline would amount to 24,335 €25. On the other hand, modification of current vehicles 
to use bio-fuels and/or to be dedicated to fuels such as CNG and CBG would have an 
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incremental cost of 1,953 € and 2,538 € respectively26. As mentioned earlier, because 
bio-fuels such as ethanol or bio-diesel can be used in current vehicles they do not have 
additional costs in terms of vehicles. Finally, an ICEV, ICE hybrid, FCV and an FC 
hybrid running on hydrogen are estimated to cost 4,750 €, 10,218 €, 11,633 € and 14,945 
€ more than a gasoline ICE vehicle27. However, it must be noted that these are estimates 
and have high range of uncertainty and therefore can differ significantly. For instance, 
Thomas (2009) demonstrates that if produced on a mass scale, an FC hybrid vehicle with 
a 560km range would have an incremental cost of around 3,600 $ whereas the related 
costs for a plug-in hybrid vehicle with 100 km and an EV with 320 km are estimated to 
be around 6,000 $ and 10,200 $
28
. The estimates of both of the studies are demonstrated 
in Figures 9 and 10.  
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Figure 8: Incremental costs of alternative vehicles compared to ICE gasoline vehicles 
Source: EC (2007a), Appendix 2, p: 18 
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Figure 9: Incremental costs of alternative vehicles compared to ICE gasoline vehicles 
Source: Thomas C. E.  (2009), p: 6013 
 
According to these calculations, the most cost-effective alternative vehicle is the 
dedicated ICEVs using CNG or CBG followed by ICE hybrids, FC, plug-in hybrid, FC 
hybrid and electric vehicles respectively. Despite the low costs, due to the low fuel 
efficiency ( fossil fuel saving of around 1%) associated with the CNG dedicated vehicles, 
these cars do not pose a significant threat against the FC vehicles. However, the hybrid 
ICE vehicles, incremental costs of which are almost two times less than that of FC 
vehicles, can be a significant competitor against the FCVs as they can lead to reductions 
in both the fossil fuel levels of around 18% and GHG emissions of 14% and 18% when 
run on gasoline and diesel respectively. Although the FCVs can achieve a 50% reduction 
in the fossil fuel consumption and zero emissions, this is only feasible with hydrogen 
fuel. When fed with gasoline or diesel the fossil fuel savings are in the order of 17% and 
14% and the GHG savings are around 14% and 5% respectively. Despite the similar or 
lower savings, however, the FCVs running on these fuels cost more than the FCVs 
running on hydrogen due to the necessity of a reformer. Thus, under these circumstances, 
hybrid vehicles are more favourable, particularly due to the fact that these vehicles can 
deploy readily available fuels that do not require new production, storage or distribution 
facilities and can help achieve reductions in the other alternative fuels such as syn-fuels 
and biofuels. As discussed in the previous chapters, due to these advantages, hybrid 
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vehicles have been receiving increasing support from the UK government and are 
considered as the short to medium term solutions to the twin problems experienced in the 
transport sector. In the case that the ongoing R&D efforts and the financial incentives can 
further reduce prices, these vehicles can become more attractive to a larger number of 
end-users and therefore increase adoption. Under these circumstances, deploying this 
technology can lead to increasing returns to its adoption and therefore create an early 
lock-in, which can in turn hinder the transition to hydrogen FC vehicles. On the other 
hand, improvements in hybrid vehicles can increase the attractiveness of the FC vehicles. 
As demonstrated earlier, if hybridised with batteries, FC vehicles achieve the highest fuel 
and GHG savings that render these vehicles the most efficient amongst all the other 
alternatives when climate change and security of supply issues are concerned. Therefore, 
the learning achieved in hybridisation can be applied to FC vehicles, which might in turn 
increase their potential and reduce costs. Thus efforts to implement hybrid vehicles might 
compliment the adoption of FC vehicles. However, it must also be noted that these R&D 
activities could also benefit the electric vehicles. Improvements in the battery 
technologies, which would be a part of R&D activities in the hybrid vehicles, would 
support the developments in the electric vehicles. As previously demonstrated, EVs have 
a few advantages over the FCVs such as higher fuel efficiency, readily available fuel, 
easier access to refuelling facilities and lower emissions depending on the hydrogen and 
grid electricity production pathways
29
. Given these advantages, if the developments in 
battery technologies are achieved earlier than the developments in fuel cells, EVs can 
lock-in the market, though it must be noted that the initial adoption requires a major 
breakthrough in the battery technologies to allow for weight reductions and in turn 
efficiency gains, significant reductions in fuelling times as well as costs. To sum up, 
where the three factors of security of supply, climate change and costs are concerned, 
hybrid vehicles provide the most attractive option, which can compete against or 
compliment the fuel cell vehicles.  
 
However, although the costs of vehicles give an indication, the overall economics of 
switching to alternative transport modes can only be evaluated by taking into 
consideration the costs of alternative fuel production pathways in addition to the vehicles. 
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In addition, as one of the criteria is assessing the impacts of these pathways on climate 
change, the costs of reducing emissions in these pathways need to be analysed. Therefore, 
in order to provide a comparison based on the two criteria of climate change and energy 
security; the cost of substituting an alternative fuel to a conventional fuel running on 
different types of vehicles and the cost of CO2 avoided in that pathway are demonstrated. 
The EC (2007) calculates that, at an oil price of $50, substituting gasoline running on 
ICEV with hydrogen derived from natural gas running on ICEV requires an additional 
cost of 5.4 € per 100 km, if alternative vehicles of ICE hybrid, FC and FC hybrid are 
used, the costs would be 7.36 €/km, 7.07 €/km and 8.44 €/km respectively. While the 
costs of substituting hydrogen produced by thermal processes with gasoline are similar, if 
hydrogen is produced via electrolysis these costs demonstrate an increase of between 
15% and 40%.  
 
As described in Chapter 6, this is due to the higher costs associated with the electrolysers. 
On the other hand, associated substitution costs for the bio-fuels can vary between 0.99 
€/100km for bio-diesel and 2.79 €/100km for CBG when supplied to ICE vehicles 
whereas the corresponding costs for CNG and syn-diesel are less than 1 €/100km. as 
these calculations demonstrate hydrogen pathways are between two and eight times more 
costly than the other alternative fuels. Where the costs of CO2 avoided per tonne are 
concerned, biofuels provide the most cost-effective option followed by CNG and 
hydrogen produced by biomass and wind electrolysis. If these two factors are analysed 
together, bio-fuels provide the most economic option for both the fuel substitution and 
CO2 reductions. Similar to the competition between the FCV and hybrid vehicles, this 
can have two consequences where the transition to a hydrogen economy is concerned. 
Firstly, bio-fuels can be established to the point that it captures the market and erodes the 
need for hydrogen. However, because of other landscape pressures such as sustainable 
development there have been many arguments against the use of biomass such as forestry 
products for energy production purposes. Also as conventional biofuels generally use 
food crops the competition between the use of crops for food production and energy 
production has raised concerns. Another issue is related to the GHG emissions; as 
demonstrated in the calculations the GHG emissions from the biofuels fall in the 
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pathways that use some of the biomass feedstock for producing energy for the process. 
Although, this reduces the GHG emissions, because of the complexity of these systems, 
the efficiency falls and results in higher costs. Thus unless all these issues are addressed 
and further R&D activities are conducted that will increase efficiency and reduce their 
costs, the possibility of biofuels to create an early lock-in and hinder the future adoption 
of hydrogen is weak. Secondly, developments in the bio-fuel production methods can 
compliment the biomass based hydrogen pathways. As discussed in Chapter 6, bio-fuels 
can be used as intermediary steps to produce hydrogen thus developments and cost 
reductions in this pathway would be translated into improvements in the hydrogen 
produced via biomass.  
 
To summarise, where the three factors of security of supply, climate change and costs are 
concerned, the most important competitors to hydrogen and fuel cells in the transport 
sector are biofuels and hybrid vehicles. However, it must be noted that these calculations 
are done based on the oil price of $50/barrel therefore any changes in the oil prices effect 
the relative costs. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, increases in the oil prices or price of 
carbon can have a positive effect on the relative price of hydrogen. Also mentioned in 
Chapter 6, are that production and storage costs are sensitive to economies of scale and 
therefore can be reduced in the case they are produced on a mass scale. In addition, the 
security of supply concerns such as depletion of oil and natural gas and increasing import 
dependency, which necessitates the diversification in the fuel mix, continue to support the 
adoption of hydrogen. Although these concerns favour hydrogen produced by renewable 
energy sources or electrolysis (if the electricity is renewables based) which are currently 
more costly than the more mature pathways such as SMR of natural gas or coal 
gasification. Thus unless the efficiency and the GHG emissions of these pathways are 
improved significantly to compensate for the high prices or the costs of these pathways 
are reduced in a timely manner, the fact that competing technologies might constrain the 
transition to a hydrogen  remains. However, due to the synergies between hydrogen and 
the alternative options they can also compliment the transition to hydrogen by creating 
incremental changes. For instance, the CCS technologies can increase the attractiveness 
of more mature fossil fuel based hydrogen pathways by reducing the GHG emissions 
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whereas developments in biofuels could improve the performance and the costs of 
biomass based hydrogen. Similarly, progress in hybrid vehicles would have a positive 
impact on fuel cell vehicles; in the case that the costs of hybridisation are reduced, this 
would reflect on the price of FC hybrid vehicles. As these vehicles have the highest 
potential in terms of fossil fuel and GHG reduction, any decreases in costs would 
increase the attractiveness of these technologies and lead to their adoption. The entry of 
fuel cells into the market is important since they can act as a bridging technology; these 
vehicles can initially be run on the current fuels to avoid the high costs of hydrogen and if 
further improvements which lead to cost reductions can take place, they can open the way 
to the use of hydrogen. Thus, where the transition to a hydrogen economy is concerned, 
the existence of multiple technologies leads to a high level of uncertainty which is 
exacerbated by fast changing landscape developments and in turn influences the way 
actors respond to these pressures.  
7.3. Stationary Applications 
Despite the focus on the transport sector, as discussed in Chapter 6, hydrogen and fuel 
cells can be utilised to generate both centralised and distributed electricity and heat. 
Another area where hydrogen can contribute in the stationary power sector is electricity 
storage. However, as also demonstrated in Chapter 5, currently these technologies are 
mostly favoured in two areas in the UK; distributed electricity generation and combined 
heat and power generation applications. Over the years, the UK government has initiated 
a number of initiatives and introduced new measures to encourage the development and 
deployment of these technologies in stationary applications. Nevertheless, as fuel cells 
are not the only technologies that can be applied to distributed electricity production and 
CHP systems, their adoption will be dependent on their performance relative to the other 
available technologies. In other words, fuel cells will have to compete with the existing 
technologies and will need to provide better performance in order to take advantage of 
the window of opportunities that emerged in the UK energy LTS.  
 
Similar to the analysis in the previous section, due to the influences of the two landscape 
pressures; security of supply concerns and the climate change, the competing options are 
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compared on two dimensions. Firstly, the amounts of energy they use which provide an 
indication of the fossil fuel energy consumption, and secondly, the amount of GHG 
emissions they release to evaluate their environmental impact. As economics plays a 
significant role in transitions, the associated costs are also discussed. This analysis is 
based on the findings of the Argonne (2008) and the DTI (2005) fuel cell assessment 
report commissioned by the UK government. 
 
To start with, amongst the distributed power generation technologies fuel cells compete 
against the internal combustion engines and natural gas turbines. When technologies with 
capacities smaller than 10 kW are compared, Argonne (2008) demonstrates that both the 
PEMFC and SOFC achieve energy conversion efficiencies of around 34% and 40%, 
which are higher than the natural gas ICE efficiency which is 23%
30
. The situation is 
similar for applications with larger capacities (>10kW); energy conversion efficiency of 
the fuel cells ranges between 36% and 49% whereas the corresponding efficiency for ICE 
and micro turbines are 35% and 25% respectively
31
. In line with the energy conversion 
efficiencies, the overall energy consumption of fuel cells is estimated to be less than the 
ICE and micro turbines
32
. However, when compared with the grid-connected natural gas 
combined cycle power plants (NGCC), the fuel cells demonstrate a poorer performance
33
. 
Finally, fuel cells provide the lowest GHG emission levels amongst the distributed power 
generation technologies
34
. Nevertheless, fuel cells utilising natural gas can lead to higher 
GHG emissions when compared to the grid integrated NGCC plants
35
.  
 
To sum up, if the selection is based on these two criteria of fuel consumption and GHG 
emission levels, then the fuel cell based systems provide the highest potential amongst all 
the other distributed power generation technologies. However, as demonstrated in Figures 
11-14, the main competitor to the fuel cells is not one of the distributed generation 
technologies rather it is the grid-connected NGCC plants. Thus, unless the barriers 
against the distributed power generations technologies are removed, fuel cells can not 
compete against the grid connected NGCC plants. Although, this might not create a 
major issue in certain parts of the world, it poses a threat in Europe and particularly in the 
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UK as there has been a significant shift to the utilisation of natural gas and combined 
cycle gas turbine stations over the last two decades.  
 
Figure 10: Total energy consumption of distributed and grid connected power generation 
technologies (< 10 kW). 
Source: Argonne (Nov 2008), p: 8 
 
Figure 11: Total GHG emissions of distributed and grid connected power generation technologies. 
Source: Argonne (Nov 2008), p: 10 
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Figure 12: Total energy consumption of distributed and grid connected power generation 
technologies (>10 kW). 
Source: Argonne (Nov 2008), p: 11 
 
Figure 13: Total GHG emissions of distributed and grid connected power generation technologies 
(>10 kW). 
Source: Argonne (Nov 2008), p: 13 
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Unlike the power-alone installations, the competition between the fuel cells and other 
plants is severe in the combined heat and power generation applications. The calculations 
of the DTI (2005) demonstrate that the fuel cells consume less energy and lead to lower 
emissions when compared to the grid electricity or heat from a gas boiler
36
. However, 
they do not demonstrate any improvements over the natural gas based ICE or gas turbine 
CHP systems where the energy consumption levels are concerned
37
. The situation is not 
different where  the CO2 emissions are concerned. As demonstrated in the figures below; 
while fuel cell-CHP systems release less CO2 emissions than the grid or a gas boiler, their 
CO2 emission levels are equal to the natural gas based ICE or gas turbine CHP systems. 
Though where the other green house gases such as the NOx, SOx, CO and CH4 are 
concerned, fuel cell-CHP systems provide a better performance than their combustion 
based counterparts. Thus if the selection is based on these two criteria of fuel 
consumption and GHG emission levels, then the fuel cell CHP systems provide a better 
performance compared to the grid electricity or heat from a gas boiler. However, when 
compared to the natural gas based ICE-CHP or gas turbine CHP these technologies can 
only win this competition if the climate change regulations become the key priority on 
the public policy agenda.  
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Figure 14: Energy consumption of different CHP systems (200 kW) 
Source: DTI (2005), p: 30 
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Figure 15: Energy consumption of different CHP systems (1 MW) 
Source: DTI (2005), p: 31 
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Figure 16: CO2 emissions of different CHP systems, (200kW) 
Source: DTI (2005), p: 33 
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Figure 17: CO2 emissions of different CHP systems, (1 MW) 
Source: DTI (2005), p: 35 
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Figure 18: Total GHG of different CHP systems, (200 kW) 
Source: DTI (2005), p: 33 
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Figure 19: Total GHG of different CHP systems, (1 MW) 
Source: DTI (2005), p: 35 
 
As these results demonstrate while being more advantageous in the distributed power 
generation applications, fuel cells can provide the same energy performance and higher 
overall GHG reductions compared to their counterparts in CHP applications. Therefore 
they can be considered to be able to compete with the other technologies available in both 
the distributed power generation and CHP applications. However, whether this 
competition results in favour of the fuel cells also depends highly on the costs. 
Comparison of costs in this field is rare and most of the information in the literature is a 
few years old. One of the most recent reports that provided this type of comparison was 
published in 2006. Findings of this study demonstrates that the capital costs of fuel cells 
that can be utilised in stationary applications can be in the range of 2500$/kWe and 
3000$/kWe for MCFC and SOFC and can range between 3000$/kWe and 4000$/kWe for 
PAFC and PEMFC, whereas the corresponding costs for diesel and gas engines and gas 
turbines and micro turbines are less than 1000$/kWe
38
. As these costs demonstrate unless 
they are reduced, adopting fuel cells in stationary applications will be hard to envisage 
despite their energy and GHG advantages over their ICE counterparts. However it must 
also be noted that although the costs provide the alternatives with advantages over FCs, 
their development can actually benefit the fuel cells. As the DTI (2005) demonstrates if 
the fuel cells are hybridised with the gas turbines they consume 5.35 MJ/kWh, for 
distributed power generation systems with capacities of 1-10 MWe, whereas the 
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corresponding energy consumptions for CCGT and non-hybrid SOFC are 8.57 MJ/kWh 
and 6.81 MJ/kWh with the same capacities
39
. In addition, this hybrid system leads to 
265.37 g/kWh of CO2 which is almost half the amount released by the same capacity 
CCGT plant that releases 416.91 g/kWh of CO2
40
. Under these circumstances, although 
the alternatives can be favoured over the fuel cells, any developments in these 
technologies can benefit the FCs in the case that these systems are hybridised. Thus, the 
overall savings achieved by the hybrid systems can increase the attractiveness of fuel 
cells and lead to their adoption.  
7.4. Conclusions 
As mentioned earlier, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the competition between the 
hydrogen and the incumbents as well as the other emerging technologies that has 
occurred as a result of the landscape developments and developments in the UK energy 
LTS. Findings of these studies confirm the argument put forward throughout this thesis 
that competition can have three broad outcomes.  
 
Firstly, developments in the competing technologies can create an early lock-in to these 
alternatives. As has been demonstrated in the transport subsection, amongst the 
alternative fuels, bio-fuels are the most important competitors that not only provide fossil 
fuel and GHG emission reduction potential but also are significantly less costly compared 
to hydrogen. Under these circumstances, given the aforementioned incentives these fuels 
have been receiving in the last decade, they can create an early lock-in and eliminate the 
need for hydrogen which requires a highly costly infrastructure. Similarly, hybrid 
vehicles, although more energy and GHG intensive than the FCVs, hold the same lock-in 
potential due to lower costs and increasing support they have been receiving from the UK 
government. The same conclusions can be drawn for the stationary applications where 
the fuel cells are at least three times more expensive than the existing technologies. In the 
case these costs can not be justified by high levels of savings in energy and GHG 
emissions, they can lock the market in and discourage the deployment of fuel cell 
technologies.  
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Secondly, this competition can benefit the adoption of hydrogen technologies. As 
demonstrated in the transport section, there are synergies between the hydrogen and 
alternative fuels when production pathways are considered. Therefore any development 
and/or cost reductions in these fuels would help achieve better results with the hydrogen 
produced from biofuels. Finally, the competition can result in hybrid systems which hold 
the highest potential amongst all the alternatives to reduce energy consumption and GHG 
emissions. Therefore despite their high costs, they can become the preferred options and 
help adopt hydrogen and fuel cell technologies.  
 
These potential outcomes are highly dependent on the external pressures. For instance, in 
the case that climate change issues become the priority, renewables based hydrogen and 
fuel cells will definitely be favoured despite the aforementioned high costs. Thus, the 
outcome of the competition is highly uncertain and it will significantly depend on the 
landscape developments that will put pressure on the actors involved and in turn 
determine the direction of the transitions.  
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Chapter 8  
The London ‘Experience’  
8.1. Introduction 
It was argued in the previous chapters that the landscape developments have diffused 
downwards from an international to national and local levels and this has led to changes 
at each of these levels. The most important landscape developments that have caused 
these changes in the energy sector have been climate change and the security of supply 
issues. The increasing nature of these pressures has forced the actors involved to take 
measures to change the way energy is consumed and produced and paved the way for the 
emergence of alternative technologies including hydrogen and fuel cells.  
 
While there have been efforts to shift to these alternatives in different parts of the UK, 
London’s approach has been the most comprehensive that has involved the formulation 
of a climate change policy agenda, and at the same time, has encouraged the development 
and deployment of hydrogen technologies from a systems perspective. In the main, this 
can be attributed to the ambitious goals of the Mayor. After being elected as the first 
Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone initiated an agenda that would make London a leader 
on different fronts, two of which were envisioned to be climate change and the hydrogen 
economy. He aimed to make London a showcase green city that would eventually be 
based on a hydrogen economy. His approach to the adoption of hydrogen technologies 
was similar to the path followed by Edison who created a technological system around 
the electric lamp. He did not just want to just encourage R&D in the emerging field of the 
hydrogen economy, he also wanted to create a working system that could be showcased 
to generate interest. The first measure taken in this direction was the participation in the 
largest hydrogen demonstration project in Europe. This was the CUTE Project which 
prepared the foundations for the realisation of hydrogen based transport in London. 
However, the Mayor’s vision extended beyond the transport sector. Therefore, while 
focusing on expanding the transport applications, he simultaneously initiated fuel cell-
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based stationary applications. Although the pressure from the landscape developments 
became much more intense during his second term in office which forced him to adopt 
other technologies including biofuels and hybrid vehicles in the transport sector and 
renewables and CHP schemes, he always emphasised the importance of linking these 
technologies to hydrogen and fuel cells to enable the ultimate transition to a hydrogen 
economy. In addition to creating synergies, he supported the developments in the 
hydrogen field by setting up new institutions such as the London Hydrogen Partnership, 
and by bringing in actors from the private sector to bring financial security. In other 
words, he created small technological systems around hydrogen and fuel cells by 
complimenting these technologies with the other components required to adopt them into 
real environments. The results were successful. These joint efforts set in motion the 
transition to a hydrogen economy in London. 
 
However, this favourable environment created around the small hydrogen systems 
changed with the emergence of an unexpected landscape development-the economic 
recession and the elections which saw the election of a new Mayor. Although Boris 
Johnson continued to promote the climate change agenda, under pressure from the 
economic recession he diverted the focus away from costly hydrogen technologies to 
other alternatives. The most important change has been the support provided for electric 
vehicles in the transport sector. As discussed in the previous chapters, landscape 
developments can pressurise the actors involved to support a variety of technologies and 
the co-existence of multiple options will lead to competition. The outcome of which will 
either be the adoption of one of these technologies or lead to a hybrid design. The agenda 
followed by the new Mayor has encouraged this competition. As will be discussed later, 
the outcome of this competition can compliment the adoption of hydrogen technologies 
as experienced through participation in the CUTE trials, or create an early lock-in to the 
alternatives which might postpone the transition to hydrogen and fuel cells in London.  
8.2. Profile of London 
Since 1851 the city has gone through a number of structural changes in terms of its 
governance structure
1
. The current administrative structure that is the Greater London 
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Authority, which covers 32 boroughs and the Corporation of London was established in 
2000
2
. The first Mayor, Ken Livingstone, who was an independent candidate, served 
between 2000-2004 period
3
. After rejoining the Labour Party, Ken Livingstone was re-
elected in 2004 for the period of 2004-2008
4
. In 2008, the Conservative Boris Johnson 
took office
5
.  
 
Under the Greater London Authority Act (1999), the GLA was given the power to 
promote; (i) economic development and wealth creation, (ii) social development and (iii) 
improve the environment of Greater London
6
. As also under the Act, the GLA was 
allowed to prepare the Spatial Development Strategy that shows how the Mayor plans to 
meet it responsibilities. As stated in the Act, the GLA’s responsibilities that are related to 
energy and the environment involve protecting biodiversity, waste management, and 
improving air quality. As of 2007, with the amended GLA Act (2007), an additional 
responsibility was added. This was the mitigation of climate change within the Greater 
London area. 
 
Over the last decade, a number of measures have been taken to meet these 
responsibilities. As will be discussed later, for a number of reasons, climate change has 
been made the main priority and since the first Mayoral elections. A number of initiatives 
have been introduced to address this issue and to reduce CO2 emissions in the power, heat 
and transport sectors. Overall, the results have been positive. As shown in Figure 1, 
despite a 10% increase in the population between 2000-2006, London has reduced its 
CO2 emissions by 6% during this time. In total this accounted for 8.6% of total CO2 
emissions in the UK
7
. While 49% of these emissions came from the consumption of 
electricity in buildings and transport, non-electricity energy consumption in buildings and 
the fossil fuel utilisation in the transport sector accounted for 32% and 19% respectively
8
. 
The GLA (2010) estimates that unless new measures are taken, London’s emissions will 
be reduced by a further 10% against 1990 levels under a business as usual scenario
9
. As 
will be discussed later, the climate change policy agenda which was established over the 
last decade, in effect, compels the Mayor to take new measures that have been estimated 
will lead to cuts of 49% by 2025 over 1990 levels
10
.  
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Figure 1: CO2 emissions in London between 1990 and 2006 
Source: GLA (2010), p: 29 
8.3. Green Energy and Climate Change 
As discussed in the previous chapters, landscape developments including sustainable 
development, climate change and security of supply concerns have diffused downwards 
from international to national and to local levels and pressurised the actors involved at 
each level to take various measures. As described in Chapter 5, the situation was similar 
in the UK and the effects of these pressures were magnified by the changes that took 
place to UK energy policy and market structure. This change was the shift away from 
nationalisation to privatisation and competition. On one hand, this transformation led the 
UK government to reduce its involvement in the energy sector diverting its attention to 
other issues such as establishing a climate change agenda. On the other, the revenues 
raised by privatisation allowed the government to allocate resources to achieve the targets 
set as a part of this agenda.  
 
As previously stated, the stricter targets set by the government to meet its climate change 
obligations have influenced the other actors involved. The GLA was one of these actors 
that took initiatives to address the issue at a local level. The GLA Act (1999) had already 
given it the responsibility for dealing with a number of environmental issues. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the 1990s and early 2000s was the period when the climate 
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change agenda gained momentum in the policy arena. Influenced by the developments at 
the international and governmental levels, as the first Mayor, Ken Livingstone wanted to 
make a difference and initiated measures to prepare an ambitious agenda that would 
make London an international leader in the climate change arena. In 2001, he established 
the London Climate Change Partnership (LCCP) that would assist London in knowledge 
dissemination and in the preparation of a climate change adaptation strategy. The 
Partnership’s first report ‘London’s Warming’, which describes the impact of climate 
change on London was published in 2002
11
. His determination to put London on a path to 
reduce emissions much became clearer when he authorised London’s participation in the 
Clean Urban Transport for Europe project, established in 2001. The Mayor’s 
determination to reduce GHG emissions in the transport sector in London was confirmed 
once again with the announcement of the Congestion Charging, proposed in the Major’s 
Transport Strategy (2001) and introduced in February 2003
12
.  
 
However, the Mayor’s goals were not limited to the transport sector. This became 
apparent in the Mayor’s Energy Strategy published in May 2004. The Strategy proposed 
an emission reduction target of 20% below 1990 levels by 2010, and a 60% reduction 
from the 2000 level by 2050
13
. Similar to the UK government’s approach set out in the 
Energy White Paper (2003), in order to achieve these targets, the Mayor introduced an 
‘Energy Hierarchy’ which involved three measures; improving the efficiency in energy 
consumption (insulation, energy efficient lighting), use of renewable energy systems and 
increasing efficiency in energy supply via CHP and more decentralised energy 
production
14
. For this purpose, different resources/technologies including wind, solar, 
waste, CHP, decentralised power and hydrogen & fuel cells were supported through 
policies and proposals as stated in the Strategy (Table 1). To ensure that these alternatives 
received sufficient support and that the actors involved were guided towards adopting 
these technologies, the London Energy Partnership which would help the Mayor promote 
these alternative technologies was also established
15
. The plan for implementing these 
proposals and policies was announced in the Mayor’s Spatial Development Strategy-the 
London Plan (2004)
16
.  
 
 
 366 
Table 1: Policies and proposals introduced in the Major’s Energy Strategy  
 
Technology Policy Proposal 
Renewable 
Energy Systems 
Maximising renewable energy 
through urban renewables and 
purchasing renewable power 
 
 Encourage the link between 
renewables and hydrogen  
 
  Increasing renewable based 
electricity by at least 5% of the 
electricity generated in 2000 by 
2010 via photovoltaics, 5 large 
wind turbines, 500 small wind 
turbines, 25000 domestic solar 
water heating systems, 2000 solar 
water heating systems for pools, 
increasing anaerobic digestion 
plants and biomass-based CHP 
Combined Heat 
and Power 
Generation 
(CHP) 
 Increasing CHP by at least 
doubling the CHP capacity 
achieved in 2000 
Decentralised 
Electricity 
Generation 
Developing electricity network 
to increase distributed power 
generation 
 
Community 
Heating 
Increasing community heating  
Micro CHP Increasing micro-CHP in areas 
with high heat demand density 
 
Hydrogen and 
Fuel Cells 
 Development of hydrogen and 
fuel cells in London to provide 
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low and zero emissions energy 
Nuclear Power The Mayor opposes to 
developing new nuclear power 
capacity. 
 
 
Source:  GLA (2004), pp: 67-90 
 
All these measures were important stepping stones that emerged from the climate change 
agenda and put London on a path to implement low carbon energy technologies. 
Following the elections in 2004, in his second term of office, Ken Livingstone 
accelerated the activities to tackle climate change which was made the main policy 
priority. He aimed to unite all the initiatives by providing a framework for climate change 
policy. His first action in this direction was establishing the London Climate Change 
Agency (LCCA 2005)set up as a ‘municipal company owned by the London Development 
Agency and led by the Mayor’ to implement projects in the energy, transport, waste and 
water sectors
17
. Different than LCCP, the objective of the LCCA was to deliver the 
climate change policy and Mayor’s Energy Strategy that was also financially supported 
by private companies such as BP, Lafarge, Rockefeller Brothers and Johnson & 
Matthey
18
. In order to promote and demonstrate the importance of climate change policy 
in London in the international arena, in 2005, the GLA hosted the C40 (Cities Climate 
Leadership Group) where an agreement was signed to create alliances to accelerate 
actions to develop and deploy low carbon energy technologies
19
. The following year, the 
Major signed a partnership with the Clinton Climate Initiative which aimed to reduce 
GHG emissions in large cities
20
.  
 
All these activities to establish a climate change policy agenda were taken a step forward 
with the Mayor’s Climate Change Action Plan, published in 2007. In the Plan, it was 
stated that with the help from the government, London could reduce its emissions by 60% 
by 2025 against the 2000 levels
21
. In order to achieve this onerous target, the Plan 
focused on moving away from the grid to decentralised energy to reduce the emissions in 
the power and heat sectors via increasing combined cooling, heat and power generation 
(including fuel cells), energy production from waste and onsite renewables
22
. The Plan 
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also involved a target to supply more than half of London’s energy by decentralised 
energy by 2050
23
. As described in the LCCA report (2007), the shift to distributed 
generation would be ensured by the newly established London ESCO, which was partly 
owned by LCCA and EDF energy
24
. Despite realising the limited opportunities, the large 
scale renewables; wind, tidal and wave power were promoted
25
. While the focus on 
hydrogen and fuel cells for transport applications continued, the Plan included a new 
technological solution, the diesel-electric hybrid vehicles to cut emissions in the transport 
sector
26
. As it was already stated in Mayor’s response to the Energy Review (2006), the 
Mayor had recognised the need to implement other technologies including bio-fuels and 
hybrid vehicles in the short term, until the uptake of hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles
27
. In 
2006, the Major had announced 6 hybrid buses to run on Route 360 and in the Plan, an 
ambitious agenda of converting the entire bus fleet (8000) to diesel-electric hybrid 
vehicles was proposed
28
.  
 
In order to help the Mayor deliver these targets, in the same year, the LCCA published an 
Implementation Strategy which introduced a number of programmes including; the Green 
Housing Programme; the Better Buildings Programme; Green 500 to increase efficiency 
in residential and commercial buildings; and projects to increase decentralised energy 
supply by 25% by 2025
29
. However, despite the efforts, it was recognised in the London 
Plan (2008) that without significant changes to national energy policy, and under the 
population projections that would lead to increasing demand, it would be difficult to meet 
the 60% reduction target by 2025
30
. Therefore, the London Plan (2008) reiterated the 
long-term emission reduction target of 60% by 2050 and set incremental targets to 
achieve this long-term goal; 15% by 2010, 20% by 2015, 25% by 2020 and 30% by 2025 
against a 1990 base
31
. Another policy that was implemented in the London Plan was that 
new developments would need to be designed to integrate onsite renewables to reduce 
20% of their CO2 emissions
32
. To achieve this target developers could chose to 
implement a variety of technologies including; biomass fired CHP/CCHP, biomass 
heating, renewable energy from waste, photovoltaics, solar water heating, wind as well as 
hydrogen and fuel cells
33
. 
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All these initiatives proved successful. As the study by Day et al. (2007) shows the 113 
installations out of 350 approved by the GLA between 2004- 2007 managed to reduce 
CO2 emissions by 25.8%; while 5.8% came from installations equipped with renewables, 
the rest was achieved by the CHP and energy efficiency measures
34
. Out of 113 
installations, 100 of them implemented one type or a combination of different types of 
renewables
35
. Although the renewables made a considerable contribution, the largest CO2 
savings came from the 2 CHP schemes based on biomass followed by the 2 fuel cell CHP 
installations
36
.  
 
As these results confirm, the Mayor’s efforts during his two terms in office to implement 
a climate change agenda for London and to cut CO2 emissions proved successful. 
Although these actions were driven by Livingstone’s personal ambition to make London 
a world leader in tackling climate change, it became a legal requirement with the GLA 
Act (2007) which stated that the Major has a ‘duty to exercise powers… to contribute 
towards the mitigation of, or adaptation to climate change in the United Kingdom’. The 
Mayor’s initiatives combined with the statutory requirements opened a new era; the 
climate change policy was finally established in London
37
.  
 
However, despite these positive developments, following the Mayoral elections in May 
2008, scepticism regarding London’s climate change agenda has increased. This was 
mainly due to the new Mayor’s first actions that included absorbing the LCCA into the 
London Development Agency and postponing decisions such as adjusting the congestion 
charge to ‘reward’ lower carbon vehicles38. One of the reasons behind these actions is in 
all probability to the economic recession, which necessitates an greater political 
willingness and leadership to address the issue of climate change. Another possible 
reason is that the new Mayor similar to the former might want to make a difference, this 
time by not following the footsteps of his predecessor. However, whatever the reason 
may be, the legally binding GLA Act (2007), the legacy of policies set by the former 
Mayor and the past investments that have already been made in the ongoing projects will 
continue to force the hand of the new Major.  
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In fact, the two reports which were published between the elections and the end of 2009 
prove this statement right. Firstly, the report; Powering Ahead (Oct 2009) which deals 
with the developments in the power and heat sectors in London, demonstrates that the 
previously set focus on decentralised energy remains the same
39
. It is reported that the 
LDA is investing up to £16 million to support distributed energy projects and a further 
£100 million is expected to be available through the Joint European Support for 
Sustainable Investment in City Areas (JESSICA) fund, £64 million of which will be 
allocated to decentralised projects and the other £36 million will be invested in waste 
infrastructure
40
. In addition, a ‘Decentralised Energy Centre of Excellence’ will be 
established to provide support for the actors involved to further increase distributed 
energy generation in London
41
. As stated in the report, as of 2009, there were around 100 
projects that involved district heating schemes, biomass heating, CHP powered by gas, 
biomass and waste and fuel cells
42
.  
 
Secondly, the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (Oct 2009) set the policy of cutting CO2 
emissions from road transport by 60% by 2050 against the 1990 levels
43
. In order to 
achieve this target the following measures were introduced; increasing the electric-
powered vehicle fleet by 2015, ensuring all new buses entering fleets from 2011/12 to be 
lower carbon, completing the Low Carbon Taxi Development Programme by 2012,a  
three-year trial of at least five hydrogen-powered buses from 2010 and conducting carbon 
footprint assessments for major infrastructure schemes
44
. These specific measures were 
introduced in addition to the efforts to increase behavioural change such as encouraging 
cycling. Although these new targets show that the climate change policies would be 
pursued, there would be changes in the way these targets would be met. The most 
significant difference was the emphasis on hydrogen and fuel cell technologies, 
especially in the transport sector. As mentioned earlier, the main objective of the first 
Mayor was to ultimately establish a hydrogen economy in London and therefore other 
technologies such as biofuels and hybrids were viewed as intermediary solutions to 
current problems and technologies that could compliment the adoption of a hydrogen 
economy. However, the new transport strategy clearly shows that there was a shift in 
focus away from hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles towards the electric vehicles. As will be 
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discussed later, such a change in focus can have a negative impact on the transition to 
hydrogen technologies.  
 
To sum up, over the last decade, London has gone through a major transformation. 
Developments that have occurred at the landscape development have diffused downwards 
from an international and fed through to the national and local levels. Landscape 
developments and changes in the UK energy LTS, when combined with the political 
leadership and willingness of the first London Mayor, placed climate change issues at the 
top of London’s policy agenda. The establishment of a climate change policy and the 
policies and targets introduced as a part of this agenda have turned London into a 
platform that has provided window of opportunities for the alternative technologies to 
flourish. Hydrogen and fuel cell technologies have benefited significantly from these 
changes. However, the landscape developments which have become more intense over 
the years such as the increasing urgency of security of supply concerns and the slow 
uptake of hydrogen technologies forced the Mayor to establish other alternative 
technologies such as biofuels and hybrids in the transport sector. Although during the 
term of the first Mayor these changes did not create any threat against the development of 
hydrogen technologies, the emergence of a new landscape development- the economic 
recession influenced  the newly elected Major to seek other alternatives such as electric 
vehicles that required less onerous and therefore less costly changes to the current 
infrastructure. As will be discussed later, the co-existence of multiple technological 
options can have different effects on the adoption of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies; 
they can compliment or constrain the transition to hydrogen technologies.  
8.4. Emergence of a Hydrogen Economy:  A Case study of FC 
Buses 
 
Having a vision to make London a worldwide leader in the climate change arena, 
Livingstone took a number of measures to cut GHG emissions in London. As a part of 
this overall vision he aimed to create a hydrogen economy in London. As stated in the 
Mayor’s Energy Strategy, the ultimate goal of the Mayor was for London to lead the 
hydrogen fuel cell industry which could fan out to the whole UK and give the country a 
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competitive advantage over the other countries
45
. In addition, because of the low 
emissions and resource flexibility of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies, implementing 
these technologies in London would enable the Mayor to meet his other responsibilities  
(reducing noise and air pollution and waste management) assigned under the GLA Act 
(1999).  
 
The first measure in this direction was to give approval to London’s participation in the 
CUTE project in 2001. In order to provide the hydrogen economy with support the 
Mayor also set up the London Hydrogen Partnership (LHP) which was given the 
responsibility to facilitate new projects and improve the performance of hydrogen and 
fuel cell niches in London
46
. The LHP is set up as a private-public partnership that brings 
together public authorities such as BERR, GLA, TfL; major private companies including 
BP, BOC, BMW as well as universities
47
. The initial focus of the LHP was mainly on 
transport applications. The London Hydrogen Action Plan (2002) identified how the 
transition to hydrogen based transport sector was envisioned in London. The starting 
point would be the fuel cell buses because of their ability to accommodate large fuel 
tanks and refuel at the predetermined depots
48
. This would be followed by the London 
taxis that would provide controllability to a certain extent as they run within a defined 
range even though they do not return to refilling station
49
. The final aspect of the strategy 
involved identifying the most suitable pathways for the refuelling infrastructure
50
. The 
CUTE Project which commenced in 2003 provided a living platform for the first stage of 
the plan. The following two stages were also initiated by a research project assigned to 
Imperial College Centre for Energy Policy
51
.  
 
As it was implied in the Mayor’s Energy Strategy (2004), the underlying reason behind 
the choice of transport sector as the starting point was ‘the level of mayoral control of 
public transport, and its high number of taxis and vans which offered a massive 
opportunity for developing the use of hydrogen in London’52. In addition, the Clean 
Urban Transport for Europe (CUTE) programme had provided a timely opportunity to 
fast track measures in this field. The  CUTE project can be considered as the first niche 
that was created around hydrogen and fuel cell technologies in London. This private-
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public partnership initiative which was partly funded by the European Commission was 
established in 2001
53
. The aim of this initiative was to create a demonstration platform 
for hydrogen fuel cell buses which would enable the development of fuel cells for 
transport applications in Europe via learning-by-doing, and using and interacting
54
. The 
project involved 27 buses running in 9 cities in Europe; Amsterdam, Barcelona, 
Hamburg, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Porto, Stockholm and Stuttgart
55
.  
 
The project which commenced in London in 2003 aimed to achieve two objectives; (i) to 
experiment the operation of fuel cell busses in a real world environment, and (ii) to 
establish a hydrogen refuelling facility
56
. For this purpose 3 FC buses started to run on 
route RV1 between Covent Garden and Tower Gateway in London
57
. While the buses 
were provided by DaimlerChrysler, BP working in collaboration with BOC was 
responsible for the construction of the refuelling station in Hornchurch, Essex
58
. In 
addition, to EC and Energy Savings Trust representing the UK Department for Transport 
who co-funded the London part of the project, other public authorities involved the 
Mayor of London and Transport for London whose aims were to reduce noise and air 
pollution as proposed in the Mayor’s strategies59. Finally bus operators; First Group and 
London Buses Limited participated as their aim was to see the eventual shift away from 
diesel to hydrogen buses
60
. The involvement of these actors from different disciplines and 
with different expectations as well as running the buses by regular bus drivers under 
normal traffic conditions of London created a real world environment.  
 
In other words, this project provided the perfect example for creation of a small 
technological system. It involved the necessary physical artefacts; fuel cells, buses, 
natural resources and technologies required to produce hydrogen as well as a refuelling 
station. As described in Chapter 6, these are all the parts that are necessary to build a 
decentralised hydrogen energy system. In addition to the technological components, this 
closed system also integrated the actors from different disciplines who build, finance 
and/or regulate different components of the system. Finally, by running it in a real 
environment, it allowed the emergence of problems that provided learning mechanisms to 
further develop and adjust the system to its environment.  
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For these reasons, the trial proved to be a very useful exercise which provided an 
understanding of the potential of the FC buses and difficulties that could be experienced 
in establishing hydrogen powered transport. For instance, while the bus operations were 
satisfactory, a number of problems emerged during the planning application of the 
refuelling station. The station would be placed at one of BP’s fuel stations in Hornchurch 
for which the planning application was submitted in September 2002
61
. However, the 
Environment Agency refused the application three times due to opposition from the local 
residents
62
. The approval of the planning permission took almost two years and in fact the 
buses started to operate with a temporary filling station
63
. While the lack of public 
acceptance created problems, in terms of technologies the results were satisfactory. Fuel 
cell buses proved their reliability by running with 90% availability over three years
64
. No 
accidents or hazards occurred as a result of hydrogen utilisation
65
. However, the fuel 
consumption of the FC buses was found to be 30 to 40% higher than its diesel 
counterparts
66
. Though, as demonstrated in the final CUTE Report (2006), the FC buses 
demonstrated potential to be designed for a better fuel economy that could be achieved by 
hybridisation and regenerative breaking that could lead to 25% reductions in the overall 
fuel consumption
67
. London continued to participate in the second part of the project, 
namely HyFLEET:CUTE project which involved operation of 47 buses (both FC and 
ICE) in 10 cities
68
. 
 
This project was important as it provided a platform for learning processes (including 
learning-by-doing, using and interacting) which enabled further development of the 
technologies. It also played a crucial role in creating public acceptance and encouraging 
private sector involvement. Successful results when combined with the willingness of a 
political leader; in this case the Major of London generated momentum. This momentum 
was also due to several events that. Due to extension, the trials in London continued until 
the end of 2006
69
. As discussed in Chapter 5, the following year the government 
published the Energy White Paper (2007) which set stricter targets and emphasised the 
importance of shifting away from oil to low carbon alternative fuels and technologies in 
the transport sector. In the same year, the GLA Act (2007) added tackling climate change 
to the responsibilities of the Mayor. In additional, oil prices were on a upward trend, at 
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the same time North Sea oil s were diminishing which turned the UK  into a net oil 
importer after almost three decades. The success of the niche applications which was 
complemented by the landscape developments of climate change and security of supply 
issues as well as the UK government’s willingness to deploy alternative technologies 
encouraged the deployment of hydrogen and fuel cells in London. Under all these 
favourable conditions, Ken Livingstone approved the support for a five year London 
Hydrogen Transport Programme which involved the introduction of 5 new fuel cell 
busses, 5 hydrogen ICE buses and 60 hydrogen vehicles by 2010
70
. In other words, the 
combination of the successful results achieved during the transfer of this small 
technological system to the real environment and the positive external factors led to 
growth of the system.  
 
As the Large Technological Systems theory suggests, during the evolution of systems, 
reverse salients of a different nature can occur, the solution to which can emerge a new 
technological system. These new technological systems can co-exist for a while during 
which they compete for adoption. The result can be in favour of one of the options 
eliminating the need for the other or can result in a hybrid system. This was the case in 
the CUTE Programme. As discussed earlier, while the support for hydrogen technologies 
continued, the Mayor also started to promote other alternative technologies including bio-
fuels and hybrid vehicles. This was due to slow uptake of hydrogen technologies and the 
urgency of security of supply concerns which necessitated immediate solutions until the 
hydrogen and fuel cell technologies could be implemented. Such a co-existence of 
alternative technologies could lead to competition that could constrain or compliment the 
adoption of these technologies. In the case of hydrogen buses in London, they had 
complimentary effects. The hybrid buses introduced started to show that they could lead 
to fuel savings. As discussed earlier, the reverse salient that occurred during the fuel cell 
trials was economic in nature. The high costs of hydrogen fuel and one of the technical 
problems that caused this was the low fuel efficiency. The solution to this problem came 
from the hybrid buses. As discussed in Chapter 7, when hybridised with an electric 
battery, the fuel efficiency of fuel cell vehicles increase. Taking this principle into 
account, the new programme employed fuel cell hybrid vehicles which demonstrated that 
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developments in a competing technology could compliment the adoption of hydrogen 
fuel cell technologies. 
 
While one of the reasons behind the complimentary impact of competing technologies 
was the technological inter-relatedness, the other reason was the strategy pursued by Ken 
Livingstone. His ultimate goal was to implement hydrogen technologies and therefore 
viewed other technologies as intermediary stages in the transition to a hydrogen 
economy. In fact, he followed the same strategy in the other applications of hydrogen and 
fuel cells. The fuel cell CHP system which included renewable sources such as solar 
heating established in Woking was an important indication of his approach. As discussed 
earlier, in the heat and power sector the Mayor’s priority was the decentralised energy 
technologies including small scale renewables and CHP schemes. There are synergies 
between these technologies and hydrogen and fuel cells. Hydrogen can be used to create 
storage mechanisms for renewable electricity and use of a fuel cell can increase the 
efficiency of CHP systems. These synergies were recognised by the Mayor, who stated in 
the Energy strategy that ‘the Mayor encourages the mutually supportive link between the 
use of renewable energy technologies and hydrogen as a fuel in London, as part of a 
move to establish widespread use of low and zero emission sources of heat and power’71. 
The realisation and encouragement of these inter-linkages by the actors who have the 
authority to make decisions has allowed the hydrogen and fuel cell technologies to be 
adopted with some considerable ease in London.  
 
However, the situation has changed slightly since the Mayoral elections. The economic 
recession combined with the lack of new Mayor’s enthusiasm to promote these 
technologies has slowed down the activities to promote hydrogen technologies. For 
instance, the fleet of 70 hydrogen vehicles which would be ready by 2010, has not been 
delivered and instead, the Mayor announced the fleet of five hydrogen fuel cell hybrid 
buses which may be increased to eight depending on the funding that might be received 
from the European Union
72
. Instead, the Mayor announced a new target to introduce at 
least 1000 GLA fleet electric vehicles and 25000 charging spaces by 2015
73
. Although 
the strategy of increasing hybrid vehicles was initiated by Ken Livingstone, the 
 377 
introduction of the number of vehicles proposed by Mayor can create a significant threat 
to the adoption of hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles in the absence of political willingness 
and thus support for these technologies. Under these circumstances, increasing efforts to 
establish the electric infrastructure and vehicles can create a lock-in and eliminate the 
need for hydrogen vehicles which are already more costly than these vehicles. On the 
other hand, as experienced during the CUTE trials, these technologies can pave the way 
for a gradual transition to hydrogen technologies. This will however depend very much 
on encouraging niches which can provide platforms to create learning mechanisms that 
can allow for timely technological developments and cost reductions. As discussed 
throughout the thesis, another factor will be the developments at the landscape level. 
Because of the changing nature of these developments they can either encourage or deter 
the transition to a hydrogen economy.  
8.5. Conclusions 
The landscape developments and in turn the changes to UK energy policy diffused 
downwards to the local level (London). The combination of these changes and the new 
Mayor’s ambition to make London an international leader in climate change arena has 
made this issue the key policy priority in London. A number of measures have been taken 
in the past decade to establish the climate change agenda. These initiatives have created a 
necessity to change the ways energy is produced and consumed. As clearly stated in the 
Mayor’s Energy Hierarchy, the aim was to increase efficiency in both the energy supply 
and consumption and to shift to cleaner alternative energy technologies including 
hydrogen and fuel cells. 
  
Hydrogen and fuel cell technologies were favoured due to synergies between these 
technologies and other greener alternatives such as renewables, use of waste and CHP 
schemes which would enable the Mayor to address a number of issues at the same time. 
In addition, the other reason was Ken Livingstone’s ambition to make London a world 
leader on different fronts and the fact that hydrogen and fuel cell technologies had 
become increasingly attractive since the start of the 21
st
 century on a global basis, made 
these technologies the ideal candidate to achieve the multiple objectives of the Mayor.   
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In order to generate an initial attractiveness and demonstrate the usefulness and 
functioning of these technologies a systems approach was followed. Therefore the first 
measure was to create a small technological system around these technologies which was 
immediately applied to the real world environment. In order to enable the functioning of 
these technologies in the real world, they needed to be supplemented by physical artefacts 
such as complimentary technologies and natural resources as well as the relevant actors 
to operate, control and finance this new system. The CUTE Project provided the perfect 
platform for an immediate application of this kind which allowed contributions from not 
only the local and national actors but also the international ones. As expected during the 
adjustment of these technologies into the real environment, reverse salients of a different 
nature have occurred and they have provided the basis for learning mechanisms which 
led to improvements in the system. The satisfactory results led to new orders, in other 
words, growth of this system.  
 
However, because of the slow uptake of these technologies, the Mayor had initiated 
measures to develop other technologies to create solutions to the urgent security of 
supply and climate change issues. Although the concern was that the developments in 
hybrid vehicles could eliminate the need for hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles, the outcome 
was different. The FC trials had proven that the changes in the FC design could improve 
the fuel efficiency of these technologies and create a solution to the high costs of 
hydrogen fuel. It became clear that this could be achieved by adopting the principle of 
hybrid buses which employed an ICE and an electric battery that would lead to at least 
25% gains in fuel consumption. Therefore, as opposed to the concerns over the negative 
effects, the co-existence of two technologies complimented the developments in 
hydrogen fuel cell buses. In fact the new orders placed were for the hybrid FC buses 
because of these positive impacts.  The Mayor followed a similar strategy in the 
stationary applications of fuel cells and encouraged the developments in renewables and 
other decentralised technologies such as CHP to compliment the eventual transition to 
hydrogen economy in other fields.  
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All these efforts set in motion the transition to hydrogen technologies. However, the 
unexpected changes at the landscape developments; the emergence of economic recession 
and the goals of the new Mayor have created a shift in focus away from hydrogen to 
other alternative technologies. As demonstrated earlier, the new Mayor favours the 
electric vehicles in the transport sector and has already allocated support to ensure the 
deployment of these vehicles and the necessary infrastructure. This approach might create 
a problem where the transition to hydrogen economy is concerned. In the case that 
support for hydrogen technologies is not increased and the developments in the electric 
vehicles are accelerated, this might lead to an early lock-in to the latter technologies 
which may constrain the transition to hydrogen technologies in the transport sector. On 
the other hand, as experienced following the CUTE trials, this might have complimenting 
impacts and lead to further adoption of these technologies.  
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
 
9.1. Theoretical Aspects 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the aim of this thesis is to analyse the factors that can set in 
motion a techno-economic transition to the hydrogen economy in the UK. The findings of 
the literature review show that no single theory or framework in the literature is 
sufficiently equipped to analyse transitions to alternative energy systems in the energy 
sector. As described throughout the thesis, the complexity of the sector requires an 
analysis covering the fields of environmental and energy policy, international and 
national energy markets, science and technology as well as innovation management. 
 
Therefore, the first objective and the contribution of this thesis is to create a new tool to 
provide a structured examination of the factors that can affect the adoption of, and in 
turn, transition to a hydrogen economy. As demonstrated in the literature review, the LTS 
theory comes closest to describing all these factors that affect a transition to a technology 
with infrastructure. A large technical system is defined as a system that involves physical 
and non-physical artefacts as well as system builders all of which interact. The LTS 
framework enables the examination of the developments in different components of a 
system and provides insights into understanding the formation of small closed systems 
and their evolution into large technical systems that interact with their environment. 
However, this framework fails to clarify the disaggregation between the levels of small 
and large technological systems and the surrounding environment complicates the already 
complex systems theory. 
 
This problem is tackled with the use of the MLP theory which distinguishes three levels: 
(i) a micro-level of technological niches, (ii) a meso-level of socio-technical regimes; (iii) 
a macro-level of socio-technical landscapes. The integration between the MLP and LTS 
theories is done by considering the concept of LTS as a proxy for socio-technical regime 
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level. By doing so the energy sector is regarded as an open LTS that is situated at the 
meso-level, comprises of its own components and subsystems, and interacts with the 
developments at the landscape and niche levels. Hydrogen technologies, on the other 
hand, are accepted as new small technological systems at the niche level that need to be 
developed to be adopted in the current energy LTS.  
 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, fast changing developments at the macro-level and the 
problems that might occur in the energy LTS can alter the choices of the actors involved 
and emerge a number of alternatives that can lead to competition. As this competition can 
compliment and/or hinder the transition to a hydrogen economy, it also needs to be 
analysed. Therefore in order to incorporate the analysis of competition, the final step in 
creating this tool involves combining the aforementioned theories with the competing 
technologies theory postulated by Paul David and Brian Arthur.  
 
To sum up, the new tool created in this thesis incorporates three theories namely the 
niche-based Multi-Level Perspective (MLP), the Large Technological Systems (LTS) and 
the Competing Technologies theory postulated by Paul David and Brian Arthur. Firstly, 
the MLP framework enables the structuring of the problems experienced within and 
outside the energy sector at three levels; (i) a micro-level of technological niches; (ii) a 
meso-level of socio-technical regimes; (iii) a macro-level of socio-technical landscapes. 
Secondly, the LTS theory provides the understanding that the energy sector can be treated 
as a large technological system that is situated at the meso-level, comprises of its own 
components and subsystems and interacts with the developments at the landscape and 
niche levels. Finally, the competing technologies theory shows the importance of factors 
such as learning mechanisms, network externalities, economies of scale and technological 
interrelatedness as well as informational increasing returns, which create increase the 
attractiveness to a technology and lead to its adoption as opposed to the competing 
option.  
 
The second contribution is to demonstrate the functioning of this integrated tool by 
applying it to a historical case study. This combined tool is applied to the case of 
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electrification to show; (i) how it can be used to analyse different levels of interactions 
within and between a large technical system and landscape developments and niches; (ii) 
the mechanisms behind the evolution of a small system into a large technical system; and 
(iii) how a transition to one technological system can be affected by the co-existence of 
alternatives; and finally (iv) how transitions can occur as a result of hybridisation of two 
competing technological systems. This case study was chosen as it has a number of 
similarities with the issues related to the transition to a hydrogen economy in the current 
energy LTS. It also provides insights into understanding one of the reasons why the 
current energy system is locked-in to the use of fossil fuels. 
9.2. Summary of the General Findings and Contribution  
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the second objective of this thesis is to analyse the evolution of 
events at the macro and meso levels that might affect the adoption of hydrogen 
technologies. For this purpose, firstly, the macro-level is analysed chronologically to 
examine the evolution of events that took place at the landscape level over the last four 
decades. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, a number of developments in the last four 
decades have led to the emergence of two main problems affecting the energy LTS; 
climate change issues and security of supply concerns including energy price 
fluctuations, the depletion of natural resources, import dependency and the aging of 
assets. Up until 2008, these landscape developments put increasing pressure on the actors 
involved in the energy LTS to take measures to address both issues. Solutions took the 
forms of new regulations such as legally binding emission reduction targets, new carbon 
trading systems, taxes and incentives to encourage carbon savings and reallocation of the 
RD&D budgets to support the uptake of low carbon alternative energy technologies. In 
other words, these pressures generated a new degree of flexibility in the locked-in energy 
LTS which started to favour the development of hydrogen technologies.  
 
Nevertheless, the situation changed with the emergence of a sudden landscape 
development; the economic recession which was followed by sharp declines in global oil 
prices. This change at the landscape level altered the priorities. It rendered the previously 
promising hydrogen technologies unattractive and created new windows of opportunity 
 385 
for other alternatives that are more cost-effective and not necessarily as efficient. Though 
the recent changes such as the gradual increases in oil prices and improvements in the 
state of the markets might once again transform this situation and have a positive impact 
on hydrogen technologies. Thus, the first contribution of this analysis at the macro-level 
is that it demonstrates the fast-changing nature of the landscape developments. On one 
hand, these developments can generate an environment that will favour certain 
technologies, on the other, the emergence of a new factor can alter the previous 
conditions and have a negative impact on the same technologies. This leads to the second 
finding that landscape developments are unpredictable. Finally, such volatility creates 
uncertainty as a result of which actors involved tend to support a number of technologies 
to reduce risks.  
 
Secondly, the meso-level is also analysed in a similar fashion which focused on the 
evolution of developments that took place in the UK energy LTS over the last four 
decades. This analysis is done to provide an understanding of how landscape 
developments have diffused downwards to the national level in the case of the UK and 
how these changes created opportunities for the emergence of alternative technologies 
since the 1970s. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the first contribution of this analysis is 
that it explains the events that took place in the realms of policy and market and how 
these changes have affected the fossil fuels industry and in turn created a lock-in to the 
use of these fuels. Secondly, it demonstrates how the landscape developments such as 
climate change issues have led to new regulations which initiated openings in the lock-in 
condition. In addition, the investigation shows that these openings are also created due to 
problems that have become apparent in the UK energy LTS over the last decade such as 
the increasing demand for electricity and transport fuels, diminishing North Sea supplies 
and the increase in imports, aging of assets as well as the insufficient supply from 
renewables. Finally based on these findings, this investigation shows that these openings 
have supported a number of technologies including hydrogen and fuels but also created 
competition between these technologies which can have multiple outcomes where the 
transition to hydrogen technologies is concerned.  
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The analyses carried out to achieve objective 2 of this thesis leads to the third objective 
which is to provide a brief comparison between the hydrogen technologies and alternative 
energy systems to determine the possible outcomes of competition and hence the 
transitional pathways. For this purpose, Chapter 6 defines the hydrogen economy by 
providing an analysis on the production, storage and distribution of hydrogen as a fuel, as 
well as the end-uses of this resource including fuel cells, internal combustion engines and 
gas turbines. By doing so, it contributes to developing an understanding that despite their 
radical nature, hydrogen and its enabling technologies are directly related to the 
incumbent resources and technologies and that they can be hybridised with the current 
energy LTS.  
 
In the following chapter, hydrogen and fuel cells are compared to the other alternative 
energy systems. This evaluation is done in two sectors; transport and power generation in 
order to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of hydrogen and fuel cells over 
their counterparts in these two fields where hydrogen technologies can be adopted. This 
comparison is undertaken upon three key parameters; fuel efficiency, GHG emissions and 
costs. These parameters are identified according to developments at the landscape level 
which pressurise actors involved to select technologies that will reduce carbon-based 
emissions and decrease dependency on fossil fuels within acceptable cost limitations.  
 
Firstly, findings of this study demonstrates that while hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and fuel 
cell based distributed power generation and CHP systems result in lower fossil fuel 
consumption and GHG emissions, their costs are significantly higher compared to other 
alternative energy systems. This leads to the second finding that, developments in the 
competing technologies can create an early lock-in to these alternatives due to their cost 
advantages which provide one of the most important selection criteria particularly 
following the economic recession and declines in oil prices. On the other hand, this 
competition can benefit the adoption of hydrogen technologies as there are synergies 
between the hydrogen and alternative fuels and technologies. Therefore any development 
and/or cost reductions in the latter would help achieve better results with the hydrogen 
and fuel cell technologies. Finally, the competition can result in hybrid systems that have 
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the greatest potential amongst all the alternatives to reduce energy consumption and GHG 
emissions. Therefore despite their high costs, they can become the preferred options and 
help adopt hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. Thus, the main contribution of the 
analysis provided in Chapters 6 and 7 is that it analyses the transition to hydrogen 
technologies by taking into consideration not only these technologies but also the others 
that are available in the current energy LTS. By doing so it illustrates that competition 
between the hydrogen and alternatives can lead to a number of transitional pathways 
which will be determined by landscape developments and the choices of actors involved. 
 
The final contribution of this thesis is the demonstration of some of the key points on a 
case study. For this purpose, a very specific niche; the hydrogen fuel cell applications for 
the transport sector in London, was selected. This case study demonstrates how landscape 
developments can exert pressure on the actors involved to take measures to adopt new 
technologies. It illustrates the formation of a small technical system by bringing together 
physical and non-physical artefacts as well as the actors. It also points out the importance 
of changing landscape pressures and their impact on the adoption of new technological 
systems. Lastly, it shows how the transition to one technical system can change direction 
in the presence of other available technologies which can complement the adoption of the 
former and result in hybrid systems. 
 
All the analyses conducted in this thesis demonstrate that the examination of transitions 
in the energy sector is complex and necessitates an assessment of a number of factors 
including external pressures, interactions and interpenetrations of different elements in 
the current energy sector as well as the emerging technologies. Due to the presence of 
these various factors, there is a high level of uncertainty where the transition to a 
hydrogen economy is concerned. Despite the unpredictable nature, however, it can be 
concluded that the direction of the transition will be determined by external pressures, in 
relation to the choices of the actors involved and the developments that will take place in 
hydrogen and other alternative energy technologies.  
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Appendix 
Hydrogen Technologies 
 
1. Hydrogen Production 
 
Table 1: Costs of hydrogen production via SMR versus hydrogen plant capacity  
Plant size  
(million 
Nm
3
/d) 
Natural gas 
Price 
($/GJ) 
Hydrogen 
Price 
($/GJ) 
Reference 
0.0028 2.96 27 Bayse & Swaminathan (1997) 
0.028 10 Bayse & Swaminathan (1997) 
0.27 11.22 Leiby (1994)
1
 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1.34 7.46 Leiby (1994) in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
2.14 6.90 Leiby (1994) in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
2.4 6.48 Bayse & Swaminathan (1997) 
2.80 6.26 Kirk-Othmer (1991)
2
 in Padro & Putsche 
(1999) 
6.67 5.60 Audus (1996)
3
 in Bayse & Swaminathan 
(1997) 
6.75 5.44 Foster-Wheeler (1996)
4
 in Padro & 
Putsche (1999) 
25.4 5.97 Blok et al. (1997)
5
 in Padro & Putsche 
(1999) 
Source: Padro C. E. G. & Putsche V. (1999), and Basye L., Swaminathan S., (1997) 
Note: Currency fixed for 1997 US$ 
 
Table 2: Updated costs of hydrogen production via SMR  
Plant size  
(million 
Nm
3
/d) 
Natural 
gas Price 
($/GJ) 
Hydrogen  
Price 
($/GJ) 
Notes  Reference 
Large centralised SMR plants 
13.3  
(1971 MW) 
4.27 7.26 With conventional technology NRC (2004)  
13.3 4.27 8.59 As the previous with CO2 
capture without CO2 storage & 
transport 
13.3 4.27 6.48 With future technology; 10% 
reduction in capital costs, 5% 
improvements in efficiency 
13.3 4.27 7.18 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
 410 
0.26 
(39.44MW) 
4.27 9.72 With conventional technology 
at a smaller scale 
0.26  4.27 11.76 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
0.26  4.27 8.52 With future technology 
0.26  4.27 10.28 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
4.2 
(622.5MW) 
2.99 5.25 With conventional technology Parsons 
Group (2002) 
4.2 2.99 5.62 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
Small forecourt SMR plants 
0.005 
(0.79MW) 
6.16 24.72 Small scale SMR with 
conventional technology using 
higher domestic gas price 
NRC (2004)  
0.005 6.16 16.41 Small scale SMR with future 
technology; costs savings from 
design standardisation, mass 
production, reduced capital cost 
0.001 
(0.19MW) 
5.06 23.81 Small scale forecourt reformer 
with conventional technology 
Myers (2002)  
0.001 5.06 26.34 Small scale forecourt; with 
hydrogen separation via gas-
permeable membrane 
(palladium) 
Source: Hawkins S. and Joffe D. (2006), pp: 6-7 
Note 1: Currency fixed for 2000 US$ 
Note 2: 1MW = 282Nm
3
/hr = 6768Nm
3
/d 
 
Table 3: Current and future costs of hydrogen produced via SMR with and without CCS 
Plant size  
(PJ H2/yr) 
Large Scale  
50 
Medium scale 
1 
Small scale 
0.02 
Current Future Current Future Current Future 
Hydrogen Price 
without CCS 
($/GJ) 
5.5 4.9 9.6 8.1 13.5 10 
Hydrogen Price 
with CCS ($/GJ) 
6.7 5.5 11.1 9.4 - - 
Source: OECD/IEA, (2005), Prospects for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells, p: 51 
 
Table 4: Cost comparisons of Kvaerner and SMR processes 
Process technology Hydrogen Price 
($/GJ) 
Reference 
SMR w/o CCS 6 Gaudernack and Lynum (1998) in Dutton (2002) 
 SMR w CCS 7.5 
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Kvaerner Process 
w/o carbon black 
10.6 
Kvaerner Process w 
carbon black 
5.8 
Source: Dutton G. (2002) 
 
Table 5: Costs of hydrogen production via coal gasification versus hydrogen plant capacity 
Plant size  
(million Nm
3
/d) 
Hydrogen Price 
($/GJ) 
Reference 
2.4 11 Basye & Swanitham (1997) 
2.8 11.57 Kirk & Othmer (1991) in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
2.83 12.3 Steinberg & Cheng (1989) in Bayse & Swanitham 
(1997) 
6.67 10.3 Audus (1996) in Bayse & Swanitham (1997) 
6.78 9.87 Foster-Wheeler 1996 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Source: Padro C. E. G. & Putsche V. (1999) and Bayse L., Swaminathan S., (1997) 
Note: Currency fixed for 1997 US$ 
 
Table 6: Updated costs of hydrogen production via coal gasification  
Plant size  
(million 
Nm
3
/d) 
Coal Price 
($/GJ) 
Hydrogen  
Price 
($/GJ) 
Notes  Reference 
13.3  
(1971MW) 
1.16 
 
6.77 With conventional technology NRC (2004)  
13.3 7.26 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
13.3 5.00 With future technology; cost 
savings from learning effects & 
improved gas cleaning 
13.3 5.43 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
3.4 
(509MW) 
1.23 6.71 With conventional technology   
Gray and 
Tomlinson 
(2002) 
3.1 
(462MW) 
8.03 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
4.1 
(613MW) 
5.79 With future technology; 
membrane gasification and C 
capture 
3.9 
(578MW) 
5.32 Current-mid term technology; 
advanced gasification and 
electricity co-production 
4.0 
(594MW) 
5.54 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
4.0 3.91 Future technology; advanced 
gasification and electricity co-
 412 
production 
3.9 
(578MW) 
2.74 Current-mid term technology; 
advanced gasification and 
electricity co-production via 
SOFC 
3.9 
(582MW) 
2.36 Future technology; advanced 
gasification and electricity co-
production via SOFC and 
ceramic membrane gas 
separation 
3.9 
(582MW) 
5.48 As the previous but electricity 
sold at prices without cross-
subsidy 
3.1 
(466MW) 
0.95 5.41 With conventional technology Parsons 
Group (2002 
3.1 
(466MW) 
6.55 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
4.3 
(642MW) 
4.80 Future technology; advanced 
membrane separation with C 
capture 
6.8 
(1019MW) 
1.12 5.66 Current technology; 
conventional gasification with 
electricity co-production 
Williams 
(2001) 
6.8 
(1016MW) 
5.95 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
8.5 
(1263MW) 
1.17 5.85 Current technology; 
conventional gasification 
Kreutz T. et 
al. (2004) 
8.5  6.39 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
8.2 
(1218MW) 
6.77 As the previous with convective 
and radiative gas cooling and 
without C capture  
8.2 7.22 As the previous with C capture 
without C storage & transport 
8.6 
(1279MW) 
6.08 Lower fuel quality suitable for 
boilers and combustion engines 
but not for PEM fuel cell 
8.3 
(1241MW) 
6.16 Advanced gasification at high 
pressure 
8.5 
(1263MW) 
6.11 Conventional gasification with 
quench cooling, savings from 
co-capturing CO2 and H2S 
8.6 
(1279MW) 
6.08 As the previous but Lower fuel 
quality not suitable for PEM 
fuel cell 
Source: Hawkins S. and Joffe D. (2006), p: 14 
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Note: Currency fixed for 2000 US$ 
Note: 1MW = 282Nm
3
/hr = 6768Nm
3
/d 
 
Table 7: Costs of hydrogen production via POX 
Plant size  
(million Nm
3
/d) 
Hydrogen Price 
($/GJ) 
Reference 
0.03  
(2.7 tonnes/d) 
28 Moore (1996) in Bayse & Swaminathan (1997) 
0.27 10.73 (Feedstock: coker-off gas) Leiby 1994 in Padro & 
Putsche (1999) 
1.34 7.39 (Feedstock: coker-off gas) Leiby 1994 in Padro & 
Putsche (1999) 
2.14 6.94 (Feedstock: coker-off gas) Leiby 1994 in Padro & 
Putsche (1999) 
2.4 7.7 (Feedstock: heavy oil) Bayse & Swaminathan 
(1997) 
2.80 9.83 (Feedstock: residual oil) Kirk & Othmer (1991) in 
Padro & Putsche (1999) 
2.83 9.13 (Feedstock: heavy oil) Steinberg & Cheng (1989) 
in Bayse & Swaminathan (1997) 
Source: Padro C. E. G.  and Putsche V. (1999) and Bayse L. and Swaminathan S. (1997) 
Note: Currency fixed for 1997 US 
 
Table 8: Costs of hydrogen produced from biomass. 
Plant size  
(million Nm
3
/d) 
Hydrogen Price 
($/GJ) 
Reference 
Biomass gasification 
0.022 17.10 Mann 1995 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
0.215 10.65 Mann 1995 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
0.72 13.09 Mann 1995 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
2.16 8.69 Larson 1992 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
2.26 10.03 Larson 1992 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1500 tonnes/d 21 Spath in Basye & Swanitham (1997) 
Biomass pyrolysis 
0.024 12.73 Mann 1995 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
0.243 10.11 Mann 1995 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
0.811 8.86 Mann 1995 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Supercritical water gasification 
Not specified 3.0* Spritzer and Hong 2003 in Ni et al. (2006) 
Direct bio-photolysis 
Not specified 20.0* Benemann 1998 in Ni et al. (2006) 
Indirect bio-photolysis  
Not specified 10.0* Ni et al. (2006) 
 
Source: Padro C. E. G. (1999) and Ni et al. (2006)  
* Technologies at laboratory scale; these figures are subject to change. 
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Table 9: Updated costs of hydrogen produced from biomass gasification 
Plant size  
(million 
Nm
3
/d) 
Feedstock 
Price 
($/GJ) 
Hydrogen  
Price 
($/GJ) 
Notes  Reference 
0.26 
(39MW) 
2.85 32.61 (1) Current technology: high 
capital costs, overall efficiency 
50% 
NRC (2004)  
0.26 1.91 15.57 (2) Future: reductions in 
biomass cost, capital cost of 
gasification, improved 
efficiency of 70%  
0.26 2.85 33.95 As (1) with carbon 
sequestration 
0.26 1.91 16.34 As (2) with carbon 
sequestration 
Source: Hawkins S. and Joffe D. (2006), p: 19 
Note: Currency fixed for 2000 US$ 
Note: 1MW = 282Nm
3
/hr = 6768Nm
3
/d 
 
Table 10: Costs of hydrogen produced via different electrolysis systems 
Plant size  
(million Nm
3
/d) 
Hydrogen Price 
($/GJ) 
Reference 
Not specified 
0.096 28.7 Andreassen 1998
6
 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
2.8 20.6 Kirk Othmer 1991 in Padro & Putsche (1999) 
6.75 24.5 Foster & Wheeler 1996 in Padro & Putsche 
(1999) 
PV-Electrolysis System 
0.195 41.8 Mann et al. 1998 in Padro & Putsche (1999) – 
estimated value for 2000. 
0.209 24.8 Mann et al. 1998 in Padro & Putsche (1999) – 
estimated value for 2010. 
Wind- Electrolysis System 
0.247 20.2 Mann et al. 1998 in Padro & Putsche (1999) – 
estimated value for 2000. 
0.279 11 Mann et al. 1998 in Padro & Putsche (1999) – 
estimated value for 2010. 
Concentrated Solar Energy- Electrolysis System 
0.015 64.72 Mann et al. 1998 in Padro & Putsche (1999) – 
estimated value for 2000. (Solar energy 
concentrator: dish-Stirling) 
0.015 60.48 Mann et al. 1998 in Padro & Putsche (1999) – 
estimated value for 2010. (Solar energy 
concentrator: dish-Stirling) 
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0.70 40.75 Mann et al. 1998 in Padro & Putsche (1999) – 
estimated value for 2000. (Solar energy 
concentrator: power tower) 
0.811 34.14 Mann et al. 1998 in Padro & Putsche (1999) – 
estimated value for 2010. (Solar energy 
concentrator: power tower) 
High Temperature Electrolysis  
Low cost 
electrolyser 
48.94 Glatzmeier et al. 1998 in in Padro & Putsche 
(1999) 
High cost 
electrolyser 
62.31 Glatzmeier et al. 1998 in in Padro & Putsche 
(1999) 
Source: Padro C. E. G. & Putsche V. (1999) 
Note: Currency fixed for 1997 US$ 
 
Table 11: Updated Costs of hydrogen produced via different electrolysis systems 
Plant size  
(million 
Nm
3
/d) 
Electricity 
Price 
($/GJ) 
Hydrogen  
Price 
($/GJ) 
Notes  Reference 
0.0002 
(0.03MW) 
13 
 
133 Neighbourhood scale: high 
capital costs low hydrogen 
output 
Ivy (2002) 
0.001 
(0.16MW) 
57 Small forecourt scale: cheaper 
electrolyser 
0.004 
(0.64MW) 
29 Forecourt scale: cheaper 
electrolyser and larger scale of 
production 
0.005 
(0.79MW) 
19 46 Distributed electrolysis current 
technology: high costs of 
alkaline electrolyser 
NRC (2004)  
0.005 
(0.79MW 
28 Distributed electrolysis future 
optimism based on 
developments, cost reductions 
and higher efficiency achieved 
in PEM electrolyser 
0.2 
(39MW) 
13 33 Mid-size current technology; 
larger alkaline electrolyser, high 
capital costs 
0.2 
(39MW) 
16 Mid-size with future optimism 
As the previous with lower 
capital cost, higher efficiency  
0.017 
(2.63MW) 
17 75 Current wind based electrolysis 
with no grid back-up 
0.017 
(2.63MW) 
17 47 As the previous with grid back-
up 
0.013 
(1.97MW) 
11 20 Future wind with larger turbines 
and reduced costs and lower 
 416 
cost and more efficient PEM 
electrolyser  
Source: Hawkins S. and Joffe D. (2006), pp: 6-7 
Note: Currency fixed for 2000 US$ 
Note: 1MW = 282Nm
3
/hr = 6768Nm
3
/d 
2. Hydrogen Storage 
2.1. Gaseous Storage 
 
Table 12: Gaseous Hydrogen Storage costs 
Storage System 
Size (GJ) 
Hydrogen Price 
($/GJ) 
Reference 
Gaseous Storage (Above Ground) 
Short Term (1-3 days) 
131 4.21 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
13,100 1.99 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
20,300 1.84 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
130,600 1.53 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Long Term (30 days) 
3,900 36.93 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
391,900 12.34 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
3,919,000 7.35 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Gaseous Storage (Underground) 
Not specified 1-5 Padro & Putsche (1999) (Short term; 1 day) 
Salt caverns 1.7 Taylor (1986) in  Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Not specified 2.7 IEA (2005) (1 filling and extraction cycle per 
year) 
Depleted gas 
well 
3.5 Taylor (1986) in  Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Source: Padro C. E. G. and Putsche V. (1999), p: 16 and IEA (2005) 
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Figure 1: Sensitivity of hydrogen costs, capital costs and tank costs to hydrogen flow.  
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Days of storage: 1day 
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of hydrogen costs, capital costs and tank costs to storage days.  
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Hydrogen flow rate: 454 kg/hr 
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Figure 3: Sensitivity of hydrogen costs and capital costs to hydrogen flow (underground storage) 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Days of storage: 1day 
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of hydrogen costs and capital costs to storage days (underground storage) 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Hydrogen flow rate: 454 kg/hr 
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2.2. Liquid Storage 
 
Table 13: Liquid Hydrogen Storage Costs 
Storage System 
Size (GJ) 
Hydrogen Price 
($/GJ) 
Reference 
Liquefied Hydrogen  
Short Term (1-3 days) 
131 17.12 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
13,100 6.68 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
20,300 5.13 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
130,600 5.26 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Long Term (30 days) 
3,900 22.81 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
108,000 25.34 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
391,900 8.09 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
3,919,000 5.93 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Source: Padro C. E. G. & Putsche V. (1999), p: 16 
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of hydrogen costs, capital costs and storage vessel costs to hydrogen flow.  
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Days of storage: 1day 
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of hydrogen costs, capital costs and storage vessel costs to storage days. 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Hydrogen flow rate: 454 kg/hr 
2.3. Solid-state Storage 
 
Table 14: Solid hydrogen storage costs 
Storage System 
Size (GJ) 
Hydrogen Price 
($/GJ) 
Reference 
Solid Hydrogen (Metal Hydrides)  
Short Term (1-3 days) 
131-130,600 2.89-7.46 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Long Term (30 days) 
3,900-3.9 million 205.31 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
 
Source: Padro C. E. G. & Putsche V. (1999), p: 16 
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Figure 7: Insensitivity of hydrogen costs, capital costs and tank costs to hydrogen flow. 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Days of storage: 1 day 
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of hydrogen costs and capital costs to storage days. 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Hydrogen flow rate: 454 kg/hr 
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3. Hydrogen Distribution 
3.1. Hydrogen Distribution via Storage Mechanisms 
3.1.1. Gaseous Hydrogen 
Table 15: Costs of gaseous hydrogen distribution via trucks and railway 
Trip 
Distance 
(km) 
Distributed Amount 
(GJ/yr) 
Distribution 
Costs 
 ($/GJ) 
Reference 
Gaseous Hydrogen via Trucks 
16 458,000-45.8 million 4.70 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
161 458,000-45.8 million 10.60 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
322 45,800-45.8 million 13.80-18.60 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
805 45,800-45.8 million 41.10 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1609 45,800-45.8 million 79.10-79.70 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Gaseous Hydrogen via Rail 
984 45,800 21.41 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
984 457,600 20.73 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
984 45.8 million 20.73 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1970 45,800 24.77 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1970 457,600 24.77 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1970 45.8 million 24.77 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Source: Padro C. E. G. & Putsche V. (1999), pp: 31-33 
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Figure 9: Gaseous hydrogen distribution costs against distance travelled. 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Hydrogen flow rate: 454 kg/hr  
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Figure 10: Gaseous hydrogen distribution costs against hydrogen flow 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998), 
Note: Distance Travelled: 161km 
3.1.2. Liquid Hydrogen 
Table 16: Costs of liquid hydrogen distribution via trucks, railway and ships 
Trip 
Distance 
(km) 
Distributed Amount 
(GJ/yr) 
Distribution 
Costs 
 ($/GJ) 
Reference 
Liquid Hydrogen via Trucks 
16 Not specified 0.24-1.60 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
161 Not specified 0.52-1.84 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
322 Not specified 1.00-2.20 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
805 Not specified 2.00-3.10 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1609 Not specified 3.90-4.70 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Liquid Hydrogen via Rail 
984 45,600 2.14 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
984 455,600 1.30 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
984 45.6 million 1.24 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1970 45,600 2.14 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1970 455,600 1.58 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1970 45.6 million 0.25 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Liquid Hydrogen via Ships 
322 Not specified 13.34 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
805 Not specified 14.39 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1,609 Not specified 15.44 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Source: Padro C. E. G. and Putsche V. (1999), pp: 31-34 
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Figure 11: Liquid hydrogen distribution costs against distance travelled 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Hydrogen flow rate: 454 kg/hr  
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Figure 12: Liquid hydrogen distribution costs against hydrogen flow 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Distance Travelled: 161km 
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3.1.3. Metal Hydrides 
 
Table 17: Costs of liquid hydrogen distribution via trucks and railway 
Trip Distance 
(km) 
Distributed Amount 
(GJ/yr) 
Distribution 
Costs ($/GJ) 
Reference 
Solid Hydrogen (Metal Hydride) via Trucks 
16 458,000-45.8 million 4.70 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
161 458,000-45.8 million 10.60 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
322 45,800-45.8 million 13.80-18.60 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
805 45,800-45.8 million 41.10 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1609 45,800-45.8 million 79.10-79.70 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Solid Hydrogen (Metal Hydride) via Rail 
984 45,800 21.41 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
984 457,600 20.73 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
984 45.8 million 20.73 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1970 45,800 24.77 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1970 457,600 24.77 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
1970 45.8 million 24.77 Padro & Putsche (1999) 
Source: Padro C. E. G. & Putsche V. (1999), pp: 32-33 
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Figure 13: Solid hydrogen distribution costs against distance travelled 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Hydrogen flow rate: 454 kg/hr  
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Figure 14: Costs of solid hydrogen distribution via trucks against hydrogen flow and number of 
trucks utilised. 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Distance Travelled: 161km 
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Figure 15: Costs of solid hydrogen distribution via railcars against hydrogen flow and number of 
railcars utilised. 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Distance Travelled: 161km 
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3.2. Hydrogen Distribution via Pipelines 
 
Table 18: Costs of hydrogen distribution via pipelines 
Transmission 
Rate (GW) 
Distance 
(km) 
Hydrogen 
Transmission Cost 
($/GJ) 
Reference 
0.15 161 2.03 Oney et al (1994) 
805 8.87 
1609 17.41 
0.5 161 0.83 
805 2.88 
1609 5.44 
1.00 161 0.57 
805 1.60 
1609 2.88 
1.5 161 0.49 
805 1.17 
1609 2.03 
Source: Padro C. E. G. and Putsche V. (1999), p: 30 
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Figure 16: Hydrogen distribution costs against distance travelled 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Hydrogen flow rate: 454 kg/hr  
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Figure 17: Costs of hydrogen distribution via pipeline against hydrogen flow 
Source: Author based on the data collected from Amos W.A., (1998) 
Note: Distance Travelled: 161km 
 
4. Hydrogen Pathways 
Table 19: Costs of hydrogen pathways – distributed generation 
Hydrogen Pathways 
Distributed (Onsite) 
Generation 
Costs 
($/kg) 
Reference Notes 
Steam Reforming of 
Methanol   
Storage: High Pressure Gas 
4.53 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Capacity: 470 kg/day 
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Storage: High Pressure Gas 
4.40 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Steam Reforming of 
Gasoline  
Storage: High Pressure Gas 
5.00 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Electrolysis of Water  
Storage: High Pressure Gas 
12.12 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Storage: Compressed Gas 
5.68 
Ogden et al. 
(1999) 
Capacity: 241.5 kg/day 
Conventional 
Reformer.  
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Storage: Compressed Gas 
2.13 
Ogden et al. 
(1999) 
Capacity: 4830 kg/day 
Conventional 
Reformer. 
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Storage: Compressed Gas 
3.55 
Ogden et al. 
(1999) 
Capacity: 241.5 kg/day 
Advanced Reformer.  
Steam Reforming of 1.99 Ogden et al. Capacity: 4830 kg/day 
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Natural Gas   
Storage: Compressed Gas 
(1999) Advanced Reformer. 
Electrolysis of Water  
Storage: Compressed Gas 
4.97 
Ogden et al. 
(1999) 
Capacity: 241.5 kg/day 
 
Electrolysis of Water  
Storage: Compressed Gas 
3.55 
Ogden et al. 
(1999) 
Capacity: 4830 kg/day 
 
 
Table 20: Costs of hydrogen pathways – centralised generation 
Hydrogen Pathways 
Centralised Production 
Costs 
($/kg) 
Reference Notes 
Biomass Gasification 
Distribution: Pipeline 
2.29 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Capacity: 150,000 
kg/day 
Biomass Gasification 
Distribution: Cryogenic 
Tanker Truck 
3.53 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Distribution: Gas Pipeline 
1.00 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Distribution: Cryogenic 
Liquid Truck 
2.21 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Electrolysis of Water 
Distribution: Gas Pipeline 
5.13 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Electrolysis of Water 
Distribution: Cryogenic 
Liquid Tankers 
6.17 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Petroleum Coke 
Gasification 
Distribution: Pipeline 
1.35 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Coal Gasification 
Distribution: Pipeline 
1.62 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Coal Gasification 
Distribution: Cryogenic 
Tanker Truck 
3.06 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Biomass Gasification 
Distribution: High Pressure 
Gas Tube Trailer 
2.69 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Distribution: High Pressure 
Gas Tube Trailer 
1.30 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Electrolysis of Water 
Distribution: High Pressure 
Gas Tube Trailer 
5.30 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
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Petroleum Residue 
Gasification 
Distribution: Pipeline 
1.27 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Coal Gasification 
Distribution: High Pressure 
Gas Tube Trailer 
2.09 
Simbeck & 
Chang (2002) 
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Distribution: Cryogenic 
Liquid Truck 
4.26 
Ogden et al. 
(1999) 
Capacity: 241.5 kg/day 
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Distribution: Cryogenic 
Liquid Truck 
2.56 
Ogden et al. 
(1999) 
Capacity: 4830 kg/day 
 
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Distribution: Pipeline 
3.55 
Ogden et al. 
(1999) 
Capacity: 241.5 kg/day 
Steam Reforming of 
Natural Gas   
Distribution: Pipeline 
2.13 
Ogden et al. 
(1999) 
Capacity: 4830 kg/day 
 
 
5. Fuel Cells 
 
Figure 18: Fuel cell working principle 
Source: Larminie J. and Dicks A., (2003), Fuel Cell Systems Explained, 2nd Edition, Wiley Press 
 
 
Anode                   2H2→ 4H
+
 + 4e
− 
 
H
+ 
ions through electrolyte 
Cathode           O2 + 4e
−
 + 4H
+→ 2H2O 
Hydrogen fuel 
Oxygen usually from the air 
LOAD  
e.g. electric motor 
 
Electrons flow round the external circuit 
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Table 21: Fuels for fuel cells and its competitors for different applications 
 Usable in fuel cells Directly usable for fuel cell 
technical competitors 
Fuel  Processing  Applications  
Direct After reforming Stationary  Mobile  
Natural gas X
1
 X
2
 X X 
Biogases  X
1,3
 X
2,3
 X - 
Cracked and 
synthesis gases 
X
1,3
 X
2,3
 X - 
Petrol  - 0 X X 
Diesel fuel - 0 X X 
Hydrogen  X Does not apply X X 
Methanol  X
5
 X 0 0 
Ethanol  - X 0 X 
Coal  - - X -
4
 
 
Source:  Oertel D. and Fleischer T., (March 2003), p: 36 
Note: (X): usable or used, (0): theoretical utilisation, much R&D is required and costly, (-): not 
usable,  
1: In high temperature fuel cells, 2: in PAFC and PEMFC (not in road vehicles), 3: More intensive 
gas cleaning is required, 4: in road vehicles, 5: in DMFC 
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Figure 19: Fuel cell type focus by industry 
Source: Worldwide Fuel Cell Industry Survey (2006), US Fuel Cell Council, Hydrogen & Fuel Cells 
Canada, Fuel Cell Europe, Fuel Cell Commercialisation Conference of Japan, Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers LLP 
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Table 22: Fuel cell types and their characteristics 
 Low Temperature Fuel 
Cells 
Medium 
Temperature 
Fuel Cells 
High Temperature Fuel 
Cells 
Type  PEMFC AFC PAFC MCFC SOFC 
Electrolyte  Solid polymer KOH Phosphoric 
acid 
Lithium and 
potassium 
carbonate 
Solid oxide 
Charge 
Carrier 
H
+
 OH
−
 H
+
 CO3
2−
 O
2−
 
Operating 
temperature 
(ºC) 
50-100 60-120 220 650 500-1,000 
Electrical 
Efficiency 
(%) 
40-50 50 40 45-55 50-60 
Power 
Density 
(mW/cm
2
) 
300-1,000 150-400 150-300 100-300 250-350 
Power 
Range (kW) 
0.001-1,000 1-100 50-1,000 100-100,000 10-100,000 
CO 
Tolerance 
Poison  
<50 ppm 
Poison 
<50 ppm 
Poison  
<1% 
Fuel Fuel  
Fuel Pure H2 
(tolerates CO2) 
Pure H2 Pure H2 
(tolerates 
CO2) 
H2, CO, CH4 H2, CO, CH4 
Application Vehicles, 
mobile 
applications 
and lower 
power CHP 
systems 
Military, 
space 
vehicles 
Large 
numbers of 
200 kW CHP 
systems 
Medium to 
large scale 
CHP systems 
up to MW 
All sizes of 
CHP 
systems 2 
kW to multi 
MW 
 
Source: O’Hayre R., Cha S-W, Colella W., Prinz F.B., (2006), Fuel Cell Fundamentals, John Wiley & 
Sons, New York and Larminie J. and Dicks A., (2003), Fuel Cell  Systems Explained, 2nd Edition, 
Wiley Press 
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Figure 20: Cumulative number of fuel cell buses  
Source: Reproduced based on the figure in Jerram L. C. (Dec 2008), with the permission of 
www.fuelcelltoday.com 
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Figure 21: Cumulative number of fuel cell light duty vehicles 
Source: Reproduced based on the figure in Butler J. (May 2008), with the permission of 
www.fuelcelltoday.com 
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Figure 22: Cumulative number of large stationary units over years 
Source: Reproduced based on the figure in Adamson K., (August 2008), Fuel Cell Today Large 
Stationary Survey, Fuel Cell Today, with the permission of www.fuelcelltoday.com, original report 
available (online), http://www.fuelcelltoday.com/ 
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Figure 23: Cumulative number of small stationary units over years 
Source: Reproduced based on the figure in Adamson K., (March 2009), Fuel Cell Today Small 
Stationary Survey, Fuel Cell Today, with the permission of www.fuelcelltoday.com, original report 
available (online), http://www.fuelcelltoday.com/  
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